Joyce Baker v. Max Yokell, Carole Yokell, Terramaq Corporation, and GnG Infinite Solutions, LLC

FIFTH DISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 5D2024-2015
LT Case No. 2022-30072-CICI
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J OYCE B AKER,
Appellant,
v.
M AX Y OKELL , C AROLE Y OKELL ,
T ERRAMAQ C ORPORATION , AND
G N G INFINITE S OLUTIONS, LLC,
Appellees.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia County.
Dennis Craig, Judge.
David W. Glasser, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Max Yokell and Carole Yokell, Valrico, pro se.
No Appearance for Other Appellees.
February 20, 2026
PER C URIAM.
Joyce 	Baker 	timely 	appeals 	the 	final 	judgment 	entered
against her and in favor of Max Yokell, Carole Yokell, and GnG
Infinite Solutions, LLC, after the trial court granted a directed
verdict in favor of the Yokells. We reverse.

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I.
Baker is Carole Yokell’s mother and Max Yokell’s mother-in-
law. The dispute in the litigation involved a home previously titled
in Baker’s name. 	Baker asserted numerous causes of action
against the Yokells, the nature of which are not critical to our
disposition of this appeal.
The 	case 	proceeded 	to 	jury 	trial 	at 	which 	Baker 	was
represented by counsel and the Yokells appeared pro se. 	Baker
called numerous witnesses who testified at trial and caused a
number of exhibits to be admitted into evidence.
After Baker had rested her case-in-chief, the trial court
inquired of the Yokells1 if they were making any motions. 	They
did not. 	This prompted the court to advise the Yokells that this
was the time of the trial at which they could contest the sufficiency
of Baker’s evidence and inquired if the Yokells wanted to do this.
The 	Yokells 	again 	declined, 	but 	then 	indicated 	they 	did 	not
understand the court’s inquiry. 	The trial court again advised the
Yokells that “now is the time for you to discuss anything about
whether [Baker’s] case was sufficient or not?”
With this judicial prompting, Max Yokell then stated, “I
don’t believe [Baker’s] case was sufficient.” 	The court then asked
if the Yokells were “moving to dismiss,” to which they answered,
“Yes.”
The 	court 	then 	stated 	that 	it 	would 	treat 	the 	Yokells’
“motion” as a motion for directed verdict, and it then essentially
argued the merits of the “motion” with Baker’s counsel. 	The
Yokells provided no other input or argument, but the trial court
nevertheless granted them a directed verdict and then entered the
final judgment now on appeal. Baker moved for rehearing, which
was denied by the court in an unelaborated order without a
hearing or response from the Yokells.
1 The other appellee in the case, GnG Infinite Solutions, LLC,
was 	defaulted 	and 	did 	not 	appear 	at 	trial. 	It 	has 	also 	not
participated in this appeal.

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II.
To the extent that the Yokells’ comment to the trial court
that they did not believe that Baker’s case was sufficient could be
construed as a motion for directed verdict, it did not comply with
the requirement of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.480(a) that
“[a] motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds
therefor.” 	That the Yokells were proceeding pro se is also of no
moment because “a party’s self-representation does not relieve the
party of the obligation to comply with any appropriate rules of civil
procedure.” Kohn v. City of Miami Beach, 611 So. 2d 538, 540 (Fla.
3d DCA 1992) (citing Carr v. Grace, 321 So. 2d 618, 618 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1975)).
Simply 	stated, 	pro 	se 	litigants 	are 	not 	to 	be 	treated
differently from litigants in similar situations who are represented
by 	counsel 	and 	are 	charged 	with 	knowledge 	of 	those 	rights.
Anderson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., 830 So. 2d 952, 953 (Fla.
5th DCA 2002) (citing Kohn, 611 So. 2d 	at 539). 	More directly, a
litigant’s pro se status does not “afford him [or her] rights over and
above those afforded to represented litigants.” 	L.E.B. v. D.D.C.,
304 So. 3d 54, 58 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020), which is what happened here.
The 	trial 	court 	improperly 	favored 	the 	pro 	se 	litigants 	by
advocating the dispositive “motion” for directed verdict, to the
detriment of the represented party, Baker. 	See James v. Crews,
132 So. 3d 896, 899 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (recognizing that “a court
‘cannot assist the pro se litigant to the detriment of the opposing
party’” (quoting Barrett v. City of Margate, 743 So. 2d 1160, 1162
(Fla. 4th DCA 1999))).
Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment and remand for
a new trial before a different judge.
R EVERSED and R EMANDED, with directions.
W ALLIS, LAMBERT , and E DWARDS, JJ., concur.

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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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