C-M-H-H-

page
124
Cite as 30 I&N Dec. 124 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4256
Matter of C-M-H-H-, Respondent
Decided October 2, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) The Board does not retain jurisdiction after remanding the record to the Immigration
Court. Matter of Patel, 16 I&N Dec. 600, 601 (BIA 1978), clarified.
(2) The Immigration Judge’s issuance of a new decision on remand without holding another
hearing did not violate the Board’s remand order nor deprive the respondent of due
process.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Laura S. Rodriguez, Esquire, Newark, New Jersey
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	GORMAN, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge;
GALLOW, Appellate Immigration Judge; and PICOS, Temporary Appellate Immigration
Judge.
GORMAN, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:
The respondent appeals from the Immigration Judge’s October 25, 2021,
decision denying his application for withholding of removal under section
241(b)(3) 	of 	the 	Immigration 	and 	Nationality 	Act 	(“INA”), 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3) (2018), and protection under the regulations implementing the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 The appeal will be dismissed. The
respondent’s request for oral argument is denied. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(7)
(2026).
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 30, 2020, the Department of Homeland Security filed a notice to
appear charging the respondent, who is a native and citizen of El Salvador,
with 	removability 	under 	section 	237(a)(1)(B) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(B) (2018), as an alien who is present in the United States in
violation of law. 	Before the Immigration Judge, the respondent conceded
removability and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the CAT. The Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s applications
1 	The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force for United States Nov. 20, 1994). 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17 (2026); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18 (a) (2020).

Cite as 30 I&N Dec. 124 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4256
page
125
and ordered him removed. 	The respondent appealed. 	On September 24,
2021, this Board held that the respondent had waived his asylum claim and
remanded the case for further fact-finding and legal analysis regarding his
claims for withholding of removal and CAT protection.
On remand, the Immigration Judge issued a new decision without holding
additional hearings and again denied the respondent’s applications for
withholding of removal and protection under the CAT.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction and Scope of Remand
The respondent argues that the Immigration Judge erred by failing to hold
a new hearing or reopen the record for additional testimony and evidence
following the Board’s remand. The Board’s remand order did not explicitly
instruct the Immigration Judge to conduct further hearings or reopen the
record. 	See generally Matter of Patel, 16 I&N Dec. 600, 601 (BIA 1978)
(holding that a remand from the Board to an Immigration Judge is effective
for all matters deemed appropriate in the exercise of the Immigration Judge’s
administrative discretion “unless the Board qualifies or limits the remand for
a specific purpose”). Instead, our order instructed the Immigration Judge to
consider some previously untimely-filed country conditions evidence and
“issue a new decision addressing the respondent’s claims for withholding of
removal under the Act and CAT in light of the evidence of record as set forth
herein.”
We take this occasion to clarify our decision in Matter of Patel to the
extent that it may be interpreted to imply that the Board retains jurisdiction
despite remanding a case to the Immigration Judge. The regulations provide
that appellate jurisdiction lies with the Board during the pendency of an
appeal. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b) (2020), 1003.3 (2026). The Board does
not retain jurisdiction after remanding the record to the Immigration Court.
When the Board remands the record to the Immigration Judge for further
proceedings, the Immigration Judge reacquires jurisdiction over the case
pursuant to the authority conferred by the regulations. 	See 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1003.10, 1240.1 (2026); see also Matter of L-S-C-R-, 29 I&N Dec. 451,
452–53 (BIA 2026). 	Insofar as Matter of Patel could be read to suggest
otherwise, we now clarify that a remand from the Board returns jurisdiction
to the Immigration Judge to conduct proceedings as directed by the Board’s
remand order and pursuant to the regulations. 	Thus, the Board’s authority

Cite as 30 I&N Dec. 124 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4256
page
126
after remand is not one of continuing plenary jurisdiction after the appeal has
been adjudicated.2
Matter of Patel correctly held that the Board may qualify or limit a
remand for a specific purpose. See generally 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(1), (6),
(7), 1003.47(h) (2026); see also Matter of M-D-, 24 I&N Dec. 138, 141–42
(BIA 2007); Matter of Alcantara-Perez, 23 I&N Dec. 882 (BIA 2006). For
example, the Board recently addressed the scope of an Immigration Judge’s
jurisdiction following a remand to the Immigration Judge to complete or
update the background and security checks. 	Matter of L-S-C-R-, 29 I&N
Dec. at 451. Where the Board remands for a discrete or limited purpose, the
Immigration Judge reacquires jurisdiction to act, but the Immigration Judge
must act only within the bounds of that remand order and may not revisit
matters already resolved by the Board. See, e.g., Matter of L-S-C-R-, 29 I&N
Dec. at 453 (holding that a background check remand under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.47(h) “is limited to the Immigration Judge’s consideration of the
results of the background and security checks and the issuance of an order
on the relief or protection that was the basis for the remand”); Matter of
M-D-, 24 I&N Dec. at 141 (holding that “the Immigration Judge may not
reconsider the decision of the Board”).3 Conversely, where the Board does
not qualify or limit the remand, the Immigration Judge may address any
matters he or she deems appropriate under the INA and regulations. Matter
of Patel, 16 I&N Dec. at 601.
Our remand order in this case did not explicitly instruct the Immigration
Judge to conduct further hearings or reopen the record for new evidence. Nor
did our order limit the scope of the remand. 	Thus, when the Immigration
Judge reacquired jurisdiction over the respondent’s proceedings on remand,
she had broad authority over the manner in which to conduct the proceedings,
subject to the terms of the remand order and pursuant to the governing
regulations. 	See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b), 1240.1(a)(1)(iv); see also Matter
2 	The regulations also contemplate the limited return of the record to the Immigration
Court for procedural or ministerial purposes (such as defective transcripts, missing records,
missing decisions, etc.), after which the matter may be returned to the Board through
certification. See generally 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(c), 1003.7, 1240.1(a)(2) (2026). That is a
different scenario outside the scope of this decision.
3 	Although an Immigration Judge may not reconsider a prior decision of the Board, once
jurisdiction has returned to the Immigration Court, the Immigration Judge may adjudicate
a properly filed motion to reopen, provided that the moving party satisfies the applicable
regulatory requirements, including the submission of material evidence that was not
previously available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3) (2026); Matter of L-S-C-R-, 29 I&N Dec. at 453; Matter of
M-D-, 24 I&N Dec. at 141–42.

Cite as 30 I&N Dec. 124 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4256
page
127
of Herrera Del Orden, 25 I&N Dec. 589, 591 (BIA 2011) (holding that in
“exercising the powers and duties delegated by the Attorney General of the
United States, Immigration Judges have broad authority over the manner in
which they conduct proceedings, not only in cases where removability is at
issue, but also in those where the alien seeks only relief from removal”).
The Immigration Judge’s issuance of a new decision on remand without
holding another hearing did not violate the Board’s remand order nor deprive
the respondent of due process. The respondent had the opportunity to fully
present his claims for consideration before the Immigration Judge and
received a full and fair hearing prior to the Board’s remand. 	See Amos v.
Att’y Gen. of U.S., 157 F.4th 313, 323–24 (3d Cir. 2025) (holding that, to
establish a due process claim, the alien must show substantial prejudice as a
result of not being able to reasonably present his or her case). 	As the
respondent had already been given a full and fair opportunity to present his
case, 	the 	Immigration 	Judge’s 	reassessment 	of 	his 	application 	for
withholding of removal and protection under the CAT did not require the
Immigration Judge to reopen the record or provide the respondent an
additional opportunity to present evidence on remand. 	See generally
8 	C.F.R. 	§ 	1003.10(b) 	(“[I]mmigration 	judges 	shall 	exercise 	their
independent judgment and discretion and may take any action consistent with
their authorities under the Act and regulations that is necessary or appropriate
for the disposition or alternative resolution of [their] cases.”). 	Thus, the
Immigration Judge did not exceed her broad authority by reevaluating the
respondent’s applications under controlling law based on the existing record.
See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a)(l)(iv) (providing that, in addition to the
actions explicitly enumerated in the pertinent regulations, Immigration
Judges are authorized to “take any other action consistent with applicable
law and regulations as may be appropriate”).
Although the respondent asserts that he would have presented additional
supporting evidence and that the existing record was limited because he
“obtained new counsel shortly before his merits hearing,” he has not
established a basis for reopening the proceedings. 	The respondent has not
alleged a material change in country conditions, established ineffective
assistance of counsel, or identified material evidence that was previously
unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former
hearing. 	See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(4) (2026), 1003.23(b)(3); Matter of
Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. 127, 138 (BIA 2009); Matter of Coelho, 20 I&N
Dec. 464, 471 (BIA 1992). 	Therefore, we decline to remand the record to
the Immigration Judge for further proceedings.

Cite as 30 I&N Dec. 124 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4256
page
128
B. Relief from Removal
Before the Immigration Judge, the respondent sought withholding of
removal and protection under the CAT. 	The respondent claims past
persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his
political 	opinion 	and 	membership 	in 	a 	particular 	social 	group. 	The
Immigration Judge denied withholding of removal and protection under the
CAT after concluding that the respondent did not carry his burdens of proof.
More specifically, the Immigration Judge concluded that, while credible, the
respondent did not suffer harm rising to the level of past persecution, did not
establish the necessary nexus to a protected ground, and did not establish that
internal relocation was not reasonably available. On appeal, the respondent
argues that the Immigration Judge erred in denying relief and protection from
removal because the respondent established past persecution and that his life
or freedom would be threatened in the future on account of a protected
ground if he is removed to El Salvador.
Considering the respondent’s arguments and the entirety of the record,
we agree with the Immigration Judge’s reasoning, and we adopt and affirm
the Immigration Judge’s decision. Matter of Burbano, 20 I&N Dec. 872, 874
(BIA 1994) (recognizing that adoption or affirmance of a decision of an
Immigration Judge, in whole or in part, “is simply a statement that the
Board’s conclusions upon review of the record coincide with those which the
immigration judge articulated in his or her decision”). 	The Immigration
Judge’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)
(2026). Moreover, the Immigration Judge’s decision properly concluded that
the respondent did not meet his burden of proof for the requested relief or
protection from removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2026).
Accordingly, the following order will be entered.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. 	See INA
§ 274D (2024), 8 U.S.C. § 1324d; 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2026). Further,
any respondent that has been denied admission to, removed from, or has

Cite as 30 I&N Dec. 124 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4256
page
129
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any
time found in the United States shall be fined or imprisoned not more than
2 years, or both. See INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2024).