State v. Tucker

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
)
v. )
) I.D. No. 2505004443
)
RALPH TUCKER )
)
)

Submitted: January 7, 2026
Decided: January 21, 2026

Upon Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence
GRANTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Christina M. Davis, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, 820 North French Street, 7th Floor, Wilmington, DE 19801; Attorney for
State of Delaware.

Eugene J. Maurer, Jr., Esquire, 1201-A King Street, Wilmington, DE 19899;
Attorney for Defendant Ralph Tucker.

WHARTON, J.
I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Ralph Tucker (“Tucker”) is charged by the grand jury with two

counts of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”), Possession of

Ammunition by a Person Prohibited (“PABPP”), Non-compliance with Bond

Conditions, and Resisting Arrest. The PFBPP and PABPP charges resulted after

police executed two search warrants – one at an address in Claymont, Delaware (the

residence warrant) seeking evidence related to an investigation of Meccour Redden

(“Redden”) and the second for Tucker’s DNA (the DNA warrant.) Tucker

challenges the probable cause supporting both warrants.1 He alleges that the

residence warrant does not establish a nexus between the residence and the items

sought. 2 He argues the DNA warrant lacked probable cause to believe his DNA

would be found on the seized firearms and that it failed to establish probable cause

to believe that evidence of a crime would be found through the seizure of his DNA.3

Looking to the four corners of each warrant and giving due deference to the probable

cause determinations of the authorizing magistrates, the Court finds that the

residence warrant inferentially establishes a nexus between the residence and the

items sought. But, the DNA warrant fails to establish probable cause that Tucker’s

1
Mot. to Suppress, D.I. 18.
2
Id.
3
Id.
2
DNA would be found on the firearms. The Motion to Suppress Evidence is

GRANTED on that basis.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The basic facts are not in dispute and largely are taken from the probable cause

affidavits of the two search warrants at issue. In March 2025, Senior Corporal Keith

Johnson (“S.Cpl. Johnson”) of the Wilmington Police Department began an

investigation into the sale of fictitious vehicle registrations and other related

documents on Instagram. 4 That investigation identified Redden as a suspect with a

current address of 2 Glenrock Dr. in Claymont, Delaware. 5 On May 9th, S.Cpl.

Johnson and others executed a search warrant he had obtained the day before for 2

Glenrock Drive. The search warrant sought documents and items related to the sale

of fictitious registration cards on Instagram. 6 During the execution of the warrant,

the police seized two firearms from an upstairs bedroom and ammunition from a

separate upstairs bedroom.7 Tucker was also upstairs in the residence, but

apparently in a location separate from the firearms and ammunition.8 Subsequently

4
Id. at Ex. A (Residence Warrant at ⁋ 2) (Both warrants are attached as exhibits to
the both the Motion to Suppress Evidence and the State’s Response. In each
submission, the Residence Warrant is Exhibit A and the DNA Warrant is Exhibit B.
Subsequent references will refer to the warrants themselves.).
5
Residence Warrant at ⁋ 3.
6
Id.
7
Id. at ⁋ 3.
8
Id.
3
on May 9th, S.Cpl. Johnson obtained a warrant for the body of Tucker to take saliva

via a buccal swab for DNA testing. 9 Tucker’s DNA was identified on the grip of

one of the firearms. 10

Tucker filed his suppression motion on November 14, 2025. 11 The State

responded on December 16th. 12 The Court heard argument on January 7, 2026.

III. THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

A. Tucker.

Tucker claims residency at 2 Glenrock Drive, and, therefore, standing to bring

this motion, an assertion the State does not challenge. Citing Dorsey v. State’s

requirement that there be a “logical nexus between the items sought and the place to

be searched,”13 Tucker argues that nothing in the affidavit of probable cause links

Redden’s criminal activity to 2 Glenrock Drive.14 Further, S.Cpl. Johnson “offered

no statement that any of the evidence discovered on [Redden’s Instagram account]

provided a logical inference that it was objectively reasonable for the police to expect

to find the items sought at 2 Glenrock Drive.”15 As a result, the seizure of the

9
DNA Warrant.
10
Mot. to Suppress. at Ex. C.
11
Id.
12
State’s Resp., D.I. 21.
13
Mot. to Suppress. at ⁋ 5 (quoting Dorsey, 761 A.2d 811, 811 (Del. 1989)), D.I.
18.
14
Id. at ⁋ 8.
15
Id.
4
weapons and ammunition violated Tucker’s rights under Article I, Section 6 of the

Delaware Constitution and 11 Del. C. § 2306, and, therefore those items must be

suppressed.16

Tucker also finds fault with the probable cause supporting the DNA warrant.

He asserts that the affidavit in support of the warrant provided “no information

within the four corners of the warrant for the magistrate to determine whether the

Defendant had any connection to the residence other than his presence at the time of

the execution of the residential search and a vague citation of ‘documents’ in the rear

bedroom.”17 Additionally the affidavit failed to establish any nexus between Tucker

and the vacant bedroom where the firearms were found. 18 Finally, Tucker argues

that the affidavit failed to establish a fair probability that the seizure of his DNA

could be linked to any crime.19 S.Cpl. Johnson asserted only that individuals “may

possibly” transfer skin cells to objects they handle and those objects “may possibly”

retain DNA samples from subjects who touch the objects. 20 According to Tucker

those “mere inference[s]” failed to establish a reasonable probability that his DNA

would be found on the objects seized. 21

16
Id. at ⁋ 9.
17
Id. at ⁋ 11.
18
Id.
19
Id. at ¶ 13.
20
Id. at ⁋ 15.
21
Id.
5
B. The State.

Primarily, the State emphasizes that this Court should give great deference the

magistrates’ probable cause determinations, considering them as a whole in a

practical, commonsense manner while refraining from engaging in a hypertechnical

analysis of their separate allegations.22 As to the residential search, the State focuses

on paragraph 5 of the affidavit in which S.Cpl. Johnson asserts that he knows through

prior experience that “individuals engaged in this type of forgery will frequently

utilize computers, printers and other pieces of technology to create forged

documents.” 23 From this statement the State posits that “[i]t is reasonable for the

issuing magistrate to infer that if a person is selling fictitious documents that the

documents and/or technology used to create those documents would be in the

residence.” 24

The State contends that there was sufficient probable cause to believe that

Tucker’s DNA would be found on the seized firearms because: (1) only Redden and

Tucker were present when the residence search warrant was executed; (2) the seized

firearms were found in what appeared to be an unused bedroom; (3) the ammunition

was found in the closet of a second story bedroom that had documents “for Tucker”

inside the bedroom; (4) the ammunition that was found matched the calibers of both

22
State’s Resp. at ⁋ 17, D.I. 17.
23
Id. at ⁋ 21 (quoting Residence Warrant, at ⁋ 5).
24
Id.
6
seized firearms.25 In the State’s view, these facts led to a practical and proper

probable cause determination by the magistrate.26

Lastly, the State asserts that in S.Cpl. Johnson’s experience individuals who

possess firearms frequently touch them and then may transfer skins cells to those

firearms.27 In fact, S.Cpl. Johnson stated that he had conducted prior investigations

in which DNA trace samples had been recovered and matched to buccal swabs.28

IV. STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW

When a defendant challenges the validity of a search warrant, he has the

burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged search

or seizure was unlawful.29 Where a magistrate has determined that adequate

probable cause exists, that determination should be given great deference.30

Nonetheless, a reviewing court must determine whether “the warrant was invalid

because the magistrate’s probable-cause determination reflected an improper

analysis of the totality of the circumstances….”31

25
Id. at ⁋ 25.
26
Id. ⁋ 26.
27
Id. at ⁋ 30.
28
Id.
29
State v. Sisson, 883 A.2d 868, 875 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005), aff’d 903 A.2d 288
(Del. 2006).
30
Id.
31
LeGrande v. State, 947 A.2d 1103, 1108 (Del. 2008).
7
The Delaware Constitution provides that a search warrant cannot be issued

“unless there is probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.” 32 In furtherance

of this constitutional provision, 11 Del. C. § 2306 provides:

The application for a search warrant shall be in writing,
signed by the complainant and verified by his oath or
affirmation. It shall designate the house, place and
conveyance or person to be searched and he owner or
occupant thereof (if any) and shall describe the things or
persons sought as particularly as may be and shall
substantially allege the cause for which the search is made
or the offense committed by or in relation to the persons
or things searched for, and shall state that the complainant
suspects that such persons or things are concealed in the
house, place, conveyance, or person designated and shall
recite the facts upon which such suspicion is founded. 33

The Delaware Supreme Court has held consistently that § 2306 contemplates

a four-corners test for probable cause.34 That standard requires that “sufficient facts

must appear on the face of the affidavit so that an appellate court can verify the

factual basis for the judicial officer’s determination regarding the existence of

probable cause.”35 Thus, the affidavit “must set forth adequate facts for a neutral

32
Del. Const. art. 1, § 6. “Section 6. The people shall be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no
warrant to search any place, or to seize any person ot thing, shall issue without
describing them as particularly as may be, nor then, unless there is probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation.”
33
11 Del. C. § 2306.
34
Dorsey, 761 A.2d at 811 (citing Pierson v. State, 388 A.2d 571, 573 (Del.
1975)).
35
Id.
8
judicial officer to form a reasonable belief … that seizable property would be found

in a particular place or on a particular person.”36 The Court does not take a

hypertechnical approach in evaluating a search warrant, preferring a common sense

interpretation. 37 The affidavit must be “considered as a whole and not on the basis

of separate allegations.” 38 “A neutral and detached magistrate may draw reasonable

inferences from the factual allegations in the affidavit.” 39

V. DISCUSSION

A. The Residence Warrant.

The only mention of 2 Glenrock Drive appears in paragraph 3 of the affidavit

which states that Redden’s probation officer reported that Redden’s “current

probation address is 2 Glenrock Drive Claymont De 19703.” 40 In support of

probable cause for a nexus to that residence, the State relies entirely on an inference

it argues should be drawn from paragraph 5 – “It is reasonable for the issuing

magistrate to infer that if a person is selling fictitious documents and/or technology

to create those documents would be located at their residence.” 41 Paragraph 5 reads

in part, “I [S.Cpl. Johnson] also know through prior experience that individuals

36
Id. (citing Pierson, 388 A.2d at 574).
37
Id. (citing Gardner v. State, 567 A.2d 404, 409 (Del. 1989); Jensen v. State, 482
A.2d 105, 110-11 (Del. 1984)).
38
Id. (quoting Gardner, 567 A.2d at 409 (quoting Jensen, 482 A.2d at 111)).
39
Sisson, 903 A.2d at 296.
40
Residence Warrant at ⁋ 3.
41
State’s Resp, at ⁋ 21.
9
engaged in this type of forgery will frequently utilize computers, printers and other

pieces of technology to create the forged documents.”42 While it would have

provided stronger support for the existence of probable cause had S.Cpl. Johnson

stated that his prior experience located those pieces of technology in the target’s

residence (if that were the case), giving great deference to the issuing magistrate, the

Court finds it reasonable for her to infer the objects would be located in the

residence. While computers and printers certainly are found in a variety of locations,

many are located in residences. Certainly, keeping the equipment in his residence

would have allowed Redden to conceal his criminal activity from others to a far

greater extent than using other more public technological devices. Our Courts have

framed the question as “whether, based upon the specific facts alleged within the

affidavit’s four corners, would one normally expect to find those items at that

place.”43 The Court finds that it would be “normal” to expect to find computer,

printers, and other pieces of technology capable of creating forged documents in

Redden’s residence. Thus the magistrate’s determination of probable cause was

reasonable.

B. The DNA Warrant.

42
Residence Warrant at ⁋ 5.
43
Dorsey, 761 A.2d at 813 (emphasis in original) (finding it “illogical for the State
to argue that it is ‘normal’ to expect to find the murder weapon missing from a crime
scene concealed in the automobile of the first person to discover the murder victim’s
body”).
10
The DNA warrant requires a different conclusion. In support of his request

for Tucker’s DNA, S.Cpl. Johnson states:

I know through prior training and experience that
individuals who possess firearms frequently touch the
firearms. I also know that when handling the firearms,
individuals, may possibly transfer skin cells from their
hands to the objects they are handling. I know that the
objects touched may possibly then retain DNA samples
from the subjects who possessed them and/or touched
them. I have conducted prior investigations involving
firearms in which DNA trace samples have been recovered
from a firearm and were able to be matched to a DNA
Buccal Sample taken from a suspect by the State of
Delaware Division of Forensic Sciences. 44

In its response, the State posits that the test for probable cause “requires only

that a probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity be

established.” 45 The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that while “t]he

probable cause standard is incapable of precise definition…because it deals with

probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances,” 46 “[t]he substance of

all probable cause definitions is a “reasonable ground for belief of guilt, which must

be particular to the person.”47

44
DNA Warrant at ⁋ 7.
45
State’s Resp. at ⁋ 21 (quoting Jensen, 482 A.2d at 112).
46
Stafford v. State, 59 A.3d 1223, 1229 (Del. 2012) (quoting Lopez v. State, 861
A.2d 1245, 1248 (Del. 2004)).
47
Id. (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)).
11
Here, S.Cpl. Johnson wrote that individuals “may possibly” transfer skin cells

from their hands to objects they touch.48 Then, some of those skin cells which might

possibly have been transferred to the firearms “may possibly” be retained on the

firearms.49 “Possible” is defined as:

1a: being within the limits of ability, capacity, or
realization…

b: being what may be conceived, be done, or occur
according to nature, custom, or manners…

2a: being something that may or may not occur…

b: something that may or may not be true or actual…

3: having an indicated potential.50

It is not being hypertechnical to suggest that words matter. All the affidavit

suggests is that an event – the presence of DNA samples identifiable as Tucker’s

being on the firearm – is within the realm of possibility. But, that event can only

occur if some preceding event, which likewise is merely within the realm of

possibility, also occurs. That preceding event is Tucker leaving skin cells from his

hands on a firearm. Both of those events are merely possible and may or may not

48
DNA Warrant at § 7.
49
Id.
50
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S THE NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.comdictionary/possible.
12
occur according to the language of the affidavit. And, both of those mere

possibilities can only occur if Tucker actually touched one of the firearms.

The initial condition precedent that Tucker touch one of those firearms is not

based on direct observation, but is inferential. Still, based on the following facts, it

is sufficient to establish probable cause to find that Tucker touched at least one of

the firearms or ammunition: (1) the firearms were located in a second story

unoccupied front bedroom;51 (2) the ammunition was located in the closet of a

different bedroom “which had documents for Tucker inside the room;”52 (3) the .25

caliber and 9mm ammunition matched the firearms found in the front unoccupied

bedroom;53 (4) Tucker was somewhere on the second floor when the Residence

Warrant was executed;54 and (5) both Tucker and Redden had prior weapons

convictions.55 Thus, the dots connecting Tucker to the firearms are that he was

present on the same floor of the residence where the weapons and ammunition were

found; documents “for” him were found in the room where the ammunition was

located; the .25 caliber and 9mm ammunition could be discharged from the weapons;

and he had a prior conviction for illegally possessing a firearm. That information,

51
DNA Warrant, at ⁋ 6.
52
Id.
53
Id. at ⁋⁋ 5, 6.
54
Id. at ⁋ 4.
55
Id. at ⁋ 8.
13
while not overwhelming, is sufficiently persuasive for the magistrate to have found

probable cause.

The affidavit falls short, however, in establishing probable cause that Tucker’s

DNA would be found on the firearms. It establishes only that, if Tucker handled the

firearms, he “may possibly” have transferred skin cells to the weapons. Then, even

if that mere possibility came to fruition, the firearms only “may possibly” retain the

DNA samples. Compounding “may possiblies” makes the likelihood of identifying

Tucker’s DNA on the firearms less likely, not more so.56 Such speculation does not

allow a neutral and detached magistrate to form a reasonable belief that Tucker’s

DNA would be found on the firearms.

In State v. Campbell,57 the Court considered a similar challenge to a search

warrant authorizing a DNA swabbing of the defendant. The defendant argued that

there was no nexus between the taking of a DNA swab from him and spent shell

casings found at a crime scene because, as here, no effort had been made to

determine whether usable DNA was recovered from the casings. 58 The Court

described the reasoning of the cases it cited holding that possession of testable DNA

was a necessary prerequisite for obtaining a comparison sample from a defendant as

56
For example, the likelihood of two things happening, each with a 50% chance of
occurring, is only 25%.
57
2015 WL 59685901 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 2015).
58
Id. at *4.
14
“compelling.”59 Yet, it declined to adopt such a rule for pragmatic reasons because

“the determination of whether DNA exists on an object is not an easy or quick

process. And in an underfunded and resource-limited criminal justice system, to

mandate such a finding is simply unrealistic.”60 Ultimately, the Court determined

the issue was moot because no usable DNA was recovered from the casings. 61 While

the Court agrees that the reasoning of those cases requiring that law enforcement

possess a testable DNA sample before seeking a defendant’s DNA seems to have

merit, the record here is insufficient to dismiss the Campbell Court’s pragmatic

considerations to the extent they remain valid, or even relevant in light of the

constitutional and statutory questions posed. 62

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence is

GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ferris W. Wharton
Ferris W. Wharton, J.

59
Id. (See cases collected at n. 18).
60
Id. at *5.
61
Id. at *6.
62
Were the Court to consider such a challenge in the future, it would be helpful to
know, for example, how often usable DNA is recovered from firearms. It has been
the Court’s experience that in cases where DNA is not found on a firearm, the State
regularly presents the testimony of a forensic services unit officer to explain, in that
officer’s experience, how infrequently DNA is recovered from firearms. The Court
would be interested in how the State reconciles its position here with the evidence it
presents in cases where no DNA is found.
15