Maldonado's Makeovers v. Jones

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

MOISES MALDONADO’S MAKEOVERS, )
)
Defendant-Below/Appellant, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. N23A-11-048 KMV
)
SANDRA JONES, )
)
Plaintiff-Below/Appellee. )

Decided: April 8, 2025
Submitted: December 4, 2024

ORDER

Upon Appeal from the Decision of the Court of Common Pleas:
VACATED, REVERSED, and REMANDED

Michael K. DeSantis, Anthony N. Delcollo, OFFIT KURMAN; Counsel for
Defendant-Below/Appellant.

Sandra Jones; Pro Se Plaintiff-Below/Appellee.

VAVALA, J.

1
I. INTRODUCTION

A building contractor appeals from the Court of Common Pleas’ entry of

default judgment against him in favor of a homeowner in a contractual dispute. The

contractor asks this Court to vacate the default judgment, arguing that the lower court

incorrectly classified his business as an “artificial entity” and erroneously concluded

that the owner could not represent the business at trial. The contractor further

contends the lower court failed to provide sufficient notice before entering default

judgment under Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 55.

This Court agrees that the lower court lacked a sufficient factual basis to

determine that the contactor’s business was an artificial entity. Accordingly, its legal

conclusion that the owner could not represent the business at trial and resulting

default judgment in favor of the homeowner, constitute reversible error. Given the

need for reversal and remand for fact finding on the business’s organizational status,

the Court does not reach the issue of defective notice.

The Court of Common Pleas’ entry of default judgement is hereby

VACATED. Its decision is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings

to determine whether the contracting business is an artificial entity or a sole

proprietorship.

2
II. BACKGROUND

This case arises from a contractual dispute between a homeowner and a

contractor over renovations to the homeowner’s residence. Plaintiff-

Below/Appellee Sandra Jones (“Homeowner”) hired Defendant-Below/Appellant

Moises Maldonado d/b/a Maldonado’s Makeovers (“Contractor” or the “Business”)

to remodel several rooms, but the work was never completed. Homeowner claims

she discharged Contractor due to substandard work and seeks contractual damages

for the incomplete project. Conversely, Contractor alleges he was prevented from

finishing the job by Homeowner and claims he is entitled to damages.

A. The JP Court Action

Homeowner sued Contractor in the Justice of the Peace Court #13 (“JP

Court”) seeking $16,0000 in damages for alleged substandard and incomplete work.1

Contractor counterclaimed for $2,500, the remaining balance due under the

contract.2

In JP Court, businesses are required to complete a Form 50.3 The Business

complied, but the JP Court returned the form and fee, determining that as a sole

1
Docket Item [“D.I.”] 15 at 1, Jones v. Moises Maldonado’s Makeovers (Apr. 8, 2022),
C.A. No. JP13-22-004087.
2
Id. at Ex. B.
3
Id. at Ex. A. A Form 50 effectuates J.P. Ct. Civ. R. 91, which permits a corporation’s or
alternative entity’s non-lawyers to represent it in JP Courts.
3
proprietorship, the owner could represent the Business without it.4 Following trial,

the JP Court ruled in favor of the Business, finding Homeowner failed to substantiate

the claim “because she hadn’t finished paying [Contractor] for the work and then

barred him from returning to the home to finish the job.”5 The court noted an

“impossibility of performance” for Contractor due to being prevented from

completing the job.6 Yet, the JP Court also denied the Contractor’s counterclaim for

$2,500, citing insufficient proof of the amount owed, leaving the parties at status

quo.7 Dissatisfied, Homeowner appealed the decision to the Court of Common

Pleas.8

B. The Court of Common Pleas Action

Appeals from JP Courts to the Court of Common Pleas are conducted by trial

de novo, meaning the case is retried from the beginning.9 Below is a summary of

the three proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas pertinent to the instant appeal.

4
Id. at Ex. B, JP Court Decision (“Pretrial it was determined that [the Business] is a sole
proprietorship run by [Contractor, and] a Form 50 was not necessary for him to represent
himself in this action.”).
5
Id.
6
Id. at Ex. B.
7
D.I. 15 at Ex. B.
8
Id. at 1–3, Jones v. Moises Maldonado’s Makeovers (Oct. 25, 2022), C.A. No. CPU4-22-
002472.
9
10 Del. C. § 9571(c); Ct. Com. Pl. Civ. R. 72.3.
4
The lower court held a pretrial scheduling conference, setting a trial date for

two months later and outlining discovery and motion deadlines to the parties.10 Both

parties proceeded pro se. There was no discussion as to Contractor’s ability to

represent his Business at trial.11

A month later, the lower court held a telephonic pretrial teleconference to

address Homeowner’s motion to compel discovery.12 During the conference, the

court stated: “[Contractor], you are not able to represent your entity, which is being

sued. And if at the time of trial you do not have an attorney, then you risk . . . a

default judgment being entered against you.”13 The court emphasized the

importance of Contractor needing legal representation at trial.14

Contractor replied that the Court of Common Pleas’ Clerk’s Office had

advised him he could proceed pro se.15 The court clarified that, unlike the JP Court,

the Court of Common Pleas requires artificial entities to be represented by counsel.16

10
D.I. 15, Ex. D, Sept. 19, 2023 Pretrial Scheduling Conf. Tr. [“PTSC”] at 5:10–12, 5:8–
8:8.
11
See generally PTSC.
12
D.I. 15, Ex. E, Oct. 19, 2023 Pretrial Conf. Tr. [“PTC”] at 3:11–4:7.
13
PTC at 4:2–7.
14
Id. at 6:9–11 (“[W]hat I really wanted to impress upon both parties is for [Contractor] to
have an attorney at the time of trial.”).
15
Id.at 6:21–7:1.
16
Id.at 7:2–8 (“Th[e JP Court] does not have a requirement that you have an attorney;
however, once an appeal was filed to this court, . . . the Court of Common Pleas does
require you to have an attorney.”).
5
The record does not indicate whether Contractor offered any affidavit or evidence

regarding his business’s organizational status.17

At trial, Contractor appeared to represent himself.18 Noting the absence of

counsel, the lower court reminded him that his business needed to be represented by

a licensed attorney:

[S]ir, the requirement under the rules is that in order for
your company to be represented at the Court of Common
Pleas you need to be represented by an attorney. You are
not permitted to represent your company as you were at
the JP Court level. So what has happened is that
effectively the artificial entity which is the subject of the
named defendant in this suit is without representation.19

With the help of an interpreter, Contractor explained that he had tried to retain

counsel, but was unable to find an attorney, stating “[T]hat’s why I’m here.” 20 The

court then invited Homeowner to move for relief based on the Business’s lack of

representation, and then interpreted Homeowner’s request for forfeiture as a motion

for default judgment.21

Contractor opposed the default judgement and inquired about his options,

explaining through the interpreter that he had never been involved in a lawsuit or

17
See generally id.
18
See generally D.I. 15, Ex. F, Nov. 14, 2023 Trial Tr.[“Trial”].
19
Trial at 4:23–6:18.
20
Id. at 5:7–10, 6:7–16, 9:13–15.
21
Id. at 6:20–21, 7:11–15.
6
appeared in court before.22 Despite this, after further discussion, the court entered a

default judgment in favor of Homeowner, citing the Business’s failure to secure legal

representation.23

Contractor also questioned why he was not given more time to find an

attorney, to which the court responded that this had been the purpose of the earlier

warning during the pretrial conference.24 Again, Contractor did not provide any

affidavit or evidence regarding the business’s organizational status, nor did the court

inquire further—seemingly assuming the Business was an artificial entity. The court

advised Contractor of his right to appeal, which he subsequently exercised.25

C. The Parties’ Contentions on Appeal

The Business, now represented by counsel, alleges the lower court erred by

not allowing a sole proprietorship to be represented by its owner, Contractor, at trial.

Alternatively, it claims Contractor was prejudiced by inadequate notice to obtain

counsel. Homeowner counters that Delaware law mandates legal representation for

artificial entities and asserts the Business received sufficient notice. Homeowner

maintains that the default judgment was appropriate because Contractor presented

22
Id. at 7:20–8:7, 10:7–8.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 11–12.
25
Trial at 10:2–4; D.I. 1. Briefing was completed on July 8, 2024. See D.I. 15, 21, 22.
7
himself as doing business in the state of Delaware, was advised by the Court to

obtain counsel, and failed to do so. 26

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 10 Del. C. § 1326, parties may appeal final judgments from the Court

of Common Pleas to the Superior Court on the record.27 Here, the default judgment

entered by the lower court qualifies as a final judgment because it resolved the merits

of the controversy and the rights of the parties, leaving no issues for future

determination28 The Superior Court’s appellate standard of review mirrors that of

the Supreme Court:—it examines whether the lower court’s ruling is free of legal

error and supported by evidence.29 Factual findings are upheld if they are backed by

26
D.I. 22, Answering Br. [“AB”] at 4, 6.
27
10 Del. C. Sec. 1326(c); see Anderson v. R.A. Midway Towing, 905 A.2d 746, 746 (Del.
2006) (TABLE) (finding the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal
from the Court of Common Pleas which had not yet entered a final judgment in the matter).
28
Werb v. D’Alessandro, 606 A.2d 117, 119 (Del. 1992) (quoting Showell Poultry, Inc. v.
Delmarva Poultry Corp., 146 A.2d 794, 796 (Del. 1958)). Indeed, the lower court
prohibited the Contractor from making any arguments on the merits of the case. Trial at
8:2–8.
29
Baker v. Connell, 488 A.2d 1303, 1309 (Del. 1985); Auto Equity Loans of Del., LLC v.
Baird, 2021 WL 2346132, at *2 (Del. Super. June 8, 2021) (quoting Clifford Romain v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1999 WL 1427801, at *2 (Del. Super. Dec. 2, 1999) (“This
Court’s function when addressing an appeal from the Court of Common Pleas is like that
of the Delaware Supreme Court. The Superior Court limits its review to correcting errors
of law and determining whether the trial judge’s factual findings ‘are adequately supported
by the record and are the product of [an] orderly and logical deductive process.” Legal
conclusions of the trial judge are reviewed [de novo].”)); Fowler v. Pratcher Krayer, LLC,
2020 WL 2520273, at *10 (Del. Super. May 18, 2020) (explaining same).
8
sufficient evidence and result from a logical and orderly deductive process.30 Legal

conclusions are reviewed de novo for errors in the formulation or application of legal

precepts.31

IV. DISCUSSION

The issue before this Court is whether the Court of Common Pleas erred in

granting default judgment for Homeowner due to the Business’s lack of legal

representation at trial. To resolve this, the Court must first assess whether there was

sufficient evidence for the lower court to find the Business was an artificial entity

and whether the applicable rules and law were correctly formulated and applied.

In the Court’s view, the lower court correctly understood the rules and laws

regarding artificial entities, but its factual finding that the Business was an artificial

entity was not supported by the evidence. Thus, remand for further fact-finding on

this issue is warranted.

30
See Hicklin v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 970 A.2d 244, 248 (Del. 2009) (“Factual findings
of the Court of Common Pleas that are supported by the record will be upheld even if,
acting independently, the Superior Court would have reached a contrary result.”); Zhang
v. Jack Lingo Inc. Realtor, 2024 WL 3791646, at *1 (Del. Super. Aug. 13, 2024) (citing
Rufus v. Ramsey, 2004 WL 838612, at *1 (Del. Super. Apr. 13, 2004)) (explaining same);
Adele v. Clifton, 2022 WL 17494808, at *5 (Del. Super. Dec. 7, 2022) (citing Coverdale v.
Witcher, 2022 WL 1438772, at *4 (Del. Super. May 4, 2022) (same).
31
Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Del. 2008).
9
A. Delaware Law Regarding Representation of Artificial Entities

Delaware law distinguishes the representation requirements for business

organizations in court. An artificial entity must be represented by counsel, while a

sole proprietorship may be represented by its owner.

In Transpolymer Industries, Inc. v. Chapel Main Corp., the Delaware

Supreme Court addressed non-lawyer representation for artificial entities.32 There,

the Court issued a show cause order because the corporation failed to appear with an

attorney licensed in Delaware. The decision clarified that a corporation, as an

artificial entity, cannot represent itself in court and must act through a licensed

attorney.33 Although the case was dismissed on other grounds, the Court

underscored that only natural persons may represent themselves without legal

counsel.34

Since 1995, Supreme Court Rule 57 has guided artificial entities and pro se

litigants in civil actions before JP Courts.35 Rule 57 mandates that artificial entities

32
582 A.2d 936 (Del. 1990) (TABLE).
33
Transpolymer, 582 A.2d 936 (TABLE).
34
Id. (citing 8 Del. C. § 510).
35
Supr. Ct. R. 57. See also Ct. Com. Pl. Civ. R. 91 (“Civil actions may be prosecuted and/or
defended in the Justice of the Peace Court by an officer or employee of a party which is an
artificial entity or public body, who need not be an attorney licensed to practice law in
Delaware, if the officer or employee (with the authorization of the artificial entity or public
body) has filed a Certificate or Representation with the Chief Magistrate and complied with
the other provisions of Supreme Court Rule 57. An annual registration fee of $15 must
accompany the Certificate of Representation filed with the Chief Magistrate.”).
10
must be represented by legal counsel.36 An “artificial person” is an “entity, such as

a corporation, created by law and given certain legal rights and duties of a human

being[.]”37 Similarly, an “artificial entity” includes those under 6 Del. C. § 371, such

as persons, firms and unincorporated associations doing business in Delaware, which

are required to file a trade name certificate with the Prothonotary’s Office.

A year after Rule 57 was enacted, the Superior Court tackled whether an

artificial entity could be represented by a non-lawyer in Gibson v. North Delaware

Realty Company Stoneybrook Townhomes.38 The court explained that Rule 57 aims

to expand representation options for companies in small claims cases.39 Specifically,

Rule 57(b) allows artificial entities to authorize officers or employees to represent

them in civil actions before JP Courts. The policy behind Rule 57 is to alleviate the

high costs of legal representation for smaller corporations and individuals in small

claims courts.40 Notably, this non-lawyer representation is limited to JP Courts.41

36
Supr. Ct. R. 57; see also Stalana, LLC v. Halmagyi, 2017 WL 384686, at *3 (Del. CCP
Jan. 27, 2017) (citing Biddles Constr., LLC v. Seeley, 2016 WL 61262451, at *2 (Del.
Super. Oct. 19, 2016) (“In Delaware, a corporation or limited liability company must be
represented by counsel in the Court of Common Pleas.”)).
37
Artificial Person, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
38
1996 WL 659480, at *1–2 (Del. Super. Aug. 20, 1996).
39
Gibson, 1996 WL 659480, at *3.
40
Id.
41
Id. at *3 n.2.
11
In the 2004 case Belfint, Lyons & Shuman, P.A. v. Pevar, the Delaware

Supreme Court examined whether a trial judge must raise the issue of non-lawyer

representation for a company.42 There, the appellant cited Transpolymer arguing

that the trial judge should have halted proceedings upon realizing the appellee was

not a member of the Delaware Bar, rendering any judgment void.43 The Court

clarified that while a corporation must be represented by counsel, there is no duty on

the trial judge to ensure proper representation.44 Thus, the Court affirmed the trial

court’s ruling, finding no excusable neglect and deeming Transpolymer

inapplicable.45

Since Rule 57 became effective, Delaware courts have consistently prohibited

corporate entities from being represented by non-lawyers, except in JP Courts.46

42
862 A.2d 385 (Del. 2004) (TABLE).
43
Belfint, 862 A.2d at 385 (TABLE) (citing Super. Ct. Civ. R. 41(e)).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
World Award Found. Inc. v. Anbang Ins. Gp. Co., 241 A.3d 217 (Del. 2020) (TABLE)
(first quoting Parfi Hldg. AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 966 A.2d 348 (Del. 2009)
(TABLE); then citing Transpolymer, 582 A.2d 936 (TABLE); then citing Evergreen Waste
Servs. V. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2011 WL 2601600 (Del. June 30, 2011); then
citing Ivize of Milwaukee, LLC v. Complex Litig. Support, LLC, 2009 WL 3720673 (Del.
Nov. 6, 2009); and then citing Harris v. RHH P’rs, LP, 2009 WL 891810 (Del. Ch. Apr.
3, 2009) (dismissing an appeal because “[i]n Delaware, a corporation or other entity “can
act before a court only through an agent duly licensed to practice law”)); Mott v. Bank of
N.Y. Mellon, 220 A.3d 245 (Del. 2019) (TABLE) (explaining that other than only limited
circumstances, [(Rule 57)] a corporation or other business entity may proceed in the
Delaware courts only through a duly-licensed attorney”); Parfi, 966 A.2d 348 (TABLE)
(quoting Transpolymer, 582 A.2d 936 (TABLE) (dismissing an appeal where the appellant
12
Conversely, the owner of a sole proprietorship may represent his company at trial.

This distinction exists because, unlike a corporation, a sole proprietorship has no

legal separation between the business and its owner.47 Thus, the owner acts in a

personal capacity rather than a representative one.48 While corporate or artificial

entities must appear in court through licensed counsel, a sole proprietorship can

proceed pro se because it is legally identical to its owner.49 Consistent with this

“‘demonstrate[d] the underlying purpose of the rule prohibiting the appearance of a
corporation by anyone other than a member of the Bar of th[e Supreme] Court’”)); Infante
Enters., Inc. v. Del. Health & Social Servs., Div. of Public Health, 888 A.2d 231 (Del.
2005) (TABLE) (dismissing an appeal for the corporation’s failure to appear “only through
an agent duly licensed to practice law”); Barker Enters., Inc. v. Del. Dep’t of Labor, Div.
of Unemployment Ins. Appeals Board, 2015 WL 2091276, at *1 n.4 (Del. Super. Apr. 22,
2015) (dismissing an appeal because the “representative of the corporate entity [wa]s not
an attorney”); Harris v. RHH P’rs, LP, 2009 WL 891810, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2009)
(citing Spanish Tiles, Ltd. V. Hensey, 2009 WL 86609, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan. 7, 2009)
(dismissing claims brought by a sole limited partner in a limited partnership against the
sole general partner, a corporation, because neither party secure counsel as required by
Delaware law)).
47
Harner v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2018 WL 6721765, at *3 (Del. Super. Dec. 12, 2018) (citing
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grzbowski, 2002 WL 1859193, at *2 (Del. Super. 2002));
Mehan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 1986 WL 15416, at *2 (Del. Super. Dec. 30, 1986), aff’d, 529
A.2d 772 (1987) (“A sole proprietorship does not exist as a legal entity separate from its
owner.”)); see also Del Collo v. Houston, 1986 WL 5841 (Del. Super. May 7, 1986)
(citations omitted) (“[W]here a sole proprietor purchases an insurance policy under his
trade name, the trade name is equated with the proprietor’s name, making the proprietor an
insured.”).
48
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 608 (1984) (citing Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S.
85 (1974)).
49
Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Propriety and effect of corporation’s appearance pro se
through agent who is not attorney, 8 A.L.R. 5th 653 (1992) (first citing Maersk Line A/S
v. Carew, 588 F. Supp. 3d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2022); and then citing Tristrata Tech., Inc. v.
Med. Skin Therapy Rsch., Inc., 270 F.R.D. 161, 77 (D. Del. 2010)).
13
view, the Court of Common Pleas has consistently allowed sole proprietorships to

be represented by their individual owners.50

This factual distinction is crucial in the instant case, as it was the sole basis

for the lower court’s entry of default judgment against Business.

B. The lower court’s finding that the Business was an artificial entity
is not supported by the record.

Default judgments are disfavored in Delaware and courts should exercise

caution before their entry by adhering to the policy of resolving cases on their

merits.51 Mindful of that approach, this Court reluctantly concludes that the record

lacks sufficient evidence to support the lower court’s finding that the Business was

an artificial entity and entry of default judgment on that basis.

Operating under a fictitious name does not preclude a business from being a

sole proprietorship.52 A sole proprietor may do business under a trade name or

fictitious name. While registration of the name is advisable, failure to do so typically

50
See Katz v. Disorb Sys., Inc., 2019 WL 3322408, at *1 (Del. Super. 2019); Gemmill v.
James McMillion & Son, 2009 WL 3134827, at *1 (Del. Com. Pl. Sept. 21, 2009) (dispute
between homeowner and contractor); Miller v. Herschamnn, Inc., 2007 WL 4577373, at
*1 (Del. Super. Dec. 12, 2007).
51
Apartment Cmtys. Corp. v. Martinelli, 859 A.2d 67, 69 (Del. 2004).
52
See, e.g., Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 1859193, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 9, 2002)
(finding a business entity doing business under trade name equated with the proprietor’s
name was a sole proprietorship); Batchelor v. Alexis Props., LLC, 2018 WL 5919683 (Del.
Super. Nov. 13, 2028) (noting a sole proprietor of a dance studio operating under a fictitious
name had standing to bring suit).
14
results in a fine and does not alter the business’s organizational status. Rather, to

determine whether a business is a sole proprietorship or an artificial entity, the Court

must conduct a fact-sensitive inquiry. Relevant factors include whether a business

is a separate legal entity from its owner, how income taxes are filed and paid,

whether the business’s assets are owned by one person or many, and whether the

owner can be held personally liable for the business’s debts.53

Here, the Court of Common Pleas correctly stated that artificial entities must

be represented by counsel; but it erred in finding Business was an artificial entity.

Contractor’s briefs offer evidence regarding the Business’s organizational status: it

is not registered as a Delaware corporation, clients pay Contractor directly, there is

no separate bank account, and the name is but a trade name for Contractor’s personal

activities.54 It is unclear whether these facts were considered by the lower court, but

they should have been. If Business has no distinct legal existence from Contractor

and no claims are separate from those against him personally, it is likely a sole

proprietorship.55 And a sole proprietorship would not require representation by a

licensed attorney to proceed in the Court of Common Pleas.

53
Harleysville, 2002 1859193, at *2 (finding a sole proprietorship was not a distinct legal
entity); Poore v. Fox Hollow, 1994 WL 150872, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 29, 1994) (finding
certain aspects of the LLC at issue constituted an artificial entity under Delaware law).
54
D.I. 15 at 8.
55
Shulman v. Facebook.com (Inc.), 788 F. App’x 882, 882 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing United
States v. Hagerman, 545 F.3d 579, 581 (7th Cir. 2008)).
15
Unfortunately, this Court cannot discern from the record whether Business

was, in fact, an artificial entity. While Contractor should have presented this

evidence, even as a pro se litigant with an interpreter, he raised concerns that

warranted further inquiry by the court. Further, although discretionary, it is unclear

why the court would not grant a brief continuance to a pro se litigant, given the

inconsistent advice from the Clerk’s Office, instead of opting for a case-dispositive

action not based on the merits.56

Because the record lacks substantial evidence to support the lower court’s

factual finding; the case must be remanded for further fact-finding on whether

Business was a sole proprietorship or artificial entity. And because the lower court’s

default judgment is predicated upon that unsupported factual finding, its legal

conclusion that the owner could not represent Business at trial constituted an abuse

of discretion.

56
See Stalana, LLC v. Halmagyi, 2017 WL 384686, at *4 (Del. Com. Jan. 27, 2017) (when
an LLC owned and operated by a sole proprietor was advised by the CCP Clerk’s Office it
did not require legal counsel, the court held: “When the facts indicate there were efforts by
a litigant to comply, and through no-fault of their own are misguided, fundamental fairness
requires the Court to balance the relative equities to achieve the prevailing policy that
disputes should be resolved on their merits. . . . This confusion should not lead to a denial
of a litigant’s right to have their day in Court. To be barred on such a technical violation is
fundamentally unreasonable and unfair.”).
16
III. CONCLUSION

This Court finds the Court of Common Pleas erred in entering a default

judgment against the Business for lack of trial counsel. The issue of whether

appropriate notice under Rule 55(a)(2) was provided is a close one, but this Court

declines to address it further, as the decision is reversed on other grounds.57

Accordingly, the Court of Common Pleas’ default judgement for Homeowner

is VACATED, and that decision is hereby REVERSED and REMANDED for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Kathleen M. Vavala
The Honorable Kathleen M. Vavala

57
Ct. Com. Pl. Civ. R 55(b)(2) (“If the party against whom judgment by default is sought
has appeared in the action, the party . . . shall be served with written notice of the
application for judgment at least 3 days prior to the hearing on such application.”).

17