SETHI

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Matter of Mike Singh SETHI, Attorney
Decided October 1, 20261
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
An 	attorney 	suspended 	for 	submitting 	a 	brief 	containing 	artificial 	intelligence
hallucinations and making false statements to the court regarding his use of artificial
intelligence is properly subject to reciprocal discipline and is therefore suspended from
practicing before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and the Department of Homeland
Security.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Salma A. Attia, Esquire, Union, New Jersey
FOR EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, OFFICE OF GENERAL
COUNSEL: Nathan S. Henriksen, Disciplinary Counsel
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: 	Catherine M. O’Connell,
Disciplinary Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	MULLANE and CREPPY, Appellate Immigration Judges,
WHITE, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
MULLANE, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The respondent will be suspended from practice before the Board of
Immigration Appeals, the Immigration Courts, and the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) for 6 months, effective June 13, 2026.
On June 3, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
issued a decision suspending the respondent from the practice of law in the
Ninth Circuit for a period of 6 months, effective 10 days from the date of its
decision, or on June 13, 2026. 	Malkeet Lnu v. Blanche, 177 F.4th 1014
(9th 	Cir. 	2026). 	On 	June 	15, 	2026, 	the 	Disciplinary 	Counsel 	for
the 	Executive 	Office 	for 	Immigration 	Review 	(“EOIR”) 	and 	the
Disciplinary Counsel for DHS filed a Joint Notice of Intent to Discipline
(“Initial NID”), as well as a Joint Petition for Immediate Suspension, based
upon the respondent’s suspension in the Ninth Circuit. 	On July 1, 2026,
the Board granted the Joint Petition for Immediate Suspension. 	See
1 	The Board has designated as precedent this decision, which was previously issued
unpublished on September 15, 2026. Editorial changes have been made consistent with
the designation of the case as a precedent.

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8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.103(a)(1), (4) (2026) (discussing grounds for immediate
suspension).
On July 6, 2026, the respondent filed a Motion to Set Aside the Board’s
immediate suspension order (“Motion to Set Aside”). 	On July 15, 2026,
Disciplinary Counsels for EOIR and DHS filed an Amended Joint Notice of
Intent to Discipline (“Amended NID”).2 On July 16, 2026, the respondent
filed an Answer to the Initial NID. On July 28, 2026, Disciplinary Counsels
for EOIR and DHS filed a response to the respondent’s Motion to Set Aside
and a Motion for Summary Adjudication on the amended NID. 	On
August 14, 2026, the respondent filed an Answer to the Amended NID,
which we deem to supersede his July 16, 2026, Answer to the Initial NID.
Finally, on August 24, 2026, the respondent filed an Omnibus Brief in
Further Support of the Motion to Set Aside and Reply in Opposition to
Counsels’ Motion for Summary Adjudication (“Omnibus Brief”).
I. 	MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION
The respondent argues that the Board’s immediate suspension order
should be set aside by regulation based on good cause and in the interest of
justice. Specifically, the respondent argues that (1) his continued practice of
law before EOIR and DHS does not pose an undue risk of harm to the public;
(2) the risk identified by the Ninth Circuit can be addressed through
disclosure or verification requirements; (3) the likelihood of a broader final
sanction is not established in the present record; (4) the balance of injuries
strongly favors avoiding immediate suspension; (5) there is a substantial
dispute regarding his knowing lack of candor before the Ninth Circuit—a
factor that was key to his suspension by that court; (6) he has made extensive
remedial efforts to reduce future risks of misconduct; and (7) there are
significant consequences of a suspension to his clients. 	The respondent
further contends that the public interest favors a tailored protective response
to the disciplinary charges in lieu of an automatic system-wide suspension.
2 	The Amended NID omitted the allegation in the Initial NID that the respondent had not
timely notified EOIR or DHS Disciplinary Counsels of the Ninth Circuit’s suspension
order, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(c)(4) (2026) and § 1003.103(c). In lieu of that
allegation, the Amended NID newly alleged that the respondent had timely notified
Disciplinary Counsels of the Ninth Circuit’s suspension order on July 2, 2026. 	The
Amended NID also newly proposed that Disciplinary Counsels’ proposed suspension
period should run from the effective date of the Ninth Circuit’s suspension order, instead
of from the date of issuance of the Board’s immediate suspension order. The Amended
NID did not otherwise substantively change the contents of the Initial NID.

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We are unpersuaded by these arguments. 	The regulations require the
Board to enter an order immediately suspending a practitioner upon the filing
of a petition for immediate suspension that is supported by a certified copy
of a court record finding that the practitioner has been suspended or disbarred
by any Federal court. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(a)(1), (4). The record includes a
certified copy of the June 3, 2026, decision suspending the respondent from
practice before the Ninth Circuit. Therefore, entry of an order immediately
suspending the respondent from practice before the Board, the Immigration
Courts, and DHS is proper. Id.
As advanced by the respondent the regulations state that the Board may
set aside an order of immediate suspension upon a showing of good cause
and 	when 	it 	appears 	in 	the 	interest 	of 	justice 	to 	do 	so. 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 1003.103(a)(4).
We have carefully considered the respondent’s arguments and evidence
provided with his Motion to Set Aside and his Omnibus Brief. We conclude
that the respondent has not established good cause for setting aside the
immediate suspension order or that it would be in the interest of justice to do
so.
As set forth below in our discussion of his answer to the Amended NID,
the respondent has not rebutted the regulatory presumption that disciplinary
sanctions 	before 	EOIR 	and 	DHS 	should 	follow 	the 	Ninth 	Circuit’s
suspension order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(b)(2)(i)–(iii); Matter of Truong,
24 I&N Dec. 52, 54 (BIA 2006). Given the specific findings of misconduct
and sanctions imposed by the Ninth Circuit, we are unpersuaded that the
respondent’s continued practice of law before EOIR and DHS does not pose
an undue threat to the public or that lesser sanctions than suspension suffice.
Further, the respondent’s claims of hardship to his clients are conclusory,
lacking in detail, and speculative in nature, and they are insufficient to
warrant setting aside the immediate suspension order. We also conclude that
the imposition of restrictions on the respondent’s practice before EOIR and
DHS is consistent with the provision of a tailored response to his misconduct
before the Ninth Circuit. 	That is particularly so given that our period of
suspension will not exceed that of the Ninth Circuit’s, as set forth below.
An “attorney” who may represent individuals is defined in the regulations
as
any person who is eligible to practice law and is a member in good standing of the
bar of the highest court of any State, possession, territory, or Commonwealth of the

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United States, or of the District of Columbia, and is not under any order suspending,
enjoining, restraining, disbarring, or otherwise restricting him in the practice of law.
8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(f) (2026). It is undisputed that the respondent is under an
order restricting him from practicing law in the Ninth Circuit. It is not in the
interest of justice to set aside the immediate suspension order where there is
a current final order of suspension against the respondent that renders him
ineligible to satisfy the regulatory definition of an “attorney” under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1001.1(f). 	See Matter of Rosenberg, 24 I&N Dec. 744, 746 (BIA 2009).
Should the respondent obtain a stay or other relief from the Ninth Circuit’s
order of suspension, this issue may be revisited and reconsidered. 	See
Professional 	Conduct 	for 	Practitioners—Rules 	and 	Procedures, 	and
Representation and Appearances, 73 Fed. Reg. 76914, 76920 (Dec. 18, 2008)
(“If an immediate suspension was solely predicated upon a state bar
suspension that was vacated, it would be in the interests of justice for the
Board to set aside its immediate suspension order.”). But at this time and on
this record, the respondent has not made a showing that the Ninth Circuit’s
suspension order has been vitiated or otherwise altered in any way since its
issuance. 	Accordingly, we will not set aside or vacate the immediate
suspension order in this case.
II. RESPONDENT’S ANSWER TO AMENDED NID AND DHS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
The 	Amended 	NID 	charges 	the 	respondent 	with 	being 	subject 	to
summary discipline based on his 6-month suspension before the Ninth
Circuit. In his response, the respondent has admitted the factual allegations
in the Amended NID.
In his Answer to the Amended NID, and again in his Omnibus Brief, the
respondent claims that a hearing before an adjudicating official is required
based on disputes in material facts as to whether (1) there is “an infirmity of
proof,” as described in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(b)(2)(ii), for the Ninth Circuit’s
determination that he knowingly exhibited a lack of candor before the
court—a factor that played an important role in the sanction imposed; and
(2) the imposition of discipline by our own tribunal would result in a “grave
injustice.” 	8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(b)(2)(iii). 	Specifically, the respondent
contests the sufficiency of the evidence that he knew that certain errors in his
filings were caused by the use of artificial intelligence (“AI”) and that he
knowingly attempted to deceive the court about the AI use. The respondent
further contends that his disputed lack of knowledge is relevant to whether
discipline would result in a “grave injustice,” as described in 8 C.F.R.
§ 	1003.106(b)(2)(iii), 	as 	is 	a 	factual 	dispute 	between 	himself 	and

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Disciplinary Counsels concerning his present staffing level and his firm’s
related ability to handle immigration matters during his suspension.
The respondent has not made a prima facie showing that there is a
material issue of fact in dispute that would warrant a hearing. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.106(a)(1) (2026). The respondent’s various assertions regarding his
lack of knowledge of the use of AI in his court filings are not and have never
been in dispute. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the respondent’s claimed
subjective lack of knowledge and belief that the errors in his initial brief were
innocent 	errors 	and/or 	typographical 	mistakes 	and 	not 	made 	by 	AI.
Makeet Lnu, 177 F.4th at 1023, 1029–31. 	The court also considered the
respondent’s ultimate concession, after his repeated denials of AI use, that it
was “more likely than not” that AI had, in fact, been used. 	Id. at 1023.
However, the court still inferred the respondent’s actual knowledge of the AI
errors in the brief and his related knowing provision of false statements to
the court from the circumstances presented. 	Id. at 1029-31. 	The court
specifically cited the respondent’s (1) implausible claim in the Motion to
Correct that a nonexistent case cited in the initial brief was merely a
“typographical error;” (2) admitted practice of not reading the cases in the
firm’s brief writers’ briefs prior to filing; (3) continued insistence in his
response to an Order to Show Cause why he should not be sanctioned that at
the time of the Motion to Correct, he believed the errors were products of
innocent typographical mistakes; and (4) the respondent’s filing of a “Notice
of Errata” in another case before the court wherein he had (a) identified two
erroneous citations in prior filings and requested to replace them with real
citations, but (b) failed to disclose that the two erroneous citations were
actually AI hallucinations. Id.
The respondent has not identified any specific material, disputed facts
concerning his knowledge of the use of AI or his candor to the court that
would warrant further hearing. The respondent’s arguments are effectively
a collateral attack on the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the
Ninth Circuit on these issues, which we have no authority to entertain in
these proceedings. 	We only address the Ninth Circuit’s order within the
context of deciding whether the respondent can meet his heavy burden of
showing by clear and convincing evidence a fundamental error in the court’s
proceedings, or a grave injustice that would result from further discipline,
that would warrant rebuttal of the presumption that summary discipline
should 	be 	imposed. 	See 	8 	C.F.R. 	§ 	1003.103(b)(2)(i)–(iii). 	Mere
disagreement with the reasoning and result of the originating disciplinary
court does not trigger the requirement for a hearing before an adjudicating
official under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.106(a).

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Additionally, we are authorized to determine an appropriate sanction in
summary discipline proceedings given the circumstances presented. 	The
respondent’s conclusory, vague, and unsubstantiated claims concerning the
burdens of suspension upon his practice and his clients are by themselves
insufficient 	to 	warrant 	further 	fact-finding 	in 	a 	proceeding 	before 	an
adjudicating official. Accordingly, we will retain jurisdiction and proceed in
summary discipline proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.106(a).
We 	agree 	with 	Disciplinary 	Counsels 	that 	summary 	discipline 	is
appropriate. The certified copy of the June 3, 2026, decision from the Ninth
Circuit ordering the respondent suspended from the practice of law in the
Ninth Circuit for a period of 6 months creates a “rebuttable presumption of
the professional misconduct” and that disciplinary sanctions should follow.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(b)(2); see also Matter of Kronegold, 25 I&N Dec. 157,
160 (BIA 2010); Matter of Truong, 24 I&N Dec. at 54; Matter of Ramos,
23 I&N Dec. 843, 845 (BIA 2005). This presumption can be rebutted only
if the attorney demonstrates with “clear and convincing evidence” that the
underlying disciplinary proceedings resulted in a deprivation of due process,
that there was “an infirmity of proof” establishing the misconduct, or that
discipline would result in “grave injustice.” 	Matter of Kronegold, 25 I&N
Dec. at 160 (citation omitted); accord Matter of Gadda, 23 I&N Dec. 645,
648 (BIA 2003). The respondent has not satisfied his burden of rebutting the
presumption of misconduct and the imposition of disciplinary sanctions,
including suspension.
The respondent has not demonstrated a deprivation of his due process
rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard in his Ninth Circuit
disciplinary proceedings. Thus, this avenue for rebuttal of the presumption
does not apply.
As indicated previously, the respondent claims that there is an “infirmity
of proof” as to his knowing use of AI and related lack of candor before the
Ninth Circuit. He relies on the absence of (1) direct evidence of an admission
by him that he knew a brief writer had used AI in the initial brief; (2) an
admission by the writer identifying an AI tool or output; (3) draft history or
metadata tracing the brief’s language to AI; (4) a prompt or response;
(5) evidence that he was responsible for separate statements made by a
subordinate 	attorney 	during 	oral 	argument 	before 	the 	Ninth 	Circuit;
(6) witness testimony that he was informed that AI had been used prior to his
filing of the Motion to Correct; and (7) direct evidence of his deliberate
concealment of the use of AI. To support his claims, the respondent submits
as evidence a copy of his Declaration in Response to the Ninth Circuit’s
Order to Show Cause that he submitted with the court.

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To rebut the presumption of professional misconduct in this regard, the
respondent must show by clear and convincing evidence that there is “such
an infirmity of proof establishing [his] professional misconduct as to give
rise to the clear conviction that the adjudicating official could not, consistent
with his or her duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 	1003.103(b)(2)(ii). 	That 	burden 	has 	not 	been 	met 	here. 	As 	the
Ninth Circuit explained, the respondent’s actual knowledge of the use of AI
could be inferred from the circumstances under applicable law. Malkeet Lnu,
177 F.4th at 1029. 	The Ninth Circuit inferred from the circumstances that
the respondent knew when he filed his Motion to Correct that the errors in
the initial brief were not innocent typographical or copy-paste errors because
there was no plausible explanation for how the fake citations he provided to
the 	court 	in 	the 	initial 	brief 	could 	have 	been 	the 	result 	of 	innocent
typographical or copy-paste errors. Id. at 1029–30. The Ninth Circuit also
inferred the respondent’s knowledge from his prior admission that he did not
normally vet citations used by brief writers, which itself created an “inherent
risk” of citing fake cases and authorities. Id. (citation omitted). As further
evidence of the respondent’s actual knowledge and related lack of candor to
the court, the Ninth Circuit cited (1) the respondent’s continued insistence in
his response to an Order to Show Cause that at the time of the Motion to
Correct he believed the errors were products of innocent typographical
mistakes, as well as (2) similar misconduct by the respondent in another case
before the court. Id. The respondent does not meaningfully challenge these
determinations. On this record, the respondent has not met his heavy burden
of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that there was such an
infirmity of proof of his actual knowledge of the AI use and his related lack
of candor before the Ninth Circuit such that we cannot accept the court’s
decision as final on those issues. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(b)(2)(ii).
Finally, the respondent asserts that imposing the reciprocal definition of
suspension would result in “grave injustice.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(b)(2)(iii).
Specifically, he claims that (1) suspending him at DHS and EOIR would be
duplicative, disregard lesser forms of remediation, and impose a materially
broader disability on his ability to practice and greater hardships than the
sanction 	imposed 	by 	the 	Ninth 	Circuit; 	(2) 	reciprocal 	discipline 	for
misconduct related to the use of AI is an “unprecedented sanction” that has
not been used by the Board; (3) no other Federal circuit courts have
suspended attorneys for actions related to their use of generative AI; and
(4) automatically extending a suspension sanction within the context of AI
usage would “magnify an outlier penalty rather than simply giving ordinary
reciprocal effect to a routine disciplinary judgment.”

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We are unpersuaded by any of these arguments. 	First, the claims of
financial hardship and other difficulties that accompany a suspension from
the practice of law do not equate to grave injustice. 	See, e.g., Matter of
Kronegold, 25 I&N Dec. at 162 (“If the financial hardship that accompanies
suspension from the practice of law was in itself adequate to establish grave
injustice, then almost any attorney whose livelihood was based on his legal
practice could avoid reciprocal discipline.”).
Additionally, an attorney must conduct himself or herself in accordance
with governing rules of professional conduct regardless of the tools he or she
uses to prepare and present cases. 	The Ninth Circuit disciplined the
respondent for citing cases that did not exist, attributing quotations to
opinions in which the quoted language did not appear, misrepresenting the
content of real legal authority, failing to identify existing law he claimed
supported his arguments, knowingly making false statements of law to the
court, and failing to correct false statements of law previously made to the
tribunal. Malkeet Lnu, 177 F.4th at 1027–31. Any or all of these actions can
be taken with or without regard to the use of AI, and any or all of them may
render an attorney subject to discipline by an authorized tribunal. As such,
the application of our rules of attorney discipline to misconduct related to the
use of AI is not an “outlier penalty,” as the respondent claims.
Disciplinary Counsels have established that the respondent is subject to
reciprocal discipline due to his suspension in the Ninth Circuit. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.103(b)(2); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(e) (2026). 	Disciplinary
Counsels’ proposed sanction of a 6-month suspension, effective from the
effective date of the Ninth Circuit’s order, is appropriate in light of the
respondent’s suspension in the Ninth Circuit. 	See Matter of Kronegold,
25 I&N Dec. at 161 (discussing our deferential approach and the imposition
of 	identical 	reciprocal 	discipline 	against 	practitioners 	who 	have 	been
suspended or disbarred). The respondent will therefore be suspended from
practice before the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Immigration Courts,
and DHS for 6 months. The respondent’s suspension will be effective as of
June 13, 2026, the effective date of the Ninth Circuit’s order of discipline.
Accordingly, the following orders will be entered.
ORDER: 	The Board hereby suspends the respondent from practice
before the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Immigration Courts, and DHS
for 6 months, effective June 13, 2026.
FURTHER ORDER: The respondent must maintain compliance with
the directives set forth in our prior order. 	The respondent must notify the
Board of any further disciplinary action against him.

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FURTHER ORDER: 	The contents of the order shall be made
available to the public, including at the Immigration Courts and appropriate
offices of DHS.
FURTHER ORDER: 	The respondent may petition this Board for
reinstatement to practice before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and DHS
under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.107.