State v. Morrison

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
v. ) Crim. ID No. 1607021543
) Cr. A. Nos. IN16-08-0863-0864
DURRION MORRISON, )
Defendant )

Submitted: March 20, 2025
Decided: May 19, 2025

Upon Defendant Durrion Morrison’s
Motions for Correction of Sentence and Appointment of Counsel,
DENIED.

ORDER

This 19th day of May, 2025, upon consideration of the Defendant

Durrion Morrison’s Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence (D.I. 73) and

accompanying request for appointment of Rule 35(a) counsel (D.I. 74), and

the record in this matter, it appears to the Court that:

(1) In August 2016, Durrion Morrison was indicted for two counts

of first-degree murder (alleging intention and felony murder), one count of

attempted first-degree robbery, three counts of possession of a firearm during

the commission of a felony (PFDCF), one count of second-degree conspiracy,

and one count of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited.1

1
D.I. 1 (Indictment). Mr. Morrison’s codefendant was named in certain of these counts,
while Mr. Morrison appeared alone in others.
(2) Days before his scheduled trial, Mr. Morrison pleaded guilty to

a reduced charge of second degree murder and a single PFDCF count.2 At

that proceeding he unequivocally admitted to committing those two separate

crimes.3 And Mr. Morrison acknowledged that he faced: (a) a sentence

ranging from 15 years to life imprisonment for the murder count; and (b) a

sentence ranging from 3 to 25 imprisonment for the PFDCF count.4

(3) Mr. Morrison was sentenced several months later as follows: for

the murder in the second-degree count—25 years at Level V, suspended after

he serves 17 years imprisonment, for two years of intensive community

supervision at Level III; for the PFDCF count—3 years at Level V.5 And as

required, his two terms of unsuspended incarceration were ordered to be

served consecutively.6

(4) In Mr. Morrison’s view, his sentence is “illegal” and in need of

correction under the Court’s Criminal Rule 35(a) because “[a]t sentencing, the

Court imposed a 3-year sentence for PFDCF, despite the State never

2
D.I. 29 (Plea Agreement).
3
Nov. 3, 2017 Plea Hrg. Tr. at 8-9 (D.I. 50).
4
Id. at 8.
5
D.I. 40 (Sentencing Order).
6
Id.; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3901(d) (2015) (providing that Level V terms for second-
degree murder and PFDCF could not, under then-extant law, be imposed to be served
concurrently either with each other or with any other sentence of confinement imposed).

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presenting evidence of a firearm.”7 According to Mr. Morrison, the Court

must vacate his PFDCF sentence and resentence him.8

(5) Criminal Rule 35(a) permits this Court to correct an illegal

sentence “at any time.”9 Relief under Rule 35(a) is available when, inter alia,

the sentence imposed: exceeds the statutorily-authorized limits; omits a term

required to be imposed by statute; is uncertain as to its substance; or, is a

sentence that the judgment of conviction did not authorize.10

(6) Mr. Morrison is simply incorrect on the law he argues in his

Rule 35(a) motion. First, the factual basis for Mr. Morrison’s PFDCF

conviction and sentence was clearly established by his specific admission in

open court that he did what he was charged with doing 11—i.e. possessing a

firearm during the murder.12 That plea relieved the State of any duty to present

any evidence at all.13 Second, the baseline statutory minimum for PFDCF is

7
Def. Rule 35(a) Mot., at 1 (D.I. 73). Mr. Morrison makes no claim as to his murder
sentence, so it is not further addressed here.
8
Id. at 2 (“Defendant respectfully requests that this Court correct the illegal sentence by
vacating the 3-year sentence for PFDCF. . . Defendant respectfully requests that this
Honorable Court grant this Motion and correct the illegal sentence imposed for PFDCF.”).
9
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a) (“Correction of sentence. -- The court may correct an illegal
sentence at any time . . .”).
10
Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998).
11
Evans v. State, 2000 WL 1727314, at *2 (Del. Nov. 15, 2000) (citing Raison v. State,
469 A.2d 424, 425-26 (Del. 1983)).
12
Nov. 3, 2017 Plea Hrg. Tr. at 8-9.
13
See Hopkins v. State, 2023 WL 8296427, at *2 (Del. Dec. 1, 2023) (explaining that,
among other things, one’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea waives his claim

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a three-year term of imprisonment14—the very sentence Mr. Morrison

received for that count.15 So while in his most recent prayer for sentencing

relief, Mr. Morrison has joined chorus with so many other sentenced inmates

incanting the United States Supreme Court decision in Erlinger v. United

States, 16 Erlinger can lend no voice here because his PDFCF sentence wasn’t

enhanced in any way on either the minimum or maximum end.

(7) In sum, there is no illegality in the substance of Mr. Morrison’s

sentence. He is due no relief under this Court’s Criminal Rule 35(a), so that

motion is DENIED. And because, as just explained, he is manifestly

ineligible for Rule 35(a) relief, there was no need to appoint counsel to pursue

his futile effort to seek it.17

regarding the sufficiency of the State’s evidence).
14
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1447A(c) and 4205(b)(2) (2015) (PFDCF is a class B felony
carrying a “minimum sentence of 3 years” and ceiling of “up to 25 years to be served at
Level V.”).
15
Sent. Order, at 1-2; Feb. 16, 2018 Sentencing Tr. at 22-23 (D.I. 48).
16
See State v. Archy, 2025 WL 1330215, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 7, 2025) (noting
that movant “is aware—as apparently every other inmate in Delaware is—that the U.S.
Supreme Court issued an opinion in Erlinger v. United States [602 U.S. 821 (2024)]
concerning judicial fact finding in the context of enhanced sentencing regimes. . . . That
opinion has triggered a virtual blizzard of pro se pleadings from inmates seeking relief
from their long-ago sentences”).
17
See, e.g., Clark v. State, 2018 WL 1956298, at *3 (Del. Apr. 24, 2018) (explaining that
this Court does not err by denying appointment of counsel when it is clear on the record
that an inmate is ineligible for sentencing relief); State v. Rowan, 2022 WL 896260, at *3
(Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2022) ([T]he Court need not appoint [movant] counsel to pursue
a futile application for relief.”); State v. Chambers, 2023 WL 8615791, at *3 (Del. Super.
Ct. Dec. 13, 2023) (“[T]he Court need not enlist ODS to pursue an application for
[sentencing] relief that is going nowhere.”).

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SO ORDERED,

/s/ Paul R. Wallace

Paul R. Wallace, Judge

Original to Prothonotary

cc: Mr. Durrion Morrison, pro se
John W. Downs, Deputy Attorney General

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