Artis v. Atlanta Cheesecake Co.

U.S. Department of Labor Administrative Review Board
200 Constitution Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20210-0001
IN THE MATTER OF:
DOROTHY ARTIS,
COMPLAINANT,
v.
ATLANTA CHEESECAKE CO.,
RESPONDENT.
ARB CASE NO. 2024-0059
ALJ CASE NO. 2023-TAX-00009
ALJ MONICA MARKLEY
DATE: May 28, 2026
Appearances:
For the Complainant:
Dorothy Ann Artis; Pro Se; Marietta, Georgia
For the Respondent:
Laura E. De Santos, Esq., Megan M. Mitchell, Esq., Hayley D.
Friedman, Esq.; Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP; Houston,
Texas
Before KAPLAN and BURRELL, Administrative Appeals Judges
DECISION AND ORDER
This case arises under the employee protection provisions of the Taxpayer
First Act of 2019 (TFA or Act) and its implementing regulations.1 Complainant
Dorothy Artis filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) alleging that Respondent Atlanta
Cheesecake Company unlawfully retaliated against her in violation of the TFA. On
July 19, 2024, a United States Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) issued a Decision and Order (D. & O.) Granting Respondent’s Motion for
Summary Decision and Denying Complaint and Order Canceling Hearing.
1 26 U.S.C. § 7623(d); 29 C.F.R. Part 1989 (2025).

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Complainant appealed the matter to the Administrative Review Board (ARB or
Board).2 For the following reasons, we affirm the ALJ’s dismissal of Complainant’s
complaint.
Complainant was terminated from her employment with Respondent on
December 21, 2021.3 Complainant filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against Respondent on February 13, 2021,
alleging sexual harassment and race discrimination. Complainant and Respondent
settled the matter, with Respondent paying Complainant a settlement in two parts,
one based on wages and the other non-wage based.4 Notwithstanding the
settlement, Complainant later filed a claim with OSHA alleging retaliation for
engaging in protected activity under the TFA.5 Complainant claims that her
protected activity was found in her EEOC charge. The ALJ summarized the content
of her EEOC charge in detail, observing mostly race and gender discrimination
2 The Secretary of the Department of Labor has delegated authority to the Board to
review appeals from ALJ decisions and to issue agency decisions in cases arising under the
TFA. Secretary’s Order No. 01-2020 (Delegation of Authority and Assignment of
Responsibility to the Administrative Review Board (Secretary’s discretionary review of ARB
decisions)), 85 Fed. Reg. 13186 (Mar. 6, 2020); 29 C.F.R. § 1989.110(a). The Board reviews
an ALJ’s grant of summary decision de novo under the same standard the ALJ applies.
Jahanbin v. The Boeing Co., ARB No. 2024-0035, ALJ No. 2023-AIR-00023, slip op. at 3-4
(ARB Mar. 13, 2025) (citing Xanthopoulos v. Mercer Inv. Consulting, ARB No. 2022-0032,
ALJ No. 2021-SOX-00017, slip op. at 10 (ARB Sept. 28, 2023)).
3 D. & O. at 2.
4 Id.
5 The TFA prohibits discrimination or discharge against employees who:
provide information, cause information to be provided, or
otherwise assist in an investigation regarding underpayment of
tax or any conduct which the employee reasonably believes
constitutes a violation of the internal revenue laws or any
provision of Federal law relating to tax fraud, when the
information or assistance is provided to the Internal Revenue
Service, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Treasury Inspector
General for Tax Administration, the Comptroller General of the
United States, the Department of Justice, the United
States Congress, a person with supervisory authority over the
employee, or any other person working for the employer who has
the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct .
. . .
26 U.S.C. § 7623(d)(1)(A).

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claims.6 In the light most favorable to Complainant, her EEOC complaint included a
brief mention of an employee who was “working 7.5 years illegally under a false
name.”7 This charge does not demonstrate anything remotely protected under the
TFA. It does not convey a reasonable belief of a violation of internal revenue laws or
any provision of federal law related to tax fraud.8 The ALJ entered summary
decision for Respondent, concluding that Complainant’s EEOC charge was not
protected under the TFA and that settlement payments were not adverse because
they were made in accordance with the settlement agreement.9
Having reviewed the evidentiary record on summary decision, and upon
consideration of the parties’ briefs on appeal, the Board concludes that Complainant
has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ committed reversible error in granting
summary decision in favor of Respondent. The ALJ’s determination that
Complainant failed to show a genuine issue of material fact that she engaged in
protected activity under the TFA is supported by the record.10 While the
Complainant substantiates her TFA claim on appeal with new facts and arguments,
that material was not part of the initial EEOC charge. Reviewing the contents of
the EEOC, the ALJ concluded there was no genuine issue of material fact that it did
not contain content remotely applicable to the TFA. Finding no error in the ALJ’s
decision, the Board affirms the ALJ’s dismissal of Complainant’s complaint.
6 D. & O. at 8.
7 February 13, 2021 EEOC Charge at 6.
8 26 U.S.C. § 7623(d)(1)(A); supra note 6.
9 The Board has consistently held that the issue of whether a settlement agreement
has been breached is not a matter for the Board to determine. Mawhinney v. Am. Airlines,
ARB No. 2014-0060, ALJ No. 2012-AIR-00017, slip op. at 4 (ARB Jan. 21, 2016); Bricklen v.
Great Lakes Chemical Corp., ARB No. 2005-0144, ALJ No. 2005-CAA-00008, slip op. at 2
(ARB Oct. 31, 2007); Taylor v. Greyhound Lines, ARB No. 2006-0137, ALJ No. 2006-STA-
00019, slip op. at 4 (ARB Apr. 30, 2007). Rather, when the parties claim that there has been
a breach of the settlement agreement, the proper remedy is found with a court of competent
jurisdiction.
10 Complainant alleges the settlement terms were unfavorable in taxation and
classification and thus were adverse actions. Because we affirm the ALJ’s protected activity
conclusion, we do not reach the ALJ’s alternate conclusion that Complainant did not
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that she suffered an adverse action under the
TFA.

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SO ORDERED.
THOMAS H. BURRELL
Administrative Appeals Judge
ELLIOT M. KAPLAN
Administrative Appeals Judge