I-B-M-S-

page
628
Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 628 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4193
Matter of I-B-M-S-, et al., Respondents
Decided May 19, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) The closer in time a change of venue request is made to an individual hearing, the less
likely it is a party will be able to establish good cause. Matter of Rahman, 20 I&N Dec.
480 (BIA 1992), followed.
(2) Off-the-record dialogue in immigration proceedings should be limited, and the
Immigration Judge must provide a true and complete summary of any off-the-record
discussion.
(3) An Immigration Judge must act as a neutral and impartial arbiter, and the obligation of
neutrality extends equally to an Immigration Judge’s treatment of both parties.
FOR THE RESPONDENTS: Pro se
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Christian Pasciak, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: OWEN and GALLOW, Appellate Immigration Judges; PICOS,
Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
OWEN, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The 	Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security 	(“DHS”) 	has 	filed 	an
interlocutory appeal from the Immigration Judge’s December 12, 2025,
decision granting the respondents’ motion to change venue. The respondents
have not responded to the appeal. 	The Board generally does not entertain
interlocutory appeals. 	Matter of M-D-, 24 I&N Dec. 138, 139 (BIA 2007).
However, given the circumstances in this case, we find it appropriate to
exercise our jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal. 	The appeal will be
sustained. 	The Immigration Judge’s December 12, 2025, decision will be
vacated, and the record will be remanded to the Immigration Court in Boston,
Massachusetts, for further proceedings.
The respondents are natives and citizens of Brazil who entered the
United States without inspection on or about June 29, 2022, near El Paso,
Texas. The proceedings commenced with the filing of notices to appear in
August 2022 with the Boston Immigration Court. 	The respondents were
scheduled for and appeared at two master calendar hearings at the Boston

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 628 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4193
page
629
Immigration Court on April 26, 2023, and August 21, 2024. The respondents
filed a Form EOIR-33, Change of Address Form, in August 2024 and
November 2025, but their new addresses were in the same city and had the
same zip code as their initial address listed on the notices to appear. 	The
respondents 	were 	scheduled 	for 	an 	individual 	hearing 	at 	the 	Boston
Immigration Court on December 12, 2025. 	They appeared for this hearing
via video conference and were represented by counsel.
At the beginning of the individual hearing, the Immigration Judge asked
respondents’ counsel if they would be seeking a change of venue or
proceeding with the scheduled hearing. Respondents’ counsel indicated they
wished to proceed with the scheduled hearing. 	After direct examination
commenced, respondents’ counsel requested a recess. 	The Immigration
Judge engaged in an off-the-record conversation with the parties. According
to the Immigration Judge’s summary of the off-the-record discussion, it
related to asylum derivation issues and the respondents’ ability to request a
change of venue. Respondents’ counsel subsequently made an oral motion
to change venue to Chelmsford, Massachusetts. Counsel for DHS opposed
the motion, noting that no reason was provided in support of the motion and
that it would be a waste of judicial resources to change venue given that
testimony had already begun. Respondents’ counsel then indicated that the
motion to change venue was requested because the family has a young child
and because of unspecified difficulties in their case. The Immigration Judge
granted the respondents’ motion over DHS’ objection, relying solely on the
fact that the zip code for the respondents’ address corresponded with the
Chelmsford Immigration Court.
On appeal, DHS argues that the Immigration Judge erred by granting the
change of venue without properly assessing whether good cause was shown.
For the reasons discussed below, we agree. 	Upon our de novo review, we
will reverse the Immigration Judge’s decision granting the venue change.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2026).
An Immigration Judge may, for good cause, order a change of venue upon
motion by one of the parties and only after the other party has been given
notice and an opportunity to respond to the motion. 	8 C.F.R. § 1003.20(b)
(2026). 	Determining whether good cause has been shown requires an
Immigration Judge to balance relevant factors including administrative
convenience, expeditious treatment of the case, the location of witnesses,
cost of transporting 	witnesses or evidence 	to a new location, 	factors
commonly associated with the alien’s place of residence, and the position of
the opposing party. 	Matter of Rahman, 20 I&N Dec. 480, 482–84 (BIA
1992).

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 628 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4193
page
630
While no single factor is dispositive when determining whether good
cause has been shown, the significance of each factor will vary depending on
the facts and circumstances of a given case. When considering expeditious
treatment of the case, the significance of this factor depends, in large part, on
when the request for change of venue is made. The weight accorded to this
specific 	factor 	increases 	as 	the 	proceedings 	progress. 	As 	a 	result,
circumstances that may have warranted a change of venue at an early stage
of proceedings may be insufficient to establish good cause at a later stage,
such 	as 	when 	the 	individual 	hearing 	has 	been 	scheduled 	or 	already
commenced. 	When considering a request for a change of venue, an
Immigration Judge must consider how long a case has been pending, the
number of hearings previously held, and at what stage of the proceedings a
party is making the request. The closer in time a change of venue request is
made to an individual hearing, the less likely it is a party will be able to
establish good cause for a change of venue given the need for expeditious
treatment of the proceedings and the potential prejudice to the nonmoving
party. Absent extraordinary circumstances, venue should not be changed the
day of an individual hearing.
In the instant case, the Immigration Judge’s order reflects no evaluation
or balancing of the factors that we have previously found to be relevant to a
finding of good cause for a change of venue. 	See id. 	Here, the relevant
factors include the extensive history of the case with the Boston Immigration
Court, the need for expeditious treatment of the case, the ability of the
respondents to appear via video conference, the undue delay in these
proceedings caused by such a change in venue after direct examination had
commenced, and DHS’ opposition to the motion. 	The sole reason the
Immigration Judge identified for granting the respondents’ request was their
zip code, which had not changed since the commencement of proceedings
and, standing alone, was insufficient to establish good cause. 	While the
factors associated with the respondents’ place of residence may be relevant
to the question of proper venue, the mere fact that the respondents reside in
a zip code corresponding with another court is insufficient cause to outweigh
the other significant factors that militate against changing venue at this late
stage 	of 	proceedings, 	including 	DHS’ 	opposition 	and 	the 	need 	for
expeditious treatment of the case. See id. at 484.
We further observe that there is no specific evidence in this case showing
that the respondents would have been prejudiced by proceeding with their
hearing at the Boston Immigration Court, which was already in progress.
There is no showing that this was not a reasonably convenient venue for the
respondents or their counsel, considering they previously appeared in that
court on multiple occasions, both in person and via video conference, and

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 628 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4193
page
631
had not previously requested a change of venue. 	While the respondents
asserted that a change of venue was necessary because they have a young
child and because they faced difficulties in their case, they did not identify
what those difficulties were or explain why these circumstances warranted a
change of venue at this stage of the proceedings, particularly since the merits
hearing had already commenced. 	Upon consideration of the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude the Immigration Judge erred in granting a
change of venue after the commencement of direct examination, over DHS’
objection, and without balancing all relevant factors. We will vacate the
Immigration Judge’s order granting the change of venue and transfer venue
back to the Boston Immigration Court.
We 	separately 	address 	the 	issue 	of 	off-the-record 	discussions.
Immigration Judges must maintain and preserve a thorough and complete
record of the proceeding. 	See section 240(b)(4)(C) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(C) (2024). 	Immigration
Judges should therefore limit off-the-record dialogue. On rare occasions, an
Immigration Judge may permit off-the-record dialogue during Immigration
Court proceedings when necessary for the appropriate consideration of issues
relevant to the case. However, fundamental fairness requires that both parties
be present for any off-the-record discussion and that the Immigration Judge
provide, on the record, a true and complete summary of the off-the-record
discussion. As appropriate, the parties shall be given the opportunity to add
to or amend the summary of any off-the-record discussion. These practices
ensure that a complete record is preserved in accordance with fair hearing
principles and to enable meaningful appellate review.
In the instant case, the Immigration Judge erred in failing to fully describe
and memorialize the off-the-record conversation that took place during the
individual hearing. 	This is especially important in this case, where the
Immigration Judge only generally referenced asylum derivation issues and
then invited respondents’ counsel to make an oral motion to change venue.
The record is devoid of any connection between derived asylum eligibility
and the request for a change of venue. When asked by DHS to explain why
she was granting the motion, the Immigration Judge only identified the
respondents’ zip code as the basis for her order. 	The lack of a full and
complete summary of the off-the-record conversation hampers our review of
the Immigration Judge’s decision. 	Combined with the absence of any
meaningful discussion of the factors relevant for a change of venue, it also
leaves us with the impression that the Immigration Judge relied solely on
equitable considerations when granting the motion. This is further supported
by the Immigration Judge’s curious statement that she “often defers to

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 628 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4193
page
632
respondents’ counsels and respondents’ preference for venue where the zip
[c]ode is proper.”
We are also troubled by the Immigration Judge’s decision to unmark
previously marked exhibits after granting the change of venue. 	The
Immigration Judge stated she was doing so to allow the next Immigration
Judge to consider the case from the beginning. However, a change of venue
does not restart the proceedings or affect the evidentiary record. 	Rather,
proceedings continue from that point, and all documentary evidence that was
presented and accepted by the court remains a part of the record. 	The
Immigration Judge erred in unmarking the exhibits and thereby failing to
preserve “a complete record . . . of all testimony and evidence produced at
the proceeding.” Id.
“Immigration Judges have broad discretion to conduct and control
immigration proceedings . . . .” Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264,
265 (BIA 2010); accord Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 568 (1st Cir.
1999); 	see 	8 	C.F.R. 	§ 	1003.36 	(2026); 	INA 	240(b)(1), 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(1). However, fair hearing principles require Immigration Judges
to act as “neutral and impartial arbiters” to both parties and ensure the
fundamental 	fairness 	of 	the 	proceedings 	they 	oversee. 	Aguilar-Solis,
168 F.3d at 569; see also, e.g., 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.101(b)(8), (14) (2026)
(requiring United States Government employees to “act impartially and not
give preferential treatment to any private organization or individual” and to
“endeavor to avoid any actions creating the appearance that they are violating
the law or the ethical standards”). 	Although the nature of the interests at
stake differs, fundamental fairness demands that both the respondent and
DHS be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Lassiter v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1981) (explaining that due process
requires “fundamental fairness”); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
267 (1970) (“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the
opportunity to be heard.” (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914))). 	The obligation of neutrality therefore extends equally to an
Immigration Judge’s treatment of both parties, and an Immigration Judge
may not justify procedural and evidentiary rulings that compromise DHS’
ability to fully present its case. Ensuring a fair hearing requires adherence to
procedures that respect the rights of all parties in immigration proceedings.
Here, 	the 	Immigration 	Judge’s 	comments 	and 	conduct 	during 	the
individual 	hearing 	raise 	concerns 	regarding 	neutrality 	and 	create 	an
appearance of bias, which is inconsistent with the Immigration Judge’s role
in these proceedings. See Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 203–04 (3d Cir.
1996) (holding that one of the “most basic of due process protections” is “a

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 628 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4193
page
633
hearing before a neutral immigration judge”). 	The Immigration Judge’s
statement that she often gives deference to respondents’ preference for venue
is particularly concerning. “[I]mmigration [J]udges must assiduously refrain
from becoming advocates for either party.” Aguilar-Solis, 168 F.3d at 569.
Generally, we are reluctant to direct that a case be reassigned to a different
Immigration Judge and only do so on rare occasions. 	However, given the
appearance of bias and the numerous procedural errors committed by the
Immigration Judge in this case, we find it appropriate to remand the record
for a new hearing before a different Immigration Judge. See generally Matter
of Exame, 18 I&N Dec. 303, 305–07 (BIA 1982) (discussing considerations
for judicial conduct that constitute disqualifying bias).
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the Immigration Judge’s order
granting the change of venue and transfer venue to the Boston Immigration
Court for a hearing before a different Immigration Judge. 	On remand, the
Immigration Judge shall schedule an individual hearing on an expedited
basis. Accordingly, the following orders will be entered.
ORDER: 	DHS’ appeal is sustained, and the Immigration Judge’s
December 12, 2025, decision is vacated.
FURTHER 	ORDER: 	The 	record 	is 	remanded 	to 	the 	Boston,
Massachusetts, Immigration Court for assignment to a new Immigration
Judge and for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion.