George X v. Paul L. Parets

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

GEORGE X, )
Plaintiff, )
v. ) C.A. No.: N24C-10-237 FJJ
)
PAUL H. MORRILL, JR., )
THOMAS J. PARAG, DAVID L. )
BAYLOR, SHANE MILLER, and )
WILLIAM J. RHODUNDA, JR., )
Defendants. )
-And- )
)
PAUL L. PARETS and )
THOMAS PARAG, )
Counterclaim Plaintiffs/ )
Third-Party Plaintiffs, )
v. )
GEORGE X, )
Counterclaim Defendant, )
-And- )
)
ZEP TEPI INSTITUTE, INC., )
Third-Party Defendant. )

Submitted: June 16, 2026
Decided: June 17, 2026

OPINION AND ORDER
On David L. Baylor, Shane Miller and William J. Rhodunda
Motion for Summary Judgment
GRANTED

On Plaintiff’s Integrated Motion for Summary Judgment
GRANTED in part; DENIED in part.

Mr. George X, Delaware City, Delaware, Pro-Se Plaintiff.

William J. Rhodunda, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendants.

Jones, J.
This lawsuit involves a claim asserted by the Plaintiff, George X (“Mr. X”),

that a detached garage, as well as a basketball pole, backboard, rim and net

(collectively referred to as “hoop”) are encroaching on property to which Plaintiff

has access to by virtue of a right of way, thereby causing a diminution in value to

his property. Plaintiff has sued several people, including David A. Baylor, Shane

Miller and William H. Rhodunda, who are Delaware City officials (collectively

referred to as “City Defendants”). The City Defendants have moved for summary

judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Plaintiff has filed an Integrated

Motion for Summary Judgment. This is the Court’s decision on the motions.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Superior Court Civil Rule 56(c) states a party seeking summary judgment

must show “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”1 “A genuine issue of material

fact is one that ‘may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.’” 2 The court

views the evidence provided “in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.”3

The initial burden is on the moving party to show there are no genuine issues of

material fact.4 The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show there is at

1
Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
2
Saunders v. Lightwave Logic, Inc., 2024 WL 4512227, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2024) (quoting Moore v.
Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680–81 (Del. 1979)).
3
Gibson v. Metro. Grp. Prop. And Cas. Ins. Co., 2017 WL 5606714, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 2017) (citing
Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A.2d 56, 59 (Del. 1991)).
4
Id.

2
least one material issue of fact in dispute.5 The court must consider “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any,” in determining whether there is a genuine issue as to any

material fact,6 and the court must “accept all undisputed factual assertions and

accept the nonmoving party’s version of any disputed facts.” 7 However, any

factual inferences made in favor of the non-moving party must be reasonable.8

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Mr. X owns the property at 301 Bayard Street which is located within the

limits of Delaware City, Delaware. Adjacent to Mr. X’s property is a property

owned by Defendant Thomas Parag (“Parag”). Between these two properties lies

an approximately 14-foot strip of land that is owned by Delaware City (hereinafter

this strip of land will be referred to as “the right of way”). Plaintiff has the right

to use this right of way to access his property.9

Sometime in 2023, Parag installed the hoop in the right of way. There is no

factual dispute that the hoop was installed by or at the direction of Parag.10 This

Court has granted partial summary judgment against Parag in favor of the Plaintiff

5
Id.
6
Coker v. Tenney-Andrews, 2016 WL 6659500, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 2016) (quoting Del. Super. Ct. Civ.
R. 56(c)).
7
Id. (quoting Sztybel v. Walgreen Co., 2011 WL 2623930, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. June 29, 2011)).
8
Smith v. Haldeman, 2012 WL 3611895, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2012) (citing Mergenthaler v. Asbestos
Corp. Of America, Inc., 1988 WL 16284, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. July 13, 1988).
9
There is a separate strip of land owned by Delaware City which is approximately 4 feet wide and divides Mr. X’s
property and the garage owned by Parag.
10
Def.’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgement (“Def.’s MSJ”), Docket Item (“D.I.”) 448, at ¶ 31; D.I. 258, at
9.

3
finding that Parag committed a trespass against Plaintiff due to the placement of

the basketball hoop.11 A basketball hoop and net were installed on the pole. Mr.

X immediately began complaining to City Officials about the installation of the

hoop. He filled out a complaint form which he sent to Delaware City. The

complaint form provided the following: 12

11
D.I. 258, at 9-10.
12
D.I. 201, Exhibit (“Ex.”) A.

4
Mr. X forwarded his complaint via email to Michael Henderson, the chief

of the Delaware City Police Department. The subject line of the emails between

Mr. X and Henderson was entitled “Encroachment upon property rights.” Mr. X

had further email correspondence with two other Delaware City officials about his

complaint: 1) David Baylor, the Delaware City Manager at the time; and 2) Shane

Miller (“Miller”), who was then Delaware City’s Code Enforcement Officer. As

seen below, Baylor sent an email back to Mr. X on July 13, 2023:13

Mr. X received another email response from Miller on July 17, 2023:14

13
D.I. 1, ¶ 18; see also D.I. 1, Ex. 5.
14
Id. at ¶ 19; see also D.I. 1, Ex. 6.

5
Delaware City took no further action. William Rhodunda is the Delaware City

Solicitor. The lawsuit in this matter was filed on October 22, 2024.15 The hoop

was removed in December 2024. 16

In February 2025, Ronald Sutton (“Sutton”), at the request of Mr. X,

surveyed the property. Sutton had also surveyed the property in 2020, at which

time he came in and set the corners. 17 Sutton is a licensed civil engineer who has

performed thousands of surveys over the years.18 Sutton further testified that

there’s a 4-foot alleyway, which is owned by Delaware City, between the garage,

the property line of Parag and Mr. X.19 When questioned about the hoop, Sutton

stated that the hoop had been removed by the time he did his 2025 survey, but he

15
D.I. 1.
16
D.I. 51, ¶ 1; see also D.I. 63, ¶ 1.
17
D.I. 150, Ex. B at 7-8 (page numbers indicate the transcript page referenced).
18
Id. at 6, 9.
19
Id. at 10.

6
was able to identify the remnants of where the hoop was located. 20 The remnants

of the hoop were situated in the right of way between the properties on land owned

by Delaware City. 21 Sutton clearly testified that the hoop was not located on

property owned by George X.22

ANALYSIS
Defendants’ Motion

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the City Defendants were negligent in

failing to properly investigate and address the Plaintiff’s complaint as to the

basketball hoop. Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint makes claims against the

City Defendants in both their personal and official capacity. 23 At a hearing before

this Court on August 27, 2025, Plaintiff agreed that he was suing the City

Defendants only in their official capacity. 24 Now he claims that he is suing the

City Defendants in both their personal capacity and official capacity. City

Defendants respond that given the Plaintiff’s prior representation in court that he

has waived any claims against the City Defendants beyond those claims that are

based on their official capacity, they should not have to defend a personal suit as

well.

20
Id. at 10-11.
21
Id. at 11.
22
Id.
23
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint, D.I. 111, at 4-6.
24
See Oral Argument recording of August 27, 2025 - 11:08 - 11:10 am.

7
As to any personal claims against the City Defendants, they are entitled to

an entry of summary judgment in their favor for two reasons. First, Plaintiff agreed

on August 27, 2025, in open court that he was not pursuing any claims against

them beyond the claims that were based on their status as city officials. Second,

even if the Plaintiff had not waived these claims, City Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment as to any personal claims filed against them. There is no

evidence that any of the City Defendants were ever acting outside of their official

duties when they took the actions that they took or did not take. In a negligence

action a Plaintiff must show that a Defendant owed a duty to the Plaintiff. There

is simply no duty on the part of the three City Defendants toward Mr. X that does

not arise out of their duties as city officials. Given the lack of duty, the City

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on any and all claims not based on

their actions as City officials.

I now turn to the claims against the City Defendants based on their actions

as Delaware City officials.

As an employee and/or agent of Delaware City, any claims against these

three gentlemen are controlled by the County and Municipal Torts Claims Act, 10

Del.C. §4011. Section 4011 provides as follows:

(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, all
governmental entities and their employees shall be immune
from suit on any and all tort claims seeking recovery of
damages. That a governmental entity has the power to sue or

8
be sued, whether appearing in its charter or statutory
enablement, shall not create or be interpreted as a waiver of the
immunity granted in this subchapter.

(b) Notwithstanding §4012 of this title, a governmental entity
shall not be liable for any damage claim which results from:

(1) The undertaking or failure to undertake any
legislative act, including, but not limited to, the adoption or
failure to adopt any statute, charter, ordinance, order,
regulation, resolution or resolve.
(2) The undertaking or failure to undertake any judicial
or quasi-judicial act, including, but not limited to, granting,
granting with conditions, refusal to grant or revocation of
any license, permit, order or other administrative approval
or denial.
(3) The performance or failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion
be abused and whether or not the statute, charter, ordinance,
order, resolution, regulation or resolve under which the
discretionary function or duty is performed is valid or
invalid.

(c) An employee may be personally liable for acts or omissions
causing property damage, bodily injury or death in instances in
which the governmental entity is immune under this section,
but only for those acts which were not within the scope of
employment or which were performed with wanton negligence
or wilful and malicious intent.25

The act makes it clear that municipal employees are immune from suit for

discretionary actions taken within the scope of their official duties unless their

actions are not taken in good faith, done with gross or wanton negligence, or with

wilful and malicious intent. The City Defendants are not immune from suit if it

25
10 Del. C. §4011.

9
can be said that their actions were ministerial.26 The first question is whether the

City Defendants were engaged in a ministerial or discretionary act. 27

In Greenfield as Next Friend of Ford v. Miles (“Greenfield”) the Delaware

Supreme Court addressed the question of ministerial versus discretionary acts.28

In Greenfield, the Plaintiff sued a number of Defendants who worked for the

Delaware Division of Family Services (“DFS”). 29 The Plaintiff alleged that these

Defendants contributed, in one fashion or another, to four faulty investigations or

reports that Ford and/or his sibling were being abused and neglected by their

mother. 30 The complaint further alleged that the Defendants’ dereliction of duty

resulted in the tragic death of one child and severe injuries to Ford.31 Defendants

moved to dismiss the case on the basis of sovereign immunity under the State Torts

Claim Act. 32 Citing a Delaware statute that mandates the reporting and

investigation of child abuse and neglect, Plaintiff maintained that the Defendants’

actions were ministerial rather than discretionary and, therefore, not subject to

immunity.

26
Greenfield as Next Friend for Ford v. Miles, 211 A.3d 1087, 1098 (Del. 2019); Wicks v. Delaware Veterans
Home, 2023 WL 5497040 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2023); see also 10 Del. C. §4001.
27
See Greenfield, 211 A.3d at 1097-1101; Wicks, 2023 WL 5497040, at *4-5.
28
Greenfield, 211 A.3d at 1097-1101.
29
Id. at 1090.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
10 Del.C. §4000 et seq.

10
The Greenfield Court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument. The court defined

ministerial duties as acts that “involve[] less in the way of personal decision or

judgment or the matter for which judgment is required has little bearing of

importance upon the validity of the act.” 33 The court said that “a duty is

discretionary if and only if the state actor faced a range of reasonable choices while

performing those duties.” 34 In determining whether the acts of the DFS

caseworkers were ministerial or discretionary, the court reasoned that “if DFS

caseworkers simply did not conduct such an assessment, they would have failed

to perform a ministerial duty but determining whether an actual home assessment

was poorly conducted entails analyzing the exercise of discretion of those social

workers.”35

The clear teaching of Greenfield is that if the public officials who were

charged with investigating an action investigated the claim, but did so poorly or

negligently, their actions would be discretionary and fall within the immunity

statute. Conversely, if the public officials did not conduct the required

investigation, then they would have failed to conduct a ministerial duty that was

required of them and would not have the protections of the immunity statute. 36

33
Id. at 1098 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D, cmt. h (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
34
Id. at 1099.
35
Id at 1100.
36
The Greenfield case was decided under the State Torts Claims Act. The instant case is governed by the County
and Municipal Torts Claims Act. This Court sees no distinction between the two statutes that would require a
different analysis under the acts in determining whether an action is ministerial or discretionary.

11
Plaintiff points to various Delaware City ordinances to argue that the City

officials were required to conduct an investigation and their failure to do so was a

violation of a ministerial act. This is substantially the same argument that was

raised by the Plaintiff in Greenfield and rejected by the Supreme Court. As was

the case in Greenfield, the record demonstrates that the City Defendants did

conduct an investigation.

Plaintiff disputes that the City Defendants conducted any type of

investigation. This argument is simply not supported by the evidence as made

clear by the affidavits submitted by Miller, Baylor and Rhodunda in this case. Even

putting aside the affidavits, the July 13, 2023 email from Baylor to Plaintiff and

the July 17, 2023 email from Miller to Plaintiff make it clear that an investigation

was done. Since the City Defendants investigated Plaintiff’s complaints, their

actions are not considered ministerial but discretionary in terms of the immunity

analysis. The question now becomes whether the Plaintiff has demonstrated that

the City Defendants acted in bad faith, were grossly or wantonly negligent, or

acted with wilful and malicious intent in order to fall within the exception for

immunity.

In Brittingham v. Board of Adjustment of City of Rehoboth Beach, this Court

had occasion to address the definition of bad faith:

The Brittinghams cite to Black's Law Dictionary for the
definition of bad faith as “[t]he opposite of ‘good faith,’

12
generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or
a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal
to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not
prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but
by some interested or sinister motive.” BLACK'S LAW DICT. 139
(6th ed.1990). The definition goes on to say, however, “ ‘bad
faith’ is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather it
implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity, it is different from the negative
idea of negligence in that it contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.”

The seventh edition of Black's Law Dictionary defines “bad
faith” as “[d]ishonesty of belief or purpose.” BLACK'S LAW
DICT. 134 (7th ed.1999).
* * *
The common thread in all of the definitions of bad faith given
is that there is some kind of dishonest motive or purpose. There
is, thus, the implication of an element of scienter. For example,
in Desert Equities, Inc.,624 A.2d at 1208, the Court stated, “a
claim of bad faith hinges on a party's tortious state of mind.”37

Gross negligence requires a state of mind above and beyond mere negligence.

“Gross negligence is a higher level of negligence representing ‘an extreme

departure from the ordinary standard of care.’” 38 Wanton conduct is “‘such

conduct as exhibits a conscious indifference to consequences in circumstances

where probability of harm to another within the circumference of the conduct is

reasonably apparent, although harm to such other is not intended.’” 39 “The

37
Brittingham v. Bd. of Adjustment of City of Rehoboth Beach, 2005 WL 1653979, at *1-2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr.
26, 2005).
38
Brown v. Robb, 583 A 2d 949, 953 (Del 1990) (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 150 (2d
ed. 1955)).
39
McCaffrey v. City of Wilmington, 133 A.3d 536, 547 (Del. 2016) (quoting Wagner v. Shanks, 194 A.2d 701, 706
(Del. 1963)).

13
‘conscious indifference’ aspect of wantonness requires an ‘I-don’t-care’

attitude.”40

When the facts are viewed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the

record is clear that Plaintiff has not proven any of the City Defendants acted in bad

faith, with gross or wanton negligence or with wilful or malicious intent. In

support of each of their motions for summary judgment, each of the City

Defendants produced an affidavit outlining the actions they took and why they

took them. The affidavit of David Baylor captures the essence of the actions taken

by the City Defendants. The affidavit provides in relevant part:

1. I previously held the position of Town Manager for the
City of Delaware City.

2. During my employment as Town Manager of the City of
Delaware City, I was familiar with, and had a number of
conversations and interactions with, George X (hereinafter
“Mr. X”). …

4. While still employed as Town Manager, I learned that
Mr. X had lodge a complaint regarding a basketball court that
was installed on or about July 8, 2023 by Mr. X’s adjoining
neighbor, Thomas J. Parag (hereinafter “Mr. Parag”). In
particular, on or before July 13, 2023, Mr. X voiced a
complaint with the City of Delaware City which was initially
directed to my attention.

5. As a result of Mr. X’s complaint, I visited Mr. X at his
property located at 301 Bayard Street, Delaware City,
Delaware 19706 on the afternoon of July 13, 2023 and listened
to his concerns.

40
Id. (quoting McHugh v. Brown, 125 A.2d 583, 586 (Del. 1956)).

14
6. Although I was informed that Mr. X’s complaint related
to what X referred to as a “basketball court,” upon my arrival
at Mr. X’s property, I observed that what he was calling a
“basketball court’ was, in reality, a metal pole in the ground
with a backboard, rim and net attached at the top (hereinafter,
the “basketball structure”).

7. According to Mr. X, Mr. Parag had installed the
basketball structure on property owned by Mr. X. As a result,
Mr. X was of the opinion that the placement of the basketball
structure constituted an encroachment upon his land. Mr. X
also believed in this regard that the location of the basketball
structure represented a violation of the Code of the City of
Delaware City and wanted my office to become involved and
have the basketball structure removed immediately. Mr. X
indicated that, as a result of the alleged encroachment, he had
sustained some sort of uncertain economic loss.

8. Following my discussion with Mr. X, and my visual
observation of the basketball structure and where it was
installed relative to what appeared to be Mr. Parag’s and Mr.
X’s respective property boundaries, I told Mr. X that I would
be back in touch with him after speaking with Mr. Parag and
after Delaware City’s investigation had been concluded.

9. I then spoke to Mr. Parag, who resides next door to Mr.
X at 300 Franklin Street, Delaware City, Delaware 19706
regarding Mr. X’s complaint relative to the location of the
basketball structure. Mr. Parag conceded that he had the
basketball structure installed several days ago. However,
contrary to Mr. X’s believes, Mr. Parag was of the opinion that
he was within his rights to erect the basketball structure
because, according to Mr. Parag, the basketball structure was
situation on property he owned.

10. Upon inspecting the two (2) properties - which are
immediately adjacent to, and touching, one another, I came to
the initial conclusion that it appeared more likely that the
basketball structure was located on Mr. Parag’s land rather

15
than on Mr. X’s property. In this regard, a large telephone pole
was located in between Mr. X’s property and Mr. Parag’s
property and the basketball structure appeared to be
approximately four or five feet from the electrical pole, toward
Mr. Parag’s property… The basketball structure had been
located to the left of the pole if one were standing on the street,
looking toward the properties. …

12. In light of the fact that these two (2) adjoining
neighbors had expressed diametrically opposite positions
concerning who owned the land where the basketball structure
had been erected, I asked (then) Code Enforcement Officer
Shane Miller (hereinafter, “Mr. Miller”) to please inspect the
two (2) adjoining properties, as well as the basketball structure
violated any provision of the Code of the City of Delaware City
and/or whether the issue Mr. X raised was a matter the City of
Delaware City should be concerned about. Mr. Miller indicated
that he understood the situation and that he would report back
to me concerning his observations and findings.

13. After inspecting the properties, Mr. Miller informed me
that he did not find there to be any violations of the Code of
Delaware City insofar as the basketball structure did not appear
to him to be located on property owned by Delaware City and
also that, even if it was located on Delaware City property, the
basketball structure was not a major concern to Code
Enforcement.

14. Based upon my observations, discussions with the
parties, and my conversation with Mr. Miller, I did not believe
Mr. X’s complaint involved a violation of any specific
provision of the Code of the City of Delaware City. Nor was I
of the opinion that Mr. X’s complaint was of particular concern
to the Delaware City Government. Instead, this seemed to me
a dispute amount or between adjoining landowners and was,
therefore, civil in nature.

15. As a result of my beliefs, I verbally informed Mr. X
that, if he believed Mr. Parag was encroaching upon his
property, he should order a survey and perhaps file a civil suit

16
against Mr. Parag. I also indicated to Mr. X that, if he believed
Mr. Parag was committing criminal trespass upon Mr. X’s
property, Mr. X would do well to call the police.

16. Thereafter, the same day (July 13, 2023), I sent Mr. X
an email to confirm my earlier conversation with him. The
email stated the following:

I have reviewed your complaint. The issue that you
have outlined is not a city issue. This would be
considered a property rights issue and therefore it is
civil in nature. The proper authority over matters such
as you[s] would be to file a civil complaint in the
Magistrate Court System. As you are aware, I am not
an attorney and therefore cannot give you legal
advice, if you have any questions regarding the
legality of your situation, I would urge you to contact
an attorney.

I have included our City Solicitor on this email.
Should you contact a lawyer, and have any legal
questions involving the city of Delaware City, please
have your attorney contact the City Solicitor.

17. Mr. Miller separately wrote to Mr. X on July 17, 2023 and
expressed his findings in an email which stated, as follows:

I have reviewed your complaint regarding the
basketball hoop that was installed on your property.
I spoke to David Baylor [who] advised me that he
reached out to you to notify you that this is a civil
matter. Code Enforcement has no authority to have
the basketball hoop removed from your property. I
am sorry that I cannot be of more help. Any other
questions let me know.

18. Following the emails from Mr. Miller and from me, neither
of us heard from Mr. X again regarding this matter, and we
were not asked by anyone to conduct any follow-up

17
investigation or to otherwise involve ourselves or anyone else
employed by the City of Delaware City in this matter. …

21. Additionally, at no time during our discussions did Mr. X
suggest that the basketball structure might be situated on
property owned by the City of Delaware City. Instead, he kept
insisting that he [sic] basketball structure was actually located
on his property. 41

In his affidavit, Mr. Miller states in relevant part:

2. During my employment as Code Enforcement Officer for
the City of Delaware City, I became familiar with George X
(hereinafter “Mr. X”) and his property located at 301 Bayard
Street, Delaware City, Delaware 19706. …

5. In light of Mr. X’s complaint about the existence and
location of the basketball hoop, I was assigned by Town
Manager David L. Baylor (hereinafter, “Mr. Baylor”) to
investigate the situation to determine whether the basketball
hoop constituted a violation of the Code of Delaware City
such that the City of Delaware City may need to become
involved.

6. Per Mr. Baylor’s instructions, I visited Mr. X’s property and
made some visual observations regarding his property, the
basketball pole hoop, as well as the property next door which
is owned by Mr. Parag. It appeared to me that the basketball
hoop was position on Mr. X’s property. Assuming this to be
the case, it was my belief that the City of Delaware City had
no authority to order Mr. X to remove the basketball hoop.
Alternatively, if the basketball hoop was located on property
owned by Mr. Parag, the City of Delaware City would again
have no authority to instruct Mr. Parag to remove it. I did not
believe that the location of the basketball hoop violated any
provision of the Code of the City of Delaware City but,
instead, it appeared to me to be a civil dispute between two
adjoining neighbors.

41
Affidavit of David L. Baylor, D.I. 239.

18
7. Thereafter, based upon my earlier observations and
conclusions, and my initial belief that the basketball hoop was
actually on Mr. X’s property, on July 17, 2023 I sent an email
to Mr. X in which I stated the following:

I have reviewed your complaint regarding the
basketball hoop that was installed on your property.
I spoke to David Baylor that advised me that he
reached out to you to notify you that this is a civil
matter. Code Enforcement has no authority to have
the basketball hoop removed from your property. I
am sorry that I cannot be of more help. Any other
questions let me know.

8. Following my email, I never heard from Mr. X again
regarding this matter.42

Finally, in Mr. Rhodunda’s affidavit, he states in relevant part:

1. I am currently the City Solicitor for the City of Delaware
City, a position I have held since 2020.

2. During my employment as City Solicitor for the City of
Delaware City, I became familiar with, and had a number of
conversations and interactions with, George X (“hereinafter
“Mr. X”) related to the pending litigation he initiated. …

9. Additionally, as a result of his investigation, on the
afternoon of July 13, 2023, Mr. Baylor sent an email to Mr.
X, which stated the following:

I have reviewed your complaint. The issue that you
have outlined is not a city issue. This would be
considered a property rights issue and therefore it is
civil in nature. The proper authority over matters
such as you[s] would be to file a civil complaint in
the Magistrate Court System. As you are aware, I am

42
Affidavit of Shane Miller, D.I. 239.

19
not an attorney and therefore cannot give you legal
advice, if you have any questions regarding the
legality of your situation, I would urge you to
contact an attorney.

I have included our City Solicitor on this email.
Should you contact a lawyer, and have any legal
questions involving the city of Delaware City,
please have your attorney contact the City Solicitor.

10. Insofar as I was carbon-copied on Mr. Baylor’s email to
Mr. X, I was made aware of Mr. X’s complaint, as well as
Mr. Baylor’s conclusions and suggestions. I was also aware
that Mr. Baylor’s email invited Mr. X to contact me in the
event he had “any legal questions involving the city of
Delaware City.” As such, I was on notice that Mr. X might
be contacting me regarding his complaint; however, Mr. X
never contacted me.

11. It was not until October, 2023 when I learned additional
details regarding Mr. X’s complaint vis-à-vis the lawsuit that
Mr. X filed. 43

The affidavits demonstrate that Plaintiff made a complaint to the City and

Baylor and Miller responded to that complaint. When the facts are viewed in a

light most favorable to Plaintiff, they could support a conclusion that the

investigation conducted was incomplete and not comprehensive enough.

However, the facts set forth in the affidavits do not show that any of the City

Defendants acted in bad faith, were grossly or wantonly negligent, or acted

willfully or maliciously. The affidavits do not come anywhere close to showing

43
Affidavit of William J. Rhodunda, Jr., D.I. 239.

20
bad faith, gross or wanton negligence, or willful or malicious actions on the part

of any City Defendants.

Once the City Defendants produced evidence showing a lack of bad faith,

gross negligence or wanton conduct, Plaintiff, under Superior Court Civil Rule 56,

was required to produce evidence, not simply arguments, that the City Defendants

conduct supported a claim of bad faith, gross or wanton negligence, or willful or

malicious actions. Plaintiff has simply not produced any evidence that the City

Defendants actions were done in bad faith, were grossly or wanton negligent, or

done willfully or maliciously. The facts as presented simply do not support such

a finding that triggers an exception to immunity. Therefore, City Defendants are

entitled summary judgment.

For the above, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by David Baylor,

Shane Miller and William Rhodunda is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s Integrated Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff has filed a pleading entitled “Integrated Motion for Summary

Judgment.”44 Attached to the motion is a form of order in which the Plaintiff seeks

12 prayers for relief. The Court will address each of those requests.

In this opinion the Court has GRANTED summary judgment in favor of

the City Defendants. The Plaintiff’s request as to prayers for relief 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,

44
D.I. 442.

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9, 10 and 11 are DENIED given the entry of summary judgment in favor of the

City Defendants.

Prayer for relief number 1 asks this Court to grant summary judgment in

favor of the Plaintiff. As to the City Defendants, this request is DENIED based

on this Court’s finding of summary judgment in their favor. As to Defendant

Parag, this request is DENIED because there are genuine issues of material fact

surrounding causation and damages.

Prayer for relief number 2 asks the court to find that no genuine issue of

material fact exists that Defendant Thomas J. Parag installed the basketball and

supporting structure within the Delaware City right-of-way burdening Plaintiff’s

appurtenant easement and use rights. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to

find that Parag installed the basketball goal within the Delaware City right-of-way.

The remaining requests are DENIED as they involve genuine issues of material

fact.

As to prayer 12, the Court agrees that the issue of damages remains for trial

as to Defendant Parag.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Francis J. Jones, Jr.
Francis J. Jones, Jr., Judge

cc: Counsel of Record via File&ServeXpress

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