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Matter of L-A-D-, Respondent
Decided May 22, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) The group “Mexican men with Schizoaffective Disorder,” defined only by such
diagnosis, is not cognizable as a particular social group under the Immigration and
Nationality Act.
(2) A series of speculative occurrences that also lack evidence of persecutory intent is
insufficient to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Hannah C. Nguyen, Esquire, Los Angeles, California
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Shana Martin, Assistant Chief
Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	GOODWIN and VOLKERT, Appellate Immigration Judges;
MCCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
MCCLOSKEY, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) appeals the Immigration
Judge’s June 13, 2025, decision granting the respondent’s application for
asylum under section 208(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2024). 	The respondent, a native and
citizen of Mexico, opposes the appeal. We will sustain the appeal, vacate the
Immigration Judge’s decision granting asylum, and remand the record to the
Immigration Court.
The Immigration Judge granted the respondent asylum based on a well-
founded fear of future persecution on account of his proposed particular
social 	group 	of 	“Mexican 	men 	with 	Schizoaffective 	Disorder.” 	The
respondent has been diagnosed with Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar
Disorder, 	Major 	Depressive 	Disorder, 	Posttraumatic 	Stress 	Disorder,
Intellectual Disability, Major Neurocognitive Disorder, Delusional Disorder,
and Unspecified Anxiety Disorder.1 	The respondent fears that he will be
1 	The Immigration Judge conducted a competency hearing, found the respondent not
competent to represent himself, and appointed a qualified representative. The Immigration
Judge also determined that the respondent’s serious mental disabilities constitute an

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detained in a Mexican mental health institution and subjected to persecutory
harm on account of his membership in the proposed particular social group.
To be cognizable, the respondent’s proposed particular social group of
“Mexican men with Schizoaffective Disorder” must be “(1) composed of
members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with
particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.” Matter
of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014). 	Particular social groups
related to mental illnesses present distinct cognizability challenges. 	The
Board has long recognized that mental illness is not a static condition. Matter
of M-A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 474, 480 (BIA 2011). 	Individuals with the same
diagnosed mental illness may exhibit vastly different symptoms. 	“Mental
illness . . . varies in degree. 	It can vary over time. 	It interferes with an
individual’s functioning at different times in different ways.” 	Indiana v.
Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 175 (2008). 	Medication and treatment also may
impact if, when, or how the symptoms of mental illnesses manifest.
In most cases, a particular social group based on a diagnosis alone will
not be cognizable, considering the broad spectrum of severity and symptoms
covered and the extent to which such symptoms are reasonably controlled by
medication. 	See, e.g., Temu v. Holder, 740 F.3d 887, 895 (4th Cir. 2014)
(explaining that mental illness “covers a huge swath of illness that ranges
from life-ending to innocuous”). To establish particularity, a respondent may
narrow an otherwise overbroad diagnosis with behaviors or symptoms of the
disease. See, e.g., id. (finding that the breadth of the term “bipolar disorder”
was limited by the requirement of “erratic behavior” in the proposed group).
However, “[a] component of a proposed social group can narrow the group
while at the same time failing to provide clear boundaries for ascertaining
who is a member of the group.” Andrade v. Garland, 94 F.4th 904, 914 (9th
Cir. 2024). 	Therefore, it is insufficient to present undefined, potential
symptoms that could be present with a diagnosis. 	See, e.g., id. at 912–13
(observing that, “absent appropriate record-based evidence, terms associated
with mental health can otherwise ‘lack[] precision’” (quoting Granados v.
Garland, 992 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2021))). 	A respondent must sufficiently
define the symptoms to set forth a benchmark for determining who falls
within the group. 	A respondent must then establish that he or she exhibits
the delineated symptoms to be a member of the group. 	An Immigration
extraordinary circumstance for purposes of the 1-year filing deadline. The respondent’s
competency and the timeliness of his asylum application are not at issue on appeal.

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Judge must also consider factors related to immutability, such as the impact
of treatment and medication, as well as the nature of the condition itself.
In this case, we determine that the Immigration Judge erred in finding that
the respondent’s proposed particular social group of “Mexican men with
Schizoaffective 	Disorder” 	is 	cognizable.2 	To 	satisfy 	the 	particularity
requirement, a group must “be discrete and have definable boundaries” and
cannot “be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, 	or subjective.” 	Matter of
M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 239 (BIA 2014). 	The term “schizoaffective
disorder” covers a broad spectrum of behavior exhibited with varying
degrees of severity. 	The proffered group does not include any limiting
language to narrow its breadth. Although the Immigration Judge found the
respondent’s proposed group was defined by “psychotic symptoms including
grandiose and persecutory delusions, auditory and visual hallucinations, as
well as disorganized thinking and behavior,” these symptoms are not defined
in the record nor included in the proposed group.3 	See, e.g., Andrade,
94 F.4th at 911 (finding that the group “Mexicans with mental health
disorders characterized by psychotic features who exhibit erratic behavior”
was not sufficiently particular because “erratic behavior” was not defined in
the record). 	Thus, the respondent’s proposed particular social group lacks
the particularity required to be cognizable under the INA.
The respondent has also not established his proposed particular social
group is sufficiently socially distinct. Social distinction requires a “showing
that society in general perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the
particular characteristic to be a group.” Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208,
217 (BIA 2014), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Reyes v. Lynch,
842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016). For particular social groups related to mental
illness, the proper consideration is whether society perceives individuals in
the proposed group distinctly, not whether a doctor or psychologist would
view one mental illness as distinct from another. 	We do not doubt that a
2 	On appeal, the respondent does not assert that his proposed particular social groups of
“bisexual Mexican men,” “Mexican men who are HIV positive,” and “Mexican men with
a history of drug use” are cognizable. Therefore, we deem these aspects of the respondent’s
claims to be waived. See Matter of P-B-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 43, 44 n.1 (BIA 2020) (stating
that arguments not raised on appeal are deemed waived).
3 	Even if the respondent included these symptoms in his proffered group, he has not
presented evidence establishing the onset or duration of his symptoms, or effect of
medication on the expression of such symptoms. 	While the record reflects that the
respondent has a history of his illness, identifying symptoms were not present while the
respondent lived in Mexico, where he was never medicated or identified as having a mental
illness.

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mental health professional would view an individual with schizoaffective
disorder as distinct from someone with bipolar disorder, for example.
However, 	the 	social 	distinction 	analysis 	requires 	the 	respondent 	to
demonstrate that “society in general” considers the group to be distinct. Id.
Here, to establish social distinction, the respondent must demonstrate that
Mexican society perceives men diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder as a
distinct group within society. The Immigration Judge relied on generalized
country conditions evidence of stigma against mentally ill individuals in
general, rather than analyzing society’s perception of individuals with
schizoaffective disorder. 	Evidence suggests that Mexican society may
perceive those who exhibit certain symptoms, such as erratic or bizarre
behaviors, as a distinct group. 	However, these symptoms may be present
with various mental illnesses or other conditions such as drug abuse or
intoxication. Although outward visibility is not required, the respondent only
points to limited anecdotal evidence that Mexican society considers those
diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder as a distinct group regardless of the
presence of symptoms. 	See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. at 216
(explaining that literal or “ocular” visibility is not required). 	As the
respondent’s proposed particular social group includes all Mexican men
diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, whether they display symptoms or
not, the record does not establish that Mexican society views the entire group
defined solely by a diagnosis as socially distinct.
Accordingly, 	we 	conclude 	that 	the 	group 	“Mexican 	men 	with
Schizoaffective Disorder,” defined only by such diagnosis, is not cognizable
under the INA. Because the respondent’s proposed particular social group is
not particular or socially distinct within the meaning of the INA, it does not
provide a basis for asylum.4
Even if “Mexican men with Schizoaffective Disorder” were a cognizable
particular social group, the respondent has not shown a well-founded fear of
persecution because the likelihood of future harm is speculative. 	The
Immigration Judge’s determination relies on the occurrence of a series of
events: (1) the respondent is unable to get effective medication in Mexico;
(2) he displays erratic behavior; (3) the erratic behavior causes him to come
to the attention of authorities; (4) the authorities respond by institutionalizing
him; and (5) while institutionalized, he is persecuted on account of his
4 	Although the Immigration Judge did not properly consider the impact of any medication
or treatment on the respondent’s illness in the immutability analysis, we deem it
unnecessary to remand for reassessment of immutability as the lack of particularity and
social distinction is dispositive on the issue of cognizability.

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schizoaffective disorder. The respondent has not established that each step
in this series has a reasonable possibility of occurring.
First, the respondent has not shown that he would be unable to receive
effective medical care in Mexico. 	The respondent has been receiving
medication and treatment in the United 	States for his schizoaffective
disorder, despite the absence of any family support. Although the respondent
asserts that his family would not be able to financially support him and that
certain medications are difficult to obtain in Mexico, the record does not
establish that his specific medication, or another effective medication or
treatment, would be unavailable or too costly for him to access. Moreover,
his family supported him with his HIV diagnosis, and, with their support, he
was able to receive the proper medication and treatment for his HIV in
Mexico.
Even assuming the respondent would not be able to receive proper
medication, it is speculative that his subsequent behavior would bring him to
the attention of authorities. 	The respondent lived in Mexico intermittently
from 2006 to 2022 without medication and had no interactions with Mexican
authorities. Although the respondent came to the attention of authorities in
the United States, this occurred due to the respondent’s illegal drug use rather
than symptoms associated with schizoaffective disorder. 	Even if the
respondent did have interactions with the authorities in Mexico, it is
speculative that such an interaction would result in his institutionalization.
The record reflects that institutionalization occurs primarily when the
individual is unable to live with family. Although the respondent claims he
would not have the financial support of his family, he does not assert that his
family would deny him housing or otherwise force authorities to resort to
institutionalization.
Finally, even if institutionalized, the respondent has not established that
the government’s actions would constitute persecution on account of his
group membership. 	Involuntary commitment and treatment for potentially
dangerous 	mental 	illnesses 	“is 	a 	legitimate 	exercise 	of 	[a 	country’s]
sovereign authority.” Joshi v. Garland, 112 F.4th 181, 191 (4th Cir. 2024).
The Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized that a “state has
a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its
citizens 	who 	are 	unable 	because 	of 	emotional 	disorders 	to 	care 	for
themselves.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). Poor conditions
in a psychiatric institution, a lack of resources, and inadequate medical care
are insufficient to demonstrate persecution without a persecutory motive.
See, e.g., Ferchichi v. Bondi, 128 F.4th 966, 974 (8th Cir. 2025) (recognizing
that “an ‘absence of [a] nexus between the conditions and a persecutory

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motive’ negates a finding of inadequate medical care as persecution”
(quoting Perez-Rodriguez v. Barr, 951 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 2020)));
Mendoza-Alvarez v. Holder, 714 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n
inadequate healthcare system is not persecution and is not harm inflicted
because of membership in a particular social group.”). 	Determining the
appropriate allocation of resources to address involuntary mental health
treatment is part of a nation’s sovereign authority and, thus, well beyond the
authority of the Immigration Courts or this Board to assess. 	See, e.g.,
Soobrian v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 388 F. App’x 182, 191 (3d Cir. 2010)
(declining 	to 	“second-guess 	the 	government’s 	allocation 	of 	its 	scarce
resources between the mentally well and the mentally ill” because if “a
disproportionate allocation of scarce resources alone [is] sufficient to be
deemed persecution, we would necessarily become entangled in matters of
international budgetary analysis”); Raffington v. INS, 340 F.3d 720, 723 (8th
Cir. 2003) (explaining that reports that “Jamaica devotes limited resources to
treating those who are mentally ill” does not establish persecution).
The evidence in this case does not establish that the either Mexican
government or healthcare workers would be motivated by a desire to harm
the respondent on account of his membership in his proposed particular
social group. 	See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. at 223 (holding that an
applicant has the burden of demonstrating a risk of persecution on account
of his membership in a cognizable particular social group). As observed by
the Immigration Judge, there are reports 	of inadequate treatment and
incidents of abuse in Mexican mental health institutions. 	The evidence
reflects that health care workers lack sufficient resources and training.
However, this lack of resources, even when it results in harm, does not
demonstrate the government possesses persecutory intent or is motivated to
harm the respondent on account of his membership in a particular social
group. See, e.g., Perez-Rodriguez v. Barr, 951 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 2020)
(holding 	that 	“Mexico’s 	inability 	to 	adequately 	fund 	mental-health
institutions” 	showed 	“a 	lack 	of 	resources 	and 	insufficient 	political
commitment,” but did not demonstrate the government was motivated to
persecute individuals with schizophrenia). Additionally, the respondent has
not presented evidence that the government guides or encourages healthcare
workers to engage in abusive behavior. 	See, e.g., id. at 976 (indicating the
government did not have persecutory motive because evidence did not reflect
the government mandated the restraint of patients).
The record also does not reflect that healthcare workers would be
motivated to persecute the respondent on account of his schizoaffective
disorder. See Matter of A-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 199, 209 (BIA 2021) (describing
a respondent’s burden to demonstrate that a protected ground is one central

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reason for the decision to target him), reinstated by Matter of S-S-F-M-,
29 I&N Dec. 207 (A.G. 2025). 	The record contains evidence of some
incidents of ill treatment that are motivated by criminal intent of health care
workers. 	The evidence also indicates that health care workers sometimes
resort to extreme measures in an effort to prevent patients from harming
themselves or others, or for noncompliance with policies, but this evidence
does not show that such measures are used specifically because patients have
schizoaffective disorder. 	See, e.g., Perez-Rodriguez, 951 F.3d at 976
(explaining that healthcare workers restraining “patients who exhibit erratic
behavior to prevent them from harming themselves and others” did not
constitute persecution); Angel-Lopez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 853 F. App’x 440,
444–45 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (finding that “underfunded treatment
and 	insufficient 	training” 	did 	not 	establish 	persecutory 	motive).
Accordingly, even if the respondent were institutionalized, he has not shown
that his membership in his proposed particular social group would be at least
one central reason for the harm he fears.
A series of speculative occurrences that also lack evidence of persecutory
intent is insufficient to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution.
Thus, the Immigration Judge erred in finding the respondent’s fear of
persecution to be objectively reasonable.
The 	respondent 	has 	also 	not 	established 	a 	pattern 	or 	practice 	of
persecution against Mexican men with schizoaffective disorder. See 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii) (2020). 	A pattern or practice of persecution exists
when persecution of a group is “systemic or pervasive.” 	Gonzalez-Aguilar
v. Garland, 29 F.4th 1208 (10th Cir. 2022). Although we acknowledge that
those with mental illnesses may experience a variety of harms in Mexico, the
record evidence “does not describe persecution so systemic or pervasive as
to amount to a pattern or practice of persecution” against men with
schizoaffective disorder. 	Matter of A-M-, 23 I&N Dec. 737, 741–42 (BIA
2005).
Accordingly, the respondent has not shown that any feared harm is tied
to his membership in a cognizable particular social group or that he has a
well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his membership in such
a group. Thus, he has not met his burden of proof for asylum. It follows that
the respondent has also not met his burden of proof for withholding of
removal, which similarly requires a nexus to a protected ground and also
requires the higher standard of a clear probability of persecution. 	See INA
§ 241(b)(3)(A) , 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2) (2026). The
Immigration Judge did not adjudicate the respondent’s claim for protection
under 	the 	regulations 	implementing 	the 	Convention 	Against 	Torture

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(“CAT”).5 We will therefore remand the record for the Immigration Judge
to consider the respondent’s eligibility for CAT protection.
Accordingly, the following orders will be entered.
ORDER: 	DHS’ appeal is sustained, and the Immigration Judge’s
June 13, 2025, decision granting asylum is vacated.
FURTHER ORDERED: 	The respondent’s applications for asylum
and withholding of removal under sections 208(b)(1)(A) and 241(b)(3) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A), 1231(b)(3)(A),
are denied.
FURTHER ORDERED: The record is remanded to the Immigration
Court for further proceedings on the respondent’s application for protection
under the Convention Against Torture consistent with the foregoing opinion
and for the entry of a new decision.
5 	The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force for United States Nov. 20, 1994). 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17 (2026); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a) (2020).