State of Delaware v. Yolanda Irizarry

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE STATE OF
DELAWARE IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

STATE OF DELAWARE,

Vv. Case No.: 2102004531

YOLANDA IRIZARRY,

Nee Nee ee Nee eee” ee” Ne”

Defendant.

Submitted: November 5, 2025
Decided: January 6, 2026

Joseph Lafferty Jason R. Antoine, Esq.
820 N. French Street, 7 Floor 1702 Kirkwood Highway, Suite 102
Wilmington, DE 19801 Wilmington, DE 19805
Attorney for the State of Delaware Attorney for Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Dismissal for Violation of Right

to Speedy Trial.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 11, 2021, Yolanda Irizarry (hereinafter “Defendant”) was pulled
over and arrested for Driving Under the Influence in violation of 21 Del. C. § 4177.
On March 8, 2021, counsel for Defendant requested that the case be transferred from
the Justice of the Peace Court to the Court of Common Pleas. On March 9, 2021,
counsel for Defendant was notified that the case was transferred and scheduled for

Arraignment in the Court of Common Pleas on June 9, 2021. On March 24, 2021,
counsel for Defendant filed a prior plea and in keeping with COVID-19 pandemic
scheduling procedures in effect at the time the Court assigned a control date of
January 1, 2025. On June 1, 2021, the State filed an Information. On May 31, 2025,
the court scheduled the case for another control date of July 22, 2025. On September
5, 2025, Defendant’s counsel filed a Motion for Dismissal for Violation of Right to
Speedy Trial. The State submitted no written response to the Motion. The Court
heard the Motion on October 8, 2025, and requested the parties submit post-hearing
briefs. Each party submitted its respective brief.

Defendant argued that a greater than four-and-a-half-year delay in bringing
this case to trial was so presumptively prejudicial that the Court should dismiss the
case based on the language in Middlebrook v. State and application of the Barker v.
Wingo four factor totality-of-the-circumstances balancing test.’ The State conceded
that the length of the delay was sufficient to trigger further analysis of the Barker
factors. The State then comprehensively addressed all four Barker factors and argued
dismissal was inappropriate, as there was no violation of the right to a speedy trial
under existing Federal and Delaware precedent.

DISCUSSION

In Delaware, “speedy trial” motions are generally of two types. One alleging

! Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268 (Del. 2002); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)
(Defendant does not address all four of the Barker factors).

2
the denial of traditional Sixth Amendment rights and the other alleging “unnecessary
delay” under Criminal Rule 48(b) of the various trial courts.? Here, Defendant
argues the denial of traditional Sixth Amendment rights and asks the Court to
dismiss the charges pursuant to Court of Common Pleas Criminal Rule 48. Because
Defendant does not present an argument or case law specific to Rule 48, the Court
will address only the alleged denial of Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights.

6" Amendment Speedy Trial Analysis

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution affords defendants
“the right to a speedy and public trial” in all criminal prosecutions.? The States apply
this right through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ The
Delaware Constitution provides the same rights to criminal defendants under Article
I, Section 7.° In Barker, the United States Supreme Court established a totality-of-
the-circumstances balancing test for Courts to determine whether a speedy-trial
violation has occurred.° Under the Barker test, the Court weighs the conduct of both
the prosecution and the defendant by considering the following factors: “(1) the
length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right

to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.”

2 State v. Korotki, 418 A.2d 1008, 1013 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980).

3 U.S. Const. amend. VI.

4 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1; Klopfer v. State of N.C., 386 U.S. 213, 223-24 (1967).
> Del. Const. art. I, §7.

6 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.

Id.
1. Length of the Delay

As a threshold factor, the Court must consider whether the delay between
arrest and trial is “uncommonly long”® and “presumptively prejudicial.”? The right
to a speedy trial attaches “as soon as the defendant is accused of a crime through
arrest or indictment, whichever occurs first.”!° There is no temporal benchmark that
automatically constitutes a violation of speedy trial rights; rather, “whether the
length of delay is presumptively prejudicial ‘depends on the peculiar circumstances
of the case.”’!' However, the Delaware Supreme Court has established that if the
delay between arrest and trial approaches one year, the Court “generally should
consider the other Barker factors.” !? In Middlebrook, the Delaware Supreme Court
found that a delay exceeding four years between indictment and trial for an
incarcerated defendant was presumptively prejudicial.

Here, as in Middlebrook, a four-and-a-half-year delay is presumptively

prejudicial. The Court finds that the first Barker factor weighs heavily in favor of

8 Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992).

9 State v. Strzalkowski, 2010 WL 2961519, at *3; Davis v. State, 99 A.3d 226 (Del. 2014); State v.
Warrington, 2016 WL 3485355, at *6 (Del. Super. June 27, 2016).

10 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 272-73.

'l Strzalkowski, 2010 WL 2961519, at *3 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31).

2 See Cooper v. State, 2011 WL6039613, at *7 (Del. Supr. 2011); see also State v. Link, 2016 WL
6994005, at *2 (Del. Com. PI. Nov. 29, 2016); State v. Warrington, 2016 WL 3485355, at *6 (Del.
Com. Pl. June 27, 2016); Strzalkowski, 2010 WL 2961519, at *3.

13 See Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 274 (Del. 2002); But see Strzalkowski, 2010 WL 2961519, at *3
(finding that a delay of eight months was not presumptively prejudicial); Baker v. State, Del.
Super., ID No. 0803038600, Babiarz, J. (Dec. 16, 2009) (Mem. Op.) (finding that a delay of seven
months was not prejudicial).
the Defendant and triggers consideration of the other Barker factors.

. Reason for the Delay

As elucidated by the United States Supreme Court, the Barker test “places the
primary burden on the courts and the prosecutors to assure that cases are brought to
trial.” A “deliberate attempt to delay the trial to hamper the defense should be
weighted heavily against the [State].” In contrast, delays due to “overcrowded
courts, should be weighted less heavily” against the State.'*

Both parties acknowledge and reference delays caused by the management of
judicial resources during the COVID-19 pandemic. The State acknowledges that this
Barker factor should weighed less heavily against it because the delay was caused
by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Court’s resulting scheduling decisions. Nothing
in the record indicates that the four-and-a-half-year delay, prolonged as it was, was
the result of a deliberate attempt by the Court or the State to postpone Defendant’s
trial date.!° Responsibility for the delay in this matter rests with the Court and its
management of cases filed during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court finds the
second Barker factor weighs slightly in favor of Defendant.

. Defendant’s Assertion of the Right to a Speedy Trial

A defendant’s failure to assert the right to a speedy trial will make it difficult

'4 Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (emphasis added).
'S Harris v. State, 956 A.2d 1273, 1277 (Del. 2008).

5
to prove that the Court denied a defendant a speedy trial!® because the failure to
assert carries significant weight in the third Barker factor analysis.'’ A defendant
has some responsibility to assert speedy trial rights in a timely manner.’® A
defendant’s failure to demand a speedy trial does not bar the defendant from
eventually raising it, but acquiescence in delaying the assertion of the right is
significant.!°

Defendant avers through Middlebrook and Dabney that the four-and-a-half-
year delay in her prosecution is so prejudicial that her case should be dismissed
because of this delay. The State counters that in Middlebrook, the defendant asserted
his speedy trial rights in response to the State's first continuance request four months
after his arrest, and similarly in Dabney, seven months after his arrest.”°

Here, Defendant did not assert her speedy trial right for four and a half years,
which is significantly longer than the defendants’ delays in asserting it in
Middlebrook and Dabney. Defendant had some responsibility to assert her right and

failed to do so for four and a half years.”! As in Harris v. State, her silence in the

matter is weighed against her,”” and the Court finds the third Barker factor weighs

'6 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 275.

"” Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1082 (Del. 1987).

'8 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529.

'9 Harris, 956 A.2d at 1277 (applying the Barker factors in a sentencing case).

20 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 271; Dabney v. State, 953 A.2d 159, 167-68 (Del. 2008).
21 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529.

22 Harris, 956 A.2d at 1277.
heavily in favor of the State.

. Prejudice to the Defendant

The fourth Barker factor focuses on the three defendants’ interests the right to
a speedy trial is intended to protect: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration,
(2) preventing a defendant’s anxiety and concern, and (3) avoiding an impairment
in a defendant’s defense.”?

The first interest is moot as Defendant was never incarcerated for this matter.

For the second interest to be weighed in a defendant’s favor, the defendant is
required to allege excessive or undue anxiety levels beyond what is presumed from
a delay in trial.?> Here, Defendant argues that generalized and prolonged anxiety
along demonstrates that this interest should be weighed in her favor. The State
argues this case is similar to State v. Rodriguez, where the Delaware Superior Court
found Rodriguez’s argument that she experienced anxiety, health, and safety issues
related to COVID-19 exposure while incarcerated insufficiently specific to her
warrant dismissal.*° Here, like in Rodriguez, Defendant failed to identify specific
sources of undue or disproportionate anxiety or concern.

The third interest, impairment of trial defense, has been found by the Delaware

3 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 276.

4 State v. Rodriguez, 2021 WL 1221461, at *6 (Del. Super. 2021).
5 Link, 2016 WL 6994005, at *2.

6 Rodriguez, 2021 WL 1221461, at *6.
Supreme Court to be the most serious, although also the one most difficult to prove.?’
Defendant avers that her defense is impaired because of a potential loss of
exculpatory evidence, the fading of witness memories, and other unnamed
impediments to mounting an effective defense. The State argues again based on
Rodriguez; Defendant failed to show with sufficient specificity that the delay in
prosecution will impair her defense at trial. Here, also like in Rodriguez, Defendant
failed to identify specific impairments of her defense.

In consideration of the three defendants’ interests the right to a speedy trial is
intended to protect, the Court finds that the fourth Barker factor weighs in favor of

the State.

Balancing of the Barker Factors

In this case, the Barker factors are evenly split between the parties, with the
first two in Defendant’s favor and the second two in the State’s favor. As it did in
State v. Cisco, this Court must look at the weight given to each factor in deciding
whether Defendant’s speedy trial rights have been violated.”’ Given the totality of
the circumstances, the Court finds no violation. The two factors weighing in the
State’s favor outweigh the two factors weighing in Defendant’s favor.

CONCLUSION

*1 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 277.
8 State v. Cisco, 2009 WL 3648674, at *3-4 (Del. Com. Pl. Oct. 6, 2009) (citing Harris, 956 A.2d

at 1278).
After considering the Barker factors, the Court finds that Defendant’s right to
a speedy trial has not been violated. For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant’s

Motion is DENIED, and the case will be scheduled for a DUI Case Review.

IT IS SO ORDERED. ¥
La N A -—

Gerard M. Spadaccini,
Judge