State v. Rosas-Jose

SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE

CRAIG A. KARSNITZ, SUSSEX COUNTY COURTHOUSE
RESIDENT JUDGE 1 THE CIRCLE, SUITE 2
GEORGETOWN, DE 19947
TELEPHONE (302) 856-5263

January 6, 2026

Luis Rosas-Jose
SBI# 00939844
Sussex Correctional Institute
23203 DuPont Blvd
Georgetown, DE 19947

Re: State of Delaware v. Luis Rosas-Jose, Def. ID No. 2010010939
Motion for Postconviction Relief
Motion for Withdrawal of Postconviction Counsel

Dear Mr. Rosas-Jose:

You were arrested on October 22, 2020, and on October 26, 2020, you were

charged by indictment with the following offenses:

Burglary First Degree
Possession of Burglary Tools
Rape First Degree (twelve counts)
Rape Second Degree (two counts)
Unlawful Sexual Contact First Degree (three counts)
Offensive Touching
Failure to Comply with Taking of Photos and Fingerprints

You were originally represented by an attorney who later withdrew as your

Trial Counsel, and an attorney from the Public Defender’s Office was then appointed
to represent you as Trial Counsel.

On January 11, 2021, prior to trial, the State filed a letter notifying you that it

intended to seek enhanced penalties in your case because the victim was under

fourteen years of age when the offenses allegedly occurred.1

On July 5, 2022, the State conveyed a plea offer of one count of Rape First

Degree during Final Case Review. The State stated it would not seek enhanced

penalties under §4205A and would not exceed a recommendation of twenty-five (25)

years of incarceration under this plea offer. The Court conducted a colloquy with

you to discuss your rights and the plea offer, and during this hearing you responded

to the Court’s inquiries in the affirmative regarding whether Trial Counsel had

provided you with discovery materials and whether you had reviewed these

materials with trial counsel. You indicated that you had recently received discovery

materials from Trial Counsel, and you made no mention of not receiving photos or

interview materials. You also indicated that you understood a conviction of most of

the charges in this case would result in spending the rest of your life incarcerated.

Ultimately, you rejected the State’s plea offer and proceeded to trial.

Trial was held from July 12-14, 2022. At the conclusion of trial, a jury found

you guilty of the following offenses:

Burglary First Degree
Rape First Degree (eight counts)

1
Pursuant to 11 Del. C. §4205A(a)(2).
2
Unlawful Sexual Contact
Offensive Touching

On September 6, 2022, the Court sentenced you to 202 years of unsuspended

incarceration.

On September 15, 2022, you filed a direct appeal with the Delaware

Supreme Court, and you were represented by Santino Ceccotti, Esquire, as

Appellate Counsel during appellate proceedings. On appeal you argued that (1)

the trial court erred in admitting identification evidence in the form of a Mexican

driver’s license, as it was hearsay evidence, and (2) there was insufficient

evidence supporting your conviction of Burglary First Degree. Oral arguments

were held on July 12, 2023, and the Supreme Court affirmed your convictions

and sentence by Order dated September 25, 2023.

Pro Se Rule 61 Motion and Appointment of Postconviction Counsel

On May 16, 2024, you filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief under

Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 along with a Motion for Appointment of

Postconviction Counsel. In your pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief, you

indicated you were unable to articulate grounds for relief due to not speaking

English. However, you also noted a general claim of Ineffective Assistance of

Counsel by Trial Counsel. On May 23, 2024, your Motion for Appointment of

Postconviction Counsel was granted, and Postconviction Counsel was appointed to

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represent you in these postconviction matters.

Postconviction Counsel met with you by videophone with the assistance of an

interpreter to clarify your claims. During these videophone meetings, you expressed

to Postconviction Counsel that your claims focused on the admission into evidence

of your Mexican driver’s license as well as ineffectiveness of your trial counsel for

failing to review all the evidence presented against you, particularly photographs of

the victim and the victim’s interview statements from the Child Advocacy Center of

Delaware (“CAC”). You expressed to Postconviction Counsel that had you reviewed

these aspects of the evidence prior to trial, you possibly would have accepted the

State’s plea offer of one charge of Rape First Degree.

Motion to Withdraw as Postconviction Counsel

On June 16, 2025, Postconviction Counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw.2 In

her motion, Postconviction Counsel addressed your core concerns and claims you

had discussed together during your videophone meetings.

In her withdrawal motion, Postconviction Counsel explained that your claim

concerning admission of your Mexican driver’s license was procedurally barred

since it was previously raised on direct appeal by Appellate Counsel and previously

denied by the Supreme Court.3 Regarding your claims concerning Trial Counsel’s

2
Pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(7).
3
Pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
4
failure to review victim photographs and interviews with you, Postconviction

Counsel detailed that the State provided Trial Counsel with this evidence on the

condition that it not be shared with or distributed to you. Postconviction Counsel’s

withdrawal motion also notes that Trial Counsel’s case log describes discussions

between you and Trial Counsel in which you were informed that these materials

existed, and that Trial Counsel advised you to accept the State’s plea offer.

Postconviction Counsel noted that, based on these discussions, you did not indicate

that you would have accepted the State’s plea offer.

Postconviction Counsel’s withdrawal motion further expressed that she

meticulously reviewed the record for other possible meritorious claims, and no such

claims were found.

On July 24, 2025, you filed your response to Postconviction Counsel’s Motion

to Withdraw as Postconviction Counsel. In this response you discussed difficulties

in communicating with Postconviction Counsel throughout the postconviction phase

due to the language barrier. Your response noted that you were frustrated by a lack

of communication and that this frustration was exacerbated when Postconviction

Counsel met with you over videophone to discuss her belief that there were no

meritorious claims applicable to your case. Your response described discussions in

which you and Postconviction Counsel reviewed your Ineffective Assistance of

Counsel claim relating to the victim interviews and photographs as well as your

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claim relating to admission of the Mexican driver’s license. You also noted that you

believed Postconviction Counsel had failed to consider seven additional claims of

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel you believed to be meritorious in your case. These

claims are discussed more fully below.

Response to Motion to Withdraw as Postconviction Counsel

The first Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claim discussed in your response

relates to Trial Counsel’s failure to call your brother as a witness at trial. You argue

that testimony from your brother would have refuted the charge of Burglary First

Degree, of which you were convicted, because it would have shown you had

permission to come and go from the home and were permitted to stay at the home as

needed. You also noted that this testimony would have challenged the credibility of

another State witness. Your response stated you believe Trial Counsel’s failure to

call your brother as a witness deprived you of your Sixth Amendment right to call

witnesses to testify in your defense.

The second Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claim discussed in your

response relates to Trial Counsel’s failure to investigate and present evidence of the

victim’s class attendance. You argue that the victim testified she attended online

classes from her home on occasion, that she was scheduled to attend an online class

the day of the incident, and that had the victim’s schedule been reviewed and

presented at trial, it would show she attended these classes. You further contend that

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this evidence of online class attendance proves that “the victim could not have been

raped in that magnitude because it would have been impossible for somebody who

suffered something like that to attend online classes if she was so upset from having

suffered something as horrible as what the victim testified.” You stated that if this

evidence had been investigated and presented by Trial Counsel, the jury may have

had reasonable doubt as to the charge of Rape First Degree and may have found you

not guilty or convicted you of a lesser offense. You further request an evidentiary

hearing relating to this evidence and claim.

The third Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claim discussed in your response

relates to cross examination of the victim and the victim’s mother by Trial Counsel

during trial. You argue that Trial Counsel did not question the victim or her mother

regarding attendance of online classes by the victim during the date of the incident,

and you again emphasize that evidence of attendance of these classes would have

mitigated the charges of Rape First Degree. You also stated that the victim’s mother

asked the victim to lie to police and to an interviewer from the CAC. You stated

Trial Counsel’s failure to question the victim and her mother regarding the online

classes was a deficiency that resulted in a missed opportunity to establish reasonable

doubt relating to the charges of Rape First Degree which may have resulted in

conviction of a lesser offense or undermined the credibility of the witnesses.

The fourth Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claim discussed in your response

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relates to Trial Counsel’s failure to investigate the victim’s and her mother’s cell

phone records. You argue that during trial, the victim testified she believed you had

hidden her cellphone to prevent her from communicating with her mother. You

noted that the State called a witness to testify with respect to prior statements under

11 Del. C. § 3507 because the State had knowledge that the victim and her mother

did not communicate by phone because the victim did not own a cellphone. You

further contend the victim’s mother testified she used a phone to call the victim at

9:00 a.m. on the date of the incident and that this is inconsistent with the victim’s

testimony that it was the victim who called her mother. Overall, you allege Trial

Counsel had knowledge that the victim did not own a cellphone, and you believe

these calls could not have occurred. You allege that Trial Counsel’s failure to

investigate call logs between the victim and her mother was a deficiency that

deprived you of an opportunity to challenge the credibility of the witnesses and

establish reasonable doubt as to the charges of Rape First Degree, and had this

evidence been presented to the jury, the outcome of the trial may have been different.

You request an evidentiary hearing for this claim to prove the calls did not exist and

that the witnesses were untruthful in their testimony.

The fifth Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claim discussed in your response

relates to Trial Counsel’s failure to question a detective regarding the recovery of

the victim’s cellphone. You stated the detective recovered some evidence from the

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victim’s home, but the victim’s cellphone was never recovered. You allege that, had

Trial Counsel questioned the detective about not recovering a cellphone from the

victim, this would have been evidence that the victim did not own a cellphone and

therefore no calls had occurred between the victim and her mother on the morning

of the incident. You further allege that the State did not question the detective about

the victim’s phone because it had knowledge that the phone did not exist. You allege

that Trial Counsel’s failure to question the detective regarding the lack of recovery

of the victim’s cellphone was a deficiency that resulted in a missed opportunity to

challenge the credibility of the victim’s and her mother’s testimony, and had such a

line of questioning occurred, the outcome of the trial might have been different, or

you could have been found guilty of lesser offenses.

The sixth Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claim discussed in your response

pertains to Trial Counsel’s failure to question the victim or her mother regarding

their testimony discussing phone calls that occurred the morning of the incident. For

the same reasons discussed above in your fourth claim, you allege that Trial

Counsel’s failure to question the victim and her mother about their cellphone

communications on the date of the incident was a deficiency that deprived you of an

opportunity to challenge the credibility of the witnesses and establish reasonable

doubt as to the charges of Rape First Degree. You argue that, had this evidence been

presented to the jury, the outcome of the trial may have been different, or you may

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have been convicted of lesser offenses.

The seventh Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claim discussed in your

response centers on Trial Counsel’s failure to inform you of the evidence to be

presented against you at trial. Specifically, you argue that Trial Counsel did not

disclose to you that the State had provided him with evidence in the form of victim

photographs and interviews on the condition that this evidence not be distributed to

or shown to you. You stated Trial Counsel informed you this evidence existed, but

that he did not provide details on the content of this evidence. Your response

expressed that you did not wish to have copies of the victim photographs or interview

statements distributed to you but instead wished to review this evidence with Trial

Counsel. You stated that Trial Counsel expressly told you this evidence would be

reviewed together, but this never occurred. You further contend that, had you been

informed of the specific content of this evidence and the statements made by the

victim and witnesses, there is a possibility that you may have accepted the State’s

plea offer. Your seventh claim goes on to argue that you had expressed to Trial

Counsel your desire to accept a plea offer, and this is evidenced by your letters to

Trial Counsel and your video phone discussions with him in which you asked him

to negotiate a more favorable plea offer. Your response states that, during your plea

colloquy, you answered in the affirmative when asked whether you had evaluated

the evidence with Trial Counsel, however you note you did so “because I sincerely

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did not want to hurt the attorney before the judge but in reality he did not inform me

of the content of this evidence and he hid from me that he had made an agreement

with the State to not show me the video evidence (CAC) of the victim and the

photographs (SANE).” Overall, your seventh claim argues that Trial Counsel’s

failure to inform you of the specific details pertaining to the victim photographs and

statements, as well as failure to timely provide you with all evidence, deprived you

of the opportunity to fully comprehend the evidence to be presented against you at

trial, and as a result you were prejudiced and not fully informed when you made the

decision to reject the State’s plea offer. You request an evidentiary hearing to

establish that Trial Counsel had knowledge of your intent to accept a plea offer, and

to present true testimony pertaining to your lack of understanding the extent of the

evidence that was to be presented against you at trial.

Postconviction Counsel’s Motion for Withdrawal

Withdrawal of counsel in a postconviction matter is governed by Superior

Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(7). In order to withdraw from a postconviction matter,

counsel must consider the claims to be so lacking in merit that she cannot ethically

advocate for the client, and she must be unaware of any other substantial ground for

granting relief.4 A motion to withdraw from a postconviction matter must explain

4
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(7).
11
the factual and legal basis for counsel’s opinion, and it must give the movant notice

that they must respond within 30 days of service.5

If such a motion is granted, counsel has continuing duties to her client. These

duties include notifying the client in writing of the Court’s ruling on the motion,

advising the client that he has the burden of proceeding with his postconviction

motion without counsel, advising the client in writing of his right to appeal the

Court’s final disposition of his postconviction motion, instructing her former client

on the rules for filing timely notice of appeal, and informing the former client that it

is his burden to file notice of appeal if desired.6

A motion for withdrawal as postconviction counsel may be granted

simultaneously, as here, with a denial of the client’s postconviction motion.7 Under

such circumstances, the duties of postconviction counsel are limited to notifying her

former client of the Court’s ruling in writing, advising the client in writing of his

right to appeal the Court’s final disposition of their postconviction motion,

instructing her former client on the rules for filing timely notice of appeal, and

explaining that it is the former client’s burden to file notice of appeal if desired.

I have thoroughly reviewed the record in this case, Postconviction Counsel’s

Motion to Withdraw, and your Response thereto. Her Motion fully explains the

5
Id.
6
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(7)(i)
7
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(7)(ii).

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factual and legal basis for her opinion that she cannot ethically advocate for you with

respect to your claims. I agree with Postconviction Counsel’s assessment that your

claims are so lacking in merit that she cannot do so. I further agree with

Postconviction Counsel that there are no other substantial grounds for granting relief.

Therefore, the Motion for Withdrawal of Postconviction Counsel is GRANTED.

Postconviction Counsel, who is copied on this letter, shall forthwith fulfill her

continuing duties and obligations to you as discussed above.

Rule 61 Motion for Postconviction Relief

I will now rule on your Rule 61 Motion itself. I first address the four

procedural bars of Rule 61.8 If a procedural bar exists, as a general rule I will not

address the merits of the postconviction claim.9 A Rule 61 Motion can be barred for

time limitations, successive motions, failure to raise claims below, or former

adjudication.10

First, a motion for postconviction relief exceeds time limitations if it is filed

more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final.11 In your case, the

judgment of conviction became final when the Supreme Court issued its mandate or

8
Ayers v. State, 802 A.2d 278, 281 (Del.2002) (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del.
1990).
9
Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748 (Del 2016); State v. Page, 2009 WL 1141738, at*13 (Del. Super.
April 28, 2009).
10
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i).
11
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
13
order finally determining the case on direct review.12 The Supreme Court issued its

mandate finally determining your case on direct review on September 25, 2023. You

filed the Motion on May 16, 2024, well before the one-year deadline. Therefore,

consideration of the Motion is not barred by the one-year limitation.

Second, second or subsequent motions for postconviction relief are not

permitted unless certain conditions are satisfied.13 Since this is your first motion for

postconviction relief, consideration of the Motion is not barred by this provision.

Third, grounds for relief “not asserted in the proceedings leading to the

judgment of conviction” are barred unless certain conditions are satisfied.14 It could

be argued that your claims could have been asserted in the proceedings leading to

your conviction and are therefore barred. However, your grounds for relief are

couched as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and I will treat them as such.

It is well-settled Delaware law that, as collateral claims, ineffective assistance of

counsel claims are properly raised for the first time in postconviction proceedings. 15

Therefore, my consideration of the Motion is not barred by this provision.

12
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(2).
13
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
14
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
15
State v. Schofield, 2019 WL 103862, at *2 (Del. Super. January 3, 2019); Thelemarque v. State,
2016 WL 556631, at *3 (Del. Feb. 11, 2016) (“[T]his Court will not review claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel for the first time on direct appeal.”); Watson v. State, 2013 WL 5745708, at
*2 (Del. Oct. 21, 2013) (“It is well-settled that this Court will not consider a claim of ineffective
assistance that is raised for the first time in a direct appeal.”).
14
Fourth, grounds for relief formerly adjudicated in the case, including

“proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction

proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus hearing” are barred. My consideration of

the Motion is not barred by this provision.

None of these four procedural bars apply either to (i) a claim that there is new

evidence of actual innocence in fact, or to (ii) a claim that a retroactively applied rule

of constitutional law renders the conviction invalid.16 You make no such claims here.

Since none of the procedural bars under Rule 61 apply, I will consider the Motion

on its merits.

To succeed on the merits, you must meet the two-part standard established in

Strickland v. Washington,17 as applied in Delaware.18 Under Strickland, you must

show that Trial Counsel’s and Appellate Counsel’s representation “fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness” (the “performance prong”); and (2) the

“deficient performance prejudiced [your] defense.” (the “prejudice prong”).19

As to the performance prong, you must demonstrate that Trial Counsel’s

decisions were unreasonable. There is a presumption that trial counsel’s challenged

16
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii).
17
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
18
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53 (Del. 1988).
19
Strickland at 687.
15
conduct may be considered a strategic choice, and there is deference afforded to

strategy.20

As to the prejudice prong, you must demonstrate that there exists a reasonable

probability that, but for Trial Counsel’s and Appellate Counsel’s errors, the outcome

of the trial would have been different.21 Even if their performance was

professionally unreasonable, it would not warrant setting aside the judgment of

conviction if the error had no effect on the judgment.22 A showing of prejudice

“requires more than a showing of theoretical possibility that the outcome was

affected.”23

Strickland teaches that there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective

assistance claim to approach the inquiry in a particular order, or even to address both

prongs of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. In

particular, a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient

before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant because of the alleged

deficiencies. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of

lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed.24 In every case, the court

should be concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the

20
Id. at 689.
21
Albury, at 687; Zebroski v. State, 822 A.2d 1038, 1043 (Del. 2003); Wright v. State, 671 A.2d
1353, 1356 (Del. 1996).
22
Strickland, at 691.
23
Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348, 358 (3d Cir. 1992).
24
Strickland, at 697.
16
result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the

adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results.25

Whether or not Trial Counsel was ineffective under the performance prong

depends upon whether counsel’s conduct was the type that would have been

undertaken by objectively reasonable attorneys. I will not second guess strategic

choices made by Trial Counsel. In my view, the conduct here by Trial Counsel was

objectively reasonable. Thus, the performance prong of Strickland is not satisfied.

Moreover, the claims raised in your Response to the Motion to Withdraw are

insufficient to overcome the heavy burden of showing that the outcome of trial would

have been different had the conduct of Trial Counsel been different. There was an

overwhelming amount of other evidence at trial which the jury considered to convict

you. A mere theoretical possibility of a different trial outcome is insufficient. Thus,

the prejudice prong of Strickland is not satisfied.

Therefore, your Motion for Postconviction Relief under Rule 61 is DENIED.

Postconviction Counsel, who is copied on this letter, shall forthwith fulfill her

continuing duties and obligations to you as discussed above.

Since you do not read or speak English, Postconviction Counsel is directed

to provide a Spanish translation of this letter to you.

25
Id. at 696.
17
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Craig A. Karsnitz
Craig A. Karsnitz

cc: Prothonotary
Kimberly A. Price, Esquire
Office of Defense Services
Office of the Attorney General

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