DOMINGUEZ REYES

878
Cite as 28 I&N Dec. 878 (BIA 2024) 	Interim Decision #4083
Matter of Cleto Marte DOMINGUEZ REYES, Respondent
Decided December 13, 2024
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
For purposes of assessing whether an offense constitutes a money laundering aggravated
felony under section 101(a)(43)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(D) (2018), the circumstance-specific approach applies to the requirement
that the “amount of the funds exceeded $10,000.”
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Lachezar I. Vanchev, Esquire, Coral Springs, Florida
BEFORE: Board Panel: HUNSUCKER, PETTY, and CLARK, Appellate Immigration
Judges.
PETTY, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The 	respondent 	appeals 	from 	the 	Immigration 	Judge’s 	decision
concluding that his conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering
is an aggravated felony rendering him both removable and ineligible for
cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents. 	The Immigration
Judge correctly concluded that the circumstance-specific approach applies in
determining whether the amount of funds laundered exceeds the statutory
threshold and thus renders the respondent’s conviction an aggravated felony.
The record supports the Immigration Judge’s finding that the amount of
funds in this case exceeded $10,000. 	Accordingly, the appeal will be
dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 14, 2022, the respondent, a native and citizen of the Dominican
Republic and lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted
of conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(h) (2018). 	The United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida issued a criminal forfeiture order finding “that at least $3,934,518
was obtained and laundered by the defendant as a result of his participation
in the money laundering conspiracy, for which he has pled guilty.”
Based on that conviction, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
charged the respondent with removability under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)
(2018), for having been convicted of an aggravated felony money laundering

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offense 	as 	defined 	by 	section 	101(a)(43)(D) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(D) (2018). 	The Immigration Judge found the respondent
removable 	as charged. 	The 	respondent 	then filed 	an application for
cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents. 	The Immigration
Judge determined that the respondent was ineligible for cancellation of
removal because of his aggravated felony conviction. See INA § 240A(a)(3),
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2018). The respondent challenges the Immigration
Judge’s conclusion that he was convicted of an aggravated felony. 	We
review this issue de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2024).
II. DISCUSSION
Section 101(a)(43)(D) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D), defines an
aggravated felony as “an offense described in section 1956 of title 18, United
States Code (relating to laundering of monetary instruments) or section 1957
of that title (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived
from specific unlawful activity) if the amount of the funds exceeded
$10,000.” It is not disputed that the respondent’s conviction for conspiracy
under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) is “an offense described in section 1956 of
title 18.” 	INA § 101(a)(43)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D); see Maniar v.
Garland, 998 F.3d 235, 239–40 (5th Cir. 2021). On appeal, the respondent
maintains that DHS did not meet its burden to show that the amount of money
he laundered exceeded $10,000 because the Shepard documents do not
establish that he pleaded guilty to laundering that amount. 	See Shepard v.
United States, 544 U.S. 13, 20–21 (2005) (discussing documents that may be
permissibly considered under the modified categorical approach).
The Supreme Court of the United States has explained that when a statute
“does not refer to generic crimes but refers to specific circumstances,” we
are not limited to the categorical approach and may consider “the particular
circumstances in which an offender committed the crime.” 	Nijhawan v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 37–38 (2009). 	With respect to section 101(a)(43)(D)
of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D), whether “the amount of funds
exceeded $10,000” does not refer to a generic category of crimes or indeed
any crime at all. It instead describes the “specific way in which an offender
committed the crime on a specific occasion.” Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 34; see
also Fuentes v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 1177, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that
“the INA’s $10,000 threshold for money laundering offenses refers to a
specific circumstance”); Varughese v. Holder, 629 F.3d 272, 274–75 (2d Cir.
2010) (same).
Moreover, as two courts of appeals have noted, if the categorical
approach 	applied 	to 	section 	101(a)(43)(D) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 	1101(a)(43)(D), 	it 	would 	be 	partially 	inoperative, 	as 	18 	U.S.C.
§ 1956 does not include a $10,000 threshold for criminal liability. 	See

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Fuentes, 788 F.3d at 1181; United States v. Mendoza, 783 F.3d 278, 282
(5th Cir. 2015). If we were limited to the categorical approach, no conviction
under 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1956 	would 	ever 	be 	an 	aggravated 	felony 	under
section 101(a)(43)(D), notwithstanding the express reference to that criminal
statute. 	We 	normally 	do 	not 	construe 	statutes 	to 	be 	inoperative 	or
superfluous, even in part. 	See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314
(2009) (explaining statutes “should be construed so that effect is given to all
its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant” (citation omitted)); Fuentes, 788 F.3d at 1181 (“[A] statute
should not be construed so as to render any provision of that statute
meaningless or superfluous.” (quoting Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 506
(2000))).
Finally, the monetary threshold in section 101(a)(43)(D) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D), parallels the $10,000 threshold requirement
under section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i),
which the Supreme Court has held is subject to a circumstance-specific
inquiry. 	See Mendoza, 783 F.3d at 281 (suggesting the provisions are
“identical” and citing Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 40); see also Matter of F-R-A-,
28 I&N Dec. 460, 462 (BIA 2022) (applying the circumstance specific
approach to determine if a crime of fraud or deceit resulted in a loss
exceeding 	$10,000). 	Accordingly, 	we 	conclude 	that 	for 	purposes 	of
assessing whether an offense constitutes a money laundering aggravated
felony under section 101(a)(43)(D) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D),
the circumstance-specific approach applies to the requirement that the
“amount of the funds exceeded $10,000.”
In applying the circumstance-specific approach, “we ‘are generally free
to consider any admissible evidence’ to determine” whether the amount of
funds exceeded $10,000. 	Matter of F-R-A-, 28 I&N Dec. at 462 (quoting
Orellana v. Mayorkas, 6 F.4th 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2021)). 	We are not
limited to the plea agreement or other Shepard documents in making this
determination, as the respondent suggests. In Matter of F-R-A-, we held that
“the amount of forfeiture, like the amount of restitution, may be considered
to determine the amount of loss to the victims under section 101(a)(43)(M)(i)
[of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M),] if the proceeds received are
sufficiently tethered and traceable to the conduct of conviction.” 	28 I&N
Dec. at 463.
Here, the record establishes that the forfeiture amount ordered by the
district court was specifically tied to the money laundering conspiracy
offense to which the respondent pleaded guilty. Contrary to the respondent’s
assertion that the forfeiture amount was applied broadly to all codefendants
and was not attributed to him directly, the forfeiture order specifically
identifies the amount that was directly attributable to the respondent’s
personal conduct. 	He is the only defendant named on the forfeiture order,

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which states: “Being fully advised of the relevant facts, the Court hereby
finds that at least $3,934,518 was obtained and laundered by the defendant
as a result of his participation in the money laundering conspiracy, for which
he has pled guilty.” The forfeiture order establishes that the loss amount is
“sufficiently tethered and traceable to the conduct of conviction,” Matter of
F-R-A-, 28 I&N Dec. at 463, and not “based on acquitted or dismissed counts
or general conduct.” Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42 (citation omitted).
We reject the respondent’s claim that the conviction records submitted by
DHS were insufficient because they were not certified. 	The conviction
records were accompanied by a sworn statement by a DHS officer attesting
that 	the 	documents 	were 	true 	and 	correct 	copies 	of 	the 	electronic
records maintained by the district court and identifying the court record
repository from which the DHS officer obtained the records. The INA and
its 	implementing 	regulations 	expressly 	provide 	for 	the 	admissibility
of 	documents 	obtained 	and 	submitted 	in 	this 	manner.1 	See 	INA
§ 	240(c)(3)(C)(ii), 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1229a(c)(3)(C)(ii) 	(2018); 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 1003.41(b) (2024).
The 	respondent’s 	argument 	that 	forfeiture 	orders 	do 	not 	meet 	the
evidentiary requirements to establish the amount of funds involved in
the offense also fails. 	The Supreme Court has considered restitution
orders 	in 	assessing 	the 	parallel 	issue 	of 	loss 	to 	the 	victim 	under
section 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).2 	See Nijhawan,
557 U.S. at 42–43. We have previously explained that restitution orders and
forfeiture orders are broadly equivalent for evidentiary purposes and can both
be considered under the circumstance-specific approach. 	See Matter of
F-R-A-, 28 I&N Dec. at 463.
We therefore agree with the Immigration Judge that DHS established by
clear and convincing evidence that the amount of funds laundered by the
respondent 	exceeded 	$10,000. 	See 	INA 	§ 	240(c)(3)(A), 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(3)(A). 	As such, the respondent has been convicted of an
1 	Contrary to the respondent’s claim, we did not hold in Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez,
17 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1980), that certified records are required to establish the factual
basis for a criminal conviction. Indeed, that case does not address removability based on
criminal convictions at all. It simply held that the documents at issue in that case, which
were certified, had been authenticated pursuant to the regulatory framework then in effect.
Id. at 506 n.2.
2 	The respondent contends that under Nijhawan, the “scale and sophistication” of conduct
are relevant when determining whether an offense qualifies as an aggravated felony. He
further maintains that DHS has not presented any evidence to suggest that his actions
involved sophisticated or large-scale money laundering. As to the first point, we cannot
locate the purportedly quoted language in Nijhawan, nor can we find any similar sentiment
using different words. As for the second, even if the respondent had correctly stated a
relevant standard, we are at a loss for how at least $3,934,518 would not be considered
large-scale money laundering.

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aggravated 	felony 	under 	section 	101(a)(43)(D) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(D). He is therefore removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)
of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and is ineligible for cancellation
of removal for certain permanent residents under section 240A(a)(3) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3).
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.