Ella III, LLC v. Ethan Madden, Ciara J. Hare, and United Southern Bank

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 5D2024-1198
LT Case No. 2023-CA-003015-A
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ELLA III, LLC,
Appellant,
v.
ETHAN MADDEN, CIARA J. HARE,
and UNITED SOUTHERN BANK,
Appellees.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County.
Lawrence James Semento, Judge.
Deborah Marks, of Deborah Marks, PLLC, Miami, for Appellant.
Benjamin C. Iseman, of Maynard Nexsen PC, Winter Park, for
Appellees, Ethan Madden and Ciara J. Hare.
No Appearance for Remaining Appellee.
April 2, 2026
HARRIS, J.
Appellant, Ella III, LLC, appeals the summary judgment
entered below, finding that Appellant’s complaint seeking
ejectment and quiet title concerning real property was time-
barred. Because the action was not time-barred, and because

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evidence of when adverse possession began was conflicting, we
reverse.
On November 6, 2023, Appellant filed an action seeking
ejectment and quiet title concerning real property located in Lake
County, Florida. Appellant alleged that it acquired the property
via tax deed recorded on October 20, 2009. Included in the
attachment to the complaint were a warranty deed in the names
of Ethan Madden and Ciara Hare (Appellees) recorded on January
20, 2023 and a Tax Deed in Appellant’s name recorded on October
20, 2009.
After answering the complaint, Appellees moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the action was time barred because
Appellant failed to assert its claim, take possession of the property,
or pay taxes within four years of the issuance of the tax deed, and
that they have adversely possessed the subject property. Thus,
Appellees argued, the action was time barred pursuant to section
95.191, Florida Statute (2023).
Appellant responded to the motion for summary judgment
arguing, inter alia, that pursuant to section 95.191, Appellees
must show that the property was adversely possessed at the time
of the recording of the tax deed in 2009, which they did not.
Appellant further argued that contrary to Appellees’ assertion, it
did pay taxes on the property from 2009 to 2012, attaching
affidavits and receipts from the tax collector showing that
Appellant’s servicer paid the taxes from 2009 through 2012.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted Appellees’ motion,
finding that the record evidence demonstrated that Appellant took
no action to secure possession of the property during the four years
after the issuance of the tax deed. The court also found that
Appellees were in adverse possession prior to this action being filed
and thus pursuant to section 95.191, Appellant’s claim was barred.
This appeal followed.
In this appeal we first consider whether Appellant’s lawsuit
was time-barred under section 95.191. Appellant maintains that
the bar to a tax deed holder seeking a quiet title action applies only
where the property is adversely possessed when the tax deed is

3
recorded. Appellant further argues that Appellees failed to present
sufficient evidence that for the four years after the recording of the
2009 tax deed, the property was adversely possessed and thus the
statute of limitations in section 95.191 did not apply.
Appellees respond that the plain language of section 95.191
does not require that the property be adversely possessed when the
tax deed is recorded. Appellees further assert that the evidence
shows that Appellant waited more than four years after the date
of the tax deed to file its claim for ejectment and quiet title after
failing to take actual possession at any time or pay taxes for the
previous ten years.
Appellant correctly argued below that under section 197.552,
Florida Statute (2023), any interest in the property subsequently
conveyed to Appellees did not survive the issuance of the tax deed.
Because Appellees therefore have no valid interest in the property,
summary judgment in their favor was error. The trial court should
have ruled in Appellant’s favor on this issue. However, because
this argument was not raised in the appeal, it is deemed waived.
See Rosier v. State, 276 So. 3d 403, 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)
(holding issues not raised in the initial brief are considered waived
or abandoned).
Nonetheless, we agree with Appellant that the court erred in
applying section 95.191, which provides in relevant part: “When
the real property is adversely possessed by any person, no action
shall be brought by the tax deed holder unless the action is begun
within 4 years from the date of the deed.” (Emphasis supplied). This
language presumes that the property is already being adversely
possessed at the time of the tax deed. See Salls v. Martin, 24 So.
2d 41 (Fla. 1945) (“[T]he prohibiting part of the statute is available
only where there is in law an ‘adverse possession’, and from what
we have held above there was no adverse possession in law . . .
Section 196.061 is a bar within four years only where there is
adverse possession.”). Thus, we conclude that the four-year
1 Same statute at issue in this case, but subsequently
renumbered.

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limitation applies only where there is adverse possession at the
time the tax deed is issued.
Appellant further argues that the evidence was conflicting on
whether the property was adversely possessed. We agree that
Appellant presented significant evidence contradicting Appellees’
claim that the property was adversely possessed beginning in
2012. Accordingly, because there was significant conflicting
evidence that the property was adversely possessed beginning in
2012, summary judgment was not proper.
We reverse the summary judgment entered below and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
JAY, C.J., and SOUD, J., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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