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Cite as 30 I&N Dec. 20 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4241
Matter of A-E-V-M-, Respondent
Decided September 4, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) The removal of former President Maduro from power and the ensuing transfer of
executive authority constitute a change in country conditions in Venezuela for purposes
of assessing an applicant’s prospective fear of persecution.
(2) Remand is required because the Immigration Judge did not sufficiently assess the effect
of the changed country conditions on the respondent’s particularized risk of future
persecution.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Rosa M. Medina, Esquire, Houston, Texas
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Michelle L. Nelsen, Senior
Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board 	Panel: 	MALPHRUS, 	Chief 	Appellate 	Immigration 	Judge;
HUNSUCKER, Appellate Immigration Judge; WHITE, Temporary Appellate Immigration
Judge.
MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:
The Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security (“DHS”) appeals 	from 	the
Immigration Judge’s April 22, 2026, decision granting the respondent’s
application for asylum under section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2024). At the Board’s request, DHS and the
respondent filed supplemental briefs regarding the significance 	of the
January 3, 2026, removal from power of former Venezuelan President
Nicolás Maduro. The Immigration Judge’s decision will be vacated, and the
record will be remanded for further proceedings.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The respondent is a native and citizen of Venezuela who was admitted to
the United States as a nonimmigrant student on July 27, 2014. In 2015, the
respondent’s spouse filed an Application for Asylum and Withholding of
Removal (“Form I-589”) with United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (“USCIS”) listing the respondent as a derivative beneficiary. 	On
March 28, 2023, DHS issued the respondent a notice to appear charging her
with removability under section 237(a)(1)(C)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.

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§ 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (2018), as an alien who failed to maintain or comply with
the conditions of nonimmigrant status. 	Before the Immigration Judge, the
respondent conceded removability, submitted a copy of her husband’s Form
I-589, and on March 19, 2026, the respondent filed her own Form I-589.
The respondent’s claim is based on her political opinion in opposition to
the Maduro government. The respondent testified that she and her husband
were 	members 	of 	pro-democratic 	political 	groups 	and 	participated 	in
opposition political activities in Venezuela and that, as a result, they were
threatened and intimidated by individuals she believed were supporters of
the Maduro regime and by a government official at the University of
Carabobo. In addition, her husband was assaulted. The respondent testified
that in October 2025, after she came to the United States, Venezuelan
authorities annulled her passport and that she continued to express strong
opposition to the Maduro government and welcomed his removal from
power through social media.
The 	Immigration 	Judge 	granted 	asylum 	after 	concluding 	that 	the
respondent did not suffer past persecution but was credible and did establish
a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her political opinion.
In so ruling, the Immigration Judge acknowledged the removal of former
President Maduro from power and the subsequent political developments in
Venezuela but concluded that the respondent continued to have a well-
founded fear of persecution.
On appeal, DHS argues the Immigration Judge erred in concluding that
the respondent carried her burden of establishing a well-founded fear of
persecution, particularly in light of changed country conditions. 	DHS also
argues 	that 	the 	Immigration 	Judge 	failed 	to 	consider 	whether 	the
respondent’s asylum application was timely filed.
II. ANALYSIS
Because the respondent is seeking relief from removal, she has the burden
of establishing that she meets all applicable eligibility requirements for relief.
See INA § 240(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4) (2024); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d)
(2026).
A. Changed Country Conditions
An alien seeking asylum bears the burden of establishing that she is a
refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (2024). An alien who has not established past persecution

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may qualify for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future
persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground. 	See 8 C.F.R.
§ 	1208.13(b)(2) 	(2026). 	An 	Immigration 	Judge’s 	predictive 	findings
concerning what may occur to an applicant upon returning to her home
country are findings of fact which we review for clear error; however,
whether those predicted circumstances establish an objectively reasonable
fear of persecution is a legal determination which we review de novo. 	See
Matter of L-T-A-, 29 I&N Dec. 362, 363–68 (BIA 2025)); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i), (ii) (2026).
The assessment of whether an alien’s fear is well-founded is necessarily
forward looking. 	See Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439, 445 (BIA
1987) (“[A]n applicant for asylum has established a well-founded fear if he
shows 	that 	a 	reasonable 	person 	in 	his 	circumstances 	would 	fear
persecution.”); see also Cabrera v. Sessions, 890 F.3d 153, 159–60 (5th Cir.
2018) (describing how an alien can show a well-founded fear of persecution).
Thus, conditions existing at the time an alien departed his or her country are
not considered in isolation; material developments that subsequently occur
may impact whether the alien’s fear is well-founded. 	We have long
recognized that changed conditions in an alien’s country may be significant
to determining whether a fear of future persecution remains objectively
reasonable. See Matter of E-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 860, 862 (BIA 1997) (stating
that “the change in government and increasing stability [subsequent to the
alien’s departure] militates against a finding that the applicant has a well-
founded fear of persecution”); see also Matter of A-E-M-, 21 I&N Dec. 1157,
1160–61 (BIA 1998) (discussing how country conditions evidence showed
that the influence of the Shining Path guerillas had recently diminished in
Peru and that the respondent did not have a well-founded fear on a
nationwide basis).
Changes in the political control or leadership of a country are among the
developments that may directly bear on whether the alien’s fear is well-
founded. For example, in Matter of R-R-, 20 I&N Dec. 547, 551 (BIA 1992),
this Board took administrative notice that the Sandinista Party no longer
controlled the Nicaraguan Government in considering an asylum claim
arising from conditions that existed under the former government. See also
8 	C.F.R. 	§ 	1003.1(d)(3)(iv) 	(2026) 	(authorizing 	the 	Board 	to 	take
administrative notice of commonly known facts, including current events and
the contents of official documents).
In this case, the parties and the Immigration Judge acknowledged that
President Maduro was removed from power on January 3, 2026, and that
executive authority in Venezuela passed to another official who now leads

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the Interim Government. The respondent’s claim is based primarily on her
opposition to former President Maduro’s government and on the actions of
individuals she claims are loyal to former President Maduro. On appeal, the
respondent does not dispute that President Maduro was removed from office
and is now in custody in the United States based on criminal charges. Rather,
she argues that his arrest and removal do not constitute changed country
conditions because the “structural, state-sponsored apparatus of persecution
and torture in Venezuela remains fully intact” and the military, intelligence,
and paramilitary networks that existed under Maduro remain under the
control 	of 	longstanding 	Maduro 	loyalists. 	The 	Immigration 	Judge
acknowledged that President Maduro had been arrested and removed and that
there had been a “change in political conditions in Venezuela,” but concluded
that “the essence of the Maduro government remains” and that the “Maduro
regime has not disappeared.”
We recognize that a change in national leadership does not necessarily
eliminate a well-founded fear of persecution.1 	Evidence that officials,
institutions, security forces, or other actors associated with the former
government continue to exercise authority may be relevant to whether an
applicant remains at risk following a change in national leadership. 	Matter
of N-M-A-, 22 I&N Dec. at 320–21 (recognizing that the removal of a prior
regime does not necessarily eliminate a well-founded fear where the former
persecutor retains influence or the successor harbors the same animus).
However, where the asserted fear of persecution arises from opposition
to the government headed by that individual, the removal of the national
leader from power and the transfer of executive authority alter the political
circumstances against which the asserted fear must be evaluated. 	Former
President Maduro’s removal from power and the resulting transfer of
executive authority constitute changed country conditions in Venezuela,
which is highly relevant to the respondent’s claim. The removal of the head
of a national government is a very significant development and not merely
another event occurring against an otherwise static political background.
Another aspect of changed conditions here is the influence of the United
States Government on the Interim Government in Venezuela. See Review of
the FY27 State Department Budget Request: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
1 	In this case, the Immigration Judge did not find that the respondent suffered past
persecution. It is only if the respondent establishes past persecution that DHS bears the
burden of establishing that changed country conditions constitute a fundamental change in
circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution. See
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(l)(i)(A), (ii) (2026); Matter of N-M-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 312, 320–21
(BIA 1998) (en banc).

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on Foreign Relations, 119th Congress, 2nd session (June 2, 2026) (statement
of Marco Rubio, Sec. of State). 	Even prior to the Immigration Judge’s
decision, full diplomatic relations were restored with the reopening of the
United 	States 	Embassy 	in 	Caracas. 	See 	Media 	Note, 	Office 	of 	the
Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, Resumption of Operations at U.S.
Embassy Caracas (Mar. 30, 2026).2 	We take administrative notice that,
subsequent to the Immigration Judge’s decision, there is further evidence of
continued cooperation and progress toward reform based on the United
States’ three-part plan to promote stabilization, economic recovery, and
democratic transition in Venezuela. 	See Fact Sheet: 	President Donald J.
Trump Announces Historic Oil Agreement to Secure American Energy
Dominance and Drive Venezuela’s Economic Recovery, U.S. Embassy in
Caracas (Aug. 31, 2026);3 see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (permitting
administrative notice). 	In this regard, the State Department has issued
statements in recent months about productive discussions toward political
reconciliation and a transition to democratic elections between the Interim
Government 	and 	the 	2015 	National 	Assembly, 	which 	was 	the 	last
democratically elected entity in Venezuela. See Press Statements, Office of
the Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State (June 18, July 16, and Aug. 3, 2026).4
Here, the removal of former President Maduro from power and the
ensuing transfer of executive authority constitute a change in country
conditions 	in 	Venezuela 	for 	purposes 	of 	assessing 	the 	respondent’s
prospective fear of persecution. The Immigration Judge did not sufficiently
assess the effect of the changed country conditions on the respondent’s
particularized risk of future persecution. The statements that the “essence of
the Maduro government remains” and that the “Maduro regime has not
disappeared” are largely conclusory and devoid of factual findings. 	The
Immigration 	Judge’s 	decision 	also 	lacks 	analysis 	concerning 	the
respondent’s prospective risk under the changed political circumstances.
The Immigration Judge’s conclusions relied in part on the fact that the
respondent’s and her husband’s passports were cancelled in 2025, but that
2 	Https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/03/resumption-of-
operations-at-u-s-embassy-caracas/.
3 	Https://ve.usembassy.gov/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-announces-historic-oil-
agreement-to-secure-american-energy-dominance-and-drive-venezuelas-economic-
recovery/.
4 	Https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/supporting-an-
institutional-democratic-transition-in-venezuela/; 	https://ve.usembassy.gov/advancing-
venezuelas-institutional-democratic-transition/; 	https://ve.usembassy.gov/continuing-to-
advance-venezuelas-institutional-democratic-transition/.

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occurred while Maduro was still in power. 	The Immigration Judge also
stated that this was as a result of the repressive Simon Bolivar Law or Law
Against Hate passed in recent years under the Maduro regime to undermine
political dissent, but the Immigration Judge also recognized that there was
no evidence in the record as to whether these laws continue to be enforced.
Thus, the Immigration Judge’s findings are insufficient to resolve the issues
before us on appeal. 	See Matter of S-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 462, 465–66 (BIA
2002) 	(describing 	the 	importance 	of 	Immigration 	Judges 	making
comprehensive findings of fact on all issues); see also Matter of M-P-,
20 I&N Dec. 786 (BIA 1994) (explaining that Immigration Judges must
articulate the reasons for their decisions); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)
(regarding the Board’s limited fact-finding authority). 	In particular, the
Immigration Judge did not sufficiently address whether the individuals or
institutions the respondent fears remain as before and are able and interested
in targeting her in the current political environment.
In light of the above, we will remand the record for further proceedings
and the preparation of a new decision with additional factual findings and
legal analysis. 	On remand, the parties should be given the opportunity to
present additional evidence and arguments as necessary to resolve any
relevant issues. See Matter of A-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 774, 790–91 (A.G. 2005)
(stating that Board’s authority to remand for further fact-finding ensures that
the Board “is not denied essential facts that bear on the appropriate resolution
of a case”). 	If the respondent’s asylum application is properly before the
Immigration Judge, which is unclear as discussed below, the Immigration
Judge should reassess whether the respondent has established a well-founded
fear of future persecution in light of the changed country conditions
identified 	above 	and 	the 	effect 	of 	those 	conditions 	on 	her 	particular
circumstances.
B. The 1-Year Filing Requirement
We will also remand the record for further findings and analysis on the
threshold issue of whether the respondent timely filed her asylum application
or has demonstrated that she qualifies for an exception to the filing deadline
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.4(a)(4), (5) (2026). 	See INA § 208(a)(2)(B),
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B); Matter of T-M-H- & S-W-C-, 25 I&N Dec. 193,
194–95 (BIA 2010). 	The Immigration Judge granted the respondent’s
asylum application without first determining whether she satisfied the 1-year
filing requirement or established an applicable exception.
The record reflects that the respondent was initially included as a
derivative beneficiary on her spouse’s Form I-589 filed with USCIS in 2015,

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a copy of that application was submitted to the Immigration Court in 2023,
and the respondent did not file a Form I-589 in her own name until March 19,
2026. 	As the Immigration Judge did not address the timeliness of the
respondent’s asylum application or make the necessary factual findings
regarding 	whether 	the 	respondent 	satisfied 	an 	exception 	to 	the 	filing
deadline, we will also remand the case for further fact-finding on this issue.
See id.; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i), (iv), 1208.4(a)(4), (5).
We 	emphasize 	that 	our 	determination 	regarding 	changed 	country
conditions in Venezuela does not resolve the statutory filing issue. 	The
“changed circumstances” exception to the 1-year filing requirement requires
more than the existence of a change in the applicant’s country. The applicant
must establish that the changed circumstances materially affect her eligibility
for asylum and that the application was filed within a reasonable period in
light of those circumstances. 	See Matter of D-G-C-, 28 I&N Dec. 297,
299–302 (BIA 2021) (defining “changed circumstances”); Matter of A-M-,
23 I&N Dec. 737 (BIA 2005) (holding the changed circumstances exception
did not apply because the change in country conditions did not materially
affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum).
If the Immigration Judge determines 	that 	the respondent’s asylum
application is timely or qualifies for an exception to the filing deadline, he
should reassess her eligibility for asylum in light of the changed country
conditions discussed above. If the respondent’s asylum application is time-
barred, the Immigration Judge should address the respondent’s applications
for withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A) (2024), and protection under the regulations implementing
the Convention Against Torture,5 which the Immigration Judge did not
address in light of the grant of asylum.
Accordingly, the following order will be entered.
ORDER: 	The decision of the Immigration Judge is vacated, and the
record is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing
opinion and for the entry of a new decision.
5 	The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force for United States Nov. 20, 1994). 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17 (2026); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a) (2020).