Pedro Carlos Perez v. State of Florida

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2025-0944
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P EDRO C ARLOS PEREZ ,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA ,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Levy County.
Luis E. Bustamante, Judge.
March 25, 2026
P ER C URIAM.
Appellant, Pedro Carlos Perez, appeals his convictions and
sentences for the confinement of animals with insufficient food,
water, air, or exercise, along with the restitution and cost of
investigation imposed by the trial court. 	Appellant raises three
issues on appeal, only two of which merit discussion. 	We agree
with 	Appellant 	that 	because 	Levy 	County 	Animal 	Services
(“LCAS”) does not constitute a “victim,” as that term is defined for
restitution purposes in section 775.089(1)(c)1., Florida Statutes
(2023), the trial court erred in ordering restitution. We also agree
with Appellant that because the State did not request the $50 cost
of 	investigation 	permitted 	under 	section 	938.27(1), 	Florida
Statutes (2023), the court erred in imposing it. 	We therefore

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reverse 	the 	restitution 	order 	and 	remand 	the 	case 	with
instructions to strike the cost. We otherwise affirm.
According to the evidence presented at trial, Appellant’s ten
dogs were seized after LCAS found them living in conditions that
allegedly violated Florida law. The jury found Appellant guilty of
the charged offenses. 	The State requested restitution in the
amount of $32,173.90 for LCAS’s care of the dogs during the
pendency of the investigation and trial. 	In ordering restitution,
the trial court rejected Appellant’s argument that LCAS was not a
victim under the restitution statute. The court also imposed a $50
cost of investigation notwithstanding that no request for the cost
was made below.
Addressing 	first 	the 	restitution, 	section 	775.089(1)(a)1-2
provides that “[i]n addition to any punishment, the court shall
order the defendant to make restitution to the victim for: [d]amage
or loss caused directly or indirectly by the defendant’s offense” and
“[d]amage or loss related to the defendant’s criminal episode”
unless the court finds clear and compelling evidence not to order
such restitution. 	The term “victim” is defined as “[e]ach person
who 	suffers 	property 	damage 	or 	loss, 	monetary 	expense, 	or
physical injury or death as a direct 	or indirect result of the
defendant’s offense or criminal episode . . . .” § 775.089(1)(c)1., Fla.
Stat. 	The term “includes governmental entities and political
subdivisions, as those terms are defined in s. 11.45, when such
entities are a direct victim of the defendant’s offense or criminal
episode and not merely providing public services in response to the
offense or criminal episode.” 	Id. (Emphasis added). 	Thus, the
question 	before 	us 	is 	whether 	LCAS 	was 	a 	direct 	victim 	of
Appellant’s offenses and not merely providing public services in
response to those crimes.
A prime example of a situation where a governmental agency
or entity qualified as a victim for restitution purposes can be found
in Anglin v. State, 369 So. 3d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). 	There,
the appellant challenged a restitution order for damage to sheriff’s
vehicles after his conviction for attempted aggravated battery on
deputies. Id. at 1168. In affirming, the Fourth District explained
that in 2015, the Legislature amended section 775.089 specifically
to include governmental entities where they were direct victims of

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a defendant’s conduct. 	Id. at 1170. 	The Fourth District observed
that the amended statute requires a showing that: (1) the agency
was a direct victim and (2) the agency was not merely providing
public services in response to the crime. 	Id. 	The Fourth District
concluded that the sheriff’s office was a direct victim “because its
vehicles were damaged, not just as a result of appellant’s criminal
episode, but directly by appellant’s conduct when he struck the
deputies’ vehicles with his truck.” 	Id. 	The appellate court also
reasoned that the damage sustained by the agency was not the
type usually sustained by merely providing public services in
response to an offense or criminal episode. Id. at 1170–71.
We find Anglin instructive to our analysis of the facts before
us. Had Appellant damaged LCAS’s facilities through his criminal
conduct, LCAS could certainly be considered a victim under section
775.089(1)(c)1. and be entitled to restitution. 	Here, however,
LCAS was not a direct victim of the offenses at issue. 	The dogs
were. 	The connection LCAS had to the offenses was its provision
of public services, i.e., providing care to the dogs, in response to
Appellant’s crimes. 	This case is more akin to Lucas v. State, 385
So. 3d 1086, 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024), where the Fourth District
held that the trial court erred in awarding restitution to the Sexual
Assault Treatment Center because the entity was not a direct
victim of the appellant’s offense of sexual battery, and it merely
provided public services in response to the offense by having one
of its nurses examine the actual victim and collect samples. 	The
fact that Appellant chose not to surrender his dogs during the
pendency of the case does not affect our analysis. 	During that
time, LCAS continued to provide its public service of caring for the
dogs. As such, the trial court erred in awarding LCAS restitution
under section 775.089.∗
Turning to the $50 cost of investigation that the trial court
imposed, section 938.27(1) permits the imposition of the cost if it
is requested by the State. 	As the State acknowledges on appeal,
no request was made below for this cost. Thus, the trial court erred
in imposing it. 	We therefore remand the case with instructions
∗ Whether LCAS may pursue civil remedies against Appellant
for the care of the dogs is not at issue in this appeal.

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that the court strike the cost. 	See Young v. State, 373 So. 3d 927,
927 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (remanding the matter to the trial court
with 	instructions 	to 	strike 	the 	$50 	agency 	investigative 	cost
because it was not requested by the State); Pruitt v. State, 98 So.
3d 231, 232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (“[W]e strike the $100 ‘Sheriff’s
Investigatory Cost’ as it was not requested by the state.”).
In 	conclusion, 	we 	A FFIRM 	Appellant’s 	convictions 	and
sentences, 	REVERSE 	the 	restitution 	order, 	and 	R EMAND 	with
instructions.
L EWIS, R AY , and LONG, JJ., concur.
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Jessica 	J. 	Yeary, 	Public 	Defender, 	and 	Tyler 	Kemper 	Payne,
Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
James 	Uthmeier, 	Attorney 	General, 	and 	Amanda 	Bosman,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.