A-L-S-

page
794
Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 794 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4225
Matter of A-L-S-, Respondent
Decided July 28, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) Inherent in the concept of flight risk is not only whether the alien will appear at future
hearings before the Immigration Judge, but also whether the alien is likely to comply with
future orders of the Immigration Judge.
(2) Speculative future eligibility for relief based upon conjecture or hypothetical future
events does not materially diminish flight risk.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Pro se
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: 	Abby Weinberg, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	HUNSUCKER, GEMOETS, and CHABAN, Appellate
Immigration Judges.
HUNSUCKER, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) appeals an Immigration
Judge’s bond order dated October 2, 2025, granting the respondent’s request
for a change in custody status and releasing him from custody upon payment
of a $7,500 bond. 	DHS’ appeal will be sustained, and the record will be
remanded for further proceedings.
The respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico who was admitted to the
United States as a nonimmigrant visitor on or about December 30, 2012, and
was authorized to remain until January 26, 2013. The respondent remained
in the United States beyond that date without authorization. DHS served the
respondent with a notice to appear on September 9, 2025, charging him with
removability under section 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (2024), as an alien who remained in
the United States for a time longer than permitted.
On 	September 	26, 	2025, 	the 	respondent 	requested 	a 	custody
redetermination pursuant to section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
(2024). 	The Immigration Judge conducted a custody redetermination
hearing on October 2, 2025, and granted the respondent’s request for release
on bond in the amount of $7,500. The Immigration Judge concluded that the

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respondent did not present a danger to persons or property and that the bond
was sufficient to ensure his continued participation in removal proceedings.
In reaching that conclusion, the Immigration Judge relied on the respondent’s
residence in the United States since 2012, claimed family and community
ties, business ownership, and the possibility that he may seek relief from
removal in the future.
On appeal, DHS argues that the Immigration Judge erred in assessing
flight risk and improperly relied on speculative and unsupported forms of
potential relief from removal. 	DHS does not meaningfully challenge the
Immigration Judge’s dangerousness determination. 	Accordingly, the issue
before us is limited to whether the respondent carried his burden of
establishing that he is not a flight risk and that release on bond is warranted
under the circumstances presented here.
At a bond hearing conducted pursuant to section 236(a) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the burden is on the alien to establish to the satisfaction
of the Immigration Judge that “release would not pose a danger to property
or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.”
8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (2026); Matter of Salas Pena, 29 I&N Dec. 173, 174
(BIA 2025); Matter of Urena, 25 I&N Dec. 140, 141 (BIA 2009); Matter of
Adeniji, 22 I&N Dec. 1102, 1112–13 (BIA 1999). Section 236(a) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), “does not give detained aliens any right to release on
bond.” 	Matter of D-J-, 23 I&N Dec. 572, 575 (A.G. 2003). 	Rather, it
“merely gives the [Immigration Judge] the authority to grant bond if he [or
she] concludes, in the exercise of broad discretion, that the alien’s release on
bond is warranted.” Id.
In determining whether an alien merits release on bond and what amount
of bond is appropriate, the Immigration Judge may consider a variety of
factors, including:
(1) whether the alien has a fixed address in the United States; (2) the alien’s length
of residence in the United States; (3) the alien’s family ties in the United States, and
whether they may entitle the alien to reside permanently in the United States in the
future; (4) the alien’s employment history; (5) the alien’s record of appearance in
court; (6) the alien’s criminal record, including the extensiveness of criminal activity,
the recency of such activity, and the seriousness of the offenses; (7) the alien’s
history of immigration violations; (8) any attempts by the alien to flee prosecution
or otherwise escape from authorities; and (9) the alien’s manner of entry to the
United States.
Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006).

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“The Immigration Judge may also consider the likelihood that relief from
removal will be granted in determining whether an alien warrants bond.”
Matter of R-A-V-P-, 27 I&N Dec. 803, 805 (BIA 2020); see also Matter of
Andrade, 19 I&N Dec. 488, 490 (BIA 1987) (“A respondent with a greater
likelihood of being granted relief from deportation has a greater motivation
to appear for a deportation hearing than one who, based on a criminal record
or otherwise, has less potential of being granted such relief.”).
The respondent has resided in the United States since entering as a
temporary visitor in 2012 at approximately 15 years of age. 	The record
reflects that the respondent owns and operates a business and has family and
community ties in the United States. The Immigration Judge found that the
respondent’s close ties to the United States “include his U.S. citizen partner
or spouse,” noting that she referred to him as her “partner,” while the
respondent described her as his “wife.” The Immigration Judge further noted
that the respondent’s partner is pregnant with their first child together and
described the respondent as a “devoted, nurturing, and reliable father figure”
to her two other children.
Regarding relief from removal, the Immigration Judge mentioned that the
respondent “plans to file a Form I-589 application to request protection in
the United States,” and further stated that the respondent “appears” eligible
to apply for cancellation of removal and adjustment of status “if” he is
married and “if” a qualifying family-based petition is filed on his behalf.
The 	respondent 	presented 	evidence 	of 	longstanding 	residence,
employment history, business ownership, and community ties in the United
States. However, the respondent failed to demonstrate that he was potentially
eligible for any form of relief from removal. While the Immigration Judge
noted that the respondent planned to file for asylum and related relief, the
Immigration Judge failed to address the fact that the respondent never sought
such relief despite residing unlawfully in the United States for over a decade,
or how the respondent would be eligible for such relief since he claimed to
have no fear of return to Mexico when he was arrested in August 2025.
Regarding adjustment of status and cancellation of removal, the Immigration
Judge merely speculated that the respondent might be eligible for such relief
“if” he is married, without determining if the respondent is, in fact, married,
or addressing how the respondent might be eligible for such forms of relief.
Even where there is evidence to support it, “[a] finding is ‘clearly
erroneous’ when . . . the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Matter
of R-S-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 629, 637 (BIA 2003) (quoting United States v.

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United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). In this case, there is
nothing to support the findings of the Immigration Judge that the respondent
is even potentially eligible for relief from removal. Thus, the findings of the
Immigration Judge in this regard are clearly erroneous. 	See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2026).
Inherent in the concept of flight risk is not only whether the alien will
appear at future hearings before the Immigration Judge, but also whether the
alien is likely to comply with future orders of the Immigration Judge. 	See,
e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 528 (2003) (noting that detention of aliens
pending 	their 	removal 	proceedings 	“serves 	the 	purpose 	of 	preventing
deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to or during their removal
proceedings, thus increasing the chance that, if ordered removed, the aliens
will be successfully removed”); 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(f) (2026) (including the
likelihood that an alien “may abscond to avoid removal” as a factor in
assessing whether continued detention is warranted); see also, e.g., Johnson
v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 544 (2021) (observing, in the context of
reinstated removal orders, that aliens who previously violated removal orders
“may be less likely to comply” with future removal orders). 	An alien may
have every incentive to appear at future Immigration Court hearings and
prolong such proceedings in order to remain in the United States. See INS v.
Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992) (“[E]very delay works to the advantage
of the deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States.”);
see also Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 436 (2009) (“There is always a public
interest in prompt execution of removal orders,” and that interest “may be
heightened by the circumstances” such as if “the alien is particularly
dangerous, or has substantially prolonged his stay by abusing the processes
provided 	to 	him.”). 	However, 	that 	incentive 	does 	not 	necessarily
demonstrate that the alien will comply with an adverse ruling or final order
of removal, particularly where, as here, the respondent has resided and
worked unlawfully in the United States for many years.
The fact that an alien has filed, or intends to file, an application for relief
from removal does not meaningfully indicate that the alien will comply with
a future order of removal. Likewise, speculative future eligibility for relief
based upon conjecture or hypothetical future events does not materially
diminish flight risk. 	The mere ability of an alien to prolong immigration
proceedings 	by 	filing 	applications 	for 	relief 	does 	not 	meaningfully
demonstrate that an alien is not a flight risk. 	See Doherty, 502 U.S. at 323
(describing 	the 	inherent 	benefit 	to 	aliens 	of 	delaying 	immigration
proceedings).

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Although this Board reviews an Immigration Judge’s underlying factual
findings for clear error, whether the respondent poses a flight risk is a
question of judgment that we review novo. 	See Matter of Beltrand-
Rodriguez, 29 I&N Dec. 76, 77 (BIA 2025). As the Immigration Judge relied
upon potential eligibility for relief as a factor in determining flight risk, and
given the lack of factual findings supporting this factor, we deem it necessary
to remand the record for further fact finding. 	See Matter of S-H-, 23 I&N
Dec. 462, 465 (BIA 2002) (describing the importance of Immigration Judges
making “clear and complete findings of fact that are supported by the record
and 	in 	compliance 	with 	controlling 	law”); 	see 	also 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 	1003.1(d)(3)(iv) 	(2026) 	(regarding 	the 	Board’s 	limited 	fact-finding
authority).
In light of the above, we will sustain DHS’ appeal, vacate the Immigration
Judge’s bond order, and remand the record for further proceedings. 	On
remand, the Immigration Judge should reassess flight risk based on the
totality 	of 	the 	record, 	including 	the 	existence 	and 	substance 	of 	any
applications for relief, objective evidence 	relating to the respondent’s
claimed family relationships and equities, and the extent to which any
asserted forms of relief meaningfully bear on the respondent’s likelihood of
attendance at future proceedings and compliance with future orders. 	In
remanding, we express no opinion regarding the ultimate outcome of the
custody redetermination.
Accordingly, the following orders will be entered.
ORDER: DHS’ appeal is sustained.
FURTHER ORDER: The Immigration Judge’s bond order is vacated.
FURTHER ORDER: 	The record is remanded to the Immigration
Court for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for
the entry of a new custody decision.