Garnett v. Cote

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

HELEN GARNETT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No.: N24C-01-138 SPL
)
NAOMI COTE, )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER

This 7th day of January 2025, upon consideration of Defendant Naomi Cote’s

(“Cote”) Motion for Summary Judgment,1 Plaintiff Helen Garnett’s (“Garnett”)

response,2 and the parties’ oral arguments,3 it appears to the Court that:

BACKGROUND

1. Garnett alleges that on January 19, 2022, Cote struck her motor vehicle

“suddenly and without warning” causing Garnett “to sustain serious injuries.”4 That

same night, Garnett presented to the emergency room with complaints of low back

pain.5 Medical staff diagnosed Garnett with a lumbar strain, ordered Garnett to seek

1
Docket Item (“D.I.”) 15.
2
D.I. 16.
3
D.I. 17.
4
D.I. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 3.
5
Def. Ex. C.
follow up treatment from her doctor within three to five days, and discharged her

that night.6 Garnett followed up with her doctor a month later on February 22, 2022.7

2. On January 25, 2022, six days after the collision, Cote’s automobile

insurer contacted Garnett with an offer to pay her $1,160 and “all reasonable and

necessary expenses…not to exceed $7,500 incurred” for other medical treatment.8

In return, Garnett agreed to,

Forever discharge[] NAOMI COTE and any and all other persons,
firms, or corporations liable or who might be claimed to be liable, from
any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits
of any kind or nature whatsoever, both to person and property, and
particularly on account of all injuries, known and unknown, sustained
by (Named Beneficiary) HELEN GARNETT, which have resulted or
may in the future develop as a result of an accident which occurred on
or about the 19th day of January, 2022 at or near GLENWOOD AVE,
SMYRNA, DE 19977 … It is further agreed that all parties to this
instrument have carefully read the contents of this Agreement and
Release and the signatures below are the voluntary and free act of each.9

Garnett signed the release agreement later the same day.10

6
Def. Ex. C.
7
Def. Ex. D.
8
Def. Ex. B.
9
Id.
10
Id.
3. On January 18, 2024, Garnett filed a complaint alleging Cote’s

negligence proximately caused her physical and emotional injuries.11 Cote answered

the complaint,12 and on October 21, 2024, moved for summary judgment.13

4. Cote contends Garnett is barred from filing this action because she

executed a valid and enforceable release that discharged Cote from any additional

liability stemming from the parties’ motor vehicle collision.14 Garnett contends a

mutual mistake existed between the parties that vitiates the release.15

STANDARD OF REVIEW

5. On October 21, 2024, Cote moved, “for judgment on the pleadings or

summary judgment.”16 Superior Court Civil Rule 12(c) governs motions for

judgment on the pleadings.17 Rule 12(c) states that,

If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the Court, the motion
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable

11
Compl. ¶ 5.
12
D.I. 5.
13
D.I. 15.
14
Def. Mot. ¶¶ 6-7.
15
Pl. Resp. ¶ 1.
16
See Def. Mot.
17
Gillespie v. Carper, 2024 WL 4709937, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2024).
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by
Rule 56.18
Both Garnett and Cote presented, and the Court has considered, matters outside the

pleadings. Notably, the parties rely on the release agreement and relevant medical

records.19 On November 11, 2024, Garnett, “answer[ed] [Cote’s] motion for

summary judgment.”20 On December 19, 2024, the Court heard argument from the

parties on the motion.21 Cote’s motion, therefore, “shall be treated as one for

summary judgment.”22

6. Under Superior Court Civil Rule 56, summary judgment will be granted

where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”23

On a motion for summary judgment, this Court “(i) construes the record in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party; (ii) detects, but does not decide, genuine

18
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(c).
19
See D.I. 15, Def. Ex. A-D; D.I. 16, Pl. Ex. A-B.
20
See Pl. Resp.
21
D.I. 17.
22
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(c).
23
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
issues of material fact; and (iii) denies the motion if a material fact is in dispute.” 24

Summary judgment will not be granted where there exists a material fact in dispute

or if it “seems desirable to inquire thoroughly into [the facts] in order to clarify the

application of the law to the circumstances.”25

ANALYSIS

7. A release is a mechanism parties use to minimize the risk involved in

litigation.26 Because litigation inherently presents risk, “[r]eleases are executed to

resolve the claims the parties know about as well as those that are unknown or

uncertain.”27 Delaware Courts generally uphold executed releases, “and will only

set aside a clear and unambiguous release where it was the product of fraud, duress,

coercion, or mutual mistake.”28 Here, Garnett argues her executed release should be

set aside because a mutual mistake of fact existed when she signed the release.29

8. To establish a mutual mistake of fact, Garnett must show, “by clear and

convincing evidence that (1) both parties were mistaken as to a basic assumption,

24
US Dominion, Inc. v. Fox News Network, LLC, 2023 WL 2730567, at *17 (Del.
Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2023) (quoting CVR Refin., LP v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 2021
WL 5492671, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 23, 2021) (cleaned up)).
25
Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-69 (Del. 1962).
26
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Fla. Evergreen Foliage, 744 A.2d 457, 462
(Del. 1999).
27
Hicks v. Sparks, 2014 WL 1233698, at *2 (Del. Mar. 25, 2014).
28
Id.
29
Pl. Resp.
(2) the mistake materially affects the agreed-upon exchange of performances, and

(3) the party adversely affected did not assume the risk of the mistake.” 30 In

assessing whether a mutual mistake exists, the Court considers the relevant

circumstances present at the time of contract formation.31 The mutual mistake “must

relate to a past or present fact material to the contract and not to an opinion respecting

future conditions as a result of present facts.”32 Accordingly, a mistake regarding

“the future unknowable effect of existing facts, … or a mistake as to the future effect

of a personal injury” is not grounds for voiding a release.33

9. Cote contends that because, “mutuality of mistake exists only where

neither the claimant nor the insurance carrier is aware of the existence of personal

injuries,” there exists no mutual mistake rendering Garnett’s executed release

unenforceable.34 Unless Garnett’s injuries are “materially different from the parties’

expectations at the time the release was signed,” the executed release bars her suit

for subsequently discovered injuries.35 To invalidate Garnett’s executed release,

30
Hicks, 2014 WL 1233698 at *2.
31
Hicks, 2014 WL 1233698 at *2.
32
Alvarez v. Castellon, 55 A.3d 352, 354 (Del. 2012) (quoting Tatman v.
Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington R.R. Co., 85 A. 716, 718 (Del. Ch. 1913)).
33
Id.
34
Def. Mot. ¶ 8. (citing Alston v. Alexander, 2011 WL 1225555, at *4 (Del. Super.
Ct. Mar. 29, 2011)).
35
Hicks, 2014 WL 1233698 at *2.
both she and State Farm must have been mistaken “as to the presence or extent of

[Garnett’s] injuries at the time they executed the release.”36 Thus, the release will

not be invalidated if Garnett knew that, “an indicia of injuries exist[ed] at the time

[she] signed the release.”37 This is true regardless of whether Garnett was aware of

“the exact degree of injuries with medical certainty.”38 Knowledge of an existing

injury precludes a finding of mutual mistake to the extent it would invalidate a

release.39

10. Garnett responds that this Court’s decision in Webb v. Dickerson

compels denial of Cote’s motion.40 In Webb, the plaintiff executed a release less

than twenty-four hours after the motor vehicle accident during a chance encounter

with an insurance adjuster outside the salvage yard where his damaged car was

stored.41 Because, at the time the release was executed, neither the plaintiff nor the

insurance adjuster knew that the plaintiff sustained a disc injury and nerve damage,

this Court found there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether a

36
Id.
37
Hicks, 2014 WL 1233698 at *2.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
2002 WL 388121 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2002).
41
Id. at *2.
mutual mistake existed.42 Garnett also relies on Reason v. Lewis, where the Court

invalidated an executed release because, “both the plaintiff and the insurance

adjuster thought that the plaintiff had been discharged from all further medical

treatment or was about to be discharged.” 43 But here, because the hospital ordered

Garnett to follow up with her doctor within three to five days, Garnett knew she had

not been discharged from further medical treatment at the time she signed the

release.44

11. On January 19, 2022, hours after the motor vehicle collision, Garnett

presented to the hospital with complaints of low back pain.45 The examining

physician opined that Garnett suffered a lumbar strain and recommended Garnett

seek further treatment within three to five days.46 Garnett did not consult her doctor

before signing the release six days later.47 Based on her visit to the hospital, her

diagnosis after the accident, and the hospital’s recommendation for further

treatment, Garnett knew that, “an indicia of injuries exist[ed] at the time [she] signed

42
Id. at *4-7.
43
260 A.2d 708, 709 (Del. 1969).
44
Def. Ex. C.
45
D.I. 15, Def. Ex. C.
46
Def. Ex. C.
47
Def. Ex. B.
the release.”48 Such knowledge precludes a finding of mutual mistake that would

invalidate the release.49

12. And Garnett’s injuries alleged in her complaint are not so “materially

different from the parties’ expectations at the time the release was signed” such that

the release should be invalidated.50 In Hicks, before the plaintiff signed the release,

she was diagnosed with a “cervical sprain” after presenting to a physician with neck

pain.51 The plaintiff then signed the release, and months later, she needed “surgery

for a herniated disc.”52 Plaintiff contended that because her pre and post-release

injuries were materially different, the executed release should be invalidated for

mutual mistake.53 The Superior Court did not find a mutual mistake to exist and

granted the defendant summary judgment.54 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed

this Court’s decision on appeal, and commented:

Although [Plaintiff] may have been mistaken as to the future effect of
her injury, both parties were aware that [Plaintiff] injured her neck in
the accident. This can reasonably be considered an “indicia of injuries”
existing at the time of the Release. [Plaintiff] had ample opportunity to
consult additional physicians and obtain further diagnoses to discover
the herniated disc. Her later diagnosis is not a materially different fact
48
Hicks, 2014 WL 1233698 at *2.
49
Id.
50
Hicks, 2014 WL 1233698, at *3.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at *2.
54
Id. at *1.
but an injury of which [Plaintiff] had some awareness. Therefore, there
was no mutual mistake.

13. Here, as in Hicks, at the time Garnett signed the release, she had been

treated for, and diagnosed with, a back injury stemming from Cote’s collision into

her vehicle.55 Garnett’s later diagnoses were materially similar to the injury she

presented with on January 19, 2022, and Garnett’s decision to execute the release

prior to seeking additional medical evaluation must not be overlooked. Whether

Garnett mistook “the future effect of [her] personal injury” does not alter the

outcome; that misapprehension is not grounds for rescinding a release.56

CONCLUSION

14. Garnett’s validly executed release was not the product of mutual

mistake and, thus, her complaint against Cote may not stand. No genuine issue of

material fact exists as to the existence or operation of the release, and Cote is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Cote’s Motion for Summary Judgment

is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

_______________ _________
Sean P. Lugg, Judge

55
Def. Ex. C.
56
Alvarez, 55 A.3d at 354 (quoting Tatman, 85 A. at 718).