State v. Monroe

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff,

I.D. No. 2409013530

V.

CHARLES MONROE,

eee ee Oe ee

Detendant.

Submitted: October 6, 2025
Decided: October 13, 2025

On Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Prejudicial Joinder: Denied
Charles Monroe (hereinafter “Mr. Monroe”) is charged in this Court by
indictment with 34 counts of alleged criminal conduct. In terms of chronology, the
charges begin with misdemeanor offenses in counts two, three, and four which are
alleged to have taken place on September 3, 2024. These domestic violence
allegations include two counts of Criminal Mischief and Reckless Burning. For ease
of reference in the Court’s analysis, the Court will refer to these allegations as

Proposed Trial One.

A second series of allegations within the indictment stems from an incident on
September 25, 2024. Those charges include First-Degree Burglary, Second-Degree

Assault, Strangulation, First-Degree Unlawful Imprisonment, and Non-Compliance
with Bond Conditions. The Court will refer to these allegations as Proposed Trial

Two.

The remaining set of allegations includes Stalking, Aggravated Act of
Intimidation, two counts of Act of Intimidation, Terroristic Threatening, and multiple
counts of Breach of Conditions of Bond During Commitment. The Court will refer

to these allegations as Proposed Trial Three.
Parties’ Contentions

Through counsel, Mr. Monroe has filed a Motion for Relief from Prejudicial

Joinder. He argues “[t]he majority of the evidence in these cases are separate and

distinct...”!

He presses the point of distinction by arguing he “is accused of
damaging and burning property on September 3, 2024. The allegations on
September 25, however, do not include any charges for the destruction of property,

but rather, for violent behavior against Ms. Dunn.”? Mr. Monroe has suggested the

Court sever the indictment into the three trials detailed above.

As to prejudice, Mr. Monroe argues the jury may cumulate the evidence against
him and use the evidence of one crime to infer a general criminal disposition.’

Finally, Mr. Monroe argues he may be subject to embarrassment or confusion—he

1 DI. 16 atp. 5.
2 Id
3 Id. at 6.
explains further that he may testify at trial, dependent on the State’s case and this

Court’s decision on the instant motion.’

The State responded.* It argues joinder is appropriate because the entire
indictment is based on a common scheme or plan.® Further, the State posits the
entirety of the indictment involves the same victim and behavior.’ Specifically, the
State argues the Stalking charge requires proof of a course of conduct. Further,
evidence of the other alleged crimes would be admissible under Delaware Rule of
Evidence 404(b), which caselaw says is a consideration for this Court.’ As to the
evidence itself, the State tells the Court evidence it intends to present on Breach of
Conditions of Bond During Commitment would also be admitted at trial on the
alleged conduct from September 3 and 25" because they contain admissions by

Defendant.
Legal Standards

This matter implicates the interplay of two Superior Court Criminal

Procedural Rules, 8 and 14. Rule 8(a) provides as follows:

Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or
information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged
are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or

4 Id.at 6-7.

> DI. 17.

5 Td. at p. 6.

"Id.

8 Td. at p. 7 quoting Monroe v. State, 28 A.3d 418, 426 (Del. 2011).
hypothetical prejudice is not sufficient.” The decision on severance is within this
Court’s discretion.'' The Wiest decision outlines the prejudice a criminal defendant

may suffer warranting severance under this rule, each of which mirrors the prejudice

transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together
or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.

Rule 14 provides Relief from prejudicial joinder:

If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such
joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate
trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever
other relief justice requires. In ruling on a motion by a defendant for
severance the court may order the attorney general to deliver to the
court for inspection in camera any statements or confessions made by
the defendants which the state intends to introduce in evidence at the
trial.

Mr. Monroe must demonstrate prejudice that requires severance.’ “[M]ere

Mr. Monroe argues to advance his position:

1.

2.

Joinder of the offenses may lead the jury to cumulate the evidence,
leading to a finding of guilt that it would not find, without that evidence.
An inference of propensity for criminal conduct of the defendant, by

the jury.

9 Wiest v. State, 542 A.2d 1193, 1195 (Del. 1988); Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Del.

1990).

10 Skinner, 575 A.2d at 1118.
'| Wiest, 542 A.2d. at 1195.
3. Embarrassment or confusion while presenting a defense.

In Wiest, the defendant was charged with two separate burglaries, approximately
five months apart. Defendant moved for severance. The State advised a co-
defendant, who was in witness protection, and thus difficult to bring to Court, would
testify he was at the scene of both burglaries with the defendant. The Court denied
the motion to sever. During trial, however, that was not his testimony. The defense
renewed its motion to sever. The motion was again denied. The Delaware Supreme
Court reversed. Our Supreme Court determined the balance of factors weighed by
this Court changed after the State’s representation failed to materialize and severance
was necessary. Therefore, this Court will consider the nature and quality of the

State’s proffered evidence in making this decision.

Related to this case and the nature of the crimes charged here is the Skinner
decision. In Skinner, the Supreme Court focused on the “similar course of
conduct...”'? The Court also discussed the relevance of reciprocal admissibility,
identifying it as a “pertinent factor’ for this Court to consider. In assessing reciprocal
admissibility, which may qualify as evidence under D.R.E. 404(b), Delaware Courts

employ a Getz analysis."°

12 Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d at 1118.
'3 See Wiest, 542 A.2d 1193 n.3 citing Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 730 (Del. 1988).
The Getz factors include:

1. The evidence of other crimes must be material to an issue or ultimate fact in
dispute in the case. If the State elects to present such evidence in its case-in-
chief it must demonstrate the existence, or reasonable anticipation, of such a
material issue.

2. The evidence of other crimes must be introduced for a purpose sanctioned
by Rule 404(b) or any other purpose not inconsistent with the basic
prohibition against evidence of bad character or criminal disposition.

3. The other crimes must be proved by evidence which is “plain, clear and
conclusive.”

4. The other crimes must not be too remote in time from the charged offense.

5. The Court must balance the probative value of such evidence against its
unfairly prejudicial effect, as required by D.R.E. 403.

Under Getz, if the evidence is admitted, it is for limited purposes and the jury

must be instructed accordingly.

‘Course of conduct’ is the same language used by our General Assembly in the
Stalking statute, which is at issue here. While used in distinct ways, this identical
language is helpful in the Court’s analysis, particularly as it relates to an indictment
that alleges Stalking. In Newman, this Court denied a motion for prejudicial joinder,
which included allegations of Stalking and Aggravated Act of Intimidation, finding
the “charges here are interrelated and demonstrate a pattern of behavior that would
provide justification to allow the Defendant’s conduct through this period of time to
be admitted in the trials of the Stalking and Aggravated Act of Intimidation.”'* The

same result was reached more recently in Rodgers, where this Court addressed a

\4 State v. Newman, 2019 WL 460311 *1 (Del. Super.).
motion for relief from prejudicial joinder in a Stalking case.'> In Rodgers, this Court
concluded “[t]hese cases are so inextricably intertwined that the State would be
seeking to admit some of the same evidence and illicit some of the same testimony
in each of the trials. Severing this indictment into two individual cases would be a

waste of judicial resources.”!®

Analysis

At the Court’s request, the State supplied a list of potential witnesses for these
matters. The Court has reviewed this 3-page submission. Many witnesses, civilians,
police officers, state employees, and hospital staff are duplicated across the three

potential trials Mr. Monroe requests.

For Proposed Trial Two, the State would be required to prove to the jury that
Mr. Monroe was Court-Ordered to have no contact with the alleged victim. That
Court Order stems from his arrest on September 2". Most significantly, for
Proposed Trial Three, the State would be required to put forth evidence before a jury

that includes:

e As to the charge of Stalking, that Mr. Monroe engaged in a course of conduct,

which is statutorily defined as “3 or more separate incidents...”

'S State v. Rodgers, 2025 WL 1906492 (Del. Super.).
16 Td. at *3.
As to the charge of Stalking, that the course of conduct referenced above
would cause fear of physical injury or cause another to suffer significant
mental anguish.

The indictment charges Stalking beginning on September 3, 2024—which
incorporates the allegations from Proposed Trial One and Proposed Trial Two.
As to the charge of Stalking, that Mr. Monroe threatened death or serious
physical injury to the alleged victim.

As to the charge of Stalking, that Mr. Monroe violated an Order prohibiting
contact with the alleged victim.

As to the charge of Non-Compliance with Bond, in count IX, that Mr. Monroe
had contact with the alleged victim on September 25, after a Court Ordered
him not to do so.

As to the various charges of Breach of Conditions of Bond During
Commitment, that Mr. Monroe continued to have contact with his alleged
victim after his arrest.

As to the three charges of Act of Intimidation (one Aggravated) that Mr.
Monroe “did knowingly and with malice attempt to prevent [alleged victim],
a victim or witness to a crime, from causing a complaint, indictment, or
information, to be sought or prosecuted, or from assisting in the prosecution

thereof.”
The above evidence is interrelated across the three trials and is admissible across
trials—therefore it is reciprocally admissible. If the Court were to grant the
Defendant’s motion, by the time of the third trial, that jury would hear evidence of
everything alleged within the indictment—so that the State could attempt to establish
its burden of proof on the charges of Stalking and Act of Intimidation. This
reciprocal admissibility is a pertinent factor for the Court’s consideration.'’ The
probative value of evidence related to both alleged September incidents is significant
as it relates to elements of fear of physical injury and mental anguish—which are
required elements of proof on the Stalking charge. This probative value is further
reinforced when considering the Acts of Intimidation charges as the State must
attempt to establish there was an underlying crime or a trial for which the alleged

victim must appear, in order for her to have been intimidated.

As to the Geiz factors, as outlined above, the proffered evidence from September
2™' and September 25" is material to Stalking, Acts of Intimidation, and Non-
Compliance with Bond charges. The evidence of events alleged to have taken place
on September 2 and 25" meet a valid D.R.E. 404(b) purpose as it goes to motive,
particularly for the Acts of Intimidation and Breach of Conditions of Bond. They

may also go to intent to create fear or anguish. The proffer from the State suggests

'7 Gibson y. State, 314 A.3d 512 n.91 (Del. 2025) citing Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1056
n. 62 (Del. 2001).
the evidence is “plain, clear and conclusive,” indeed, some of the evidence purports
to include recorded calls by Mr. Monroe. The dates at issue are charged within this

indictment, as such, they are not too remote to the crimes charged.

As to Mr. Monroe’s assertions of prejudice, he has suggested the Court’s ruling
would impact his decision to testify. There has also been reference throughout the
pleadings, scheduling conference, and oral argument to the alleged victim having
recanted or not being cooperative with the State. Mr. Monroe states “[t]he credibility
issues regarding that incident will differ from other events and effect Mr. Monroe’s
desire to testify and present his own case-in-chief.” The Court has sincerely
endeavored to determine exactly what this means, but frankly, any conclusion would
be speculative. Mr. Monroe must carry the burden, and this opaque assertion does

not suffice.

The Court notes if Mr. Monroe testified as to facts that could be rebut by
information within the State’s possession reserved for another count within the
indictment, the State could properly cross-examine him using that information or
use it in rebuttal—even if it were severed. Further, the Court does not find that

prejudice exists in the way of confusion or embarrassment.

Finally, the Court must balance the probative value of such evidence against its

unfairly prejudicial effect, as required by D.R.E. 403. Consistent with other
decisions of this Court, the Court finds the probative value of evidence from the
incidents alleged to have occurred on September 2% and 25" is substantial to the
crimes, particularly of Stalking and Act of Intimidation. In balancing, the Court

finds the probative value of the evidence outweighs any unfairly prejudicial effect.

NOW, THEREFORE, this 13" day of October 2025, Defendant’s Motion for

Relief from Prejudicial Joinder is DENIED.

IT ISSO ORDERED.

/s/Sonia Augusthy

Judge Sonia Augusthy