Jimenez-Ayala

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Matter of Maricruz JIMENEZ-AYALA, Respondent
Decided by Board September 26, 20251
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
The respondent’s criminal history of drug use and her exposure of her children to drugs
outweigh the favorable factors in this case, including her claimed remorse and intention to
avoid drug use in the future, and warrant a discretionary denial of cancellation of removal.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Cristobal Colindres, Esquire, Dallas, Texas
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Miranda N. Leach, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	HUNSUCKER, GEMOETS, and VOLKERT, Appellate
Immigration Judges.
GEMOETS, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) appeals the Immigration
Judge’s April 16, 2025, decision granting the respondent’s application for
cancellation 	of 	removal 	for 	certain 	permanent 	residents 	under
section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(a) (2024). 	The respondent has filed a brief in opposition to the
appeal. 	The appeal will be sustained, and the respondent will be ordered
removed to Mexico.
The Immigration Judge granted the respondent, a native and citizen of
Mexico 	and 	lawful 	permanent 	resident 	of 	the 	United 	States 	since
November 10, 1998, cancellation of removal in the exercise of discretion.
Whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted is a question that we
review de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2025).
On September 30, 2021, the respondent was convicted in Potter County,
Texas, 	for 	Abandoning 	or 	Endangering 	a 	Child, 	in 	violation 	of
section 22.041(f) of the Texas Penal Code. DHS charged the respondent as
1 	Pursuant to Order No. 6520-2025, dated December 8, 2025, the Attorney General
designated the Board’s decision in Matter of Jimenez-Ayala (BIA Sept. 26, 2025), as
precedent in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3)
(2025). Editorial changes have been made consistent with the designation of the case as a
precedent.

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removable 	under 	section 	237(a)(2)(E)(i) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2018), as an alien who at any time after admission is
convicted of a crime of domestic violence, a crime of stalking, or a crime of
child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment. 	The Immigration Judge
determined the respondent was removable as charged and the respondent
applied for cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents. 	The
parties agreed that the respondent was statutorily eligible for relief. 	The
Immigration Judge determined that the respondent was statutorily eligible for
cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents and granted the
application as a matter of discretion.
On appeal, DHS argues that the Immigration Judge did not properly
consider the totality of the record by balancing the adverse factors against
the equities in the case, and that he erred in determining that the respondent
warranted a favorable exercise of discretion. Upon de novo review, we agree
with DHS and conclude that the respondent does not merit a discretionary
grant of cancellation of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii).
When conducting a discretionary analysis in cancellation of removal
cases, the Board does not apply a threshold test of “unusual or outstanding
equities” before balancing the favorable and adverse factors in the case.
Matter of Sotelo, 23 I&N Dec. 201, 204 (BIA 2001). Instead, we look to the
“totality of the evidence before us” to indicate whether the respondent
warrants a favorable exercise of discretion. 	Id. (citation omitted). 	Where
serious misconduct is 	evident, the respondent must present additional
favorable evidence to counterbalance such an adverse factor. 	Matter of
Sotelo, 23 I&N Dec. at 203; see also Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581, 585
(BIA 1978).
On review, we will first consider the favorable factors. Favorable factors
to be considered include family ties in the United States, residence of long
duration in the United States (particularly when the inception of residence
occurred at a young age), evidence of hardship to the respondent and her
family if removal occurs, military service in the United States, a history of
employment, the existence of property or business ties, evidence of value and
service to the community, proof of genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record
exists, and other evidence of the respondent’s good character. 	Matter of
C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. 7, 11 (BIA 1998).
We acknowledge, as did the Immigration Judge, that the respondent has
resided in the United States since she was a baby. The respondent’s mother,
father, partner, children, and many of her extended family members live in
the United States as citizens or lawful permanent residents. The respondent

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went to school in the United States through the 11th grade. The respondent’s
mother, father, and partner testified on her behalf at her hearing.
After her conviction in 2021, the respondent began a rehabilitation
program 	as 	part 	of 	probation, 	including 	participation 	in 	Narcotics
Anonymous and attending courses while in custody. 	The respondent, after
her drug relapse in May 2024, took and completed an online course that was
assigned to her.
The respondent has also started reading the Bible and testified that she
turns to it when she feels stressed. The respondent testified that she has been
trying hard to fix what led up to her relapse drug use in May 2024 and has
accepted that she needs to lean on people, like her family who support her to
get her through her hard times. She feels as if her children being taken away
from her has opened her eyes. 	The respondent has been apologetic and
remorseful for her conduct. 	See Matter of Arreguin, 21 I&N Dec. 38, 40
(BIA 1995) (explaining that acceptance of responsibility may be considered
as evidence of rehabilitation); cf. Matter of Khalik, 17 I&N Dec. 518, 520–21
(BIA 1980) (holding that denial of wrongdoing is a negative discretionary
factor).
Next, we look at the adverse factors. The adverse factors to be considered
include the nature and underlying circumstances of the grounds for removal
that are at issue, the presence of additional significant violations of the
immigration laws, the existence of a criminal record, and, if so, its nature,
recency, and seriousness, and other evidence indicative of the respondent’s
bad character or undesirability as a permanent resident of this country.
Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. at 11.
As compelling as the respondent’s positive factors and her expressed
intent to pursue rehabilitation are, they do not outweigh the troubling
negative factors in this case. The respondent has engaged in criminal conduct
that both resulted in a conviction and conduct that did not result in a
conviction. 	See Matter of Thomas, 21 I&N Dec. 20, 23-24 (BIA 1995)
(explaining 	that, 	in 	examining 	the 	presence 	of 	adverse 	factors 	in 	an
application for discretionary relief, the adjudicator may consider evidence of
unfavorable conduct, including criminal conduct that has not culminated in
a final conviction for purposes of the INA).
In 	particular, 	the 	respondent 	admitted 	that 	she 	began 	to 	use
methamphetamine in 2014, and became addicted to the drug in 2019,
continuing to use it during her pregnancy with her fourth child. 	At the
respondent’s hearing, the respondent testified that she and her partner used

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methamphetamine at home with their children present. After the birth of the
respondent’s fourth child, she tested positive for methamphetamine, having
smoked it 3 days before the child’s birth. 	Her drug use was discovered
through external intervention, rather than voluntary disclosure, as her child
remained 	in 	the 	hospital’s 	ICU. 	As 	a 	result 	of 	testing 	positive 	for
methamphetamine, the respondent was criminally charged, pled guilty, and
placed on 4 years of community supervision. 	During an investigation after
the respondent’s child was born, two of her other children tested positive for
methamphetamine, 	and 	in 	May 	2024, 	she 	violated 	the 	terms 	of 	her
supervision 	by 	again 	testing 	positive 	for 	the 	drug. 	The 	facts 	and
circumstances of the respondent’s criminal conviction may be considered in
assessing 	whether 	she 	merits 	discretionary 	relief. 	See 	Matter 	of
D. Rodriguez, 28 I&N Dec. 815, 824 (BIA 2024).
Although we recognize the respondent’s claims that she is committed to
overcoming her addiction and using the tools she now has to do so and marks
her turning point as her completion of a 90-by-90 mandated online class for
her probation violation, we find this insufficient to overcome the negative
factors 	in 	this 	case. 	During 	the 	respondent’s 	probation, 	she 	used
methamphetamine in May 2024, thereby violating her probation. 	This
relapse occurred even after her children were removed from her home when
they tested positive for methamphetamine. 	While the respondent has
completed 	several 	programs 	to 	aid 	her 	rehabilitation 	in 	detention,
confinement can make it difficult to assess rehabilitation. 	See Matter of
C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. at 14. The respondent’s efforts at rehabilitation have
been either under court orders or in detention where her ability to abuse drugs
or commit crime is restricted.
Although we believe the respondent genuinely hopes to change, the
evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that she has been rehabilitated or that
she will refrain from conduct that endangers others, particularly her children,
who have already tested positive for drugs or been present when she used
them. 	See Matter of Siniauskas, 27 I&N Dec. 207, 209 (BIA 2018)
(“[A respondent’s] actions are a better indication of his future conduct than
his assurances to the contrary.”); Matter of Castillo-Perez, 27 I&N Dec. 664,
670 (A.G. 2019) (holding that multiple convictions for driving under the
influence will likely result in a discretionary denial in part because such
conduct reflects a “disregard for the safety of others”); Matter of Roberts,
20 I&N Dec. 294, 303 (BIA 1991) (noting that a respondent’s assurances
alone are insufficient to show genuine rehabilitation). 	Notably, during
periods when the respondent was neither detained nor under court order, she
did not pursue treatment or rehabilitation programs on her own initiative.
Additionally, the respondent remains in a relationship with the same partner

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with whom she used methamphetamine for years, including in the presence
of their children, and who was arrested for the same offense in 2021, which
further undermines the likelihood of lasting rehabilitation. 	Furthermore,
although the respondent testified that losing custody of her children was
difficult and a motivating factor to change, she nevertheless continued to use
methamphetamine, which resulted in her being assigned another class in
May 2024. 	Moreover, despite testimony regarding the importance of her
family support system, the respondent’s mother testified that after the
respondent’s arrest, she saw her only about once a month, calling into
question the extent of that support.
The respondent’s criminal history and recidivist conduct, culminating
most recently in a May 2024 probation violation—which she minimizes as a
“hiccup” and a “simple mistake”—together with her participation only in
court-ordered rehabilitation programs, does not support her rehabilitation
claim. 	See Matter of Siniauskas, 27 I&N Dec. at 209 (concluding that an
alien’s recent arrest for driving under the influence, where he had been
convicted of the same offense 10 years prior, “undercut[] his argument that
he 	. 	. 	. 	established 	rehabilitation”). 	Considering 	the 	totality 	of 	the
circumstances, including the respondent’s long-term methamphetamine drug
use, the nature of her arrest, the fact that her children tested positive for
methamphetamine, her drug use in their presence, and the recency of her
criminal actions, we conclude that the negative factors outweigh the positive
factors, affecting the respondent’s undesirability as a permanent resident.
Matter of Sotelo, 23 I&N Dec. at 203–04.
We acknowledge the respondent has considerable equities in the United
States. 	However, the respondent has not provided sufficient evidence of
rehabilitation or other positive factors to tip the balance toward a favorable
exercise of discretion considering her criminal record. 	See Matter of
Silva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. 826, 837 (BIA 2016) (noting that it is incumbent
on a respondent to introduce favorable evidence to offset serious negative
discretionary factors in the record). 	While the respondent’s family may
sincerely desire she remain, we cannot conclude that her continued presence
is in the best interest of the United States. Therefore, we conclude that the
respondent has not met her burden to demonstrate that she merits a favorable
exercise of discretion.
As such, we reverse the Immigration Judge’s discretionary grant of
cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the INA, 8 	U.S.C.
§ 1229b(a).
ORDER: DHS’ appeal is sustained.

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FURTHER ORDER: 	The Immigration Judge’s order dated April 16,
2025, granting cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), to the respondent is vacated, and the respondent is
ordered removed from the United States to Mexico. The respondent’s status
as a lawful permanent resident is revoked.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. 	See INA
§ 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2025).