Patrick Keane v. Jacklyn Niggenmyer

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE STATE OF
DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

PATRICK KEANE
Plaintiff-Below/Appellant,

Vv. Case No. CPU4-23-001442

JACKLYN NIGGENMYER
Defendant-Below/Appellee.

Submitted: December 8, 2023
Decided: January 8, 2024

ORDER ON DEFENDANT?’S PRE-TRIAL MOTION

Manning, J.
This matter, which is before the Court de novo on appeal from a decision of
the Justice of the Peace Court, stems from an oral residential lease agreement
between a landlord, Plaintiff-Below/Appellant Patrick Keane, and his former tenant,
Defendant-Below/Appellee Jacklyn Niggemyer. Mr. Keane alleges that Ms.
Niggemyer vacated his rental property (the “Property”) without giving 60-days’
notice, resulting in damages in the amount of $6,618.' Not surprisingly, Ms.
Niggemyer disagrees. She maintains that Mr. Keane is not legally entitled to the
damages he seeks, and she asserts a counterclaim to recover unspecified monetary
damages for expenses relating to her alleged compulsory relocation due to the
Property’s uninhabitability.

On October 17, 2023, Ms. Niggemyer filed the motion presently before the
Court, styled as “Defendant’s Motion to Determine Plaintiff's Inability to Rely on
Any Provisions/Statute of the Delaware Residential Landlord Tenant Code” (the
“Motion’”). On December 8, 2023, the Court held a hearing on the Motion, during
which it heard oral argument from both parties.

Ms. Niggemyer argues that Mr. Keane failed to comply with Section 5118 of

Delaware’s Landlord-Tenant Code (the “Code’”) in that he failed to furnish a

' Mr. Keane’s damages claim is calculated as two months (60 days) of unpaid rent, and related
fees. However, it is unclear from the present record whether he seeks to recover for two months
of unpaid rent incurred while Ms. Niggemyer was residing at the property, or two months of rent
accruing once Ms. Niggemyer vacated the property.

2
summary of the Code, as prepared by Consumer Protection Unit of the Attorney
General’s Office (the “Code Summary”), at the beginning of the rental term, thereby
statutorily entitling her to raise ignorance of the law as a defense. She reasons that
Mr. Keane’s claims are derived from the Code, and thus are unrecoverable given her
ignorance of law defense.

On the other hand, Mr. Keane asserts that he was not statutorily obligated to
tender the Code Summary because the lease agreement was oral. He points to
language in the Code Summary itself specifying that it must be provided “upon
signing of a residential lease,”” which he interprets as meaning the Code Summary
is only required in written leases. Therefore, he claims that § 5601—which requires
60-days’ notice to terminate a lease—applies, and Ms. Niggemyer is liable for her
failure to provide adequate notice. Further, he claims, although under no legal
obligation to do so, he did provide Ms. Niggemyer with a copy of the Code Summary
in July of 2022.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

The relief sought in Defendant’s Motion disorients the legal standards to be

applied. Specifically, Ms. Niggemyer requests that this Court “issue an order that

* Del. Dept. of Justice Consumer Protection Unit, Summary of the Delaware Residential Landlord-
Tenant Code, Rev’d May 2014, available at

https://attorney general.delaware.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/50/2019/06/NEW-Revised-LL-T-
summary-for-tenants-4-1-19.pdf.
[Mr. Keane]:

1. Failed to supply [Ms. Niggemyer] a copy of the summary of the Delaware
Residential Landlord Tenant Code; and

2. That [Mr. Keane's] failure to supply [Ms. Niggemyer] a copy of the
aforesaid Code "prohibits" [Mr. Keane] from relying upon the
statutes/rules/regulations of the Code; and

3. That [Ms. Niggemyer] is entitled to plead ignorance of the law as a defense
to [Mr. Keane’s] Complaint; and

4, That [Mr. Keane] is precluded from the damages sought as same are not
authorized by the Code; and

5. That the Court grant summary judgment in favor of [Ms. Niggemyer]
and/or dismiss the [Mr. Keane’s] Complaint in its entirety.”

Requests one through four constitute rulings on the ultimate issues to be
decided by the finder of fact at trial, and thus are not appropriate for resolution in
this form or at this junction.?

As to the fifth request, the Court notes that Ms. Niggemyer pointed to no legal
authority to support a finding that summary judgment is appropriate in the context.
Indeed, it is not. Summary judgment is granted only where the moving party

demonstrates that no issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to

3 See Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co., 2003 WL 25849476, at *2 (Del.
Super. Jan. 24, 2003). Specifically, four of the five itemized requests must be decided at trial:
“(1) [Plaintiff] Failed to supply defendant a copy of the summary of the Delaware Residential
Landlord Tenant Code; and (2) That the plaintiffs failure to supply defendant a copy of the
aforesaid Code "prohibits" the plaintiff from relying upon the statutes/rules/regulations of the
Code; and (3) That the defendant is entitled to plead ignorance of the law as a defense to the
plaintiffs Complaint; and (4) That the plaintiff is precluded from the damages sought as same are
not authorized by the Code.” Def. Mtn. at 2.

A
judgment as a matter of law.4 Summary judgment is not appropriate where further
inquiry is required to clarify the application of law to the circumstances,” and it is
“not a substitute for the trial of disputed fact issues.”®

Here, the record is riddled with factual disputes and uncertainties which render
application of the law to the circumstances impossible. For example, it is unclear
from the present record whether Mr. Keane’s claims are derived exclusively from
the Code, rather than the oral lease agreement; whether Ms. Niggemyer’s actions,
including her alleged failure to provide notice, violated the terms of the parties’ oral
agreement; and, whether Mr. Keane’s delivery of the Code Summary in July
constituted the “ beginning of the rental term” under § 5118 given the month-to-

month nature of the oral lease agreement. The Court will not engage in speculation

on such questions of material fact.

4 GMC Capital Investments, LLC v. Athenian Venture Partners [, L.P., 36 A. 3d 776, 783 (Del.
Jan. 3, 2012); Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979).

> Lillis v. AT&T Corp., 2006 WL 3860915, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006)(quoting Ebersole v.
Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 470 (Del.1962)).

6 GMC Capital Investments, at 783 (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2712 (3d ed.1998)).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
DENIED. However, Ms. Niggemyer is permitted to raise ignorance of the law as a

defense at trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

aC

Bradley VManning, Judge