State v. Warner

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

STATE OF DELAWARE, :
: Case No. 20I-01948
:
v. :
:
RANDY WARNER, :
:
Respondent. :
:

Submitted: February 24, 20251
Decision: February 27, 2025

ORDER UPON APPEAL OF COMMISSIONERS’ ORDERS

Randy Warner2 (“Respondent”) filed a series of pro se letters

appealing this Court’s Commissioners’ Orders entered November 6, 20243

and February 12, 2025 (“Commissioners’ Orders”) in ongoing involuntary

commitment proceedings conducted pursuant to 16 Del. C. Chapter 50. For

1
This appeal considers claims raised in Respondent’s letters to this Court of November 6,
2024, November 7, 2024, November 8, 2024, January 21, 2025, January 31, 2025,
February 3, 2025, February 5, 2025, February 6, 2025, February 10, 2025, February 12,
2025, February 17, 2025, and February 24, 2025.
2
This name has been assigned to Respondent due to the confidentiality of these
proceedings.
3
The November 6, 2024 Order became moot when it expired; however, because
Respondent sought consolidation of his appeals and both appeals raise the same legal
issues, they are discussed herein.
the reasons set forth herein, Respondent’s appeals are denied and the

Commissioner’s Orders are AFFIRMED.

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

When a patient meets the criteria for an involuntary psychiatric

commitment,4 the court enters an order which cannot exceed 3 months in

duration (“90-day commitment order”).5 Upon expiration of the 90-day

commitment order, the court must convene a subsequent hearing, every 3

months, to review whether “continued involuntary inpatient treatment is

necessary”6 and, if warranted, issue another 90-day commitment order.

4
Those criteria under16 Del. C. § 5011(a) are:

(1) The individual is a person with a mental condition;
(2) Based upon manifest indications, the individual is:
a. Dangerous to self; or
b. Dangerous to others;
(3) All less restrictive alternatives have been considered
and determined to be clinically inappropriate at the time of
the hearing; and
(4) The individual has declined voluntarily inpatient
treatment, or lacks the capacity to knowingly and
voluntarily consent to inpatient treatment. When evaluating
capacity, the court shall consider an individual’s ability to
understand the significant consequences, benefits, risks,
and alternatives that result from the individual’s decision to
voluntarily request or decline inpatient treatment.

5
16 Del. C. § 5011(c).
6
16 Del. C. § 5011(d).

2
Respondent has an extensive history of civil involuntary psychiatric

commitments.7 During a February 22, 2024 involuntary commitment

hearing, the Commissioner denied Respondent’s request for an independent

psychiatric examination, at the State’s expense, reasoning:

[T]here have been 29 previous [90-day
commitment] orders where doctors testified. Only
two doctors…were not adamant that [Respondent]
did not have an illness with psychosis as an
element. All the other doctors consistently
diagnosed him with a mental illness where
psychosis was exhibited.8

Respondent does not acknowledge his psychiatric diagnoses9 or concomitant

symptoms and actions that make him a danger to himself and others.

Respondent refuses medications while inpatient10 and has not been

compliant with his outpatient treatment.11

Respondent now appeals the Commissioners’ Orders of November 6,

2024 and February 12, 2025 on two discrete issues. First, Respondent

argues the Commissioners erred by denying his request for an independent

7
See State v. Randy Warner, C.A. No. 20I-01948 (Del. Super. June 18, 2024)(Denying
appeal).
8
Warner, C.A. No. 20I-01948 at 14 (cleaned up).
9
Id.at 14, 17-18.
10
Id.at 18.
11
Id.at 17-18.

3
psychiatric examination.12 Second, Respondent argues the Commissioners

failed to grant his requests for court-appointed counsel of his own

choosing.13

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard applicable this Court’s review of Commissioners’

Orders in involuntary psychiatric commitment proceedings is well-

articulated in State v. Randy Warner:14

Superior Court Civil Rule 132(a)(4) provides [its]
commissioner the power to conduct case-
dispositive hearings including, among other things,
mental hearings pursuant to …16 Del. C. ch. 50.15
Upon review of a case-dispositive determination,
the Court shall make a “de novo determination of
those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings of fact or recommendations made by the
Commissioner.”16

The remainder of Rule 132(a)(4)(iv) of the Superior Court Civil Rules

(“Rules”) permits this Court to “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in

part, the findings or recommendations made by the Commissioner, receive

12
See Respondent’s Letters dated November 6, 2024 and February 12, 2025.
13
See Respondent’s Letter dated November 7, 2024.
14
Warner, C.A. No. 20I-01948 at *1-2 (quoting Smith v. State, 2019 WL 3231201 (Del.
Super. July 17, 2019)).
15
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 132(a)(4), (4)(iv).
16
Warner, C.A. No. 20I-01948 at *1-2.

4
further evidence, or recommit the matter to the Commissioner with

instructions.” 17 Respondent’s due process claims are questions of law, so

the Court reviewed the Commissioners’ Orders de novo.

DISCUSSION

I. The Commissioners Did Not Err by Denying Respondent’s
Requests for Independent Reviews.

Respondent argues the Commissioners erred by refusing his request to

court-appoint Dr. Jose Caprio to perform an independent psychiatric review

because 16 Del. C. §5007(3) does not limit the number of independent

reviews.18 Respondent further claims Dr. Caprio, an employee of the

Delaware Psychiatric Center, could perform the review at no charge.19

16 Del. C. §5007 states that an independent psychiatric review is a

procedural right; however, the statute does not specify the number of

independent reviews to which an indigent patient is entitled:

When a designated treatment facility, hospital or
outpatient treatment provider seeks to require an
individual to be involuntarily hospitalized pursuant
to … an involuntary inpatient commitment hearing
… without the individual’s consent, the individual
shall be entitled:
...
17
Rule 132(a)(4)(iv) (cleaned up).
18
See Respondent’s letter to the Court, dated November 12, 2024, at *2.
19
Whether Dr. Caprio is willing to perform the exam free of charge is disputed.

5
(3) To be represented by counsel at all judicial
proceedings, such counsel to be court-appointed if
the individual cannot afford to retain counsel; and
to be examined by an independent psychiatrist or
other qualified medical expert and to have such
psychiatrist or other expert testify as a witness on
the individual’s behalf, such witness to be court
appointed if the involuntary patient cannot afford
to retain such witness.20
Although the statute is silent, Respondent has repeatedly raised (and this

Court has decided) the issue of whether Section 5007(3) entitles Respondent

to multiple independent reviews at the State’s expense.21 As summarized in

this Court’s June 18, 2024 Order22 denying Respondent’s 2024 appeal this

Court held:

The file shows that Respondent constantly
demands that a person other than the treating
psychiatrist examine him. The statute allows for an
independent examination. Respondent was granted
such twice. The statute does not require an
examination for each hearing or every time
Respondent requests it. It just allows for an
independent examination of Respondent and
Respondent received an independent examination.
He has had his independent examination as
statutorily required and he is not entitled to
another.23

20
16 Del. C. §5007(3).
21
Respondent is at liberty to secure an independent psychiatric review at his own cost.
22
See Warner, C.A. No. 20I-01948, at 25-26 (emphasis added).
23
Id.at 26. See also State v. Randy Warner, 2023 WL 129688 (Del. Super.)(denying
appeal based on Commissioner’s failure to order independent psychiatric review).

6
Consistent with this Court’s prior holdings, there is nothing new here that

establishes the Commissioners erred by denying Respondent’s requests for a

additional independent reviews during either the November 6, 2024 or

February 12, 2025 hearings. To the contrary, the Commissioners followed

precedent established by this Court.

II. The Commissioners Did Not Err by Denying Respondent’s
Request for New Court-Appointed Counsel.

Respondent argues the Commissioners erred by refusing his request to

provide his choice of court-appointed counsel. According to Respondent, he

is entitled to new counsel because he is dissatisfied with his current court-

appointed counsel.24 Respondent is mistaken.

16 Del. C. §5007(3) provides involuntarily committed patients the

procedural right to “be represented by counsel at all judicial proceedings

[and] such counsel [shall] be court-appointed if the individual cannot afford

to retain counsel.”25 The procedural right to counsel, however, does not

24
See Respondent’s Letters dated November 7, 2024 (claiming “[counsel says] Dr.
Caprio is unwilling to conduct an independent review” and “is manipulating and refusing
to file my appeal”); dated January 21, 2025 (claiming “[counsel] has manipulated Dr.
Caprio’s statements to suit her own agenda [a]nd has been unethical”); dated February 5,
2025 (asking to “fire” different court-appointed counsel because he will not represent him
on appeal and for new court-appointed counsel); dated February 6, 2025 (same).
25
16 Del. C. §5007(3).

7
equate to counsel of Respondent’s choice, nor does it mandate a court grant

his request for different court-appointed counsel.26

Consistent with Section 5007(3), Respondent was provided with legal

counsel at his 90-day commitment proceedings. That is all that is required.

Accordingly, this Court finds no error in the Commissioner’s denial of

Respondent’s request for different court-appointed counsel.

III. The Court Declined to Appoint Counsel to Represent Respondent
in Appeals of a Legal Issue Already Decided by this Court.

Respondent requested the Court appoint counsel to represent him in

the appeals sub judice. In support, Respondent cited 16 Del. C. §5007(3)

stating, a mental health patient shall be “represented by counsel at all

judicial proceedings. . . to be court-appointed if the individual cannot afford

to retain counsel.”27 In what appears to be an issue of first impression, this

Court holds 16 Del. C. §5007(3) should not be interpreted to confer an

absolute right to court-appointed counsel in every appeal of a 90-day

involuntary commitment proceeding.
26
Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748, 758 (Del. 2016)(citing United States v. Gonzalez-
Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151-52 (1988)(the right to choice of counsel does not extend to
defendants who require appointed counsel, and trial courts have wide latitude in
balancing the right to choice of counsel against needs of fairness and the demands of their
calendar) and Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d 758, 763 (Del. 2006)(no constitutional violation
found where trial court refused to grant defendant’s request for different court-appointed
counsel for post-trial proceedings and appeal based defendant’s dissatisfaction with his
court-appointed counsel)).
27
16 Del. C. §5007(3)(emphasis added).

8
16 Del. C. §5014(a), titled “Appeal; habeas corpus; rules of

procedure,” provides involuntarily committed patients the right to appeal an

order of disposition issued by a Commissioner to a Superior Court Judge.

The statute is silent on the issue of whether a patient is entitled to court-

appointed counsel on an appeal, but an appeal is a judicial proceeding. And,

as a matter of custom and practice, this Court regularly appoints counsel for

indigent patients for appeals from Commissioner’s Orders. That, however,

does not resolve the matter of whether this Court must or should appoint

counsel where the appeal presents a legal issue identical to one previously

raised by the same party and decided by this Court against him—as here.

Respondent previously appealed prior Commissioners’ Orders

denying him additional independent psychiatric reviews.28 In those appeals,

Respondent had ample opportunity to advocate his position, with the

assistance of court-appointed counsel. This Court held, “[Respondent] has

had his independent examination as statutorily required and he is not entitled

to another.”29 Respondent now seeks to make the identical argument on

appeal and demands new court-appointed counsel to do so.

28
See Section I, supra.
29
Id. at 26. See also State v. Randy Warner, 2023 WL 129688 (Del. Super.)(denying
appeal based on Commissioner’s failure to order independent psychiatric review).

9
For guidance on whether it must appoint counsel, this Court looked to

§5014(b), which addresses habeas corpus proceedings related to involuntary

psychiatric commitments. Section 5014(b) states: “after any order of

disposition becomes final, the involuntary patient shall be entitled to petition

the court for a writ of habeas corpus for release on the grounds . . . the

proceeding which led to the patient’s commitment was illegal—provided

that that issue has not been previously determined.”30 Applying the same

logic to the instant case, 31 and notwithstanding that each 90-day order is a

separate final judgment,32 this Court declined Respondent court-ordered

counsel for an appeal of an identical legal issue, when Respondent,

represented by counsel, already had a full opportunity to present all of the

facts and law relevant that issue in his 2023 and 2024 appeals. Respondent

may continue to file his appeals pro se, but this Court cannot continue to

allocate already scant resources to assist an indigent client to relitigate a

matter already decided by this Court.

30
16 Del. C. §5014(b)(emphasis added).
31
See also Gannet Co., Inc. v. Kanaga, 750 A.2d 1174, 1181 (Del. 2000)(applying the
“law of the case doctrine,” established when a specific legal principle is applied to an
issue presented by facts which remain constant throughout the subsequent course of the
same litigation, to an appeal).
32
Radulski for Taylor v. Delaware State Hosp. et al., 541 A.2d 562, 555-56 (Del. 1988).

10
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court’s Commissioners’ Orders

entered November 6, 2024 and February 12, 2025 are AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

_____________________________
The Honorable Kathleen M. Vavala

cc. Prothonotary
Respondent

11