Navy Federal Credit Union v. Veros Credit, LLC, Anthony Tyrone Williams, and Latrenda Anntonette Williams

FIFTH D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 5D2024-1804
LT Case No. 16-2023-SC-11699
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NAVY FEDERAL C REDIT UNION ,
Appellant,
v.
VEROS C REDIT , LLC, A NTHONY
TYRONE W ILLIAMS, and
LATRENDA A NNTONETTE
W ILLIAMS,
Appellees.
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On appeal from the County Court for Duval County.
Kelly E. Eckley-Moulder, Judge.
W. Patrick Ayers and Dana Robbins, of Burr & Forman, LLP,
Tampa, for Appellant.
Drew Beinhaker, of Henschel & Beinhaker, P.A., Hollywood, for
Appellee, Veros Credit, LLC.
No Appearance for Other Appellees.
April 10, 2026
L AMBERT , J.

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Navy Federal Credit Union (“Navy Federal”) timely appeals
the post-final-judgment order rendered by the trial court that
assessed $2,660.00 in attorney’s fees against it and in favor of
Appellee, Veros Credit, LLC (“Veros Credit”), as a sanction for bad
faith, vexatious litigation.
Because the record contains no evidence to support the trial
court’s finding of vexatious, bad faith conduct by Navy Federal, we
reverse the order imposing sanctions.
I
Navy Federal was the garnishee in the litigation below.
Veros Credit, which was the plaintiff, obtained a final judgment
awarding it damages against the co-Appellees, Anthony Tyrone
Williams and Latrenda Anntonette Williams (“the Williamses”).1
Subsequently, Veros Credit moved for and obtained a writ of
garnishment that it then had served upon Navy Federal. The writ
directed Navy Federal to answer whether it had any tangible and
intangible personal property of the Williamses in its possession or
control.
Navy Federal timely answered the writ, stating that it had
a good faith doubt as to whether it was holding assets of the
Williamses subject to garnishment. 	Navy Federal explained that
it possessed an account of the Williamses, but the account was
located in Virginia and thus not subject to garnishment in Florida.
Without waiving this defense, Navy Federal acknowledged that it
was indebted to the Williamses in the amount of $322.17.
Veros 	Credit 	filed 	a 	reply 	to 	Navy 	Federal’s 	answer,
“objecting” 	to 	what 	it 	labeled 	was 	Navy 	Federal’s 	“false,”
“misleading,” 	and 	“legally 	insufficient” 	answer. 	Veros 	Credit
disputed Navy Federal’s factual assertion that the Williamses’
account with Navy Federal was located in Virginia, pointing out
that the Williamses resided in Florida and that they accessed their
1 Neither Veros Credit nor the Williamses have filed briefs in
this appeal.

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Navy Federal account there.2
II
Navy Federal’s answer that the Williamses’ account was
located in Virginia necessarily raised a factual dispute concerning
the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the account. 	See
Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Veros Credit, LLC, 396 So. 3d 590, 592
(Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (“Under Florida law, if the accounts are in fact
located outside of the jurisdictional reach of this state, the trial
court would lack subject matter jurisdiction over such accounts.”);
see also Burns v. State, Dep’t of Legal Aff., 147 So. 3d 95, 97 (Fla.
5th 	DCA 	2014) 	(recognizing 	that 	a 	trial 	court 	lacks 	in 	rem
jurisdiction over bank accounts located in other states (citations
omitted)); 	Stansell 	v. 	Revolutionary 	Armed 	Forces 	of 	Colom.
(FARC), 149 F. Supp. 3d 1337, 1342 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (explaining
that 	Burns 	fortifies 	the 	court’s 	“jurisdictional 	conclusion 	that
under Florida law it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to issue writs
of garnishment seeking to garnish funds held in bank accounts in
jurisdictions outside the territorial limits of the State of Florida”).
Under these circumstances, section 77.083, Florida Statutes
(2023), which provides, in pertinent part, that “[j]udgment against
the garnishee on the garnishee’s answer or after trial of a reply to
the garnishee’s answer shall be entered for the amount of his or
her liability as disclosed by the answer or trial,” required that the
trial court hold a trial to resolve the factual dispute raised by Navy
Federal’s answer to the writ of garnishment and Veros Credit’s
reply. 	See Navy Fed., 396 So. 3d at 592 (holding that when a
plaintiff’s 	reply 	contests 	a 	garnishee’s 	answer 	to 	the 	writ 	of
garnishment, section 77.083 requires a trial or proper evidentiary
hearing to resolve the dispute).
The trial court, however, did not do this. 	Instead, upon
Veros 	Credit’s 	separate 	motion, 	the 	court, 	without 	notice 	or
hearing, entered a final judgment of garnishment against Navy
Federal. 	This was error. 	See id. at 592–93 (reversing the final
2 Navy Federal acknowledged that the Williamses’ address is
in Jacksonville, Florida.

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judgment of garnishment entered against the garnishee without
notice or hearing and remanding to the trial court to hold a trial or
proper 	evidentiary 	hearing 	consistent 	with 	the 	express
requirement of section 77.083 to resolve the factual dispute on
whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
bank account).
III
Navy Federal thereafter moved under Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.540(b)(4) to vacate this final judgment. It argued that
the final judgment was void because the judgment had been
entered in violation of Navy Federal’s due process rights to notice
and a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the disputed facts
raised in its answer and Veros Credit’s reply to that answer. 	See
Nat’l 	Loan 	Acquisitions 	Co. 	v. 	Tabernacle 	Christian 	Ctr.
Ministries, Inc., 402 So. 3d 1028, 1033 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (“For
example, a judgment is void if the trial court violates the due
process guarantee of notice and an opportunity to be heard in the
proceedings leading up to the judgment.” (citing Tannenbaum v.
Shea, 133 So. 3d 1056, 1061 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014))).
In response to Navy Federal’s Rule 1.540(b)(4) motion, Veros
Credit filed the subject motion to impose sanctions against Navy
Federal for “bad faith vexatious litigation.” Veros Credit asserted
that since Navy Federal’s account holders, the Williamses, resided
in 	and 	accessed 	their 	account 	in 	Florida, 	Navy 	Federal 	had
“erroneously misrepresent[ed] the law in bad faith to the court” by
submitting to the court that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Following a hearing at which no evidence was presented, the
trial court entered an omnibus order imposing sanctions against
Navy Federal and denying its motion to vacate the final judgment.
The court found that Navy Federal’s assertion that the Williamses’
account was in Virginia was “contrary to existing facts and legal
precedent,” and that its “ongoing, frivolous motion practice in this
case and others constitutes bad faith conduct which has been
extremely 	prejudicial 	to 	[Veros 	Credit]” 	and 	to 	its 	“various
judgment debtors and customers.”

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As 	we 	explain 	below, 	we 	reverse 	and 	direct 	the 	post-
judgment order imposing sanctions be vacated.3
IV
In Bitterman v. Bitterman, 714 So. 2d 356, 365 (Fla. 1998),
the 	Florida 	Supreme 	Court 	explained 	that 	“[t]he 	inequitable
conduct doctrine permits the award of attorney’s fees where one
party has exhibited egregious conduct or acted in bad faith.” 	The
court, however, cautioned that this doctrine “is rarely applicable”
and “is reserved for those extreme cases where a party acts ‘in bad
faith, 	vexatiously, 	wantonly, 	or 	for 	oppressive 	reasons.’” 	Id.
(quoting Foster v. Tourtellotte, 704 F. 2d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir.
1983)).
Appellate 	review 	of 	a 	trial 	court’s 	decision 	to 	impose
sanctions for bad faith litigation is reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard. 	Forrey v. Marlin Constr. Grp., LLC, 395 So.
3d 632, 636 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024) (quoting Bennett v. Berges, 50 So.
3d 1154, 1159 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)). 	To that end, a trial court’s
findings regarding the imposition of sanctions must be supported
by 	competent 	substantial 	evidence 	in 	the 	record, 	Tabernacle
Christian, 402 So. 3d at 1036 (citations omitted); and “[a] trial
court abuses its discretion when there is no competent substantial
evidence to support its findings.” 	Quest Sys., LLC v. Far, 356 So.
3d 	300, 	303 	(Fla. 	2d 	DCA 	2023) 	(quoting 	Can 	Fin., 	LLC 	v.
Niklewicz, 307 So. 3d 33, 35 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020)).
We find that the trial court erred here when it assessed
attorney’s 	fees 	against 	Navy 	Federal 	for 	vexatious, 	bad 	faith
litigation. 	As previously outlined, first, Navy Federal’s defense
that Florida courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction in a
garnishment proceeding over an account not located in Florida is
a valid defense if supported by the facts. Navy Fed., 396 So. 3d at
592; 	see 	also 	Osio 	v. 	Moros, 	Case 	No. 	21-20706-CIV-
GAYLES/TORRES, 2025 WL 1031904, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27,
3 Navy Federal specifically declined to also challenge the
aspect of the order that denied its motion to vacate the final
judgment of garnishment.

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2025) (“Indeed, numerous federal courts in Florida have held that
extraterritorial 	bank 	accounts 	are 	outside 	their 	jurisdictional
reach, 	even 	when 	the 	relevant 	banks 	operated 	branches 	in
Florida.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1025193
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2025). 	Importantly, there was no evidentiary
hearing in the proceedings below, so the trial court’s findings, and
the imposition of a sanction, are not supported by the record.4 See
Tabernacle Christian, 402 So. 3d at 1036 (providing that the record
must also contain competent substantial evidence supporting the
trial 	court’s 	findings 	regarding 	the 	imposition 	of 	sanctions
(citations omitted)).
Second, Navy Federal’s Rule 1.540(b)(4) motion to vacate the
final judgment of garnishment correctly recognized that the final
judgment of garnishment was void because it was entered without
Navy Federal being given notice and a reasonable opportunity to
be heard on its subject matter jurisdiction defense. 	See Viets v.
Am. Recruiters Enters., Inc., 922 So. 2d 1090, 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA
2006) (“A violation of the due process guarantee of notice and an
opportunity 	to 	be 	heard 	renders 	a 	judgment 	void.” 	(citations
omitted)). 	Accordingly, this was not an “extreme case” under
Bitterman, 	supra, 	for 	which 	the 	inequitable 	conduct 	doctrine
permitted an award of attorney’s fees as a sanction.
R EVERSED; ORDER A SSESSING A TTORNEY ’S FEES SANCTION
V ACATED; R EMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
EISNAUGLE and M AC I VER , JJ., concur.
4 Our decision is based solely on the lack of any evidence in
our record. 	We do not decide when a bank account is located in
Florida or when it is deemed located out of state.

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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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