Department of Children and Families and Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office v. A.B., mother of J.O.S. and A.S.M.P., minor children

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2025-2198
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D EPARTMENT OF C HILDREN AND
FAMILIES and STATEWIDE
GUARDIAN AD LITEM OFFICE ,
Appellants,
v.
A.B., mother of J.O.S. and
A.S.M.P., minor children,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
Thomas H. Williams, Judge.
May 15, 2026
P ER C URIAM.
The Department of Children and Families (the Department)
appeals the denial of its petition for termination of A.B.’s (the
mother’s) parental rights, arguing the trial court erred when it
granted A.B.’s motion to dismiss the petition. It asserts the trial
court erroneously failed to take all the evidence as true and to
construe 	the 	evidence 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the
Department. Because the trial court applied the incorrect standard
when ruling on A.B.’s motion to dismiss, we reverse and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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Evidence of severe abuse of A.B.’s minor children was brought
to the Department’s attention by the hospital after the six-week-
old baby girl was admitted for treatment unrelated to the abuse
injuries. The mother did not take the baby to the hospital because
of concern for broken bones. Due to the severity of the injuries
discovered, the Department filed an Expedited Verified Petition
for Termination of Parental Rights and asked that the children,
including the baby and her toddler brother, be declared dependent.
A hearing was held on the petition, and after the Department
rested, 	A.B. 	moved 	to 	have 	the 	expedited 	petition 	dismissed,
claiming that the Department had failed to prove the termination
grounds alleged. A.B.’s attorney argued that there was no evidence
that A.B. was the one who caused the children’s injuries, or that
she knew those injuries occurred and knowingly failed to prevent
those 	injuries 	to 	the 	children. 	The 	trial 	court 	granted 	A.B.’s
motion, finding that the Department failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the mother engaged in egregious conduct
under section 39.806(1)(f), Florida Statutes, or had engaged in
aggravated, chronic, or sexual abuse under section 39.806(1)(g),
Florida 	Statutes. 	It 	further 	concluded 	that 	no 	evidence 	was
presented that A.B. caused the injuries or knowingly failed to
prevent the injuries.
“Motions for judgment of dismissal in dependency cases are
akin to motions for directed verdict in civil cases.” Dep’t of Child.
& Fams. v. A.L., 307 So. 3d 978, 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (citing
M.F. v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 992 So. 2d 410, 411 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2008)). A directed verdict is appropriate only where there is
“no evidence upon which a jury could find against the party for
whom the verdict is directed.” Id. (quoting White v. City of Waldo,
659 So. 2d 707, 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)). Stated another way, “[a]
directed verdict is appropriate ‘only when the evidence considered
in its entirety and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom
fail to prove the plaintiff’s case under the issues made by the
pleadings.’” Id. (quoting White, 659 So. 2d at 708). “A party who
moved for a directed verdict admits for the purpose of testing the
motion 	the 	facts 	in 	evidence 	and 	in 	addition 	admits 	every
reasonable and proper conclusion based thereon which is favorable
to the adverse party.” Id. (quoting White, 659 So. 2d at 708).

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In making its findings, the trial court erred when it failed to
consider 	the 	evidence 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the
Department. The evidence established that the baby suffered from
over twenty-five breaks in her ribs, 	a broken clavicle, 	and a
hemorrhage in her right eye, in addition to a bruise on her left
shoulder and an abrasion to her left upper chest area. The medical
director for the Child Protective Team testified that these injuries
would have caused the baby to be uncomfortable and cry with
position changes and clothing changes, and that a proper caregiver
would have been aware of these injuries. In fact, CPT’s nurse
practitioner testified she could feel the baby’s ribs moving at the
breaks simply by holding her and turning her over and noted in
her report that the broken bones were “clicking.” In addition, the
baby’s 	toddler 	brother 	presented 	with 	a 	fresh 	“loop” 	bruise
indicative of having been hit with a belt or cord, together with
multiple other bruises in various stages of healing, indicative of
other abuse in the household, which the mother also failed to
acknowledge.
While the trial court was correct that the baby was diagnosed
with pneumonia and coronavirus and that this could have caused
the baby to be fussy, the court overlooked the undisputed fact that
the pain caused by the injuries would have been more prevalent
with movement, not attributable to general fussiness. Further, the
trial court opined at the hearing that it would be more difficult for
a general layperson to see the bruises on A.P. because she is black.
But numerous witnesses testified to the marks on the baby’s body,
and none indicated they were not visible to the naked eye.
Additionally, the evidence showed the baby suffered from both
acute and subacute fractures, indicating she was abused on, at a
minimum, two separate occasions, but A.B. was unable to provide
any explanation for the injuries and stated that she did not know
the baby was injured. Yet there was no evidence that another
caregiver had the baby during the timeframe these injuries were
sustained, nor any explanation of how A.B. could have failed to
notice them or why she failed to seek emergency care for the baby.
Because the trial court failed to apply the proper standard in
granting the motion to dismiss, and because there is competent,
substantial 	evidence 	to 	support 	the 	grounds 	alleged 	by 	the

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Department, 	we 	reverse. 	On 	remand, 	the 	trial 	court 	should
consider whether the evidence established a prima facie case for
termination when the issues and evidence are viewed in a light
most favorable to the Department.
R EVERSED and R EMANDED.
BILBREY , KELSEY , and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Sarah J. Rumph, Appellate Counsel of Children’s Legal Services,
Tallahassee, for the Florida Department of Children and Families.
Sara 	Elizabeth 	Goldfarb, 	Statewide 	Director 	of 	Appeals, 	and
Amanda Victoria Glass, Senior Attorney, Appellate Division, of the
Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office, Tallahassee.
Michael J. Titus of the Office of Criminal Conflict and 	Civil
Regional Counsel Region One, Tallahassee, for Appellee.