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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 826 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4232
Matter of Nii Ahene Nunoo BOYE, Respondent
Decided August 12, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
A Georgia state court sentence “clarification” order issued by a different judge, more
than 6 years after the original sentencing order, and after the respondent had been placed
into removal proceedings is not valid for immigration purposes.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Carlos E. Solomiany, Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Adilina Malave, Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	RADICS, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge;
MAHTABFAR, Appellate Immigration Judge; PICOS, Temporary Appellate Immigration
Judge.
RADICS, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:
The Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security (“DHS”) appeals 	from 	the
Immigration Judge’s August 25, 2023, decision granting the respondent’s
motion to terminate these proceedings. The respondent, a native and citizen
of Ghana and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, opposes the
appeal. The appeal will be sustained, the Immigration Judge’s decision will
be vacated, and the record will be remanded.
On April 11, 2017, the respondent was convicted of battery, family
violence, in violation of section 16-5-23.1(f) of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (“O.G.C.A.”). The respondent was sentenced “to confinement for
a period of 12 months,” but he was allowed to serve the entirety of the
sentence on probation. More than 6 years later, on August 4, 2023, a different
judge of the State Court of Carroll County, Georgia, granted the respondent’s
Motion to Clarify Sentence and issued an order stating that the respondent’s
sentence was “12 months on straight probation.” 	The order further states,
“The 	sentence 	never 	should 	have 	been 	and 	was 	not 	‘12 	months 	in
confinement to be served on probation.’” 	The clarification order does not
specify under which Georgia statute it was issued, and the underlying motion
for clarification has not been made part of the record.
On August 25, 2023, the Immigration Judge granted the respondent’s
motion to terminate these proceedings based on the Georgia state court’s

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“clarification” 	that 	the 	respondent 	was 	not 	sentenced 	to 	a 	term 	of
imprisonment of 12 months. 	The Immigration Judge determined that,
because 	the 	respondent 	was 	not 	sentenced 	to 	a 	12-month 	term 	of
imprisonment, he has not been convicted of an aggravated felony crime of
violence 	pursuant 	to 	section 	237(a)(2)(A)(iii) 	of 	the 	Immigration 	and
Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2018), nor a crime
of domestic violence under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2018).
The parties do not dispute that the respondent has been convicted of a
crime of violence within the meaning of section 101(a)(43)(F) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2026), and thus his conviction falls under the
ambit of an aggravated felony within the meaning of section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)
of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2026). 	The parties dispute only
whether the respondent was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least
1 year. See Edwards v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 97 F.4th 725, 742 (11th Cir. 2024)
(holding that, where the alien was convicted of family violence battery under
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-23.1 and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at
least 1 year, he is removable as an aggravated felon); Talamantes-Enriquez
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 12 F.4th 1340, 1353 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Our precedent
establishes that [the alien] was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for at
least one year for purposes of [8 U.S.C.] § 1101(a)(43)(F), even if he was
permitted to serve part or all of that sentence on probation.”).
We acknowledge that the respondent obtained an order from the Georgia
state court purporting to clarify the terms of his original sentence. However,
the Georgia state court order clarifying the respondent’s sentence is not valid
for immigration purposes. 	See Matter of Thomas and Thompson, 27 I&N
Dec. 674, 690 (A.G. 2019) (holding that state-court clarifying orders “will
be given effect for immigration purposes only if based on a procedural or
substantive 	defect 	in 	the 	underlying 	criminal 	proceeding”); 	see 	also
Edwards, 97 F.4th at 733, 742 (holding that the Attorney General’s holding
in Matter of Thomas and Thompson is controlling and thus a state court
sentence 	modification 	order 	issued 	for 	“avoidance 	of 	immigration
consequences” has no legal effect for immigration purposes).
Whether a sentence includes a “term of imprisonment” as defined in
section 101(a)(48)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B) (2024), is a
question of federal immigration law. Edwards, 97 F.4th at 735. In this case,
the plain language of the respondent’s sentencing order that he be “hereby
sentenced to confinement for a period of 12 months” to be “served on
probation” 	indicates 	that 	the 	respondent 	was 	sentenced 	to 	a 	term 	of
imprisonment. 	The consent clarification order stating that “[t]he sentence

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never should have been and was not ‘12 months in confinement to be served
on probation’” does not clarify the original sentencing order; it contradicts it.
Thus, it is apparent that the clarification order was not simply correcting a
scrivener’s error under section 17-1-3 of the O.C.G.A., which allows the
correction of such mistakes at any time.
Moreover, section 17-10-1(f)(1) of the O.C.G.A. requires that any motion
to correct, reduce, or modify a sentence be filed within 1 year of imposition
or within 120 days after affirmance on appeal.1 	The respondent’s motion
was not filed within this deadline. 	Section 42-8-34(g) of the O.C.G.A
permits a sentencing judge to modify or change a probated sentence at any
time during the period of probation. In this case, the clarification order was
entered years after the expiration of the respondent’s sentence; thus, it is
apparent that the clarification was not pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-8-34(g).
In sum, we are not aware of any statutory authority for the issuance of the
respondent’s sentence clarification order. The clarification order was issued
6 years after the sentence was originally imposed, and the “clarification” was
made by a judge other than the original sentencing judge. “The clarification
order is flatly contrary to the sentencing order.” 	United States v. Garza-
Mendez, 735 F.3d 1284, 1288 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013) (addressing a similar
“clarification” order). 	“Nor does the subsequent state judge rely upon any
consultation with the sentencing judge.” 	Id. 	“[T]he judge who signed the
order[] did nothing more than review and interpret another judge’s sentence
order years later.” 	Talamantes-Enriquez, 12 F.4th at 1354. 	Under such
circumstances, we “reject[] the invitation to take the ‘clarification’ order . . .
at face value, much less to be bound by it.” Id. We thus do not afford full
faith 	and 	credit 	to 	the 	respondent’s 	sentencing 	clarification 	order 	for
immigration purposes. See Matter of Thomas and Thompson, 27 I&N Dec.
1 	Section 17 10 1(f)(1) of the O.C.G.A. provides:
Within one year of the date upon which the sentence is imposed, or within 120 days
after receipt by the sentencing court of the remittitur upon affirmance of the judgment
after direct appeal, whichever is later, the court imposing the sentence has the
jurisdiction, power, and authority to correct or reduce the sentence and to suspend or
probate all or any part of the sentence imposed. The time periods prescribed in this
subsection require the defendant to file a motion within such time periods; however,
the court shall not be constrained to issue its order or hear the matter within such
time periods. Prior to entering any order correcting, reducing, or modifying any
sentence, the court shall afford notice and an opportunity for a hearing to the
prosecuting attorney. Any order modifying a sentence which is entered without
notice and an opportunity for a hearing as provided in this subsection shall be void.
This subsection shall not limit any other jurisdiction granted to the court in this Code
section or as provided for in subsection (g) of Code Section 42-8-34.

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at 686–87 (explaining that the Board can interpret the definition of a
conviction under the INA without violating the principles of full faith and
credit).
Based on the foregoing, the Georgia state court sentence “clarification”
order issued by a different judge, more than 6 years after the original
sentencing order, and after the respondent had been placed into removal
proceedings is not valid for immigration purposes. 	We thus conclude that
the respondent was in fact sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least
1 year. See Matter of Thomas and Thompson, 27 I&N Dec. at 690; Edwards,
974 F.4th at 472 (concluding that modification by a Georgia state court of an
alien’s sentence for family violence battery from 12 months’ probation to
11 months and 27 days of probation was issued only to prevent removal and
thus did not change the alien’s term of imprisonment for purposes of federal
immigration law). Thus, the respondent is removable based on his conviction
for an aggravated felony.
Finally, removability for a crime of domestic violence under section
237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2024), does not
require any term of imprisonment. 	Thus, whether the respondent was
sentenced to a term 	of probation or imprisonment is not relevant to
determining whether the charge under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), has been sustained. 	Therefore, contrary to the
Immigration Judge’s conclusion, termination of these proceedings based on
the 	sentence 	clarification 	order 	was 	not 	warranted. 	On 	remand, 	the
Immigration Judge should reassess whether the respondent is alternatively
removable based on his conviction for a crime of domestic violence under
section 	237(a)(2)(E)(i) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). 	In
remanding, we express no opinion on the 	ultimate outcome of 	these
proceedings. See Matter of L-O-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 413, 422 (BIA 1996).
Accordingly, the following orders will be entered.
ORDER: 	DHS’ appeal is sustained, and the Immigration Judge’s
August 25, 2023, decision is vacated.
FURTHER ORDER: 	The record is remanded to the Immigration
Court for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for
the entry of a new decision.