Cale Johnson Construction, Inc. v. Bucher v. Johnson

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

Cale Johnson Construction, Inc., )
)
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, )
)
v. )
)
Mark Bucher and Amy Bucher, )
Mark Bucher Revocable Trust Dated )
May 18, 2023, Amy Bucher Revocable )
Trust Dated May 18, 2023, and Amy )
Bucher Tee, ) C.A. S24L-01-005 MHC
)
Defendants/Counterclaim and )
Third-Party Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
Cale Johnson and Jordan Williams, )
)
Third-Party Defendants. )
)

OPINION & ORDER
Submitted: December 20, 2024
Decided: February 27, 2025

Third-Party Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss - GRANTED

Victoria K. Petrone, Esquire, Attorney for Plaintiff Cale Johnson Construction, Inc.
Armand J. Della Porta, Jr., Esquire, Attorney for Counterclaim Defendant Cale
Johnson Construction, Inc. and Third-Party Defendants, Cale Johnson and Jordan
Williams
Daniel Griffith, Esquire, Attorney for Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs Mark
Bucher and Amy Bucher

CONNER, J.
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss brought by Third-Party Defendants

Cale Johnson and Jordan Williams for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Delaware Superior Court Rules of Civil

Procedure.

Defendants Mark and Amy Bucher hired Plaintiff Cale Johnson Construction,

Inc. to construct a house (“the Property”) to be their new fulltime residence (“the

Agreement”). Third-Party Defendant Cale Johnson owns Plaintiff company. Third-

Party Defendant Jordan Williams is an employee of Plaintiff and is Cale Johnson’s

son-in-law.

Plaintiff originally filed this action on January 10, 2024, alleging that Plaintiff

satisfactorily completed the Agreement and that Defendants improperly withheld

partial payment for the Agreement. Thus, Plaintiff placed a mechanic’s lien on the

Property and are seeking the withheld payment plus costs and interest under three

alternative theories of breach of contract, quantum meruit, and/or unjust enrichment.

Defendants claim Plaintiffs exceeded the scope of the Agreement and

defectively performed resulting in Plaintiff owing Defendants damages. Defendants

assert counterclaims against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants for breach of

contract, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and negligence based on defective

performance.1 Defendants also seek a declaratory judgment against Plaintiff and

1
Third-Party Defendant Jordan Williams is not included in the breach of contract claim.

2
Third-Party Defendant Cale Johnson alleging: (1) that Defendants have complied

with contractual obligations; and (2) that Plaintiff is subject to forfeiture of its

business license pursuant to 25 Del. C. §2707; and (3) that Defendants are owed a

list of all subcontractors involved pursuant to 25 Del. C. § 2705.

Third-Party Defendants move to dismiss the claims against them on the

grounds that Defendants fail to state a claim that they are liable independent from

Plaintiff. Defendants argue that the Third-Party Defendants were acting in their

individual capacities while committing the alleged tortious acts.

For the following reasons Third-Party Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED.

3
STANDARD OF REVIEW

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the

Court “. . . (1) accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint;

(2) credits vague allegations if they give the opposing party notice of the claim; (3)

draws all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-movant; and (4) denies

dismissal if recovery on the claim is reasonably conceivable.”2

ANALYSIS

I. Tort Claims

Defendants argue that Third-Party Defendants are independently liable for the

tortious claims against Plaintiff for negligence, breach of contract, quantum meruit,

and unjust enrichment. Defendants claim Third-Party Defendants operated

independent from Plaintiff by performing outside the scope of the Agreement and

pocketing company funds rather than paying subcontractors. Defendants argue in

their opposition to the Motion to Dismiss that “[t]he claims are against Cale Johnson

based upon his individual misrepresentations and negligent conduct, not his status

as a signatory on Cale Johnson Corporation documents.”3 Third-Party Defendant

2
State ex rel. Jennings v. BP America, Inc., 2024 WL 98888 at *6 (Del. Super. Jan. 9, 2024)
(citing Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535 (Del.
2011)).
3
Third-Party Pls., Mark and Amy Bucher’s Opp’n to Third-Party Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Third-
Party Compl. (hereinafter “Answering Br.”) at 8.

4
Williams is not listed as a defendant to the breach of contract, but Defendants still

seek recovery from Williams individually on the basis of quantum meruit, unjust

enrichment, and negligence.

Simply stated, Defendants’ arguments are governed by the doctrines of

respondeat superior and piercing the corporate veil. Since the company, i.e.

Plaintiff, would be responsible for respondeat superior claims and the Delaware

Superior Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil,

Defendants fail to state a legal claim that this Court can impose individual tort

liability on Third-Party Defendants.

Defendants’ theories can be summarized as: (i) a negligence claim for

performance within the contract; and (ii) contractual and quasicontractual claims

against Third-Party Defendants as independent parties to the Agreement; and (iii)

“extracontractual” claims under negligence, contractual, and quasicontractual

theories against Third-Party Defendants based on their actions which fall outside the

scope of the Agreement.

5
A. Negligence

Vicarious liability, as it applies to an employer-employee relationship, arises

through the doctrine of respondeat superior.4 Under the doctrine of respondeat

superior, an employer is subject to liability for torts committed by employees while

acting within the scope of their employment.5 If the principal is the master of an

agent who is a servant, the fault of the agent, if acting within the scope of

employment, will be imputed to the principal by the doctrine of respondeat

superior.6

In Defendants’ opposition to this Motion to Dismiss, Defendants state:

[t]he Motion to Dismiss finally claims, without citation to any legal
authority and without more than one sentence of argument, that the
Third-Party Complaint does not allege an independent duty owed by
Cale Johnson beyond his role as agent and president of Cale Johnson
Corporation, Inc. That argument miscomprehends both Delaware law
and the plausible factual allegations in the Third-Party Complaint.7

However, in Defendants’ Counterclaim V, Defendants only allege:

4
Hall v. Machulski, 2010 WL 2735748 at *2 (Del. Super. July 12, 2010) (citing Fisher v.
Townsends, Inc., 695 A.2d 53 (Del. 1997)).
5
Verrastro v. Bayhospitalists, LLC, 208 A.3d 720, 724 (Del. 2019).
6
Fisher v. Townsends, Inc., 695 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1997); see also Hecksher v. Fairwinds Baptist
Church, Inc., 115 A.3d 1187, 1192 (Del. 2015) (finding an employer is not absolved of vicarious
liability when it knowingly hires family members with personal motives to act tortiously within
the scope of employment).
7
Answering Br. at 8.

6
[Second ¶] 12. Counterclaim Defendants owed a duty to the Buchers to
perform the construction services on the Property in a timely and
workmanlike manner. [Second ¶] 13. Counterclaim Defendants
breached their duty and failed to perform the construction services on
the Property at a level which meets the applicable standard of care.8

The negligence claims against Third-Party Defendants are based on performance of

construction services, which is within the scope of their employment as construction

workers for Plaintiff construction company. Thus, the negligence claims against

Third-Party Defendants fall squarely within the doctrine of respondeat superior, and

Plaintiff will be held vicariously liable for the alleged actions of Third-Party

Defendants for Defendants’ negligence claims.

B. Contractual/Quasi-Contractual Claims

As to the contractual and related quasi-contractual claims, “Delaware law

clearly holds that officers of a corporation are not liable on corporate contracts as

long as they do not purport to bind themselves individually.”9 Here, while

Defendants argue that there is a “. . . fundamental dispute as to whether a contractual

relationship existed (let alone the terms of that relationship),”10 they do not allege

8
Mark and Amy Bucher’s Answer to Pl.’s Compl. with Separate Defenses, Countercl. and Third
Party Compl. (hereinafter “Answer”) at Countercl. Second ¶ 12–13. The pinpoint cite reflects
the Answer restarting its paragraph numbering at Counterclaim Count III.
9
Ruggiero v. Futuragene, PLC., 948 A.2d 1124, 1132 (Del. Ch. 2008) (quoting Amaysing Tech.
Corp. v. CyberAir Commc’ns, Inc., 2005 WL 578972 at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 3, 2005)).
10
Answering Br. at 4.

7
anything that the Third-Party Defendants have done that would suggest they bound

themselves to the contract in their individual capacities outside the scope of their

employment. Defendants argue that since the nature and scope of the contract is

undetermined, Third-Party Defendants possibly are parties within their individual

capacities. However, their own argument fails to cite how or why Third-Party

Defendants bound themselves to the Agreement separate from their obligations as

employees of Plaintiff. Defendants clarify that their claims as to Third-Party

Defendant Cale Johnson “are based upon his individual misrepresentations and

negligent conduct” but then fail to explain how his individual conduct was not in the

scope of employment. Defendants further fail to identify any other conduct that

could be interpreted as the Third-Party Defendants binding themselves to Plaintiff’s

contract as independently liable parties.11 Thus, Defendants fail to state a direct

contractual or quasicontractual claim as to Third-Party Defendants within their

individually capacity.

C. “Extracontractual” Claims

Finally, Defendants allege that Third-Party Defendants’ actions outside the

scope of the Agreement created independent liability for negligence, contractual,

and quasi-contractual claims, which Defendants call “extra-contractual” claims.12

11
Id. at 8.
12
Id. at 8.

8
Under Delaware law, when an employee or officer of a company does not

bind himself or herself to a corporate contract individually, “[c]onsequently, a

plaintiff who seeks to sue an officer of a corporation must pierce the corporate veil

to do so.”13 Piercing the corporate veil asks the court to disregard the corporate

boundaries and seek personal liability against individuals where fraud or inequity in

the use of the corporate form is found.14

The Delaware Court of Chancery has sole subject matter jurisdiction over

actions to pierce the corporate veil and therefore, the Delaware Superior Court lacks

jurisdiction over such claims.15 Accordingly, the Delaware Superior Court has

previously dismissed for lack of jurisdiction claims alleging that an officer engaged

in fraudulent conduct within their individual capacity such that the claim “reads like

an improper attempt to pierce the corporate veil.”16

Again, Defendants argue “[t]he claims are against Cale Johnson based upon

his individual misrepresentations. . . , not his status as a signatory on Cale Johnson

Corporation documents.”17 The basis of “individual misrepresentations” is

fraudulent conduct within Cale Johnson’s individual capacity such that the

extracontractual claims read like an improper attempt to pierce the corporate veil.

13
Thomas v. Hobbs, 2005 WL 1653947 at *2 (Del. Super. Apr. 27, 2005).
14
Yu v. GSM Nation, LLC, 2018 WL 2272708 at *6 (Del. Super. Apr. 24, 2018).
15
Yu v. GSM Nation, LLC, 2018 WL 2272708 at *6 (Del. Super. Apr. 24, 2018).
16
See id. at *13.
17
Answering Br. at 8.

9
Third-Party Defendant Williams’ individual liability, although not specifically

argued by Defendants, appears to also be a fraudulent conduct claim based on his

individual capacity.18 Thus, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the

“extracontractual” theory of claims as they are an improper attempt to pierce the

corporate veil.

Ultimately, Defendants’ direct theories of liability fail to state a claim against

Third-Party Defendants in their individual capacities, and this Court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over Defendants’ “extracontractual” theory which improperly

attempts to pierce the corporate veil. Defendants have failed to state tortious claims

as to Third-Party Defendants.

II. Declaratory Judgment Claims

Third-Party Defendants request this Court to dismiss the declaratory judgment

claims against them. Third-Party Defendant Cale Johnson is named as a defendant

for Counterclaim Count II. Although neither party provides any argument as to

Count II, the Court is compelled to address these claims.

Counterclaim Count II(a) requests a claim for declaratory judgment that

Defendants complied with their contractual obligations. Counterclaim Count II(b)

asks this Court to revoke Plaintiff’s business license pursuant to 25 Del. C. §2707.

18
See generally Answer; Answering Br.

10
Counterclaim Count II(c) is essentially a discovery demand for a list of all

subcontractors involved pursuant to 25 Del. C. § 2705.

A. Counterclaim Count II(c) misstates an affirmative defense as a

cause of action.

The analysis starts with Counterclaim Count II(c) which misconstrues an

affirmative defense as a cause of action and thus fails to state a claim. Therefore,

Counterclaim Count II(c) must be dismissed as to all parties, including the Plaintiff.

Defendants allege that “25 Del. C. [sic] § 2705 requires [Third-Party

Defendant] Cale Johnson and/or [Plaintiff] to furnish to the Buchers upon request a

complete and accurate list of all subcontractors on the project.”19 Defendants

thereby “. . . seek a judgment declaring that: . . . Cale Johnson and/or [Plaintiff] must

furnish to the Buchers a full and complete list of all subcontractors on the project.”20

Section 2705 of Title 25 reads in full:

The owner of any structure built, repaired or altered by any contractor
or subcontractor may require such contractor or subcontractor from
time to time to furnish and submit to the owner complete and accurate
list in writing of all persons who have furnished labor or material, or
both, in connection therewith, and who may be entitled to avail
themselves of the provisions of this chapter. Should any such
contractor or subcontractor fail to furnish such list for 10 days

19
Answer at Countercl. ¶ 45.
20
Id. at Counterclaim II(c) prayer for relief.

11
after demand made therefor by such owner, the contractor or
subcontractor shall be entitled to receive no further payments from
the owner until such list be furnished and shall not be entitled to
avail himself or herself of any of the provisions of [the mechanic’s
lien statute].21

Section 2705 is an affirmative defense to a mechanic’s lien, where a contractor’s

failure to provide such list within ten days of a homeowner’s request bars the

contractor from asserting the lien.22 The purpose of 25 Del. C. § 2705 is to permit

an owner to learn the identity of the persons who may obtain mechanic's liens on the

owner's property, and a noncompliant contractor is prevented from invoking

provisions of the mechanic's lien statute.23 The statute does not apply when no

mechanic’s lien has been filed.24

Defendants claim that 25 Del. C. § 2705 requires Plaintiff or Third-Party

Defendant Cale Johnson to provide a list of all subcontractors. However, a plain

reading of 25 Del. C. § 2705 does not provide a statutory right for the Defendants to

obtain such a list if not provided. Thus, Counterclaim Count II(c) fails to state a

claim against not only Third-Party Defendants but also the Plaintiff.

21
25 Del. C. § 2705 (emphasis added).
22
See e.g., Foraker v. Voshell, 2022 WL 2452396 at *7 (Del. Super. July 1, 2022).
23
Carey v. Estate of Myers, 2015 WL 4087056 at *20 (Del. Super. July 1, 2015) (quoting
Rockland Builders, Inc, v. Endowment Mgmt., LLC, 2006 WL 2053418 at *3 (Del. Super. July
10, 2006)).
24
See id.

12
It is also important to note that although 25 Del. C. § 2705 does not create a

cause of action, this information is still discoverable in the underlying breach of

contract claim and counterclaim between Plaintiff and Defendants.

B. Cale Johnson is not a necessary party to Counterclaims Counts II(a–b).

Counterclaim Count II(a) seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendants have

complied with their contractual obligations, listing both Plaintiff and Third-Party

Defendant Cale Johnson in the claim. Counterclaim Count II(b) asks this Court to

revoke Plaintiff’s business license pursuant to 25 Del. C. §2707.

Section 6511 of Title 10 provides that “[w]hen declaratory relief is sought, all

persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be

affected by the declaration. . . .”25 However, Delaware allows an action to continue

if an absent party’s alleged interest is fully represented in the lawsuit.26 “Delaware

courts will also not issue declaratory relief when it can have no practical effect on

the injury complained of.”27 The Delaware Superior Court has previously rejected

dismissal of a declaratory judgment based on the same claims asserted elsewhere on

the grounds of duplicity or overripeness, noting that “. . . the Court can deal with all

25
10 Del. C. § 6511.
26
Sprint Nextel Corp. v. iPCS, Inc., 2008 WL 2737409 at *14 (Del. Ch. July 14, 2008) (citing
Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1073 (Del. Ch. 1985)).
27
In re COVID-Related Restrictions on Religious Servs., 302 A.3d 464, 493 (Del. Super. 2023)
(citing Intermec IP Corp. v. TransCore, LP, 2021 WL 4841131 (Del. Super. Oct. 18, 2021)).

13
related issues at trial without any additional burden.”28 If, somehow, it could be

construed that 25 Del. C. § 2705 provides a basis to pierce the corporate veil, again,

this Court lacks jurisdiction on such claims.

Counterclaim Count II(a) may be viable against Plaintiff if it is not duplicative

of the competing breach of contract claims and it would not burden court resources.

However, there is no practical effect to keeping Third-Party Defendant Cale Johnson

as a separate party for Counterclaims Counts II(a) and II(b) when these claims still

stand against Plaintiff. Even if he were a necessary party, his interests would be

adequately represented by the Plaintiff since he owns the Plaintiff company.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ tortious claims against Third-Party Defendants are governed by

the doctrines of: (1) respondeat superior under which they are not independently

liable from Plaintiff; and (2) piercing the corporate veil, which the Superior Court

lacks jurisdiction. Additionally, Defendants’ Counterclaim Count II(c)

misconstrues an affirmative defense as a cause of action and is DISMISSED sua

sponte as to both Plaintiff and Third Party Defendants. Finally, Third-Party

Defendant Cale Johnson is not a necessary party to the declaratory judgments sought

28
JanCo FS 2, LLC v. ISS Facility Servs., Inc., 2024 WL 4002825 at *18 (Del. Super. Aug. 30,
2024).

14
in Counterclaims Counts II(a) and II(b). Therefore, Third-Party Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Mark H. Conner
Mark H. Conner, Judge

xc: Prothonotary

15