G-M-I-

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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 431 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4161
Matter of G-M-I-, Respondent
Decided February 4, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
The relevance and the reliability of an expert witness’ opinions are significantly undercut
when those opinions are informed by anecdotal or inaccurate facts or data.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Benjamin J. Osorio, Esquire, Fairfax, VA
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Serena L. Podish, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	GOODWIN and VOLKERT, Appellate Immigration Judges;
MCCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
MCCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge:
This case was last before the Board on June 20, 2024, when we remanded
the record to the Immigration Judge. On March 26, 2025, the Immigration
Judge granted the respondent’s application for deferral of removal under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 	The Department of Homeland
Security 	(“DHS”) 	has 	appealed 	from 	that 	decision, 	challenging 	the
Immigration Judge’s reliance on the testimony of the respondent’s expert
witness. The respondent opposes the appeal. The appeal will be sustained.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The respondent is a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China.
In 2014, the respondent was convicted of conspiracy to import 150 kilograms
or more of cocaine into the United States and was sentenced to 14 years’
imprisonment. 	DHS subsequently issued a notice to appear, charging the
respondent with removability. 	The respondent conceded removability and
filed an application for deferral of removal under the CAT. After according
the respondent’s expert witness’ statement and testimony full weight, the
Immigration Judge found that the Chinese Government will detain and
torture the respondent upon his return for committing drug crimes and
1 	The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force for United States Nov. 20, 1994). 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17 (2025); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a) (2020).

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causing reputational damage to China. 	She consequently granted the
respondent’s application for deferral of removal under the CAT. On appeal,
DHS challenges the weight accorded to the expert witness’ testimony and the
Immigration Judge’s grant of deferral of removal under the CAT.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
To qualify for deferral of removal under the CAT, the respondent must
demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured by, at the
instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity in China. 	8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2),
1208.17 (2025); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) (2020). “[T]he requirements for a
grant of protection under the CAT are exacting” and are not satisfied unless
every 	step 	in 	the 	hypothetical 	chain 	of 	events 	that 	will 	lead 	to 	the
respondent’s torture is more likely than not to occur. 	Matter of A-A-R-,
29 I&N Dec. 38, 46 (BIA 2025); Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I&N Dec. 912, 917–18,
918 n.4 (A.G. 2006). “Evidence of the general possibility of torture does not
meet the [respondent]’s burden of establishing that it is more likely than not
he will be targeted for such treatment.” 	Matter of A-A-F-V-, 29 I&N
Dec. 118, 121 (BIA 2025). 	We review an Immigration Judge’s predictive
factual findings for clear error but review de novo the ultimate legal
determination of whether the respondent has met the burden of proof. 	See
Matter of A-A-R-, 29 I&N Dec. at 41 (distinguishing between factual findings
regarding 	the 	type 	and 	likelihood 	of 	mistreatment 	with 	the 	legal
determination that this mistreatment constitutes torture).
A. Expert Witness Evidence
In finding that the respondent established the requisite likelihood of
torture, the Immigration Judge gave significant weight to the testimony and
written affidavit of an expert in the legal system in the People’s Republic of
China. 	The role of an expert witness is to “help the Immigration Judge
understand the evidence or decide a fact in issue.” Matter of J-G-T-, 28 I&N
Dec. 97, 101 (BIA 2020). The testimony of an expert witness is less helpful
when it merely interprets common types of evidence that Immigration Judges
regularly encounter and do not need expert assistance to understand, such as
country condition reports and news articles. 	See id. at 100 (noting that
Immigration Judges have relied on experts “to help them make factual
determinations 	‘regarding 	matters 	on 	which 	they 	possess 	little 	or 	no
knowledge or substantive expertise’” (citation omitted)). 	“Expert witness
testimony 	. 	. 	. 	is 	treated 	the 	same 	as 	all 	evidence 	in 	immigration
proceedings.” Matter of M-A-M-Z-, 28 I&N Dec. 173, 177 (BIA 2020). The
Immigration Judge, as the trier of fact, must determine what probative weight

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to give the expert evidence based on the witness’ area of expertise and
whether any proffered opinion has a “sufficient factual basis.” Id. at 177–78,
180–81 (quoting Matter of J-G-T-, 28 I&N Dec. at 104).
While an expert witness “may make reasonable inferences based on facts
and data,” Matter of J-G-T-, 28 I&N Dec. at 101, his or her opinion is “not
conclusive fact.” 	Matter of M-A-M-Z-, 28 I&N Dec. at 180. 	Only the
Immigration Judge is “charged with making factual findings” and legal
conclusions based on those facts. 	Id. 	An Immigration Judge “should only
find an expert’s opinion to be persuasive if there is a reliable factual or
evidentiary basis for his or her conclusions.” Matter of J-G-T-, 28 I&N Dec.
at 103. “[T]o the extent that the record contains contradictory evidence, the
Immigration Judge should explain why inferences made by an expert are
reasonable 	and 	more 	persuasive 	than 	the 	other 	evidence 	presented.”
Id. at 106; cf. Matter of M-A-M-Z-, 28 I&N Dec. at 177–78 (explaining that
“when the Immigration Judge makes a factual finding that is not consistent
with an expert’s opinion, it is important . . . to explain the reasons behind the
factual findings”). 	An Immigration Judge should not merely defer to an
expert’s predictive inferences, especially when those inferences are based on
commonly understood generalized evidence and “essentially establish” a
factual finding or legal conclusion. 	Matter of J-G-T-, 28 I&N Dec.
at 103–04.
Here, the respondent’s expert witness provided two affidavits, and
testimony, in which he stated his opinion that the respondent is more likely
than not to face torture or execution upon removal to China, based on his
assessment that (1) China routinely subjects individuals convicted of serious
drug trafficking crimes to torture and death and (2) China will know of the
respondent’s removal in advance. 	The evidentiary basis underlying the
expert’s predictive inference, as outlined in his affidavits, includes articles
describing China’s hard line against drug trafficking crimes as a threat to
public safety and the country’s concern for its global reputation, China’s
relatively high use of the death penalty, and China’s ability to track and
monitor citizens and entrants with an extensive surveillance apparatus. The
Immigration Judge accorded the expert witness’s testimony and statements
full weight and relied upon them in determining that the respondent would
more likely than not be tortured in China.
We agree with DHS that the Immigration Judge erred in according the
expert witness’ evidence full weight. 	The expert witness’ opinions did not
have a “sufficient factual basis.” 	Id. 	First, the expert did not profess any
direct knowledge of the extent to which China tortures those convicted of
drug trafficking crimes abroad, nor did he articulate any past professional

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experience with death penalty cases in China or the way in which China
implements the death penalty. 	Second, the expert noted in his report that
“there is a paucity of statistics on torture and executions in China” and “little
official information on the handling of expatriated drug-traffickers.” He also
did not provide any meaningful estimations on the number of individuals
sentenced to death or the percentage of those convicted of crimes who were
sentenced to death. 	Although he cited a law journal article stating that
95 percent of death sentences in China involve drug crimes, intentional
homicide, and robbery, this statistic was not broken down further as to how
likely a person convicted of drug crimes was to receive the death penalty or
the likelihood of that the death penalty would be inflicted on individuals, like
the respondent, who were convicted of drug trafficking in another country.
Admitting that it was very difficult to know exactly what would happen
to the respondent, the expert claimed there were examples, as reported by
human rights organizations, of Chinese citizens convicted of drug trafficking
in other countries being detained upon return to China. 	In support of this
assertion, the expert relied on a single anecdote about a Canadian national
who was immediately arrested upon attempting to enter China after a
conviction for a drug-related crime in Canada. 	The expert also referenced
another single incident in 2017 when a tycoon in Hong Kong was abducted
out of his hotel room and escorted into extralegal detention.
In making predictions about the harm the respondent would suffer in
China, the expert witness did not distinguish between harm suffered by those
convicted of drug crimes within China and those returning to China after
being convicted of drug crimes abroad, nor did he provide any actual
examples 	of 	China 	torturing 	or 	executing 	anyone 	convicted 	of 	drug
trafficking abroad. 	The relevance of the anecdote involving a tycoon
abducted in Hong Kong is unclear, as the vague testimony of the expert did
not provide sufficient context to explain what the respondent has in common
with this individual. 	Moreover, the expert’s description of the anecdote
about the Canadian 	national, which is further described in an 	article
submitted into the record, was incorrect. 	This incident did not concern a
Canadian national arrested and convicted in Canada for drug-related crimes
in Canada, as the expert asserts, but rather a Canadian citizen who was
arrested and convicted in a Chinese court for trafficking drugs in China—a
fact pointed out by DHS in its opening statement. Additionally, the primary
subject of the article originally received a 15-year sentence, and the death
penalty was only imposed after a retrial (and allegedly as retribution for
Canada’s arrest of a Chinese telecommunications executive). This anecdote
therefore bears little, if any, relevance to the respondent’s circumstances.

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The relevance and the reliability of an expert witness’ opinions are
significantly undercut when those opinions are informed by anecdotal or
inaccurate facts or data. Because the expert relied on two anecdotes that are
not analogous to the respondent’s circumstances to support his prediction
that the respondent would be detained and tortured due to his drug trafficking
conviction in the United States, the Immigration Judge clearly erred in
assigning significant weight to the expert’s opinion without reasonably
considering the apparent deficient underlying factual basis. 	See Matter of
J-G-T-, 28 I&N Dec. at 104.
B. Convention Against Torture
Turning to the respondent’s application for deferral of removal under the
CAT, we conclude upon de novo review, that the evidence cited by the
Immigration Judge, including the expert witness’ opinion concerning the
probability of torture, was insufficient to meet the respondent’s burden of
proof. 	See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). 	Even assuming that the Chinese
Government will likely become aware of the respondent’s drug conviction
and detain him upon arrival, the expert witness’ opinion that the respondent
will likely be tortured relies upon the same kind of anecdotal and generalized
country conditions evidence that we have explained does not establish a
sufficiently individualized clear probability of torture. 	See, e.g., Matter of
J-H-M-V-, 29 I&N Dec. 278, 283 (BIA 2025) (finding that anecdotal
evidence of some similarly situated individuals suffering severe harm is not
sufficient to show that a particular alien is more likely than not to suffer harm
rising to that level); Matter of A-A-R-, 29 I&N Dec. at 41–42 (same);
Matter of J-E-, 23 I&N Dec. 291, 303–04 (BIA 2002) (same). 	The expert
witness’ conclusions relied upon general evidence that China has engaged in
instances of harm rising to the level of torture and treats serious drug
trafficking crimes particularly harshly for public safety and reputational
reasons. However, the expert witness acknowledged that very little official
information exists about the treatment of expatriated drug traffickers and
admitted lacking familiarity with the exact details of Chinese criminal law or
the repatriation process.
Evidence 	of 	the 	general 	possibility 	of 	torture 	does 	not 	meet 	the
respondent’s burden to show that he, in particular, would more likely than
not be tortured, even if some similarly situated individuals have suffered
torture. 	See Matter of A-A-F-V-, 29 I&N Dec. at 121; Jean-Pierre v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 500 F.3d 1315, 1324 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that an
applicant for CAT protection must demonstrate an individualized risk of
torture). Here, the respondent has not presented sufficient evidence that drug
traffickers convicted of crimes outside China are more likely than not to

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suffer torture. He has also not presented sufficient evidence of any particular
or specific interest in him by the Chinese government. 	His argument
ultimately depends on generalized country conditions evidence and an expert
witness’ opinion based on that same generalized evidence. 	Generalized
evidence that would otherwise be insufficient to establish an individualized
clear probability of torture is not rendered sufficient merely because an
expert witness reviews it and opines that a respondent is likely to be tortured.
See Matter of M-A-M-Z-, 28 I&N Dec. at 177 (noting that expert testimony
is treated the same as all evidence in the record and only an Immigration
Judge makes findings).
The general evidence of China’s harsh penalties for individuals convicted
of drug trafficking crimes committed in China and the use of torture in
Chinese prisons is insufficient to establish that the respondent will more
likely than not be detained and tortured, extralegally or otherwise, based on
his drug trafficking conviction in the United States. 	See, e.g., Matter of
M-B-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 474, 479 (BIA 2002) (concluding that the harsh and
life-threatening prison conditions in Nigeria were insufficient to warrant
CAT protection where the respondent did not demonstrate that she would
more likely than not be detained and tortured based on her drug convictions
in the United States). Upon our de novo review, we conclude that the record
evidence, including the expert witness’ opinion, is insufficient to satisfy the
respondent’s burden of proof for deferral of removal under the CAT. 	See
Matter of M-S-I-, 29 I&N Dec. 61, 62 (BIA 2025)). We will therefore vacate
the Immigration Judge’s grant of this relief. The respondent will be removed
pursuant to the Immigration Judge’s removal order.
ORDER: 	DHS’ appeal is sustained, and the Immigration Judge’s
March 26, 2025, order granting deferral of removal under the CAT is
vacated.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. See section
274D of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1324d
(2024); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2025). 	Further, any respondent that has
been denied admission to, removed from, or has departed the United States
while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding and

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thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in the United States
shall be fined or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. 	See INA
§ 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2024).