River Valley Ingredients, LLC v. American Proteins, Inc.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

RIVER VALLEY )
INGREDIENTS, LLC, et al., )
)
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. N19C-12-160 PRW
) CCLD
AMERICAN PROTEINS, INC., et al., )
)
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs. )

Submitted: April 7, 2025
Decided: July 2, 2025
Withdrawn and Reissued with Clarifications: November 5, 2025*

DECISION AFTER TRIAL

Stephen H. Barrett, Esquire, DLA PIPER LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Brett
Ingerman, Esquire, and Dale K. Cathell, Esquire, DLA PIPER LLP, Baltimore,
Maryland; David Horniak, Esquire, DLA PIPER LLP, Washington, District of
Columbia, Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants River Valley Ingredients,
LLC, Tyson Poultry, Inc., and Tyson Farms, Inc.

Philip A. Rovner, Esquire, and Ryan D. Kingshill, Esquire, POTTER ANDERSON &
CORROON LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; J. Allen Maines, Esquire, A. Andre
Hendrick, Esquire, Patrick B. Reagin, Esquire, and Matt Covell, Esquire, HOLLAND
& KNIGHT LLP, Atlanta, Georgia, Attorneys for Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs
American Proteins, Inc. n/k/a Crossroads Properties A, Inc., Ampro Products, Inc.
n/k/a Crossroads Properties B, Inc., Georgia Feed Products Company, L.L.C. n/k/a
Crossroads Properties C, LLC.

WALLACE, J.
Poultry rendering is a brutal business. The rendering process consists of

taking the unappetizing remnants of butchered chickens—bone meal, blood,

feathers, etc.—grinding them up and dehydrating that material for use in pet food or

animal feed.1 It likely comes as no surprise then, that the competition between the

renderers can be just as unsparing.

American Proteins, Inc. (“API”) had dominated the poultry rendering market

in the Southeast. Tyson Farms, Inc. planned to enter the region and disrupt API’s

dominance. It made strategic moves to ensure that it would enter the market by

either building its own rendering plants or buying out its competition. After Tyson

swooped in and contracted with API’s suppliers as the expiration of API’s contracts

neared, API finally agreed to enter into negotiations with Tyson to sell its plants in

Alabama and Georgia.

In 2018, Tyson subsidiary, River Valley Ingredients, LLC,2 and API entered

* On July 2, 2025, the Court issued its Decision After Trial. River Valley Ingredients, LLC v.
Am. Proteins, Inc., 2025 WL 1826656, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. July 2, 2025). API timely filed a
motion for reargument or, in the alternative, to alter or amend the judgment. D.I. 691. By separate
simultaneous order, the Court has denied much of that motion. D.I. 702. But the Court has found
merit in API’s argument regarding the compounding of pre-judgement interest in this instance.
Indeed, having considered the parties now-developed arguments on the interest issue, the Court
recognizes the value of greater clarity in the Court’s findings and holdings, hereby withdraws its
July 2, 2025 decision, and issues in substitution this amended Decision After Trial.
1
11/18/24 Trial Tr. at 17–19 (D.I. 684).
2
Plaintiffs are River Valley Ingredients, LLC, Tyson Poultry, Inc., and Tyson Farms, Inc. River
Valley is a subsidiary of Tyson Poultry, and Tyson poultry is a subsidiary of Tyson Foods. See
River Valley Ingredients, LLC v. Am. Proteins, Inc., 2021 WL 598539, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb.
4, 2021). For the sake of convenience and clarity, the Court will use “Tyson” when referring to
the plaintiff(s).

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into an Asset Purchase Agreement (the “APA”). Tyson acquired API’s poultry

rendering facilities, the Cummings and Hanceville plants, for $865.8 million. After

the deal closed, Tyson noticed issues with the facilities and had lower-than-expected

profits.

Due to these issues, Tyson claims that API fraudulently induced them into

signing the APA via various false representations and warranties. Specifically,

Tyson alleges that API failed to disclose their recent change in process to remove

SPN stickwater. Tyson alleges that API also failed to disclose a vital

“environmental” report (the “Reid Report). Too, Tyson pleads breach of contract

for failure to indemnify for breaches of the APA’s representations and warranties.

At bottom, Tyson complains that it overpaid because of API’s concealment and

misrepresentations.

In response, API brings seven counterclaims—fraudulent inducement,

tortious interference, unfair competition, recission, indemnification, breach of the

Transition Service Agreement (TSA), and civil conspiracy. According to API,

Tyson conspired with API’s suppliers to illegally coerce API into selling its facilities

and force it out of the market. The Court held a seven-day bench trial on the parties’

dueling charges of wrongdoing.

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I. THE TRIAL

During the trial, the Court heard the in-person testimony of:

Douglas Ramsey Matthew Bell – Expert
Shane Parks Jon Pesicka – Expert
Roy Slaughter Andrew Dixon
Brandon Kyzar Ave Tucker – Expert
Daniel Kaiser Timothy Hart – Expert
Jason Spann David Meeker – Expert
Jeremy Helt Stephen Gross – Expert
Stan Gudenkauf Michael Hull
Richard Stewart Brian Rindt – Expert
Thomas Bagwell Peter Karutz – Expert
Mark Ham Ave Tucker – Expert
Steve Patrick Timothy Hart – Expert

The parties presented video deposition testimony from:

Joseph Clinton Rivers Shane Parks
Mark Kaminsky Joseph Rivers
Johnathan Green Douglas Ramsey
Rexford Alexander Scott Peters
Bryce Burke Derek Klemann
Mark Rebollit Jeremy Helt
Remi Bagwell Christell Rooker
BJ Bench Josh McClelland
John Reid Brian Harris
Bryan Kattleman Bo Watson
Jacob Swann Roy Slaughter
Charles Starkey Jeremy Helt
Kristin Wolf Fred Cespedes
Betsy Griffin Jonathan Green
Ashley Yayock Michael Hudlow
Roger Smith

The parties also submitted over 400 exhibits.

At the close of Tyson’s evidence, API made a Rule 41(b) motion regarding

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the representations and warranties in Articles 4.5(b), (c) and 4.20(b).3 The Court

granted the motion in part and dismissed the claims regarding Articles 4.5(c) and

4.20(b).4

Now, the Court will determine the liability of both parties under their

respective claims and counterclaims and appropriate damages, if any.5

II. GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES

The Court has applied the same principles of law in its consideration of the

claims and in its deliberations as would a jury. The Court may highlight some of the

facts and legal principles most applicable to this particular case. But the fact that

some particular point or concept may not be mentioned here shouldn’t be read as

any indication that the Court did not—during its deliberations—consider all legal

principles applicable to this case and to the parties’ claims and defenses.

In reaching its verdict, the Court has considered applicable Delaware law and

each party’s respective arguments, both oral and written, on the merits of their claims

and the weight to be accorded to the testimony and evidence. It has examined all

exhibits submitted and considered the testimony of all witnesses, both direct and

3
11/25/24 Trial Tr. at 66–76 (D.I. 686).
4
Id. at 74–76.
5
In addition to the trial evidence and arguments made by counsel, the Court also now has the
benefit of the parties’ post–trial briefing. D.I. 677, 678, 681, 682.

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cross, live and by deposition. As the sole finder of fact, the Court has made its own

assessment of each witness’s credibility and reconciled, as best it could, any

inconsistencies in the testimony and documentary evidence.6 During trial, the Court

applied the Delaware Rules of Evidence to the testimony and exhibits presented.

Consistent with the Court’s knowledge of those rules and the specific rulings that

were articulated both pre-trial and during the trial proceedings, it only used evidence

allowed under those rules and rulings for its deliberation.

The Court then reviewed and applied some of the very instructions that it

would give a jury in these circumstances.7

III. FINDINGS OF FACT

For certain actions at trial, it is difficult at times to completely segregate

findings of fact from conclusions of law.8 So, to the extent any one of the Court’s

findings of fact here might be more appropriately viewed as a conclusion of law, that

6
Pencader Assoc., LLC v. Synergy Direct Mortg. Inc., 2010 WL 2681862, at *3 (Del. Super.
Ct. June 30, 2010) (“[I]n a bench trial, it is the Court’s role to resolve the conflicts in witnesses’
testimony and weigh their credibility.”); Interim Healthcare, Inc. v. Spherion Corp., 884 A.2d 513,
545–46 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005), aff’d, 886 A.2d 1278 (Del. 2005) (setting forth “the customary
Delaware standard” a trial judge applies when assessing trial testimony and evidence in a bench
trial).
7
See, e.g., Del. Super. Ct. Civ. Pattern Jury Instr. 4.1 (Burden of Proof by a Preponderance of
the Evidence); id. at 4.2 (Evidence Equally Balanced); id. at 23.1 (Evidence—Direct or
Circumstantial); id. at 23.9 (Credibility of Witnesses—Weighing Conflicting Testimony); id. at
23.10 (Expert Testimony).
8
Intermec IP Corp. v. TransCore, LP, 2023 WL 5661585, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 2023).

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finding of fact may be considered the Court’s conclusion of law on that point.9

A. TYSON’S OFFER TO BUY AND CONTINGENCY PLAN

Tyson, via River Valley, was dead set on entering the poultry rendering market

in the Southeast.10 It had two options: buy an existing plant or build its own and

compete.11 It found the first option more desirable.12

In the years prior to the APA, Tyson had approached API’s CEO, Thomas

(“Tommy”) Bagwell, about selling.13 Mr. Bagwell wasn’t interested.14 But Tyson

didn’t cease its efforts to enter the region.15

Tyson began negotiations with the biggest rendering raw material suppliers in

the region, Koch and Wayne. They had been API’s suppliers for decades.16 And

when API’s contracts with Koch and Wayne were set to expire, Koch and Wayne

contracted with Tyson to supply its future plants (whether Tyson acquired or built

9
Id. (citing Facchina Constr. Litigations, 2020 WL 6363678, at *2 n.12 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct.
29, 2020), judgment entered sub nom. Facchina Const. Litigations (Del. Super. Ct. 2020)
(collecting authority)).
10
11/18/24 Trial Tr. at 19–21.
11
Id. at 21–25.
12
Id. at 28–29 (“Because through the process over the year or so of the process, we decided that
we were better off to go buy instead of build.”), 291.
13
See id. at 38–39.
14
Id.
15
See, e.g., 11/18/24 Trial Tr. at 22–24.
16
See id. at 37–40, 126; see also DTX–1038 (Kaminsky Dep.) at 76.

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them) at a significantly higher profit margin.17 In fact, Tyson admits that these

contracts’ terms were so beneficial to the suppliers that Tyson was prepared to incur

a loss on them.18 But the loss was a calculated business decision because these

contracts were crucial to Tyson’s success; since chicken renderings can’t be hauled

long distances without going rancid, suppliers are ideally located within 60 miles of

the rendering processing facilities.19 This significantly limits the number of viable

suppliers. And Tyson successfully locked up two of the region’s key suppliers for

the ensuing ten years.20

With these contracts in hand, Tyson once again approached Mr. Bagwell.21

Mr. Bagwell reluctantly entered negotiations with Tyson because he claimed that,

without his suppliers, he had no other choice.22

As part of API’s counterclaims, API alleges that Tyson was lying about its

intentions to build its own plant in the southeast.23 API claims that Tyson’s

17
See 11/18/24 Trial Tr. at 130–31.
18
See id. at 171–72.
19
Id. at 271.
20
Id. at 272–73.
21
See CX–2 (explaining that the Tyson-Koch offal purchase agreement was finalized on May
22, 2017, and the first meeting between Tyson and API was on June 28, 2017).
22
See 11/20/24 Trial Tr. at 220–22 (“With Tyson having more than 40 percent of my raw material
affirmatively locked up under contract, that effectively ruined my company, and I was in a blind
despair, freaking panic about if they have got those contracts tied up, how in the hell did they do
it. And they have just effectively financially ruined my company . . . .”) (D.I. 687).
23
API Opening Br. at 8–9 (D.I. 678).

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statements were false and solely used to fraudulently induce API into selling.24 The

credible trial evidence says otherwise.

B. API’S PROCESS CHANGE TO REMOVE SPN25 STICKWATER

In preparation for the acquisition, API created a “to-do” list of projects that

needed to be completed before due diligence began. Item Number One on that list

was removing SPN stickwater from its pet food meal process.26

Why was that so important? Two reasons. First, SPN stickwater wasn’t

supposed to be used in API’s production processes.27 SPN stickwater is a byproduct

of the SPN process that contains protein, grit, and fat that is washed off the chicken,

which can then be turned into a concentrate.28 In most instances its usage seems, at

best, disfavored. And some of API’s buyers’ contracts specifically prohibited the

24
Id. at 42–45.
25
In poultry processing, “SPN” generally refers to Secondary Processing Nutrients. These are
byproducts of wastewater treatment at poultry processing plants that can be collected, treated, and
rendered into other usable feed materials.
26
See PX–590 (Green Dep.) at 55–56; see also PX–214; see also PX–638 (stating that Goal
Number Three was to “have a plan and or process in place to remove SPN stickwater from API’s
waste heat systems”).
27
See, e.g., PX–211.
28
See 11/19/24 Trial Tr. at 18–20 (D.I. 680). The Court understands that API takes issue with
the use of various labels mentioned during this litigation—“clarifier sludge”, “SPN”,
“stickwater”—almost synonymously to describe the material spoken of now. The Court
understands, too, the distinctions and the different meanings ascribed to such. But API’s parsings
are now of little moment to the resolution of the contested issues.
The credible evidence demonstrates that API knew well that what will be referred to hereinafter
as “SPN Stickwater” was a proscribed substance in its particular processing under the agreements
it had and representations it made.

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inclusion of SPN stickwater in their products.29 That notwithstanding, API had been

using SPN stickwater in its processes for at least the previous ten years.30 Why?

Because second, the use and inclusion of SPN stickwater was more cost effective.

Removing SPN stickwater from the process was costly, would decrease the final

product yield, and would significantly lower API’s profits.31

Due to the potential sale to Tyson, API determined that—to conceal its past

practices—SPN stickwater had to be removed from its processing before due

diligence commenced.32 So, API undertook the SPN stickwater removal process

with a very tight and strict timeline.33 The process change was initially estimated to

take six months, but API effectively did it in about six weeks.34 Completing this

removal process was so important to API that it offered significant bonuses to its

29
See 11/20/24 Trial Tr. at 69 (“Q: The Nestle contract specs prohibited, quote, clarifier sludge
(“SPN”), correct? A: Yes”).
30
11/19/24 Trial Tr. at 20.
31
See 11/21/24 Trial Tr. at 185–86 (D.I. 688); see also Green Dep. at 196:
Q: Did there ever come a point in time when you realized what the impact was on
Cumming with respect to the SPN removal project?
A: So there was a decline in the profitability at Cumming. I was never able to put
my finger on exactly what resulted in that during the time that I was with Tyson.
Could have part of that been associated with the process change? I think it
could have been.
32
See PX–645; see also 11/19/24 Trial Tr. at 61–62.
33
See 11/19/24 Trial Tr. at 61–62.
34
Id. at 61–63.

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team to get it done.35 And, the total cost of the project was over $2 million.36

Ultimately, API succeeded in completing the removal process before the start

of due diligence.37

C. API’S CONDUCT AND CONCEALMENT DURING DUE DILIGENCE

API never informed Tyson of its past SPN stickwater practices or its SPN

stickwater removal project because it would have negatively impacted API’s

valuation.38 At the beginning of negotiations, Mr. Bagwell relied on 7x EBITDA to

estimate API’s worth at about $518 million.39 But an independent evaluation by

UBS—one, done without notice of the SPN stickwater removal—came in at a high

35
E.g., PX–1007 (“In addition to the $25,000 special bonus related to [one API supervisor]’s
work on the SPN process at Hanceville, [he] is also to receive a special one-time bonus payment
in the gross amount of $25,000 related to work he has done at Cumming during 2017.”).
36
11/21/24 Trial Tr. at 186–88:
Q: So at a minimum, the company spent 1.65, $1.7 million in Cumming and some
amount in Hanceville to implement this SPN stickwater removal project that
you believe improved the quality of the pet food meal at API, yes?
A: Yes.
37
11/19/24 Trial Tr. at 135–36, 160; DTX–1007; 11/21/24 Trial Tr. at 189–90:
Q: You never told Tyson that API was putting SPN stickwater in pet food meal,
right?
A: No, we did not.
Q: And you never told Tyson that API changed its past practice to stop putting
SPN stickwater in pet food meal, did you?
A: No, we did not.
38
See 11/21/24 Trial Tr. at 189–90; see also 11/25/24 Trial Tr. at 12–14 (explaining the
difference in value of the plants taking into account its stickwater use).
39
11/21/24 Trial Tr. at 27.

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of $830 million.40 Mr. Bagwell was ecstatic and asked Tyson for a purchase price

of $850 million.41 The first letter of intent (“LOI”) was based on an $850 million

purchase price.42

To ensure that due diligence supported the $850 million purchase price, API

handed over past financial records without disclosing the intervening SPN stickwater

change.43 And terms on balance sheets and expenses associated with the SPN

stickwater removal project were listed under non-descript labels to not raise any

suspicion.44

After the signing of the second LOI, Tyson began site inspections. API took

additional steps to ensure that no employee would mention any “past practices,”

including the removal of SPN stickwater.45 No doubt, API knew its $850 million

purchase price was in danger if Tyson discovered its past practice of using SPN

stickwater in its production processing.

40
PX–166 (UBS Valuation).
41
11/21/24 Trial Tr. at 33–34.
42
PX–1045 (Email with First LOI attached); 11/21/24 Trial Tr. at 33–35; 11/20/24 Trial Tr. at
251–52.
43
See, e.g., 11/21/24 Trial Tr. at 189–90.
44
DTX–1007.
45
See, e.g., PX–528; 11/19/25 Trial Tr. at 67–69:
Q: [P]rior to Tyson acquiring API, did you tell anyone at Tyson that API had a
business practice of putting SPN into its pet food meal at its Cumming and
Hanceville B plants?
A: I was told not to.

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D. THE PARTIES’ ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT

On August 20, 2018, the parties signed and executed the APA.46 Through the

APA, Tyson bought API’s Cummings and Hanceville poultry rendering plants in

Alabama and Georgia for a total price of $865.8 million.47

The APA had several representations and warranties to ensure that API:

(1) had remained consistent with past practices;48 (2) provided accurate books and

records;49 (3) was in compliance with its contractual requirements;50 (4) was in

compliance with laws and government regulations;51 and (5) had disclosed all

environmental assessments, audits, investigations, and reports.52 Outside of the

representations and warranties, the APA has a no-reliance provision.53

The APA also has indemnity rights for both parties. Article 10.1 grants Tyson

indemnity rights “for the full amount of any such Losses relating to, arising out of

or resulting from[:]”

(a) any inaccuracy in any representation, or the breach of any warranty,
made in Article IV (for purposes of determining whether an inaccuracy
or breach exists and calculating any Losses arising from such

46
See generally JX–1 (APA).
47
APA § 1.5(a); see 11/20/24 Trial Tr. at 251.
48
APA § 4.26.
49
Id. §§ 4.5(b), (d).
50
Id. § 4.21(b).
51
Id. §§ 4.13, 4.22, 4.23(a)-(b).
52
Id. § 4.20(g).
53
Id. § 5.7.

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inaccuracy or breach, such representation and warranty shall be read as
if it were not qualified by any concept of “material,” “materiality” or
“Material Adverse Effect” (other than Section 4.5(b), Section 4.26(b)
and the word “Material” in the term “Material Acquired Contracts” and
the categories of “Material Acquired Contracts” in Section 4.9(a)) . . .54
As long as the written indemnity notice is properly noticed by:

stat[ing] the nature and basis thereof, the amount of the asserted Losses
and the method by which such asserted Losses were calculated;
provided, however, that the Indemnified Person may subsequently
revise the basis for such Indemnity Claim and the amount of asserted
Losses asserted as well as the method by which such asserted Losses
are calculated.55

But “the failure to provide such prompt notice does not impair the rights of the

Indemnified Person or limit the obligations of the Indemnifying Party hereunder

except to the extent that such failure materially compromises or prejudices any right

of the Indemnifying Party.”56

Under Article 1.3(a), API is also entitled to indemnification for “assumed

liabilities,” defined as:

all Liabilities of Sellers to the extent arising from the operation of the
Business in the ordinary course of business, including the Liabilities set
forth on the Financials (to the extent not satisfied in the operation of the
Business in the ordinary course prior to the Closing Date).57

For any breach, the parties agreed to an escrow deductible of $4.125 million

54
APA § 10.1(a).
55
Id. § 10.4(a).
56
Id.
57
Id. § 1.3(a).

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and a damages cap of $55 million.58

E. TYSON’S TAKEOVER AND SUBSEQUENT DISCOVERIES

After Tyson took possession of the facilities, it noticed a variety of issues,

including lower profits and environmental concerns.59 Many of the environmental

and engineering issues at the facilities were discussed in the undisclosed Reid

Report.60 Tyson sued after it discovered API’s past practice of using SPN stickwater,

its concealment of the SPN stickwater removal project, and alleged concealment of

environmental issues by not disclosing the Reid Report.61

Throughout litigation, when API was asked about the issues and lack of

disclosure, API gave a mashup of different, conflicting excuses. Initially, API cited

anti-trust concerns as the reason that it did not disclose the SPN stickwater removal

project, claiming that its process was “proprietary.”62 In the next breath, though, API

said that its use of SPN stickwater wasn’t disclosed because “[i]t was not material to

the deal.”63 Now, in its final verse, API insists that it did indeed disclose the SPN

58
Id. § 10.3(a), (c).
59
11/21/24 Trial Tr. at 267–68:
A: After we acquired the facility – shortly after we acquired the facility, we started
having problems at wastewater related to concentrations, loadings and
everything else like that, which were above what we were expecting.
60
See DTX–102 (Reid Report); see also 11/21/24 Trial Tr. at 269–71, 287–90.
61
D.I. 2 (Complaint).
62
11/18/2024 Trial Tr. at 72–73; 11/20/2024 Trial Tr. at 214; see, e.g., 11/21/24 Trial Tr. at 191–
92.
63
11/21/24 Trial Tr. at 151.

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stickwater removal via its capital expenditure spreadsheet and during one of the

parties’ deal meetings.64

IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this was a civil trial, both parties had the burden of proving their respective

claims by a preponderance of the evidence.65

The Court will first address Tyson’s claims, followed by API’s counterclaims.

Additional facts are included now where needed but the Court will, where possible,

seek to avoid repetition.

A. TYSON’S CLAIMS ARE MERITORIOUS, IN PART.

1. API did fraudulently induce Tyson.

Tyson met its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that API

fraudulently induced it into signing the APA. Fraudulent inducement requires “1) a

false statement or misrepresentation; 2) that the defendant knew was false or made

with reckless indifference to the truth; 3) the statement induced the plaintiff to enter

the agreement; 4) the plaintiff’s reliance was reasonable; and 5) the plaintiff was

injured as a result.”66

64
API Reply Br. at 8 n.29 (D.I. 682).
65
See, e.g., Navient Sols., LLC v. BPG Off. P’rs XIII Iron Hill LLC, 2023 WL 3120644, at *10
(Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2023).
66
ITW Glob. Invs. Inc. v. Am. Indus. Partners Cap. Fund IV, L.P., 2017 WL 1040711, at *6 (Del.
Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2017) (quoting In re Student Fin. Corp., 2004 WL 609329, at *7 (D. Del. Mar.
23, 2004)); Surf’s Up Legacy Partners, LLC v. Virgin Fest, LLC, 2024 WL 1596021, at *15 (Del.
Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 2024), reargument denied, 2024 WL 3273427 (Del. Super. Ct. July 2, 2024)
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To prove its claim, Tyson relied on API’s concealment of its past SPN

stickwater practices and its covert cessation thereof, along with API’s failure to

disclose the Reid Report.67 It says that “had Tyson known the truth, Tyson would

have negotiated a reduced price or walked away.”68

Tyson’s complaint that it was fraudulently induced by API’s failure to

disclose the Reid Report is more appropriately addressed as a breach of a

representation and warranty because at trial Tyson focused on the failure to disclose

the Reid Report during due diligence and its violation of an express warranty in the

APA.69

As such, the Court’s resolution of the fraudulent inducement claim will focus

on the SPN stickwater allegations.

a. API made several false statements and misrepresentations.

Tyson proved the first element of fraudulent inducement. It requires “(1) an

overt misrepresentation; (2) deliberate concealment of material facts; or (3) silence

in the face of a duty to speak.”70

Prior to the execution of the APA, API employed several misrepresentations

(“A party must prove each element by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
67
See Tyson Opening Br. at 5 (D.I. 677).
68
Id.
69
See, e.g., 11/18/24 Trial Tr. at 155, 181–84; 11/21/24 Trial Tr. at 259–61.
70
Surf’s Up, 2024 WL 1596021, at *15.

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to induce Tyson into buying API at an inflated price. API misled Tyson about its

anticipated profits by leaving out the SPN stickwater removal project and engaged

in pre-contract concealment of its use of SPN stickwater. This is evident through

API’s actions, like using non-descript labels such as “additional discretionary

bonus” and “evaporator and FG process upgrade” for its SPN stickwater removal

project and its silence about the project during the due diligence process. 71 API’s

actions include overt misrepresentations, deliberate concealment, and silence when

it had a duty to speak during due diligence.

b. API knew certain representations were false.

Tyson has proven the second element of fraudulent inducement, which

requires that Tyson prove API “had knowledge of the falsity of the representation or

made the representation with reckless indifference to the truth.”72

There is ample evidence of API’s knowledge that it was making false

representations. Perhaps the two of API’s actions that are most compelling are the

renaming of the SPN stickwater removal projects and instructing API employees to

not comment if asked about past SPN stickwater practices.73 Mr. Bagwell’s texts

are also damning; he starts on of his messages with “I don’t want to put too much on

71
See 11/19/24 Trial Tr. at 134, 258–59; DTX–1007.
72
Great Hill Equity Partners IV, LP v. SIG Growth Equity Fund I, LLLP, 2018 WL 6311829, at
*32 (Del. Ch. Dec. 3, 2018).
73
See DTX–1007; PX–528.

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the record” and another with “I didn’t want to put anything into email. Which by

the way after thinking about it the long email I gave to Don was not sent via email.”74

Such statements are clear, uncontroverted evidence of knowledge of the issue and

API’s intent to conceal.

c. API intended for Tyson to rely on its false representations.

Tyson has proven the third element of fraudulent inducement. It requires API

to have intended for Tyson to rely on its misrepresentations.75 In many cases, the

“transaction itself may serve as both the motive and opportunity to commit the

fraud.”76

API had a clear motive to commit fraud—receive a significantly inflated price

for the sale. API had regional dominance in the poultry rendering market and

Mr. Bagwell didn’t want to give that up by selling or being forced to compete.77 But

when he chose to sell, he made it very clear that he was not interested in selling

“unless Tyson is willing to pay ‘really, really stupid money’ for the entire

company.”78 And API obtained a fraud-fueled premium through active efforts to

conceal the SPN stickwater removal project from Tyson. API’s deceitful intent is

74
PX–214; PX–211.
75
Great Hill Equity, 2018 WL 6311829, at *32.
76
Surf’s Up, 2024 WL 1596021, at *17 (quoting NetApp, Inc. v. Cinelli, 2023 WL 4925910, at
*13 (Del. Ch. Aug. 2, 2023), judgment entered, (Del. Ch. 2023)).
77
See 11/20/24 Trial Tr. at 221, 244.
78
PX–121.

- 18 -
demonstrated by both circumstantial and direct evidence.

d. Tyson reasonably relied on API’s representations.

Tyson has also proved the fourth element of fraudulent inducement. To

satisfy this element, Tyson’s reliance must be objectively reasonable and on a

material fact.79 Too, Tyson mustn’t have been aware of the misrepresentation when

it acted.80

Tyson was objectively reasonable in relying on API’s representations. The

unreliability of API’s financials for projections wasn’t something that Tyson could

have been aware of without express and proper disclosure from API—especially

considering the lengths that API went to conceal the specifics that engendered that

unreliability. Without such disclosure, Tyson had no reason to question API’s

financials or other due diligence because API’s financial statements appeared (and

perhaps were) otherwise facially accurate81—API just concealed the existence of the

SPN stickwater removal project and its likely effect on profits.82

But API says that Tyson couldn’t have justifiably relied on its representations

79
Surf’s Up, 2024 WL 1596021, at *18; Great Hill Equity, 2018 WL 6311829, at *33.
80
Great Hill Equity, 2018 WL 6311829, at *33; Maverick Therapeutics, Inc. v. Harpoon
Therapeutics, Inc., 2020 WL 1655948, at *30 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2020), judgment entered, (Del. Ch.
2020), judgment entered, (Del. Ch. 2021).
81
See DTX–1041 (Klemann Dep.) at 142–43.
82
APA Schedule 4.5(a)(i) (discussing factors that could affect future results and including the
price of raw materials, utilities, and government regulations).

- 19 -
because Tyson had no intent to “rely” on them.83 In API’s view, Tyson didn’t rely

on any of API’s financials—Tyson intended to buy no matter what because the sale

was a “once in a lifetime opportunit[y].”84 Not so.

While there may be some truth to the notion that Tyson was willing to take a

loss to ensure the sale would happen, it doesn’t mean that it didn’t rely on any of

API’s financials to investigate, evaluate, and mitigate its risk; API actively thwarted

any meaningful chance to do so on the SPN/profitability issue. The financials were

heavily depended upon to determine an appropriate purchase price, hence the various

stages of due diligence.85 In fact, the purchase price was negotiated and adjusted

throughout due diligence.86 In short, there was justifiable reliance.

e. Tyson was injured by API’s false representations.

Tyson was injured by the amount it overpaid for API due to API’s

83
API Opening Br. 32–34.
84
Id. at 35.
85
PX–259; see 11/18/24 Trial Tr. at 59–60:
Q: All right. And then if we go down a little bit further in that paragraph, it says
“If the overall results of due diligence are satisfactory to Tyson and Tyson
moves forward with a final definitive bid, the parties anticipate any adjustments
to the nonbinding offer would address any individual material issues identified
in the due diligence process.” What did that mean to you?
A: I think it meant the same as we talked about before on the last LOI, that if during
due diligence if anything of material interest came up, we would investigate
completely and then we would make a decision whether to renegotiate the price
up and then -- or walk away.
86
PX–1043 (stating that the purchase price would be between $800 million and $850 million);
PX–259 (setting a preliminary, non-binding purchase price of $825 million).

- 20 -
concealment and withholding of material information. The damages will be fully

evaluated below.

2. API breached some of its APA-borne indemnification obligations.
Tyson has met its burden of proving that API breached its indemnification

obligations for some of the representations made in the APA. Tyson claims that it

is entitled to indemnification for certain false representations and warranties,

specifically Articles 4.5(b), (d), 4.13, 4.20(g), 4.21(b), 4.22, and 4.23(a)-(b).

Article 10.1 of the APA provides indemnity by API for all losses “relating to,

arising out of or resulting from” any inaccurate representation or warranty in Article

4.87

But prior to looking at the merits of the claim, the Court must address API’s

postulations that Tyson failed to satisfy conditions precedent to indemnification.

a. No conditions precedent bar Tyson’s recovery.

API raises three arguments suggesting that its obligation to indemnify hasn’t

been triggered. None work.

i. Tyson complied with the APA’s notice requirements and its claims are
not time barred.

API claims that Tyson failed to comply with the APA’s notice provision for

indemnity claims and that some of Tyson’s claims for breach are time-barred.

87
APA § 10.1(a).

- 21 -
Specifically, it says that the alleged Article 4.26 breach wasn’t properly noticed

within the survival period.88 Also, according to API, Article 4.5(b) was never

properly identified in any indemnity notice or pleading so it should not be considered

by the Court.89

Per the APA, an indemnity obligation only arises after proper notice.90 Tyson

noticed its claim for indemnification for breach of contract on December 17, 2019.91

It requested indemnification for the “fraudulently inflated purchase price” that

exceeded the escrow amount.92 But its notice did not specifically mention Article

4.26 until its later supplement.93 And Tyson never specifically noticed its claim

under Article 4.5(b).94

Regardless, the Court has already ruled on this issue and found that any notice

issues—including alleged untimeliness—regarding Article 4.26 do not bar

indemnification.95 And that previous ruling extends to Article 4.5(b) claims as

88
API Opening Br. at 27–29.
89
Id. at 20.
90
Article 10.4 states that the written notice must be given for “any such claim to Sellers, and if
any Seller Indemnified Person has notice of facts or circumstances that could reasonably result in
an Indemnity Claim against Buyer.” APA § 10.4(a).
91
Tyson Opening Br. at 38.
92
PX–936.
93
PX–937.
94
Id.
95
Tyson Opening Br. Ex. B (Mot. in Limine Tr.), at 12–13 (“Given the notice, pleading notice,
of Delaware practice, and more particularly, the history of this case, it, indeed, was pled, although
it was not specifically identified as 4.26.”).

- 22 -
well.96 Simply put, at this post-trial point, we are well past evaluation of supposed

procedural defects that were supposedly present when the complaint was filed in

2019. There are no notice defects that bar Tyson’s recovery on the merits that have

been the subject of a full trial.

ii. The escrow deductible is of no consequence at this stage.

API now alleges that Tyson cannot prevail because it did not prove that its

losses were greater than the $4,125,000 deductible at the time the complaint was

filed.97

The Court previously suggested that API could re-raise this issue after

discovery was completed.98 But API didn’t then and, therefore, API missed its

window to raise this issue in some dispositive way.

As the trial record stands, Tyson has alleged that they overpaid by at least

96
See id.
97
Article 10.3(a) of the APA states:
neither any Buyer Indemnified Person nor any Seller Indemnified Person,
respectively, has any recourse against Sellers, or Buyer, as the case may be, under
this Article X unless and until the aggregate amount of all Losses incurred or
suffered by Buyer Indemnified Persons or Seller Indemnified Persons
indemnifiable pursuant to Section 10.1(a), or Section 10.2(a), as the case may be,
exceeds $4,125,000 (“Deductible”), in which event the Indemnified Person is
entitled to indemnification for Losses suffered only to the extent in excess of the
Deductible.
APA § 10.3(a).
98
See River Valley Ingredients, 2021 WL 598539, at *7 (“The Court finds that API’s argument
fails because Tyson is not required, at this juncture, to show that it incurred losses in excess of
$4.125 million. However, API potentially could raise this argument again if, after the discovery
process is completed and the parties have a more concrete estimate of damages, Tyson cannot
prove it suffered losses beyond the designated amount.”).

- 23 -
$102 million.99 So, this escrow-threshold argument is unavailing on its merits too.

In the end, there are no unsatisfied conditions precedent preventing review of

the merits of Tyson’s breach-of-contract claim.

b. Tyson has proved that API breached certain representations and
warranties and, in turn, has certain indemnification obligations.

To prove breach of the APA, Tyson must prove that there was (1) a contractual

obligation, (2) a breach of that obligation, and (3) resulting damages.100 The Court

will address each of the alleged breaches in turn.

i. Article 4.26 – The past practices representation was breached.

API breached its past practices representation, which reads:

Absence of Certain Changes. Since the December 31, 2017, (a) Sellers
have conducted the Business only in the ordinary course and in a
manner consistent with past practice, and (b) there has been no Material
Adverse Effect.101

The Court has already found that SPN stickwater was removed from API’s

process right before due diligence began.102 But, API claims, its SPN stickwater

removal was consistent with past practices because “API had not included SPN

stickwater in pet food during most of its 75-year history.”103

99
Tyson Reply Br. at 18 (D.I. 681).
100
Interim Healthcare, 884 A.2d at 548.
101
APA § 4.26.
102
See 11/19/24 Trial Tr. at 61–62.
103
API Reply Br. at 12.

- 24 -
Even if this otherwise unsupported assertion that API didn’t always use SPN

stickwater was true, this is an ineffectual counter.104 The issue was the lack of

disclosure for the recent change—the SPN stickwater removal project. A past

practice representation and warranty is intended to assure the buyer that the seller’s

past financial records are reliable predictors and that there have been no substantial

changes or material adverse effects that need to be accounted for.105 Accordingly,

Tyson was interested in knowing and having warranted the immediate past practices

that underpinned the financials it was looking at to aid in negotiating an appropriate

purchase price.

It had been API’s practice to use SPN stickwater since 2012; that use of SPN

stickwater had become a relevant “past practice” of API’s.106 The substantial change

in API’s production process to remove SPN stickwater wasn’t consistent with that

past practice and was a violation of the Article 4.26 representation and warranty.

ii. Articles 4.5(b) and (d) – The books and records representations were
not breached.

API did not breach its books and records representations which, as written, is

104
See id. at 12–13.
105
See Anschutz Corp. v. Brown Robin Cap., LLC, 2020 WL 3096744, at *11 (Del. Ch. June 11,
2020) (“Other decisions of this court are in accord, finding that ordinary course representations
either were actually violated or were well-pled to have been violated when: seller’s employees
manipulated financial records in deviation from its past accounting practices; a company
substantially restructured its business; and employees of a company schemed to start a competing
business and redirected assets to that competing business during the pendency of a transaction.”).
106
See 11/20/24 Trial Tr. at 90–91; see also DTX–19.

- 25 -
a narrow one. Articles 4.5(b) and (d) covered the representations and warranties

regarding API’s books and records.

Article 4.5(b) states:

The Financials (i) were prepared in accordance with the books of
account and other financial records of Sellers, (ii) fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition and results of operations of
Sellers as of the dates thereof or for the periods covered thereby, (iii)
have been prepared in accordance with GAAP applied on a basis
consistent (except as otherwise noted therein and subject, in the case of
the interim Financials to normal, recurring year-end adjustments and
the absence of notes and the absence of all eliminating entries used in
consolidated financial statements).107

And 4.5(d) states:

The books of account and other financial records of Sellers are
complete and correct in all material respects and represent actual, bona
fide transactions and have been maintained in accordance with sound
business practices.108
On their face, the representations were compiled with as stated and

numerically accurate—API didn’t tamper with its books and records, nor tinker with

the numbers. They were misleading, however, as to what backed those inputs. And,

no doubt, when handing over its financials in due diligence and then making those

representations, API hoped that Tyson would rely on its previous financials as an

indication of future financial performances, including anticipated profits.

Strictly speaking though—while not to be excused—this wasn’t a separate

107
APA § 5.4(b).
108
Id.

- 26 -
breach of the Article 4.5(b) and (d) representation itself; it was the breach of Article

4.26 that the Court just found above.109 Tyson has not met its burden here.

iii. Article 4.21(b) – The contractual compliance representation was
breached.

API breached its representation that it had complied with its contractual

obligations to third parties. More specifically, this representation was intended to

assure Tyson that API had been complying with its contracts with its buyers. Article

4.21(b) states:

All Products manufactured, processed, distributed, shipped, or sold by
Sellers and any services rendered by it in connection therewith have
conformed in all material respects with all applicable contractual
commitments and all express or implied warranties, or if not, any such
commitments and warranty claims have been satisfied. Except as set
forth on Schedule 4.21(b), no Liability exists for repair, replacement or
damage in connection with such sales or deliveries.110
This representation wasn’t accurate. As the Court interprets API’s supply

agreement with Nestle, the use of SPN stickwater was prohibited.111 The fact that

Nestle wasn’t aware of the non-conformity is immaterial because API was clearly

aware of its non-compliance. In fact, its non-compliance was discussed in depth and

even kept Mr. Bagwell up at night.112

109
See id. § 4.26 (“Absence of Certain Changes. Since the December 31, 2017, (a) Sellers have
conducted the Business only in the ordinary course and in a manner consistent with past practice,
and (b) there has been no Material Adverse Effect.”).
110
Id. § 4.21(b).
111
See 11/20/24 Trial Tr. at 69.
112
See, e.g., PX–214.

- 27 -
As such, API wasn’t complying with the contract until it removed SPN

stickwater from its process right before the start of due diligence. Recall, the

operative language warranted that the “[p]roducts manufactured, processed,

distributed, shipped, or sold by” API “conformed in all material respects with all

applicable contractual commitments.”113 Note, that these are voiced in the past

tense, i.e., as things that have happened. Since the Nestle contract had been and was

still active and API’s pre-SPN-process-change products were not in compliance

therewith—API breached Article 4.21(b).

iv. Articles 4.13, 4.22, 4.23(a)-(b) – The legal compliance representations
were not breached.

Tyson did not meet its burden in proving that API was not in compliance with

relevant regulations and breached Articles 4.13, 4.22, 4.23(a)-(b). Tyson claims that

because its product was adulterated with SPN stickwater and API labeled its product

as “poultry by-product meal,” it was not in compliance with the Association of

American Feed Control Officials’ (“AAFCO”) regulations and other regulations.114

For this Court to find that API’s products weren’t AAFCO compliant would

be quite a stretch. First, there’s been no official finding by AAFCO or any other

regulatory body that API wasn’t complying with a specific regulation or law.115

113
APA § 4.21(b).
114
Tyson Reply Br. at 34–35.
115
See DTX–1031 (Swann Dep.) at 90, 94 (stating that he wasn’t aware of API violating any
AAFCO or FDA laws or regulations or API being subject to any relevant recalls).

- 28 -
Second, the Court found the testimony presented about the difference between “feed

grade” and “pet grade” materials unilluminating. As best the Court can tell from the

record developed, the industry itself doesn’t seem to have a bright line rule on the

difference between “feed grade” and “pet grade.”116 As such, Tyson didn’t prove by

a preponderance of the evidence that API’s products violated any applicable

regulations and that API breached any legal compliance representations.

v. Article 4.20(g) – The environmental report disclosure representation
was not breached.
Tyson did not meet its burden in proving that API breached its report

disclosure representation. Article 4.20(g) assures Tyson that:

To the Knowledge of Sellers, Sellers have delivered or made available
to Buyer copies of all environmental assessments, audits,
investigations, reports or the like that were created or prepared within
the last five (5) years and that are in the possession or control of a Seller
or its Affiliates affecting or relating to the Facilities, the Business, the
Transferred Assets, or any real property currently owned or operated in
connection with the Business.117
Tyson claims that API’s failure to disclose the Reid Report created a

misrepresentation. Not so.

To be clear, the Reid Report is an engineering report with environmental

implications. It is titled “Confidential Engineering Evaluation” with a sub-title of

116
See 11/25/24 Trial Tr. at 93–99 (discussing AAFCO’s non-exhaustive list of poultry parts and
explaining that AAFCO’s definitions focus on mislabeling product as “human grade” and “pet-
food grade” is not defined by AAFCO).
117
APA § 4.20(g).

- 29 -
“Environmentally and Economically Responsible Engineering.”118 API stated at

trial that the Reid Report, prepared by engineers, wasn’t “environmental” and, if it

wasn’t produced during due diligence, it was because API didn’t view it as an

environmental report.119 No witness could say for certainty whether or not the report

was handed over.120

While it would have been prudent for API to have handed over the Reid

Report—and for there to have been a clearer record on the fact that had occurred—

the Court does not view the report itself an “environmental” report that implicates

this representation. Moreover, the Court is not convinced that API was deliberate in

its failure to disclose—if it did, in fact, fail to disclose—the Reid Report.

To the Court, the evidence on these points is in equipoise. Accordingly, the

Court cannot find a breach of Article 4.20(g).

3. Damages are awarded to Tyson.

API had a contractual obligation to indemnify Tyson for the

misrepresentations in Articles 4.26, and 4.21(b). Since API did not compensate

Tyson for those misrepresentations, API is in breach of its indemnity obligations.

As such, API must pay Tyson for the resulting damages. The damages therefor—

118
PX–438; see also 11/26/25 Trial Tr. at 219 (calling the Reid Report an “engineering report that
addressed certain potential environmental issues”) (D.I. 689).
119
See 11/21/24 Trial Tr. at 200.
120
See id. at 146–47.

- 30 -
which the Court finds to specifically overlap those for the fraud found earlier—are

discussed below.

B. ALL API’S COUNTERCLAIMS FAIL

API didn’t satisfy its burden of proof on any of its counterclaims.

1. Tyson did not fraudulently induce API.

While Tyson’s deal tactics weren’t the friendliest, they didn’t constitute

fraudulent inducement. Fraudulent inducement requires:

(1) a false representation, usually one of fact, made by the defendant;
(2) the defendant's knowledge or belief that the representation was
false, or was made with reckless indifference to the truth; (3) an intent
to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from acting; (4) the plaintiff's
action or inaction taken in justifiable reliance upon the representation;
and (5) damage to the plaintiff as a result of such reliance.121

Tyson made no false representation to API. API claims that Tyson never had

an intent to build in the region so it misrepresented that it would build plants there if

it didn’t buy API’s.122 There’s ample credible evidence to the contrary.123

Of course, it was Tyson’s preference to buy pre-existing plants and buy-out

the competition instead of building from scratch and competing.124 But it was

prepared to do either; regardless of the option, Tyson ensured that it had suppliers

121
Maverick Therapeutics, 2020 WL 1655948, at *26 (quoting Great Hill Equity, 2018 WL
6311829, at *32).
122
API Opening Br. at 42.
123
E.g., 11/18/24 Trial Tr. at 207, 228, 240–41.
124
Id. at 44–45.

- 31 -
locked up.125 Tyson’s contracts with the suppliers clearly outlined the parties’

obligations based on the possibility of building or buying. 126 The fact that Tyson

didn’t take major concrete moves towards building its own plant is inconsequential.

Such steps aren’t required, but merely that which API thinks should have been done

to prove the validity of Tyson’s bargaining positions.127

Tyson’s plan to build was simply its contingency that was never needed.

Tyson made no materially false statements to API to induce them into the APA; API

failed to meet its burden.

2. Tyson did not tortiously interfere or unfairly compete.

API did not meet its burden in proving tortious interference or unfair

competition. API claims unfair competition, tortious interference with its

contractual business relations, and tortious interference with its prospective business

relations. Since both parties addressed these claims jointly, the Court will do the

same.128

API needed to prove “(1) a reasonable probability of a business opportunity;

(2) intentional interference by a defendant with that opportunity; (3) proximate

125
Id. at 79–80, 137–38; 11/19/24 Trial Tr. at 212–13.
126
See 11/18/24 Trial Tr. at 232–33.
127
See API Reply Br. at 1–2.
128
API Opening Br. at 48 (stating “all of these elements similarly are satisfied here” and “API’s
damages for unfair competition are the same as those addressed in connection with its claim for
tortious interference.”); Tyson Reply Br. at 31–34.

- 32 -
causation; and (4) damages.”129

a. API satisfies the first element of a reasonable probability of a business
opportunity.

For the first element—a reasonable probability of a business opportunity—

API was required to “identify a specific party who was prepared to enter into a

business relationship but was dissuaded from doing so by the defendant.”130 API

had a reasonable business expectancy with its suppliers, Koch and Wayne, from its

decades long relationships with them.131 The suppliers expressed that they weren’t

fully content with their contracts with API, but they made no indication that they

wouldn’t have re-upped the contract if Tyson hadn’t offered them another option.132

The evidence presented at trial proved that, without Tyson, the suppliers likely

would have continued their contracts with API.

b. There was no intentional, wrongful interference.

The second element requires that Tyson’s interference was intentional and

wrongful.133 Wrongful interference may be achieved through improper economic

129
OptimisCorp v. Waite, 2015 WL 5147038, at *76 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 2015), aff’d, 137 A.3d
970 (Del. 2016) (stating the elements for tortious interference with prospective business relations)
(citing Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 607–08 (Del. Ch.), aff’d sub nom. ASDI, Inc. v.
Beard Research, Inc., 11 A.3d 749 (Del. 2010)).
130
Organovo Holdings, Inc. v. Dimitrov, 162 A.3d 102, 122 (Del. Ch. 2017) (citing Agilent
Techs., Inc. v. Kirkland, 2009 WL 119865, at *7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 20, 2009)).
131
11/26/24 Trial Tr. at 28–29 (D.I. 689).
132
See 11/21/24 Trial Tr. at 214–16.
133
KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Techs. Inc., 2021 WL 2823567, at *13 (Del. Super. Ct. June 24,
2021) (“Delaware law requires courts to consider these elements in light of a defendant’s privilege
- 33 -
pressure.134 Typically, a party exerts improper economic pressure that might require

a Court to intervene when the pressure forces a competitor out of business.135

According to API, Tyson’s actions were wrongful because it used improper

economic pressure by contracting with its suppliers for ten-year terms, which would

eventually put API out of business.136 API asks the Court to grant relief because

Tyson made deals with the region’s suppliers it could not.

It’s important to keep in mind the nature of the poultry rendering business.

Due to the product itself, its raw materials can’t travel far distances without going

rancid.137 Tyson had to make a substantial initial investment to become competitive

and challenge a dominant producer in the region. So it did.

Tyson contracted with the region’s suppliers, that were also API’s suppliers,

to “apply pressure on the API transaction,” but also as the best means to enter the

region if it chose to build.138 In response, API had the choice to sell or compete.

API could have chosen to fight and find a solution, but it didn’t. It treated the

to compete or protect his business interests in a fair and lawful manner. That privilege derives from
Delaware’s concern that this tort could restrict free competition. As a result, a plaintiff must prove
that a defendant’s conduct was independently wrongful to prevent the competition privilege from
barring recovery.”) (citations omitted).
134
Preston Hollow Cap. LLC v. Nuveen LLC, 2020 WL 1814756, at *18 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2020),
judgment entered, (Del. Ch. 2020).
135
Id.
136
API Opening Br. at 45–47.
137
11/18/24 Trial Tr. at 271.
138
DTX–472.

- 34 -
possibility of failure and going out of business as an inevitability.

The facts here do not add up to intentional wrongful interference. For

example, API attempts to rely on Preston Hollow Cap. LLC v. Nuveen LLC, but

unlike in that case, there are very few players in this very specific market.139 Here,

API had regional dominance.140 As such, the Court must look to the distinctive facts

here and may be more tolerant of competitive practices in this peculiar small market

than might be proper in other circumstances.141

In doing so, the Court cannot find that API has proven Tyson’s actions to be

wrongful. Tyson took an opportunity to expand into a market that had minimal

competition. Tyson’s means were reasonable; it secured supplier contracts legally

and without use of any wrongful means. Based on the unique aspects of the chicken

139
But cf. Preston Hollow Cap., 2020 WL 1814756, at *18 (“Davern informed Morgan that
Nuveen was attempting to make the prohibition on 100% placements ‘uniform across [Wall
Street].”).
140
11/18/24 Trial Tr. at 189 (“Q: So API was Tyson’s largest rendering competitor. Is that
correct? A: In chicken, yes, that’s correct.”); see 11/21/24 Trial Tr. at 157 (“You can’t replace the
locations. I worked all my life on those plants. Those were the very best locations.”); API Opening
Br. at 2 (“It would be impossible to re-create today”).
141
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 768 (Am. L. Inst. 1979) (using the following balancing
test to determine if the competition is wrongful “(a) the relation concerns a matter involved in the
competition between the actor and the other and (b) the actor does not employ wrongful means
and (c) his action does not create or continue an unlawful restraint of trade and (d) his purpose is
at least in part to advance his interest in competing with the other”), cmt. c (explaining that
improper economic pressure requires reviewing “the circumstances in which it is exerted, the
object sought to be accomplished by the actor, the degree of coercion involved, the extent of the
harm that it threatens, the effect upon the neutral parties drawn into the situation, the effects upon
competition, and the general reasonableness and appropriateness of this pressure as a means of
accomplishing the actor’s objective”).

- 35 -
rendering business in the region, the Court does not find that Tyson’s actions exerted

improper economic pressure.

Accordingly, API did not meet its burden of proving tortious interference or

unfair competition.

3. API isn’t entitled to recission or rescissory damages.

API failed to prove that it is entitled to rescissory damages. “Rescission is an

equitable remedy that ‘results in abrogation or “unmaking” of an agreement, and

attempts to return the parties to the status quo.’”142 But the remedy is used sparingly,

as it “will not be granted unless the Court can and does, by its decree, restore the

parties substantially to the position which they occupied before making the

contract.”143 It’s counterpart—rescissory damages—is only given “if the remedy of

rescission is impractical but otherwise warranted.”144 Unconscionability may be

independent grounds for recission or recessionary damages if there is a unilateral

142
GB-SP Holdings, LLC v. Walker, 2024 WL 4799490, at *22 (Del. Ch. Nov. 15, 2024) (quoting
Norton v. Poplos, 443 A.2d 1, 4 (Del. 1982)).
143
Craft v. Bariglio, 1984 WL 8207, at *12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 1984).
144
GB-SP Holdings, 2024 WL 4799490, at *22.

- 36 -
mistake.145 Such an award relies on the Court’s discretion.146

Here, only recessionary damages are at issue. API suggests that Tyson’s

interpretation of the APA is unconscionable and based on a unilateral mistake.147 A

unilateral mistake requires that API “show that it was mistaken and that the other

party knew of the mistake but remained silent.”148 API asserts that it believed it

complied with AAFCO. But it makes no argument that Tyson, for instance, was

aware of the non-compliance at the time of the sale and remained silent.149 Instead,

API claims that there was a “mistake” regarding the terminology in the APA.150 This

is nowhere near sufficient to meet API’s burden. API has failed to prove that Tyson

knew of any sort of mistake, and that Tyson remained silent.

More so, Tyson’s actions do not meet the standard for unconscionability

because “[a] court rarely will intervene when the contracting parties are both

145
FdG Logistics LLC v. A&R Logistics Holdings, Inc., 131 A.3d 842, 861 (Del. Ch.), aff’d sub
nom. A & R Logistics Holdings, Inc. v. FdG Logistics LLC, 148 A.3d 1171 (Del. 2016)
(“Rescission of a transaction because of a unilateral mistake is an extraordinary remedy. It is only
available under Delaware law when a party can demonstrate that (1) the enforcement of the
agreement would be unconscionable; (2) the mistake relates to the substance of the consideration;
(3) the mistake occurred regardless of the exercise of ordinary care; and (4) it is possible to place
the other party in the status quo.) (citation omitted).
146
Telstra Corp. v. Dynegy, Inc., 2003 WL 1016984, at *8 n.22 (Del. Ch. Mar 4, 2003).
147
API Opening Br. at 49–51.
148
Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC v. ASB Allegiance Real Est. Fund, 68 A.3d 665,
679–80 (Del. 2013) (citing Cerberus Int’l, Ltd. v. Apollo Mgmt., L.P., 794 A.2d 1141, 1143 (Del.
2002)).
149
API Opening Br. at 50–51.
150
Id. at 51.

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commercial entities or otherwise sophisticated.”151 Here, we have two sophisticated

parties that engaged in ample negotiation and due diligence to execute the APA.

Much more is needed to invoke the doctrine of unconscionability. API also attempts

to claim that there is unconscionability because API was valued at significantly more

than Tyson paid.152 But this claim is unavailing too because—as the Court will

explain—Tyson actually overpaid.

Accordingly, API is not entitled to recessionary damages.

4. API is not entitled to indemnification.

API didn’t meet its burden in proving that it’s entitled to indemnification. API

claims that Tyson violated Articles 1.3 and 10.2 of the APA by failing to indemnify

API for the Sipsey litigation.153 Both API and Tyson were named defendants, but

Tyson didn’t participate in the settlement and contested its indemnity obligation

from the start.154

For the Sipsey litigation to be covered, it must be an “assumed liability.”155

151
James v. Nat’l Fin., LLC, 132 A.3d 799, 826 (Del. Ch. 2016).
152
API Opening Br. at 51.
153
Id. at 52–53.
154
See DTX–1060.
155
Defining “assumed liabilities” as:
all Liabilities of Sellers to the extent arising from the operation of the Business in
the ordinary course of business, including the Liabilities set forth on the Financials
(to the extent not satisfied in the operation of the Business in the ordinary course
prior to the Closing Date).
APA § 1.3(a).

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The definition is unambiguous and requires that the liability be: (1) of API’s;

(2) via the normal course of business; and (3) one that hasn’t been satisfied prior to

closing.156 The provision states that the obligation is “not satisfied in the operation

of the Business in the ordinary course prior to the Closing Date.” 157 This requires

that the liability be present prior to closing. But the Sipsey issue didn’t occur until

post-closing.158 As such, it can’t be an assumed liability under the APA.

API also claims that Tyson is liable under common-law.159 “Common law

indemnification, in contrast, involves the responsibility of a third party to pay for

another’s liability.”160 But API cannot prevail via this route either. Delaware courts

have permitted common-law or implied indemnification claims only when there is

no contractual right to indemnification.161 Since there is an indemnification

agreement between the parties, the Court won’t entertain a common-law based

claim.

156
Terrell v. Kiromic Biopharma, Inc., 2025 WL 249073, at *3 (Del. Jan. 21, 2025) (“This Court
‘will give priority to the parties’ intentions as reflected in the four corners of the agreement.’
‘When the contract is clear and unambiguous, we will give effect to the plain-meaning of the
contract’s terms and provisions unless it appears the parties intended a special meaning.’”)
(quoting Salamone v. Gorman, 106 A.3d 354, 368 (Del. 2014) and Norton v. K-Sea Transp.
Partners L.P., 67 A.3d 354, 360 (Del. 2013)).
157
APA § 1.3(a).
158
See API Opening Br. at 52.
159
Id. at 52–53.
160
Levy v. Hayes Lemmerz Int’l, Inc., 2006 WL 985361, at *11 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 2006).
161
See, e.g., Davis v. R.C. Peoples, Inc., 2003 WL 21733013, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. July 25, 2003).

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Regardless, API chose to enter a settlement agreement.162 In fact, the

settlement agreement specifically contained a provision that would govern the

repayment provision if there was any indemnity from Tyson.163 Put simply, API

chose to settle the entire claim knowing that its right to indemnity was being

contested and may never be actualized.164

Accordingly, API is not entitled to indemnification for the Sipsey litigation.

5. API hasn’t proven any breach of the TSA.

API did not meet its burden of proving that Tyson breached the TSA.

A breach of contract claim has three elements: “1) a contractual obligation; 2)

a breach of that obligation by the defendant; and 3) a resulting damage to the

plaintiff.”165

API claims that Tyson’s claims should be stricken because it intentionally

breached the TSA.166 But API failed to even enter the TSA into evidence during

trial.167 On this record, the Court can’t pinpoint the contractual obligation Tyson

162
See DTX–1060 (Sipsey Settlement).
163
Id.
164
Id. (“contribute to the settlement to resolve the Lawsuit in exchange for a release of any
disputes . . . while preserving any rights it may have to recover its payment under [its] indemnity
rights under the asset Purchase Agreement between Crossroads and Tyson Foods, Inc.”).
165
Connelly v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 135 A.3d 1271, 1279 n.28 (Del. 2016).
166
API Opening Br. at 52.
167
API only entered correspondence regarding the TSA into evidence. See DTX–643; DTX–651;
DTX–652, DTX–623, DTX–656.

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was alleged to have had or breached. As such, this API claim fails.

6. Tyson did not commit civil conspiracy.

API did not meet its burden in proving civil conspiracy. “Civil conspiracy is

not an independent cause of action; it must be predicated on an underlying wrong.

Thus, if plaintiff fails to adequately allege the elements of the underlying claim, the

conspiracy claim must be dismissed.”168 Since all of API’s other claims fail, it

cannot prevail on its civil conspiracy count.

C. TYSON IS AWARDED $55 MILLION IN DAMAGES, NOT INCLUDING INTEREST.

Based on the Court’s findings above, Tyson is entitled to damages for API’s

fraud and misrepresentations. API is not entitled to damages.

1. There are no bars to Tyson recovering damages.

First, API claims that, under the APA, Tyson’s “losses” must exclude any

“amounts calculated by any multiple of the applicable Losses solely based on any

multiple used by Buyer to determine purchase price.”169 That provision is not

applicable to the damage calculations presented at trial. Tyson relied upon the flat

purchase price agreed to by both parties and the discounted cash flow (DCF) that

was adjusted for the misrepresentations by using data of past revenue and estimated

168
Kuroda v. SPJS Holdings, L.L.C., 971 A.2d 872, 892 (Del. Ch. 2009) (citing Ramunno v.
Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 1039 (Del. 1998) and Transched Sys. Ltd. v. Versyss Transit Solutions,
LLC, 2008 WL 948307, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2008)).
169
APA Ex. A, at Definition—Losses.

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SPN stickwater percentages.170 Simply put, the calculation is based on actual losses,

not a mere multiple of the purchase price.

Second, API claims that any damages owed to Tyson either do not exceed the

deductible or are limited by the escrow cap.171 The escrow deductible is $4.125

million and the cap is $55 million.172 Since API is not entitled to damages, there is

no need to offset any damages awarded to Tyson. The $4.125 million deductible

has easily been exceeded. The application of the damages cap will be addressed

below.

2. Mitigation wasn’t necessary or even, as a practical matter, possible.

API claims that any damages should be reduced because Tyson failed to take

any mitigating efforts.173 But, based on the breaches, the Court fails to see what

mitigation efforts were even available to Tyson. The damages at issue here were the

misrepresentations by API and its acts prior to Tyson acquiring the facilities. As

such, damages are solely based on the actual value of the business/plant at the time

of the sale. Since Tyson had no control over the facilities and they had no clue to

disbelieve API’s representation, there was nothing Tyson could do to mitigate

damages. Accordingly, mitigation is not appropriate.

170
See CX–18.
171
API Reply Br. at 36–38.
172
APA §§ 10.3(a), (c).
173
API Opening Br. at 40.

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3. Tyson’s damages are $55 million without interest.

In Delaware, damages for fraudulent inducement and breach of contract are

based on benefit-of-the-bargain calculations.174 This means that Tyson’s damages

are “the difference between the actual and the represented values of the object of the

[fraudulent] transaction.”175 It is intended to “put the plaintiff in the same financial

position that [the plaintiff] would have been in if the defendant's representations had

been true.”176

Tyson paid $865.8 million for API’s facilities,177 but it overpaid because of

API’s false representations. Tyson’s evaluation of the plant without notice of the

misrepresentations and SPN stickwater removal project stated that facilities were

worth $871 million.178 But after considering the misrepresentations, Tyson has

estimated that it overpaid by $80.1-$91.8 million.179

Looking at API’s profits from 2015 to 2017, Tyson’s expert calculated the

174
Maverick Therapeutics, 2021 WL 1592473, at *9.
175
Stephenson v. Capano Dev., Inc., 462 A.2d 1069, 1077 (Del. 1983).
176
Id.
177
See 11/20/24 Trial Tr. at 251 (“Q: By the way, you sold the assets to Tyson for $865 million,
didn’t you? A: I think it was 825. And saying 865 is like saying you took your bank account and
you sold it to Tyson. That was working capital. All that was adjustments. The price was 825.”).
The Court will base its calculations on estimates without synergies because you don’t pay for
synergies. See, e.g., 11/27/19 Trial Tr. at 112 (“It’s contingent upon the buyer to actually earn
those synergies out of their operation. It’s not coming from the operation they buy.”) (D.I. 683).
178
CX–18; 11/25/24 Trial Tr. at 14.
179
CX–18.

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amount that Tyson overpaid for API.180 This calculation relied in part on estimating

the percentage of SPN stickwater used at each plant to calculate the difference in

profits for the years it used SPN stickwater.181 Generally, the Court found that

Tyson’s methods for determining the percentage of SPN stickwater used at the

Cummings plant were reliable.182 In fact, Tyson’s samples coincided with those

API’s own expert used.183 For the Cummings plant, the SPN stickwater percentage

was 4.72%.184

But the samples from and testimony regarding the Hanceville plant weren’t as

reliable.185 The Hanceville plant has no historical records.186 Tyson relied on only

4 samples and those samples were collected post-sale once Tyson took possession.187

Tyson claims that the SPN stickwater percentage was 11.51%.188 But without data

from the relevant time period, it is difficult to believe that the Hanceville plant’s

180
CX–18; 11/25/24 Trial Tr. at 12–27.
181
See 11/27/24 Trial Tr. at 10–14, 85–87.
182
See Medicalgorithmics S.A. v. AMI Monitoring, Inc., 2016 WL 4401038, at *26 (Del. Ch. Aug.
18, 2016), judgment entered, (Del. Ch. 2016) (“Delaware does not require certainty in the award
of damages where a wrong has been proven and injury established. Responsible estimates of
damages that lack mathematical certainty are permissible so long as the court has a basis to make
such a responsible estimate.”) (quoting Beard Research, 8 A.3d at 613).
183
11/27/24 Trial Tr. at 86–87 (stating that API used 30 samples and Tyson used 540 samples).
184
Id. at 87–88.
185
See id. at 88.
186
See id.
187
Id.
188
11/27/24 Trial Tr. at 10–11.

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SPN stickwater percentage was more than double the percentage at the Cummings

plant. While the Court accounts for API’s own record-keeping gaps, it does not have

extant evidence sufficiently reliable to support Tyson’s higher damages scenario. In

turn, the Court uses Tyson’s lower damages estimates as an appropriate starting

point.189

Accounting for the SPN stickwater factor, a reliably accurate valuation of API

at the time of sale could be as low as $785.7 million, compared to the original

estimate of $871 million. As such, a truer valuation of API might be found to be

approximately $80 million lower than the purchase price.190 And discounting any

other relevant factors, it would be possible for the Court to deliver an award of up to

$80 million to Tyson were the Court to find that full delta to have been proven by a

preponderance of the evidence.

But, the Court finds that the higher estimate of such damages—whether the

result of fraudulent inducement or breach of contract, which in this instance are truly

inseparable—would be excessive and trigger the indemnification cap of $55

million.191 As such, the proper award to Tyson is $55 million without accounting for

189
See Great Hill Equity, 2020 WL 948513, at *20 (“[S]o long as a plaintiff provides a reasonable
method to calculate damages, the risk that such cannot be determined with mathematical certitude
falls on the wrongdoer, not the wronged.”).
190
CX–18.
191
APA § 10.3(c).

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interest.

4. Punitive damages aren’t warranted.

In Delaware, the granting of punitive damages is done sparingly.192 Typically,

punitive damages aren’t awarded in breach-of-contract cases.193 But, there is an

exception when the defendant “exhibits a wanton or willful disregard for the rights

of [the] plaintiff.”194 This requires that the plaintiff “show[s] that the defendant acted

maliciously and without probable cause for the purpose of injuring the other party

by depriving him of the benefits of the contract.”195

In this case, the Court finds the evidence of such lacking here. So, particularly

in light of the substantial damages just found and to be awarded, punitive damages

are not justified. Make no mistake, API’s actions were wrongful. But the Court

does not find the required maliciousness. Accordingly, Tyson is not entitled to

punitive damages.

192
Contrary to API’s assertion, there is nothing in the APA that bars punitive damages. The only
mention of punitive damages is in Article 10.3 where it states that Losses exclude “punitive and
exemplary damages and amounts calculated as any multiple of the applicable Losses solely based
on any multiple used by Buyer to determine the Purchase Price (but not excluding any other
damages recoverable under Applicable Law).” APA § 10.3. The Court does not read this
agreement language as a ban on punitive damages.
193
Callahan v. iLight Techs., LLC, 2022 WL 2902810, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. July 21, 2022).
194
Ripsom v. Beaver Blacktop, Inc., 1988 WL 32071, at *16 (Del. Super. Apr. 6, 1988) (citing
Cloroben Chem. Corp v. Comegys, 464 A.2d 887 (Del. Super. 1983)).
195
Id. at *18.

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5. Interest must be added to the damage calculation.

Tyson is entitled to pre-and-post judgment interest.196 For pre-judgment

interest, the rate will be based on the “legal rate” of interest described in 6 Del. C.

§ 2301, since there is no specific interest rate within the APA.197

196
See Smart Sand, Inc. v. US Well Servs. LLC, 2021 WL 2400780, at *14 (Del. Super. Ct. June
1, 2021) (explaining that pre-judgment interest is a matter of right for the non-breaching party in
Delaware) (citation omitted); see also Beard Research, 8 A.3d at 620–21 (“Delaware courts also
routinely grant post-judgment interest.”) (citation omitted).
197
See Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. WSMW Indus., Inc., 426 A.2d 1363, 1367 (Del. Super. Ct.
1980).
Originally, the Court indicated pre-judgment interest would be compounded quarterly. River
Valley Ingredients, LLC, 2025 WL 1826656, at *1. But after it was raised in API’s motion for re-
argument, the Court held argument on the issue because neither party sufficiently developed any
interest arguments in their post-trial briefs. See, e.g., D.I. 677, 678 and 682. Upon reconsideration,
the Court finds that compounding interest isn’t justified in this situation.
The Supreme Court hasn’t clearly decided if this Court can award compounding interest. See NGL
Energy Partners LP v. LCT Cap., LLC, 319 A.3d 335, 342 (Del. 2024). And the Court need not
resolve its power to do so here. For both sides have agreed: any Delaware court that does exercise
authority to grant compounding interest, must look at: (1) the parties’ sophistication; (2) the nature
of any breaches; (3) the economic realities of the market; (4) the economic realities of the parties;
and, (5) the fairness of compounding. See Brandin v. Gottlieb, 2000 WL 1005954, at *29 (Del.
Ch. July 13, 2000); see also Energy Transfer, LP v. Williams Companies, Inc., 2023 WL 6561767,
at *22 (Del. Oct. 10, 2023); see also Williams Companies, Inc. v. Energy Transfer LP, 2022 WL
3650176, at *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2022); see also Brown v. Ct. Square Cap. Mgmt., L.P., 2024
WL 1655418, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 2024). And now, having heard from the parties and squarely
engaging those factors—as the Court should have in the first instance were it properly considering
a grant of compounding—the record here doesn’t support compounding interest.
While the Court could readily deem these parties “sophisticated” and note that today’s market
tends to compound interest, there has been no real evidence presented supporting the granting of
compound interest. See, e.g., 11/22/24 Trial Tr. at 263–64 (simply providing figures for damages
with both simple and compounding interest) (D.I. 685); 11/25/24 Trial Tr. at 26–67 (same) (D.I.
685). There was no testimony regarding “the probability that [API] earned more than the legal
rate of interest on the moneys [it] owes to [Tyson].” See Brandin, 2000 WL 1005954, at *29. Even
upon the motion for reargument, Tyson made no claim that awarding simple interest would deprive
it of any benefit that it’s entitled to. Without a more-developed record on this issue, it’s not in the
interest of justice to compound interest. Indeed, the Court believes that the fairness factor in these
unique circumstance—where, among other considerations, the Court expressly rejected a prayer
for punitive damages—weighs heavily in favor of a simple interest award.

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Tyson’s right to post-judgment interest begins to accrue upon the date of the

entry of this judgment.198 The post-judgment interest shall be awarded “at the legal

rate on the combined amount of the damages award and prejudgment interest.”199

V. VERDICT AND JUDGMENT

Tyson was determined to enter the poultry rendering market in the Southeast.

After approaching API about acquiring its plants and being rebuffed, Tyson

contracted with API’s suppliers in preparation of Tyson building its own plant(s) or

buying plant(s) from a competitor. With this change in circumstance, API

reluctantly came to the negotiating table. At that point, API could use hard

bargaining to extract “stupid money” for this very specialized business; it was not

allowed to use deception.

In 2018, Tyson purchased API’s Cummings and Hanceville plants for a total

price of $865.8 million. Tyson brought suit alleging fraudulent misrepresentation

and breach of contract for misrepresentations in the APA. In response, API filed

multiple counterclaims.

Following an eight-day trial, the Court finds in favor of Tyson on its

fraudulent inducement claim and certain aspects of its breach-of-contract claim

198
Wilm. Country Club v. Cowee, 747 A.2d 1087, 1097 (Del. 2000).
199
See NGL Energy Partners, 319 A.3d at 345 (“On the date of the judgment, the judgment
debtor’s obligation is a sum certain that includes the amount of the award plus prejudgment interest
and, in some cases, fees and costs.”).

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centered on API’s past practices and concealment from others of its use of SPN

stickwater. But the Court does not find in Tyson’s favor on the specific books-and-

records allegation, failure to disclose the Reid Report allegation, or its allegations

that API wasn’t in compliance with relevant laws and government regulations.

The Court finds that API failed to meet its burden in proving any of its

counterclaims.

Accordingly, Tyson is entitled to a damages award of $55 million without

including interest.

A. ON TYSON’S CLAIMS:

- Count I—Fraudulent Inducement: for Tyson

- Count IV—Breach of Contract: for Tyson regarding API’s
SPN stickwater practices and concealment, but not the
books-and-records, Reid Report, or non-compliance with
government laws and regulations.

B. ON API’S CLAIMS:

- Count I—Fraudulent Inducement: for Tyson

- Count II—Rescission: for Tyson

- Count III—Tortious Interference: for Tyson

- Count IV— Unfair Competition: for Tyson

- Count IV— Civil Conspiracy: for Tyson

- Count IX— Breach of Contract: for Tyson

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The parties shall confer and, within 21 days, submit to the Court a proposed

form of Order of Final Judgment consistent with these findings and verdicts.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Paul R. Wallace
_______________________
Paul R. Wallace, Judge
Original to Prothonotary
Cc: All counsel via File & Serve

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