C-P-Y-

page
610
Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 610 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4191
Matter of C-P-Y-, Respondent
Decided May 6, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
The words “arrival” and “arrived” in the serious nonpolitical crime bar provisions at
sections 208(b)(2)(A)(iii) and 241(b)(3)(B)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii), refer to the alien’s most recent arrival
in the United States.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Nancy L. Alexander, Esquire, Portland, Oregon
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Dae C. Choi, Associate Legal
Advisor
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	GOODWIN and MULLANE, Appellate Immigration Judges;
MCCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, appeals from the
Immigration Judge’s March 19, 2025, decision denying his applications for
cancellation 	of removal for certain permanent residents under section
240A(a) 	of 	the 	Immigration 	and 	Nationality 	Act 	(“INA”), 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1229b(a) (2024), asylum under section 208(b)(1)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(A) (2024), withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3)(A)
of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2024), and protection under the
regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 	We
requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties.2 	We will
dismiss the appeal.
1 	The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force for United States Nov. 20, 1994). 	8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c) (2026); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a) (2020).
2 	We acknowledge with appreciation the parties’ supplemental briefs.

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I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 13, 2024, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
initiated removal proceedings against the respondent, alleging that he is not
a citizen or national of the United States, he is a native of Mexico, he was
admitted to the United States at El Paso, Texas, on or about March 24, 1995,
as a lawful permanent resident, and on August 23, 2005, he was convicted in
the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, for the offense of
willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant in violation of
section 273.5(a) of the California Penal Code. DHS charged the respondent
with removability under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2024), for having been convicted of a crime of domestic
violence, stalking, or child abuse. On May 29, 2024, the Immigration Judge
determined the respondent was not competent to represent himself in
removal proceedings and appointed a qualified representative to assist him.
The Immigration Judge held the respondent is removable as charged. 	The
respondent asserted a fear of returning to Mexico because of his bisexuality
and mental illness. The Immigration Judge found the respondent credible.
The respondent was apprehended by U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement 	based 	on 	a 	referral 	from 	U.S. 	Interpol 	identifying 	the
respondent as the subject of an Interpol Red Notice. 	The Record of
Deportable/Inadmissible 	Alien 	(“Form 	I-213”) 	indicates 	that 	an 	arrest
warrant was issued by the Government of Mexico for the crime of “human
trafficking 	in 	the 	category 	of 	recruitment 	for 	the 	purpose 	of 	sexual
exploitation,” 	that 	the 	Red 	Notice 	and 	the 	Mexican 	warrant 	for 	the
respondent’s arrest were active, and, based on the identifiers in the warrant,
a match existed between the warrant and the respondent.
The Immigration Judge found that the Mexican arrest warrant contains
the respondent’s name and other identifiers related to the respondent and
states that the respondent is wanted in relation to the sexual exploitation of a
minor. 	The arrest warrant asserts that the respondent established a sexual
relationship with a minor, moved her from her home to the city of Tijuana,
and engaged her in prostitution for the purpose of gaining an economic
benefit. 	Further, 	the 	Immigration 	Judge 	considered 	the 	respondent’s
testimony that he fathered children with the minor victim.
Considering the evidentiary findings and 	the lack of any political
character associated with the criminal offenses alleged in the Mexican arrest
warrant, the Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent is ineligible
for asylum and withholding of removal because there are serious reasons to
believe 	the 	respondent 	committed 	a 	serious 	nonpolitical 	crime. 	The

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Immigration Judge also denied the respondent’s claims for deferral of
removal under the CAT and cancellation of removal.
II. 	ISSUE
This case presents the issue of whether the statutory terms “arrival” and
“arrived” in the serious nonpolitical crime bar at sections 208(b)(2)(A)(iii)
and 	241(b)(3)(B)(iii) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	1158(b)(2)(A)(iii),
1231(b)(3)(B)(iii), refer solely to an alien’s initial admission in the United
States or include any subsequent arrival in the United States despite a prior
admission.
III. 	ANALYSIS
An applicant is barred from obtaining asylum “if the Attorney General
determines that . . . there are serious reasons for believing that the alien has
committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to the
arrival of the alien in the United States.” INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii). 	An applicant is similarly barred from obtaining
withholding of removal “if the Attorney General decides that . . . there are
serious reasons to believe that the alien committed a serious nonpolitical
crime outside the United States before the alien arrived in the United States.”
INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii). 	Each of these two
provisions of the INA is commonly referred to as “the serious nonpolitical
crime bar” to the relevant relief.
The respondent argues that the serious nonpolitical crime bar does not
apply to him because the alleged criminal activity occurred after his
admission into the United States as a lawful permanent resident. This appeal,
thus, requires us to interpret the terms “arrival” and “arrived” in the serious
nonpolitical crime bar statutes. 	The meaning of the terms “arrival” and
“arrived” for purposes of the serious nonpolitical crime bar is an issue of first
impression.
The 	serious 	nonpolitical 	crime 	bar 	provisions 	in 	sections
208(b)(2)(A)(iii) 	and 	241(b)(3)(B)(iii) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii), serve the same purpose, namely, to
preclude statutory relief if the Attorney General determines there are serious
reasons to believe the alien committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside
of the United Sates “prior to the arrival of the alien” or “before the alien
arrived” in the United States. Therefore, we should interpret these statutory
provisions consistently. 	See Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S.
735, 752 (1988) (“Given the parallel purpose, structure, and language of [the

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statute], we must interpret that provision in the same manner.”); Ariz. All. for
Cmty. Health Ctrs. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 47 F.4th 992,
999 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that “courts must ‘interpret [a] statut[e] as a
whole, giving effect to each word and making every effort not to interpret a
provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute
inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous’ and that ‘[p]articular phrases must
be construed in light of the overall purpose and structure of the whole
statutory scheme”) (quoting United States v. Neal, 776 F.3d 645, 652 (9th
Cir. 2015)).
The INA does not define the terms “arrival” and “arrived.” 	When a
phrase “is not defined in the statute, our textual analysis begins by consulting
contemporaneous dictionaries, because we are bound to assume that the
legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.”
Doe 1–10 v. Fitzgerald, 102 F.4th 1089, 1099 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation
omitted). Thus, we will consult contemporaneous dictionaries to discern the
plain meaning of the noun “arrival” and the verb “arrive,” of which “arrived”
is the past tense, and will interpret them consistently.
The serious nonpolitical crime bar was first enacted by the Refugee Act
of 1980 with respect to withholding of deportation or return of an alien to a
country where the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened on account of
a 	statutorily 	protected 	ground. 	See 	INA 	§ 	243(h)(2)(C), 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1253(h)(2)(C) (1980) (withholding of deportation “shall not apply to any
alien if the Attorney General determines that . . . 	there are serious reasons
for considering that the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime
outside the United States prior to the arrival of the alien in the United
States”); Matter of Rodriguez-Palma, 17 I&N Dec. 465, 467–68 (BIA 1980)
(explaining that “[s]ection 243(h) was recently amended by the Refugee Act
of 1980 and now provides” the serious nonpolitical crime bar to relief, and
noting that “[t]he term ‘serious nonpolitical crime’ is new to the Immigration
Act and is not further defined therein.”). On September 30, 1996, as part of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-602, 691 (“IIRIRA”),
Congress 	enacted 	the 	serious 	nonpolitical 	crime 	bars 	to 	asylum 	and
withholding of removal in sections 208(b)(2)(A)(iii) and 241(b)(3) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii), 1231(b)(3).
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language
Unabridged (1993) and the American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language (3d ed. 1996), which were in effect at the time of the enactment of
the serious nonpolitical crime bar provisions in 1996, both define the noun
“arrival” as “the act of arriving” and the verb “arrive” as “to reach a

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destination.” 	Based on these definitions, we conclude that the words
“arrival” and “arrived” in their ordinary meaning are not synonymous with
the words “admission” or “admitted,” which are specifically defined in the
INA. 	See INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2024) (“The
terms ‘admission’ and ‘admitted’ mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful
entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by
an immigration officer.”).
“IIRIRA amended section 101(a)(13) of the Act by entirely supplanting
the definition of ‘entry’ with definitions for the terms ‘admission’ and
‘admitted.’” Matter of Collado, 21 I&N Dec. 1061, 1064 (BIA 1998). We
are persuaded that Congress could have replaced the terms “arrival” and
“arrived” with the terms “admission” and “admitted” when enacting IIRIRA
but chose not to do so. “Where Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23
(1983) (citation omitted). We thus conclude that the difference between the
statutory language “arrival” and “arrived” in the serious nonpolitical crime
bar and “admission” and “admitted” as defined in section 101(a)(13)(A) of
the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(13)(A), is intentional.
Moreover, interpreting the terms “arrival” and “arrived” in the serious
nonpolitical crime bar to mean “admission” and “admitted” as defined in
section 101(a)(13)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A), would render
the serious nonpolitical crime bar inapplicable to aliens who have never been
admitted, including aliens who apply for asylum or withholding of removal
after entry into the United States without inspection. 	We do not think that
Congress intended such an absurd result. 	Cf. Matter of Chavez-Alvarez,
26 I&N Dec. 274, 278 (BIA 2014) (“there should be no loophole in the law
that would allow an alien who enters the country without inspection and
adjusts status to avoid removal if he or she subsequently commits an
aggravated felony”). Accordingly, we conclude that the terms “arrival” and
“arrived” in the serious nonpolitical crime bar provisions have their ordinary
meaning and refer to the alien’s reaching the United States as a destination.
Use of the definite article “the” preceding the word “arrival” in section
208(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii), refers to a single
date. 	The question remains how to determine that single date for purposes
of the serious nonpolitical crime bar if an alien has, like the respondent, made
more than one arrival in the United States.

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The asylum statute uses the word “arrival” in another provision, namely
the 1-year time limit for filing an asylum application in section 208(a)(2)(B)
of the INA, 8 U.S.C.§ 1158(a)(2)(B) (2024). 	The INA requires an asylum
application to be filed “within 1 year after the date of the alien’s arrival in
the United States.” 	INA § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C.§ 1158(a)(2)(B). 	This
provision, like the serious nonpolitical crime bar, was enacted in 1996 as part
of IIRIRA. IIRIRA § 604, 110 Stat. at 3009-691. We conclude that “arrival”
should be construed consistently in the two sections. 	Congress “generally
uses a particular word with a consistent meaning in a given context,”
particularly “when the statutes were enacted by the same legislative body at
the same time.” Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243–44 (1972).
The regulation governing how to calculate the 1-year statutory time limit
for filing an asylum application provides that “[t]he 1-year period shall be
calculated from the date of the alien’s last arrival in the United States or
April 1, 1997, whichever is later.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2)(ii) (2026). “[T]he
words ‘last arrival’ refer to an alien’s most recent coming or crossing into the
United States after having traveled from somewhere outside of the country.”
Matter of F-P-R-, 24 I&N Dec. 681, 683 (BIA 2008). Although there is not
a similar regulation applicable to the serious nonpolitical crime bar in section
208(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii), our interest in
consistently interpreting the term within the statute guides us to conclude that
“arrival” 	in 	section 	208(b)(2)(A)(iii) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii), likewise refers to the alien’s most recent arrival in the
United States.
This 	interpretation 	is 	consistent 	with 	the 	purposes 	of 	the 	serious
nonpolitical crime bar, which is “to protect the community of a receiving
country from the danger of admitting a refugee who has committed a serious
common 	crime.” 	United 	Nations 	High 	Commissioner 	for 	Refugees,
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and
Guidelines on International Protection Under the 1951 Convention and the
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 151 (2019). We are not
persuaded by the respondent’s argument that the serious nonpolitical crime
bar does not apply to lawful permanent residents like him because other
provisions of the INA serve the purpose of protecting the community from
lawful permanent residents who have committed serious crimes. 	See INA
section 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (providing for removability based
on 	criminal 	convictions), 	and 	INA 	sections 	208(b)(2)(A)(ii) 	and
241(b)(3)(B)(ii), 	8 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 	231(b)(3)(B)(ii)
(respectively 	barring 	asylum 	and 	withholding 	of 	removal 	based 	on
convictions for a particularly serious crime). For example, those provisions

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are limited to criminal convictions and hence do not include all conduct
covered by the serious nonpolitical crime bar.
The respondent also argues that interpreting the serious nonpolitical
crime bar to apply to him would render the bar void for vagueness because it
failed to give him sufficient notice of the conduct the statute punishes.
“Neither the Board nor the Immigration Judges have the authority to rule on
the constitutionality of the statutes we administer, so we lack jurisdiction to
address this claim.” 	Matter of G-K-, 26 I&N Dec. 88, 96–97 (BIA 2013)
(finding no authority to reach void-for-vagueness argument).
We thus hold that the words “arrival” and “arrived” in the serious
nonpolitical 	crime 	bar 	provisions 	at 	sections 	208(b)(2)(A)(iii) 	and
241(b)(3)(B)(iii) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	1158(b)(2)(A)(iii),
1231(b)(3)(B)(iii), refer to the alien’s most recent arrival in the United States.
The respondent does not contest that the offense of which he is accused
occurred prior to his last arrival in the United States on June 24, 2018.
Accordingly, the bar applies to the respondent if we conclude that there are
serious reasons to believe the respondent committed the serious nonpolitical
crime with which he has been charged in Mexico.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit “has long
interpreted ‘serious reasons to believe,’ the standard set by statute for the
serious nonpolitical crime bar, as equivalent to probable cause.” Gonzalez-
Castillo v. Garland, 47 F.4th 971, 974 (9th Cir. 2022); see also Matter of
E-A-, 26 I&N Dec. 1, 3 (BIA 2012) (“We interpret ‘serious reasons for
believing’ to be equivalent to probable cause, as have the circuit courts that
have considered this question.”). Contrary to the respondent’s argument, the
Immigration 	Judge 	need 	not 	use 	the 	words 	“probable 	cause” 	when
determining 	that 	there 	are 	serious 	reasons 	to 	believe 	the 	respondent
committed a serious nonpolitical crime. 	See Villalobos Sura v. Garland,
8 F.4th 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Probable cause exists when there is a
‘fair probability’ that the defendant committed the alleged crime.”). 	In
making that finding, the Immigration Judge relied on DHS’s Form I-213, the
Mexican warrant for the respondent’s arrest, and the respondent’s admissions
of the existence of his sexual relationship with the minor victim.
The Mexican arrest warrant specifies the serious crime of which the
respondent 	is 	accused, 	namely 	“human 	trafficking 	in 	the 	category 	of
recruitment for sexual exploitation.” This is not a situation involving nothing
more than a Red Notice that “fails to articulate any specific crime of which
[the respondent] is accused” to support application of the serious nonpolitical
crime bar. Gonzalez-Castillo, 47 F.4th at 977. Moreover, the Mexican arrest

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warrant is not the only evidence supporting a serious reason to believe the
respondent committed a serious nonpolitical crime. 	See Villalobos Sura,
8 F.4th at 1167 (“While we have not held that a foreign arrest warrant alone
can establish probable cause, we have held that arrest warrants and other
government documents provide probable cause when supported by other
evidence.”).3 	The Immigration Judge also considered the content of the
Form 	I-213 	and 	the 	respondent’s 	admissions. 	Although 	on 	cross-
examination the respondent denied certain allegations contained in the
Mexican 	arrest 	warrant, 	his 	admissions 	sufficiently 	corroborate 	the
allegations contained in the arrest warrant, and the Form I-213 sufficiently
corroborates the existence of the Mexican arrest warrant and notes the active
status of the related Red Notice.
Accordingly, we conclude that there are serious reasons to believe the
respondent committed a serious nonpolitical crime in Mexico prior to his
most recent arrival in the United States. He is therefore statutorily ineligible
for asylum and withholding of removal pursuant to sections 208(b)(2)(A)(iii)
and 	241(b)(3)(B)(iii) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	1158(b)(2)(A)(iii),
1231(b)(3)(B)(iii).
IV. 	RESPONDENT’S OTHER CLAIMS
A. Cancellation of Removal
We affirm the Immigration Judge’s denial of the respondent’s application
for cancellation of removal under section 240(A)(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(a), as a matter of discretion. The Immigration Judge considered the
relevant factors favorable to the respondent, including the respondent’s
family ties, long residence in the United States, and the claimed hardships.
See Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. 7, 11–12 (BIA 1998) (explaining that the
exercise of discretion requires balancing of favorable and adverse factors and
“as the negative factors grow more serious, it becomes incumbent upon the
alien to introduce additional offsetting favorable evidence, which in some
cases may have to involve unusual or outstanding equities”).
We agree with the Immigration Judge that the favorable factors of record
are significantly outweighed by the respondent’s recidivist criminal history.
The respondent has several criminal convictions, dating back to 2005, and an
3 	We need not determine today whether a foreign arrest warrant alleging a serious
nonpolitical crime is, by itself, sufficient to establish probable cause for purposes of the
serious nonpolitical crime bar under sections 208(b)(2)(A)(iii) and 241(b)(3)(B)(iii) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 (b)(2)(A)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii).

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arrest as recent as 2024. We are not persuaded by the respondent’s arguments
that the Immigration Judge failed to consider all favorable factors. Nor did
the Immigration Judge err in assigning weight to arrests not resulting in a
criminal charge or conviction. Matter of Thomas, 21 I&N Dec. 20, 23 (BIA
1995) (“In examining the presence of adverse factors on an application for
discretionary relief, this Board has found it appropriate to consider evidence
of 	unfavorable 	conduct, 	including 	criminal 	conduct 	which 	has 	not
culminated in a final conviction for purposes of the [INA].”). Weighing all
factors of record, we conclude that the respondent does not merit a favorable
exercise of discretion with respect to his application for cancellation of
removal.
B. CAT Deferral of Removal
We 	affirm 	the 	Immigration 	Judge’s 	finding 	that 	the 	respondent’s
aggregate risk of torture is insufficient to establish that he will more likely
than not be tortured in Mexico. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c); Cole v. Holder,
659 F.3d 762, 775 (9th Cir. 2011) (where a petitioner asserts he would face
risk of torture “from police, death squads, and gangs,” he “need not prove
that each group, treated individually, would more likely than not torture
him,” but “must establish that, taking into account all possible sources of
torture, he is more likely than not to be tortured, by or with the consent or
acquiescence of the government”).
We do not perceive any legal error in the standard applied by the
Immigration Judge when assessing deferral of removal under the CAT. The
Immigration Judge properly considered in the aggregate the respondent’s risk
of torture from multiple sources. 	The respondent does not assert that the
Immigration Judge considered his “separate theories of torture as a single
hypothetical chain of events” or required the respondent “to show that he was
more likely than not to be tortured under [all] theories” or “that he was more
likely 	than 	not 	to 	be 	tortured 	under 	any 	single 	theory 	considered
individually.” Velasquez-Samayoa v. Garland, 49 F.4th 1149, 1155–56 (9th
Cir. 2022).
The respondent’s conclusory assertion that reliance on Matter of J-F-F-,
23 I&N Dec. 912, 917 (A.G. 2006) (requiring a CAT applicant to establish
that each “step in th[e] hypothetical chain of events is more likely than not
to happen”), is legal error simply because he faces torture from multiple
sources is incorrect. 	See Andrade v. Garland, 94 F.4th 904, 915 (9th Cir.
2024) (applying the Matter of J-F-F- standard where multiple theories of
torture were asserted). 	The respondent does not challenge the Immigration
Judge’s finding that he did not suffer past torture in Mexico and has not

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shown clear error in the Immigration Judge’s predictive finding that the
respondent is not more likely than not to suffer harm rising to the level of
torture if removed to Mexico.
C. Due Process
The respondent argues that the Immigration Judge erred in finding the
respondent removable based on his pro se admissions and concessions made
while incompetent. 	The respondent, however, has failed to establish
prejudice from any initial pleading error because the record demonstrates
that, during the July 31, 2024, hearing, the respondent, through counsel,
entered new pleadings. Counsel conceded the respondent’s alienage, denied
the 	factual 	allegation 	of 	a 	domestic 	violence 	conviction, 	and 	denied
removability. The respondent’s counsel did not dispute the admissibility of
DHS’s 	evidentiary 	submission 	that 	included 	an 	FBI 	rap 	sheet. 	The
Immigration Judge sustained the charge of removability based on the
documentary evidence of the conviction and the respondent’s admission of
alienage. 	Thus, the outcome of the proceedings was unaffected by the
alleged error in the initial removability holding. See Lacsina Pangilinan v.
Holder, 568 F.3d 708, 709 (9th Cir. 2009) (to prevail on a due process
violation claim an alien must demonstrate prejudice, “which means that the
outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation”)
(quoting Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620–21 (9th Cir. 2006)).
Similarly, the respondent has shown no prejudice from the Immigration
Judge’s exclusion of the Forensic Competency Evaluation from the record.
He argues that it is an important piece of evidence in support of his claims,
but he does not specify how its preclusion may have affected the outcome of
the proceedings. The Immigration Judge considered the respondent’s mental
health issues when assessing the likelihood the respondent will be tortured
and when weighing whether the respondent merits cancellation of removal
as a matter of discretion. The respondent does not specify any fact regarding
his mental health that the Immigration Judge did not consider.
The respondent argues the Immigration Judge erred by giving no weight
to Dr. Alexandera Linscott’s psychological evaluation and Dr. Beatriz Reyes
Foster’s 	country 	conditions 	report. 	However, 	the 	Immigration 	Judge
expressly considered both the psychological evaluation and the country
conditions report and found the respondent’s fear of torture speculative. The
respondent is arguing for a different interpretation of the evidence and has
not shown that he was denied due process in this regard. The respondent has
not established that he was denied due process or was prejudiced by any of
the errors he alleges.

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Accordingly, the following order will be entered.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. 	See INA
§ 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2026). Further,
any respondent that has been denied admission to, removed from, or has
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any
time found in the United States shall be fined or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both. See INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2024).