State v. Schultz, Sr.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. )
) I.D. No. 2410001496
FRANK J. SCHULTZ, SR., )
)
Defendant. )

Submitted: May 12, 2025
Decided: May 27, 2025

ORDER

Upon Defendant’s Motion to Suppress

DENIED

1. Defendant Frank J. Schultz, Sr. filed a motion to suppress evidence
resulting from a search of real estate he owns, and which adjoins his domicile, but
which is leased to a third party. Because Defendant lacks standing to object to the
search of the property and seizure of evidence therefrom, Defendant’s motion is
DENIED.
2. On October 3, 2024, the Justice of the Peace Court issued a warrant
authorizing the search for and seizure of firearms and ammunition located at “3576
Walnut Shade Rd., Camden Wyoming, Kent County Delaware . . . [a] single story
brick home with a long stone driveway on the southwest side of same.”1 Per the
warrant’s description, “[t]here is a detached garage located to the east of the
property. The garage contains white vinyl siding and red painted cinder block.”2

1
Mot. to Suppress Ex. A, 1, 3.
2
Id. at 3.
Upon executing the warrant, Delaware State Police located a firearm concealed
under brush in relative proximity to the detached garage.
3. On March 26, 2025, Defendant moved to suppress “any evidence,
including statements, obtained as a result of the illegal search and seizure of the
Defendant.”3 Defendant’s motion does not dispute (nor did defense counsel at oral
argument dispute) that probable cause existed for the October 3, 2024, warrant.
Rather, Defendant contends that the search that yielded the gun exceeded the scope
of the warrant. Per Defendant, the “[o]fficers failed to realize that the northeast
portion of the property, where the gun was located, was not on 3576 Walnut Shade
[Road], but instead was on the property of 3570 Walnut Shade Road.” 4 Defendant
states that he also owns 3570 Walnut Shade Road, but “that property was being
rented to individuals unrelated to this case.” 5
4. On April 15, 2025, the State filed a response to Defendant’s motion.
The State contends, in relevant part, that Defendant lacks standing to complain of
the search because he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area
searched. 6
5. The Court heard oral argument on May 12, 2025. Following argument,
the Court reserved judgment pending this written decision, concluding that an
evidentiary hearing was not necessary to resolve Defendant’s motion.
6. An evidentiary hearing was not necessary in this case because the
parties do not dispute any fact that would determine the outcome of Defendant’s
motion. Accepting all of Defendant’s factual assertions as true, he lacks standing to

3
Mot. to Suppress ¶ 1.
4
Id. at ¶ 3.
5
Id. at ¶ 4.
6
Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Suppress, § III.
2
challenge the search at issue, and his motion must fail. The Delaware Supreme Court
has explained:
When ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, a court must engage in
a two-prong inquiry. First, the court must determine whether the
movant has a right to contest the search or seizure. If he does not, the
inquiry ends, and the evidence will not be suppressed. Only when the
movant has standing must the court assess the validity of the police
conduct. 7
7. Even assuming arguendo that a search exceeding the scope of the
warrant would have been constitutionally infirm, the firearm and any evidence
flowing from its discovery should not be suppressed. Defendant lacks standing to
object to the search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
and Defendant has not made any argument that he has an independent basis for
standing under Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution.8
8. Under the Fourth Amendment, a party may not generally contest the
legality of a search unless he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place

7
Hanna v. State, 591 A.2d 158, 162 (Del. 1991) (emphasis supplied).
8
Delaware courts will analyze suppression motions under Article I, § 6 “only when a party
produces particular and detailed explanations of why a separate analysis is appropriate.” State v.
Brown, 287 A.3d 1222, 1230 (Del. Super. 2023) (quoting Backus v. State, 202 A.3d 1126, 2019
WL 327963, at *3 (Del. Jan. 23, 2019) (ORDER)).
3
searched. 9 This is commonly referred to as Fourth Amendment standing.10 As
federal courts have regularly held, landlords do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in leased properties because, by renting them to others, they give up the right
to exclude others from accessing them. 11
9. Moreover, even if Defendant retained a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the residence on the adjoining parcel, he did not have such an expectation
in the brush under which the gun was found. In State v. Fullman, this Court held
that a defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the stoop of a
multi-unit apartment complex in which he lived because the stoop was not within
the curtilage of the defendant’s residence.12 The Court analogized the stoop to “a

9
Righter v. State, 704 A.2d 262, 265 (Del. 1997) (en banc) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
143 (1978)). Alternatively, a party may object to a search because it violates his property interests.
Everett v. State, 186 A.3d 1224, 1235 (Del. 2018) (citing Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395, 403
(2018)). Such a violation could be grounded, for instance, on a common law trespass to the
defendant’s property. See generally United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). This second
basis for Fourth Amendment standing has no impact here, because the Fourth Amendment protects
“houses,” rather than real property generally, and intrusions on “open fields” outside the curtilage
of the home therefore do not require the suppression of evidence. See Florida v. Jardines, 569
U.S. 1, 6 (2013); Stone v. Martin, 720 Fed.Appx. 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 177, 183–84 (1984)). “That is true even though the officers’ entry into the
[defendant’s] yard might be considered a trespass at common law . . . or might have violated [state]
statutory law.” United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 996 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing Oliver, 466
U.S. at 183–84; United States v. Hatfield, 333 F.3d 1189, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2003)). For the
reasons stated in paragraph 9 of this order, the officers did not intrude on the curtilage of
Defendant’s home, and the mere fact that he owned the leased parcel adjoining his home does not
make that parcel a Fourth Amendment adjunct to his “house.”
10
See U.S. v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 551 (3d Cir. 2010).
11
Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 338 F.3d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 2003) (homeowner did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in basement apartment); Marcavage v. Borough of Lansdowne,
Pa., 826 F.Supp.2d 732, 741 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“Courts have . . . held that a landlord does not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to individual apartments leased to third parties,
simply on the basis that the landlord owns the apartments.”) (collecting cases), aff’d on other
grounds, 493 Fed.Appx. 301 (3d Cir. 2012); Miller v. Hassinger, 173 Fed.Appx. 948, 952 (3d Cir.
2006) (“By [his] own admission, the apartment had been leased . . . . [Landlord] does not allege
that he had access to the apartment, that he stayed in it, or that he maintained personal items there.
Thus, [Landlord] has set forth no basis from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
[he] had a privacy interest in the apartment that was violated by the search.”).
12
319 A.3d 346, 362 (Del. Super. 2024).
4
common yard or parking lot open to the public,” and noted that “‘[b]ecause of the
number of residents and guests visiting a multiple-occupancy residence,’ there is no
justified expectation of privacy” in such spaces. 13 Although it is unlikely that the
yard space at issue in this case is as highly trafficked as those areas referenced in
Fullman, the logic the Court employed in that case is applicable here: Defendant’s
tenants and their guests had access to the yard, regardless of whether it was reserved
exclusively for their use or shared with him, and he did not, therefore, have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in that space. In United States v. Maestas, the
Tenth Circuit reached precisely this conclusion as to an enclosed garbage area shared
by three tenants and accessible by the landlord.14
10. Since Defendant lacks standing to contest the search, the Court need
not assess whether the search was lawful. 15 Thus, the Court will not evaluate
whether the search for and seizure of the firearm exceeded the scope of the warrant,
or whether a search beyond the scope of the warrant would have been legal under
these facts.
11. In sum, by leasing the parcel adjoining his home to a third party,
Defendant lost his reasonable expectation of privacy in that parcel. Even if this were
not the case, because the open area in which the gun was found was accessible to
third parties including Defendant’s tenant and guests, he still would not have held a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus, Defendant lacks standing to object to the
search for and seizure of the gun and any evidence flowing from the search or
seizure.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing considerations, Defendant Frank J.
Schultz, Sr.’s motion to suppress is DENIED.

13
Id. (quoting Lease v. Tyler, 2008 WL 2673381 (M.D. Pa. June 30, 2008))(alteration in original).
14
639 F.3d 1032, 1037–39 (10th Cir. 2011).
15
Hanna, 591 A.2d at 162.
5
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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