State v. Caccavone

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Crim I.D. No. 2303015450
)
CHRISTOPHER CACCAVONE, )
Defendant. )

Submitted: February 10, 2025
Decided: May 9, 2025

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On Defendant’s Motion for Post Conviction Relief – DENIED

Isaac Rank, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware, attorney
for the State of Delaware

Christopher Caccavone, pro se

BRENNAN, J.

1
I. RELEVANT FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 20, 2023, Caccavone was Indicted on one (1) count of Carrying a

Concealed Deadly Weapon (hereinafter “CCDW”), two (2) counts of Possession of

a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, two (2) counts of Possession of Ammunition by a

Person Prohibited, one (1) count of Possession of a Controlled Substance, and

various traffic offenses. 1 The charges against Caccavone resulted after officers with

New Castle County Police Department observed a drug deal on March 27, 2023, in

New Castle, Delaware. 2 Following an on-scene investigation, Caccavone’s vehicle

was searched upon which officers recovered a Polymer 9mm firearm and

ammunition concealed under the steering column, .27 grams of crack cocaine, a

scale with suspected crack residue, a pipe, and pieces of firearms purchased from

Ebay. 3 Ultimately, Caccavone confessed to the officers that he was aware the

firearm was concealed under his steering column. 4

Caccavone’s counsel (hereinafter “Counsel”) filed a motion to suppress on

October 4, 2023.5 Briefing was completed and a hearing on the motion was

1
State v. Caccavone, Crim. I.D. No. 2303015450 Superior Court Criminal Docket
Item (hereinafter “D.I.”) 4. A motion to dismiss filed on May 12, 2023 and was later
ruled as moot upon his indictment.
2
State v. Caccavone, Crim. I.D. No. 2303015450 Court of Common Pleas D.I. 3;
See Prelim. Hr’g. Trans.; Superior Ct. Crim I.D. No. 2303015450, D.I. 2.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
D.I. 11.
2
scheduled for November 17, 2023.6 The hearing was ultimately mooted as

Caccavone pled guilty to one count of CCDW at his final case review on November

6, 2023.7 The Court, upon finding that Caccavone’s plea was knowing, voluntary,

and intelligent, sentenced him to eight (8) years at supervision Level V suspended

after three (3) years for twelve (12) months at Level III.8 Caccavone was sentenced

to the jointly recommended plea that had been negotiated pursuant to the plea

agreement.9

On March 7, 2024, Caccavone, pro se, filed his first motion for modification

of his sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b).10 In it, Caccavone

requested his Level V time be suspended after either serving his agreed upon three

years, or upon completion of the Level V Road to Recovery program. Caccavone

argued the hardship imposed on his family during his absence justified modifying

his sentence.11 This motion was denied on March 18, 2024. 12 In its denial, the Court

explained that his motion was untimely and that the sentence imposed was the one

Caccavone, himself, requested. “The plea agreement reached by the parties called

6
D.I. 15.
7
D.I. 17.
8
Sentencing Order, D.I. 18.
9
D.I. 17.
10
Defendant’s First Motion for Modification, D.I. 19.
11
Id.
12
D.I. 20.
3
for the exact sentence Mr. Caccavone received. The sentence was the result of a

joint request of both the State & Defense.”13

On June 25, 2024, Caccavone filed his second pro se motion for modification

of sentence, again seeking to suspend his Level V time after successful completion

of the Road To Recovery program. 14 Additionally, he argued his sentence was illegal

because the “crime of CCDW only held up to a 2 year level 5 term of

incarceration.”15 This motion was denied on July 24, 2024. 16 In denying the motion

as untimely, repetitive and meritless, the Court noted his sentence was legal, as a

maximum of 8 years at Level V can lawfully be imposed for the charge of CCDW.17

On September 20, 2024, Caccavone filed the instant pro se motion for

postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (hereinafter “Rule 61

motion”). 18 The Court interprets his motion to argue four grounds for relief.19

While only one ground is entitled “Ineffectiveness of Counsel,” the body of

13
Id.
14
Defendant’s Second Motion for Modification, D.I. 21.
15
Id.
16
D.I. 22.
17
Id.
18
Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief, D.I. 23.
19
Caccavone used the standard “form” motion for postconviction relief as provided
by the Court. This form only allots space for three grounds of relief to be raised. In
the form there is a section for movants to explain why the motion should not be
barred from relief. In this section, Caccavone instead pled a fourth ground for relief.
Giving Caccavone every benefit, this claim will be liberally read as both a standalone
claim and, if any procedural bars apply, as his argument to avoid any such bar.
4
Caccavone’s grounds all allege ineffectiveness claims and will be reviewed as

such.20

At the Court’s direction, Counsel filed an Affidavit in response to Caccavone’s

Rule 61 motion on September 27, 2024, denying all four of Caccavone’s claims of

ineffectiveness.21 Thereafter, a further Scheduling Order was issued. 22 Pursuant to

that Order, the State filed its Response in opposition on October 3, 2024.23

Caccavone was given until February 10, 2025, to file a Reply.24 To date, no Reply

has been filed. This is the Court’s Opinion DENYING his motion for postconviction

relief.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Before addressing the merits of a Rule 61 motion, the Court must first examine

whether any of the Rule's procedural bars apply.25 An applicable procedural bar

precludes a reviewing court from addressing the merits of a Rule 61 claim.

Procedural bars exist to “protect the procedural integrity” of the court rules.26 A

motion for postconviction relief can be procedurally barred as untimely, repetitive,

20
D.I 23.
21
D.I. 27.
22
D.I. 28.
23
D.I. 29.
24
D.I. 28.
25
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
26
State v. Page, 2009 WL 1141738, at *13 (Del. Super.).
5
for failing to raise a claim in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction,

and for being formerly adjudicated. 27

When considering the motion’s substance, Caccavone carries the burden to

show counsel’s representation at trial fell below “an objective standard of

reasonableness.” If so, Caccavone must then show that is a “reasonable probability”

that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the results of the proceedings would have been

different.28 In the context of a plea, Caccavone must show that but for counsel’s

deficiencies, he would not have pled and insisted on proceeding with trial.29

III. ANALYSIS

There are no procedural bars under Rule 61(i) that preclude Caccavone’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. His sentence was imposed on November 6,

2023. Caccavone did not file a direct appeal, therefore, his conviction was final

thirty (30) days later in December 2023. Rule 61(i)(1) affords a litigant one-year

from the finality of a conviction to file a postconviction motion. Caccavone’s

postconviction motion was filed on September 20, 2024, and is timely.30 As this is

Caccavone’s first motion for postconviction relief and he solely raises allegations

regarding ineffectiveness of counsel, which cannot be raised on direct appeal, the

27
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)-(4).
28
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
29
Jamison v. State, 2003 WL 21295908, at *2 (Del. June 3, 2003).
30
D.I. 23.
6
procedural bars of Rule 61(i)(2)-(4) do not apply.31 Caccavone’s motion will be

reviewed on its merits.

Caccavone asserts Counsel was ineffective for: 1) failing to raise an

“important argument” and “file motions that would have changed the course of the

criminal case … [and] coerce[d] [him] into pleading guilty by telling him he better

take this plea.”; 2) coercing him and having “psychologically pressured [him] into

pleading guilty,” which he argues should invalidate his plea; 3) having a conflict of

interest which “impeded on her [sic] work performance” and was “below the aBa

[sic] standards.”; and 4) failing to proceed to a suppression hearing where “every

item obtained due to the illegal search and seizure would not have been used against

[him].”32

Counsel’s Affidavit denies all claims: “Contrary to Mr. Caccavone’s

statements, it was Mr. Caccavone who chose to enter his plea of guilty. After

discussing the pros and cons of rejecting the plea offer and moving forward with

suppression and trial, Mr. Caccavone elected to accept an agreed upon three (3) year

plea.” 33 Counsel avers there were no conflicts of interest, that Caccavone was the

one who voluntarily signed the plea documents prior to entering his plea and that,

“it was explained [] that if he accepted the State’s plea offer, he would not have a

31
Hoskins v. State, 103 A.3d 724, 729 (Del. 2014).
32
D.I. 23.
33
D.I. 27, p. 2.
7
suppression hearing and there would not be a trial. He understood this fact and

elected to accept the State’s offer to plead guilty.” 34

The State’s opposition centers around Caccavone’s election to plead guilty.35

Citing to the fact that not only did Caccavone face a substantial amount of Level V

incarceration should he have proceeded to trial, as well as the statements made when

accepting his plea of guilt pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 11, the State

argues Caccavone has waived any right to challenge any pre-trial issues. 36

At the time of Caccavone’s plea, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: …Mr. Caccavone, did you hear the plea that was read into
the record by the prosecutor?

[CACCAVONE]: Yes, I did.

…

THE COURT: Is that your signature on the bottom of each one of these
[plea] forms?

[CACCAVONE]: Yes, it is.

THE COURT: And did you fill out these forms with [Counsel]?

[CACCAVONE]: Yes, I did.

THE COURT: And when you filled out these forms with [Counsel], did
you do so truthfully?

[CACCAVONE]: Yes, I did.

34
Id., pp. 2-3.
35
D.I. 29.
36
Id.
8
THE COURT: And have you been and will you continue to answer my
questions truthfully this morning?

[CACCAVONE]: Yes, I will.

THE COURT: …And when you filled out these forms with [Counsel],
did you have the opportunity to ask her any questions
that you may have had about them?

[CACCAVONE]: Yes, I did.

THE COURT: …And in looking at the plea agreement that you have in
front of you, is that your understanding of everything that
you yourself are agreeing to?

[CACCAVONE]: Yes, I am.
…

THE COURT: And has anyone threatened or forced you to enter into this
guilty plea agreement?

[CACCAVONE]: No.
…

THE COURT: Did you also go through your constitutional rights listed in
one through seven on the top of that form that includes
your constitutional rights to a trial that you are waiving by
pleading guilty?

[CACCAVONE]: Yes, I did.

THE COURT: … And when you went through these rights with
[Counsel], did you have the chance to ask her any
questions about those rights you are waiving?

[CACCAVONE]: Yes, I did.

THE COURT: … Do you have any questions for me right now about the
rights you are waiving?
9
[CACCAVONE]: No, I do not.

THE COURT: There’s a box in the middle of that same form, and that
tells us that the statutory penalty for the charge of carrying
a concealed deadly weapon, which is a class D violent
felony, is up to eight years at level five. So, regardless of
what the guidelines call for [] up to two years at level five,
or regardless of what the party’s recommendation here is
for three years at level five, do you understand that I have
the ultimate legal authority to sentence you to eight years
at level five today if I thought that was appropriate?

[CACCAVONE]: Yes, I do.
…

THE COURT: [Indicted CCDW charge was read.] Mr. Caccavone, do
you understand that charge?

[CACCAVONE]: Yes.

THE COURT: And how to you plead to that charge?

[CACCAVONE]: Guilty.

THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you are in fact guilty of
this crime?

CACCAVONE: Yes.
…

THE COURT: … Your attorney did mention that there’s a pending motion
to suppress here. We went through your constitutional
rights. You told me you didn’t have any other questions.
[Counsel] told me that she explained to you that you no
longer will be able to present the motion to suppress. Do
you understand that?

[CACCAVONE]: I understand.

10
THE COURT: And with that understanding, do you still wish to go
forward with this plea?

[CACCAVONE]: Yes, Ma’am.

THE COURT: … Have you had the opportunity to fully talk with
[Counsel] about the plea that’s been offered to you?

[CACCAVONE]: Yes, I have.

THE COURT: … And do you understand that while [Counsel] may give
you advice or recommend how – whether you should take
the plea or not, or how to resolve your case, [Counsel]
cannot make that decision for you.

[CACCAVONE]: I understand.

THE COURT: … And with that understanding is it your decision to
plead guilty here today?

[CACCAVONE]: It is my decision.

…

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Caccavone, you – are you satisfied with
[Counsel’s] representation of you?

[CACCAVONE]: Yes, I am.

THE COURT: And do you feel that she has done all she could do in
representing you on these charges?

[CACCAVONE]: Yes, I have. 37

37
D.I. 17.
11
Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Caccavone’s statements at the

plea colloquy indicating he was content with Counsel’s representation and aware of

the difficulty in revoking his guilty plea are binding.38

A. GROUND ONE

Caccavone first alleges Counsel was ineffective for failing “to raise important

argument[s] and file motions that would have changed the course of the criminal

case,” and further contends “[d]efense counsel coerce [sic] [M]r. Caccavone into

pleading guilty by telling him he better take this plea.”39 Counsel’s Affidavit denies

both of Caccavone’s allegations:

[c]ontrary to Mr. Caccavone’s statements, it was Mr. Caccavone who
chose to enter his plea of guilty. After discussing the pros and cons of
rejecting the plea offer and moving forward with suppression and trial,
Mr. Caccavone elected to accept an agreed upon three (3) year plea
deal. 40

Nonetheless, Caccavone argues Counsel coerced him into pleading guilty.

The record indicates otherwise. After discussing his case with Counsel, Caccavone

made an informed decision to accept the plea offer. 41 He reviewed and signed the

Plea Agreement, the Truth in Sentencing form, and the Immediate Sentencing

38
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631-32 (Del. 1997).
39
D.I. 23.
40
D.I. 27.
41
Id.
12
form.42 Caccavone’s words in the plea colloquy show it was his own decision to

enter into the plea.

Further, Caccavone offers only conclusory allegations that, had Counsel filed

additional motions or made different arguments, he would not have pled guilty. Bare

assertions without factual support falls short of the concrete evidence required in

postconviction motions.43 Caccavone “must make concrete allegations of actual

prejudice and substantiate them” to successfully show there was a reasonable

probability that the outcome would have been different.44 “A reasonable probability

means a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome....” 45 “The

likelihood of a different result must be substantial[,] not just conceivable.”46

Caccavone has not made such a showing here; his Ground One is denied as meritless.

B. GROUND TWO

Caccavone next asserts he was “coerced by [t]rial counsel, under duress, and

psychologically pressured into pleading guilty.”47 Counsel’s Affidavit makes it clear

that “Mr. Caccavone, himself, elected to accept the State’s plea offer. After

reviewing the Plea Agreement, the Truth in Sentencing form, and the Immediate

42
D.I. 17.
43
Purnell, 106 A.2d at 342.
44
Dawson v. State, 673 A.3d 1186, 1196 (Del. 1996).
45
Green v. State, 238 A.2d 160, 174 (Del. 2020).
46
Swan v. State, 248 A.3d 839, 859 (Del. 2021).
47
D.I. 23.
13
Sentencing form with Counsel, Mr. Caccavone signed each document and entered

his guilty plea with the Court.”48 Once again, Caccavone is bound by his own words

to the Court when entering his plea. Before accepting Caccavone’s guilty plea, the

court must ensure several circumstances are present to protect a defendant from

making a potentially irreversible error. 49 Caccavone’s statements during the

colloquy are “presumed to be truthful,” and create “a formidable barrier in any

subsequent collateral proceedings.”50 He is bound by his representations made at

the time his plea was entered. 51 By knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering

a guilty plea agreement, he waived the constitutional right to challenge any “alleged

errors or defects preceding the entry of the plea.” 52

Caccavone received all required protections during his colloquy. During the

colloquy, he was specifically asked if anyone had threatened or forced him to enter

his plea. Caccavone responded “[n]o.” 53 Caccavone’s own words evidence the

48
D.I. 27.
49
Somerville, 703 A.2d at 631-32 (requiring a trial judge to ensure (1) defendant
understands nature of the charges and penalties and their waiver of trial and other
constitutional rights, (2) the record reflects defendant’s understanding, and (3)
defendant was not forced, threatened, or promised anything in exchange for agreeing
to the plea agreement).
50
Id. (quoting Blackledge v. Allison 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)).
51
Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1231 (Del. 2003).
52
Id. at 1232. (citing Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309 (Del. 1988)).
53
D.I. 17.
14
voluntariness of his guilty plea; he was not “coerced” or “psychologically” pressured

into pleading guilty. 54 Caccavone’s Ground Two is denied as meritless.

C. GROUND THREE

Caccavone’s third ground for relief references Counsel’s alleged “personal

family matters” that created a conflict of interest and “impeded on [Counsel’s] work

performance.” 55 As a result, Caccavone argues Counsel’s representations fell below

the American Bar Association’s (hereinafter “ABA”) standards. 56 Counsel denies

this claim, stating there were no conflicts in the case. Caccavone fails to provide

support for this argument, nor does he cite the ABA standard to which he refers.

Caccavone, who carries the burden in this motion, has not presented any evidence

as to any purported “conflict of interest,” or how any such conflict influenced

Counsel’s performance. Contrary to Caccavone’s claims, once again, his statements

to the Court at the time of his plea reflect his satisfaction with Counsel’s

representation.57 Caccavone was presented with an opportunity to bring any issues

to the Court at the time of his plea; instead, he expressed satisfaction with Counsel’s

representation.

54
See Selby v. State, 100 A.3d 1021 (Table) (Del. 2013) (finding a plea voluntarily
given when a defendant represented during the plea colloquy that no one threatened
or forced him into accepting the plea agreement made during the plea colloquy).
55
D.I. 23.
56
Id.
57
D.I. 17.
15
Having only presented a bald assertion without legal or factual support, the

record is devoid of any evidence that a conflict existed. Caccavone has not met his

burden to show either that Counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Nor has Caccavone shown that Counsel’s supposed conflict

changed the outcome of the proceedings in that he would not have pled guilty and

proceeded to trial. Caccavone’s Ground Three is denied as meritless.

D. GROUND FOUR

Caccavone’s final allegation contends Counsel should have proceeded to the

suppression hearing, because “every item obtained due to the illegal search and

seizure would not have been used against defendant.”58 Once again, Caccavone fails

to articulate facts or case law to support his allegation. As discussed in detail above,

the record demonstrates Caccavone was fully informed about the constitutional

rights he voluntarily waived upon entering a guilty plea, including the right to

challenge the constitutionality of the traffic stop. Caccavone was specifically

questioned about his then-pending motion to suppress and stated he “understood”

his guilty plea would be a waiver of his constitutional rights and that he would no

longer be able to litigate the suppression motion.59 Caccavone cannot now argue to

58
D.I. 23.
59
D.I. 17.
16
the contrary, let alone without any supporting evidence. As such, his Ground Four

is denied as meritless.

E. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Caccavone’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

_________________________
Danielle J. Brennan, Judge

17