Julie Gibson v. David Konick

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JULIE GIBSON )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. 2022-1036-LWW
)
DAVID KONICK, )
)
Defendant, )
)
-and- )
)
23 WEST BAYARD STREET, LLC, )
)
Nominal Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Date Submitted: April 5, 2024
Date Decided: July 10, 2024

Frank E. Noyes, OFFIT KURMAN, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Counsel for
Plaintiff Julie Gibson

David Konick, pro se; Defendant

WILL, Vice Chancellor
This case presents an unusual dissolution request. The nominal defendant is

a Delaware limited liability company with no operations, employees, or income. It

has a single asset: a beach house in Fenwick Island.

The defendant—a lawyer—formed the company when he and the plaintiff

were a couple, giving each equal membership interests. At the defendant’s

suggestion, they bought the then-dilapidated house through the company to limit

taxes. The defendant prepared a limited liability company agreement with

provisions favorable to him, which he told the plaintiff were standard. The parties

worked to renovate the house and hoped it would bring them years of personal

enjoyment.

This plan went awry when the parties’ romantic relationship came to a bitter

end. But their business relationship as co-owners of the company continues. The

plaintiff wants to recover her investment, sell the house, and move on. The

defendant will not let her.

After trial, there is no doubt that the entity must be dissolved. The governing

agreement requires the members’ unanimous approval to dissolve the company, and

the members are deadlocked. The plaintiff cannot withdraw from the company

without triggering punitive provisions depriving her of fair value. The “business”

of jointly owning a vacation property is no longer practicable.

1
Given the company’s function, the winding up process involves selling the

property and dividing the proceeds. Some steps in that process are straightforward;

others are hotly contested. The parties debate whether their lopsided mortgage

payments recut their respective ownership interests. They each seek reimbursement

for home improvement store receipts, furniture, and contractor fees. The defendant

also asks to be paid back for his “sweat equity” and his legal services to the entity.

In the decision that follows, I grant dissolution of the company. I also interpret

the governing agreement to outline the parties’ interests and entitlement to

reimbursement. But I decline the parties’ invitation to oversee the sale of the

property. A liquidating trustee will be appointed to that end.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts were stipulated to by the parties

or proven by a preponderance of the evidence at trial.1

A. 23 West Bayard Street

Nominal defendant 23 West Bayard Street, LLC (the “Company”) is a

Delaware limited liability company with two members: plaintiff Julie (Coonce)

1
Joint Pre-trial Order (Dkt. 116) (“PTO”). Trial testimony is cited as “[Name] Tr.” See
Dkts. 118, 120. Trial exhibits are referred to according to the numbers provided on the
parties’ joint exhibit list and cited as “JX__” unless otherwise defined. See Dkt. 109. To
the extent that conflicting evidence was presented, I have weighed it and made findings of
fact accordingly.

2
Gibson and defendant David Konick.2 Gibson is a Virginia resident.3 Konick, also

a Virginia resident, is a lawyer admitted to practice in Virginia.4

Gibson first met Konick in 2017 when she sought to engage him for legal

advice on a potential divorce.5 After Gibson became separated from her spouse, she

moved about a mile away from Konick in Virginia.6 She developed a personal

relationship with Konick, who was 29 years her senior.7 They became a couple by

the summer of 2018.8

Soon after their relationship began, Gibson and Konick began to discuss

purchasing a vacation home at 23 West Bayard Street Extension in Fenwick Island,

Delaware (the “Property”).9 The Property was well known to Konick. It belonged

to the family of his childhood friend. Konick had stayed in the Property during the

summer months since 2008 and, with the owners’ permission, had docked a boat

there.10

2
PTO ¶ 1; see JX 14 (“LLC Agreement”) § 2.7.
3
See Gibson Tr. 7-8.
4
PTO ¶ 4.
5
Gibson Tr. 9-10. She did not retain him.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 10; Konick Tr. 178.
8
See Gibson Tr. 9-10.
9
See JX 2; Gibson Tr. 12, 16.
10
Konick Tr. 161.

3
The Property had fallen into disrepair during long periods of vacancy. 11 Its

roof was leaking, walls were rotting, a large masonry fireplace and chimney were

causing the house to sink into a marsh, and a front addition was separating from the

original structure.12 The house reeked of mold and lacked a functioning HVAC

system or furnace.13

By 2019, the Property was the subject of numerous county repair notices and

at risk of being condemned.14 Rather than renovate the house, the original owners

decided to sell it to Konick.15 A purchase agreement for the Property was negotiated

over several months until Konick walked away.16 Gibson encouraged him to revive

negotiations since she viewed the Property as a “long-term investment” that could

be secured at a favorable price.17

In July 2020, Konick agreed to purchase the Property for $550,000 from

Borodulia Family Properties, LLC (the “Seller”).18 Gibson and Konick intended to

11
Id. at 161-62; see JX 7.
12
See JX 5 at 1-4; see generally JX 22.
13
See JX 4; JX 5 at 1-5; Konick Tr. 108-11, 162-68.
14
Konick Tr. 167.
15
Id.
16
JX 5; see Konick Tr. 184.
17
Gibson Tr. 13, 16; Konick Tr. 184.
18
JX 7; PTO ¶ 7.

4
buy the Property together and renovate it.19 They wanted to use the Property for

their own enjoyment rather than rent it out.20

B. The Purchase

To avoid real estate transfer taxes, Konick endeavored to structure the

purchase as a “tax-free reorganization.”21 This involved forming an entity that

would operate as a subsidiary of the Seller: 23 West Bayard Street, LLC.22 The

Seller would spin the property off to the Company and sell ownership interests in

the Company (as opposed to the real estate itself) to Konick.23 The Company was

formed as a Delaware limited liability company on August 3, 2020.24

The purchase was initially financed by equal contributions of $100,000 each

from Gibson and Konick and a short-term promissory note in the principal amount

of $350,000 owed to the Seller (the “Note”).25 The Company was the primary

obligor on the Note, and Konick and Gibson were joint guarantors.26 Monthly

19
Gibson Tr. 12, 16.
20
Id. at 16.
21
See JX 5 at 52-54; Gibson Tr. 114; Konick Tr. 183, 206.
22
JX 8.
23
See JX 5 at 52-54; JX 7 ¶¶ 2, 3; Gibson Tr. 114-16, 125-26; Konick Tr. 205-06.
24
LLC Agreement at Recitals.
25
PTO ¶ 7; see JX 7 ¶ 6(b).
26
PTO ¶ 8.

5
payments of $2,333.76 were owed and the remaining principal balance was to be

paid in full by January 1, 2022.27

Konick made fourteen consecutive monthly payments on the Note totaling

$32,672.64.28 Konick made an additional $25,000 curtailment payment to extend the

Note when it reached maturity.29

On March 9, 2022, the Note was largely paid off with a $300,000 loan from

Nation Bank of Kansas City (the “Loan”).30 After closing costs, the net proceeds

from the Loan were $297,035.42.31 Konick paid the remaining balance on the Note

of $7,663.24.32

Gibson and Konick are joint obligors on the Loan and continue to make

payments.33 They equally contribute to the $2,070.30 monthly payments.34 The

Loan is secured by liens on the Property and on Konick’s primary residence in

Virginia.35

27
Id. ¶ 7; see JX 7 ¶ 6(b).
28
PTO ¶ 8.
29
Id.; see JX 16.
30
PTO ¶ 9; see JX 18; JX 19; JX 20.
31
PTO ¶ 9.
32
Id.
33
See id. ¶ 11.
34
Id.
35
Id.

6
C. The LLC Agreement

Around the time the Loan was secured in March 2022, Konick presented

Gibson with a limited liability company agreement (the “LLC Agreement”) that he

had drafted.36 The LLC Agreement was “entered into as of” October 4, 2020.37 It

states that the Company’s sole purpose was to acquire, develop, own, and lease

residential property in Sussex County, Delaware.38 The LLC Agreement contains

an integration clause stating that it “constitutes the complete and exclusive statement

of the Agreement among the Members” and “supersedes all prior written and oral

statements,” including a prior “Operating Agreement.”39

The LLC Agreement confirms that Konick and Gibson were the Company’s

only two members and that each owned a 50% interest.40 Exhibit A to the LLC

Agreement also reflects that “as of October 4, 2020,” Konick and Gibson each held

a 50% interest in the Company based on their “[i]nitial [i]nvestment[s]” of

$100,000.41 These initial investments were used to pay the Seller when the Property

36
Gibson Tr. 66-67; PTO ¶ 3. Gibson recalled that she had been presented with the LLC
Agreement long after the Property was purchased in 2020 because the LLC Agreement
references a home that she did not own until August 2021. Gibson Tr. 66-67; see LLC
Agreement § 9.2.
37
LLC Agreement at Recitals; see PTO ¶ 2.
38
PTO ¶ 12; see LLC Agreement § 2.3.
39
LLC Agreement § 9.3.
40
Id. § 2.7.
41
Id. at Ex. A.

7
was purchased. The LLC Agreement stated that neither member would “be required

to contribute any additional capital to the Company,” except to pay off the $350,000

Note.42

Although the LLC Agreement is titled “Member-Managed Limited Liability

Company Agreement of 23 West Bayard Street, LLC,” it states that the Company

“shall be managed by one or more Managers.”43 Gibson and Konick designated

Konick as the Company’s “initial and sole Manager.”44 The Manager can only be

removed by a vote of members “holding a two-thirds interest in the Company.”45

The LLC Agreement reserves other decisions and actions to the members by

requiring approval of more than 50% of the membership interests.46 For example:

• borrowing more than $10,000 requires “unanimous consent of
the Members”;47

• compensating a member “for services performed by” the
Company requires “approv[al] by the Members”;48

• the “timing and amount of all distributions” is to be “determined
by the Members”;49

42
Id. § 3.2.
43
Id. § 5.1.
44
Id. § 5.2.1.
45
Id. § 5.2.2.
46
See PTO ¶¶ 15(a)-(h).
47
LLC Agreement § 5.1(f).
48
Id. § 5.8.
49
Id. § 4.6.1.

8
• the value of non-cash proceeds from a sale of Company assets is
to be “determined by the Members” with proceeds allocated “in
proportion to their percentage interests.”50
Particularly relevant to this case, the dissolution of the Company requires “the

unanimous written agreement of the Members.”51 The LLC Agreement cannot be

amended without “written unanimous consent of all Members.”52

D. The Breakup

For a time, Gibson and Konick enjoyed the using Property and worked to

improve it. Konick preferred to do the renovations himself and, throughout 2021

and 2022, worked extensively on the Property.53 Gibson preferred to hire contractors

and hired one to replace an unworkable bathroom.54

Gibson and Konick’s relationship began to deteriorate in late 2021.55 They

separated and got back together several times over two volatile years.56 The

relationship became irreparably broken in August 2022.57

50
Id. § 4.2.
51
Id. § 7.1.2; see Konick Tr. 192.
52
LLC Agreement § 9.3.
53
See JX 22.
54
Gibson Tr. 31-33.
55
Id. at 81.
56
Id. at 80-83.
57
See Konick Tr. 180-81; Gibson Tr. 82-83.

9
This break-up was far from amicable. Gibson made clear that she no longer

wanted to own and share the Property with Konick.58 Konick made disparaging

remarks about Gibson while refusing to take her calls.59 He began removing

Gibson’s personal belongings from the Property and dropping them off at her

Virginia residence.60 When Gibson tried to access the Property, she discovered that

Konick had taken the only available key.61 Konick refused to let Gibson visit the

Property unless he was also present.62 He also cut off her access to the Company’s

joint bank account.63

Gibson sought legal recourse.64 After retaining counsel, she became wise to

“zingers” in the LLC Agreement she had signed.65 Under Section 6.1, without

Konick’s consent, Gibson cannot transfer membership interests to anyone.66 If she

transfers her interests without Konick’s approval, the transferee loses “Membership

58
See Gibson Tr. 86-90.
59
Id. at 84-85, 88, 99-100; see also id. at 84 (testifying that Konick became upset after she
went on a date with someone else).
60
Id. at 84.
61
Id. at 86; Konick Tr. 299-300.
62
Konick Tr. 289.
63
Gibson Tr. 92.
64
Id. at 89-90.
65
Id. at 88.
66
LLC Agreement § 6.1.

10
Rights.”67 These “Membership Rights” include “(i) interest; (ii) [the] right to inspect

the Company’s books and records; and (iii) the right to participate in the

management of and vote on matters coming before the Company.”68 Under Section

6.2, if Gibson were to “Voluntarily Withdraw” from the Company, she would “not

be entitled to receive the fair market value of the Member’s Interest as of the date of

the Voluntary Withdrawal.”69 That is, if Gibson were to withdraw from the

Company by resignation, she would forfeit her right to receive fair market value for

her interests.

E. This Litigation

On November 16, 2022, Gibson filed a Verified Complaint in this court

advancing three counts.70 Count I is a claim for judicial dissolution under

6 Del. C. § 18-802.71 Count II is a claim for declaratory relief. Gibson seeks a

declaration that her and Konick’s capital accounts have equal value and that she is

entitled to an equal 50% share of the net proceeds from the dissolution of the

Company and sale of the Property.72 She also seeks a declaration that Konick is not

67
PTO ¶ 17; see LLC Agreement § 6.1.
68
PTO ¶ 17; see LLC Agreement § 1.
69
LLC Agreement § 6.2; see PTO ¶ 17.
70
Dkt. 1.
71
Verified Compl. for Judicial Dissolution and Declaratory J. (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 51-55.
72
Id. ¶¶ 62-64.

11
entitled to indemnification or advancement of expenses by the Company or the use

of Company funds for his defense in this litigation.73 Count III is a claim for a breach

of Section 5.9.1 of the LLC Agreement, which provides that each member “shall

have a general fiduciary duty” to the Company.74

After filing the litigation, Gibson continued to communicate with Konick.

She called him; he would not answer. When she went to his home in January 2024

to discuss the Property, he told her she was trespassing.75 No negotiated path

forward was reached.

Meanwhile, Konick both moved to dismiss and answered the complaint,

asserting seven affirmative defenses.76 Konick then filed a barrage of motions. This

included two motions to strike,77 a motion to compel,78 a motion for “craving oyer,”79

and two Rule 41(b) motions.80 All were denied.81

73
Id. ¶¶ 59-61.
74
Id. ¶¶ 67-72; see LLC Agreement § 5.9.1.
75
Gibson Tr. 83-84.
76
Dkts. 9, 10, 18. Because Konick filed an answer to the complaint, I deemed his motion
to dismiss as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Court of Chancery Rule 12(c).
77
Dkts. 24, 51.
78
Dkt. 38.
79
Dkt. 63.
80
Dkts. 76, 88.
81
See Dkts. 31, 70, 72, 93, 95.

12
A one-day trial was held on February 28, 2024.82 After post-trial briefing, this

matter was submitted for decision on April 5.83 Gibson’s post-trial briefing did not

address her claim in Count III claim for breach of Section 5.9.1 of the LLC

Agreement.84 The remaining claims are resolved below.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Gibson’s primary claim is for judicial dissolution of the Company under

6 Del. C. § 18-802. Because it is no longer reasonably practicable to maintain the

LLC, that relief is appropriate. Gibson and Konick are deadlocked on whether to

dissolve the Company and the LLC Agreement lacks a feasible deadlock-breaking

mechanism.

I go on to conclude that Konick is a 60.51% member and Gibson is a 39.49%

member of the Company based on their capital contributions. I also address their

entitlement to recover certain expenses and reject Konick’s demand that he be

compensated for certain services.

Finally, I appoint a liquidating trustee to oversee the winding up of the LLC

and sale of the Property.

82
Dkts. 118, 120.
83
Dkts. 125, 126.
84
See In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 62 (Del. Ch. 2001) (concluding that a
party waived an argument by not including it in its opening post-trial brief); see also
Emerald P’rs v. Berlin, 2003 WL 21003437, at *43 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2003).

13
A. Judicial Dissolution

The LLC Agreement permits dissolution upon “the entry of a decree of

judicial dissolution under 6 Del. C. § 18-802.”85 Under Section 18-802, “on

application by or for a member or manager,” this court “may decree dissolution of a

limited liability company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the

business in conformity with a limited liability company agreement.”86

A petitioner need not “show that the purpose of the [LLC] has been

‘completely frustrated.’”87 Dissolution may be appropriate where “the LLC’s

management has become so dysfunctional or its business purpose so thwarted that it

is no longer practicable to operate the business, such as in the case of a voting

deadlock or where the defined purpose of the entity has become impossible to

fulfill.”88 Even if a business can function, the analysis considers whether the “entity

is otherwise stuck within a ‘residual, inertial status quo’ that prevents it from

‘operating or from furthering its stated business purpose.’”89

85
LLC Agreement § 7.1.4.
86
6 Del. C. § 18-802.
87
Fisk Ventures LLC v. Segal, 2009 WL 73957, at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13), aff’d, 984 A.2d
124 (Del. 2009).
88
In re Arrow Inv. Advisors, 2009 WL 1101682, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 23, 2009).
89
Seokoh, Inc. v. Lard-PT, LLC, 2021 WL 1197593, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 2021)
(quoting Fisk Ventures, 2009 WL 73957, at *4).

14
There is no “blueprint for determining whether it is ‘not reasonably

practicable’ for an LLC to continue.”90 But “several factual circumstances indicative

of a lack of ‘reasonable practicability’ have ‘pervaded the case law.’”91 These

factors are: “(1) the members’ vote is deadlocked at the Board level; (2) the operating

agreement gives no means of navigating around the deadlock; and (3) due to the

financial condition of the company, there is effectively no business to operate.”92

The factors are not mandatory and no single factor is dispositive.93

1. Deadlock

The LLC Agreement provides that the “powers of the Company shall be

exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the Company

shall be managed by one or more Managers.”94 Certain matters, though, are reserved

for decision by the members.95 They include dissolving the LLC, which requires

“the unanimous written agreement of the Members.”96 Amending the LLC

90
In re GR Burgr, LLC, 2017 WL 3669511, at *5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2017).
91
Seokoh, 2021 WL 1197593, at *8 (quoting Fisk Ventures, 2009 WL 73957, at *4).
92
Fisk Ventures, 2009 WL 73957, at *4; see also Lola Cars Int’l Ltd. v. Krohn Racing,
LLC, 2009 WL 4052681, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2009).
93
See Seokoh, 2021 WL 1197593, at *8; Fisk Ventures, 2009 WL 73957, at *4.
94
LLC Agreement § 5.1.
95
See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text; e.g., LLC Agreement §§ 5.1(j), 5.2.2,
7.1.2.
96
LLC Agreement § 7.1.2.

15
Agreement or selling the Property similarly require unanimous member consent.97

The LLC Agreement lacks a tie breaking clause.

Konick argues that Gibson is no longer a 50% member of the Company since

he has made more capital contributions than her.98 He believes that based on his

payments on the Note and Loan, his capital account stands at $188,109.18 to

Gibson’s $122,773.30 and that he now holds 60.51% to Gibson’s 39.49%.99 Even

if he were right, it would have no effect on the present deadlock insofar as 2/3 or

unanimous members consent is required.

Konick maintains that there is no deadlock since Gibson did not pursue a

formal meeting of the Company’s members to vote on selling the Property or

dissolving the Company before pursuing relief in this court. But there is no

requirement that a petitioner pursue such actions before claiming deadlock.

“Delaware law does not require a member to plead she made performative proposals

she knew would be dead-on-arrival as a predicate to seeking judicial dissolution.”100

Gibson tried in vain to communicate with Konick both before and during this

litigation. He repeatedly (even cruelly) rebuffed her and denied her access to the

Property.

97
LLC Agreement § 9.3; see id. §§ 4.2, 4.6.1, 4.6.2, 7.1.2.
98
See Def.’s Post-trial Br. (Dkt. 125) 21-24; Konick Tr. 268.
99
See Def.’s Post-trial Br. 22; JX 16.
100
Seokoh, 2021 WL 1197593, at *11.

16
Although Konick is the Company’s manager, its two members are hopelessly

deadlocked. The very fact of this lawsuit evidences Gibson’s desire to dissolve the

Company and recover her investment.101 Konick wishes to retain the Property

through the Company.102 The end of Gibson and Konick’s romantic relationship has

left them unable to amicably communicate for the past two years, let alone reach

consensus on matters requiring 2/3 or unanimous member approval. Given the

mutual hostility expressed at trial, I see no potential for them to resolve their

differences in a way that provides a path forward.103 Gibson has proven deadlock.

2. No Deadlock Breaking Mechanism

The LLC Agreement lacks a viable means for breaking the deadlock. Konick

insists that Section 7.1.2 is an “anti-deadlock provision” because it permits the

members to agree on dissolution.104 That is illogical. Section 7.1.2’s requirement

that dissolution have unanimous member consent is the very reason the present

101
Pl.’s Post-trial Br. (Dkt. 126) 19.
102
See Def.’s Post-trial Br. 29.
103
See Haley v. Talcott, 864 A.2d 86, 96 (Del. Ch. 2004) (finding that the parties were at
an impasse based on evidence including that they had “not interacted since their falling
out” a year before and their “open hostility” toward one another).
104
Def.’s Post-trial Br. 33; Konick Tr. 193-94.

17
deadlock on dissolution exists. In fact, Konick himself views the provision as

leaving Gibson “stuck in the deal.”105

Sections 6.1 and 6.2 of the LLC Agreement outline how Gibson could exit her

investment in the Company. But these exit mechanisms are insufficient alternatives

to dissolution. Section 6.1 of the LLC Agreement prevents Gibson from effectively

transferring her shares to anyone other than Konick, who has declined to purchase

them.106 And Section 6.2 prevents her from receiving the fair market value of her

membership interests if she voluntarily withdraws from the LLC.107 Konick

acknowledges that the exit provisions are “onerous.”108 Proceeding under Sections

6.1 and 6.2 would not permit Gibson “a fair opportunity” to “exit and receive the

fair market value of her interest.”109

Konick argues otherwise based on the text in Section 6.1 stating that each

member acknowledges “the reasonableness of these restrictions in view of the

105
Konick Tr. 255 (“I said she is stuck because the operating agreement says it can’t be
sold unless its unanimous. So, in my view, she was stuck in the deal.”); see also id. at 187-
88.
106
LLC Agreement § 6.1; see Konick Tr. 255. During trial, Konick asked that I give the
parties time to decide whether one is able to buy the other’s interest in the Company.
Konick Tr. 252. As I remarked at the close of trial, he has had ample time. Id. at 292. The
case has not resolved in the more than 20 months since it was filed.
107
LLC Agreement § 6.2.
108
Konick Tr. 188.
109
Haley, 864 A.2d at 96; see also In re Dissolution of T&S Hardwoods KD, LLC, 2023
WL 334674, at *7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 20, 2023) (explaining that a viable exit mechanism is one
that is “equitable in its operation”).

18
purposes of the Company and the relationship of the Members.” 110 That provision

carries little weight. The parties’ purpose of enjoying the home over the long-term

is frustrated and their relationship is irreconcilably damaged. Gibson and Konick

can no longer negotiate a separation of Gibson’s membership in a reasonable way.111

Gibson’s only viable path to exit the Company and recover her investment is through

judicial dissolution.112

3. Frustration of Purpose

The LLC Agreement defines the Company’s purpose as “to purchase, acquire,

buy, sell, own, trade in, hold, develop, lease, manage, and otherwise deal in real

property in Sussex County, Delaware . . . and do any and all things necessary,

convenient, or incidental to that purpose.”113 The Company has no operations. The

Property is and has always been the Company’s sole asset.114 The Property has never

been rented out or otherwise generated income.115 The parties have also not

110
LLC Agreement § 6.1; see Def.’s Post-trial Br. 8-9.
111
See Seokoh, 2021 WL 1197593, at *15.
112
Although it is hypothetically possible for Konick to purchase Gibson’s membership
interests, he has refused to do so. See Konick Tr. 255; supra not 105 and accompanying
text.
113
LLC Agreement § 2.3.
114
PTO ¶ 13.
115
Id. ¶ 5.

19
contemplated buying other properties through the Company.116 Their intention was

to improve the property for personal enjoyment.117

Konick has retained the use of the Property. But he has blocked Gibson from

accessing it.118 Meanwhile, she has ongoing financial obligations through the Loan.

Given the deterioration of her ties to Konick, she is unwilling to continue to cover

costs and maintenance associated with the Property. Konick, too, has expressed

concerns about his ability to afford the Property and its upkeep.119 The Company’s

ability to procure a new loan of $10,000 or more without unanimous member consent

further hamstrings its viability.120

Although it may be feasible for the Company to continue holding the Property,

that would hardly fulfill its intended purpose. The present situation benefits only

Konick. Gibson has been deprived of the upside while she continues to pay costs,

with no guarantee of recovering them. The parties’ intended purpose of using the

Property for pleasure and long-term investment has been meaningfully frustrated.121

116
Id. ¶ 6.
117
E.g., Gibson Tr. 12; Konick Tr. 202.
118
See Konick Tr. 288-89.
119
Id. at 171.
120
See LLC Agreement § 5.1(f).
Although Konick contends that as the Company’s manager he has authority to determine
121

who can use and access the Property, this purported authority is not found in the LLC
Agreement. See Konick Tr. 287.

20
* * *

The parties’ deadlock, the lack of a deadlock-breaking provision or viable exit

mechanism in the LLC Agreement, and the frustration of the Company’s purpose

demonstrate that it is not reasonably practicable for the Company’s business to

continue. Dissolution under Section 18-802 is warranted. Judgment on Count I is

in Gibson’s favor.

B. Relative Ownership Interests and Reimbursement

Gibson seeks a declaration that she remains a 50% member of the Company.

Konick disagrees, citing to the parties’ capital contributions, out of pocket expenses,

and his provision of services to the Company. The parties’ respective membership

interests must be adjusted based on their capital contributions at the time of trial.

They will be entitled to recover certain out of pocket expenses used to improve the

Property. But Konick is not entitled to recover for his services.

1. Ownership Percentages

Section 2.7 of the LLC Agreement provides that the “Percentages” owned by

Konick and Gibson are 50% of the Company’s total interests.122 Those

“Percentages” are also reflected Exhibit A to the LLC Agreement. Exhibit A states

that the ownership “Percentage” of Gibson and Konick are 50%.123

122
LLC Agreement § 2.7.
123
Id. at Ex. A.

21
The term “Percentage” is defined in the LLC Agreement as “the percentage

set forth after the Member’s name on Exhibit A, as amended from time to time based

on each Member’s capital contributions.”124 The members’ initial capital

contributions were $100,000 each, supporting the 50% allocation of membership

interests in Exhibit A to the LLC Agreement as drafted.125 Section 3.2 states that no

further capital contributions were required, “[e]xcept for funds necessary to

discharge the [Note]” of $300,000.126

Gibson argues that the parties’ interests remain 50/50 irrespective of their

additional capital contributions.127 She reads the word “amended” in the definition

of “Percentages” to require that Exhibit A to the LLC Agreement be formally

amended under Section 9.3 for the parties’ initial interests to change. I disagree.

“Amended” is not a defined term. It means “to change or modify.”128 To require

the members to unanimously consent to a formal amendment to Exhibit A to adjust

124
Id. § 1.
125
Id. at Ex. A; see id. § 3.1 (discussing the initial capital contributions).
126
Id. § 3.2.
127
Pl.’s Post-trial Br. 18-19.
128
Amended, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/amended
(last visited July 6, 2024); see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 903 A.2d 728,
738 (Del. 2006) (“Under well-settled case law, Delaware courts look to dictionaries for
assistance in determining the plain meaning of terms which are not defined in a contract.”).

22
their respective ownership stakes would be commercially unreasonable.129 If that

were required, either party could block the other from adjusting his or her stake,

regardless of their relative capital contributions.

The definition of “Percentages” unambiguously reflects the parties’ intention

that their ownership interests correspond to their capital contributions. Exhibit A

can be changed at any time to reflect those interests. Because capital contributions

toward the Note were required by Section 3.2, the parties’ interests should fairly

match their payments toward the Note and successor Loan.

Konick made all payments on the Note—14 monthly payments of $2,333.76

each totaling $32,672.54.130 Konick also made a $25,000 “curtailment payment”

and paid an additional $7,364.24 at closing to pay off of the Note.131 The balance of

the Note was paid through the Loan. As of the trial, Gibson and Konick have made

equal payments on the Loan of $2,070.30, totaling $45,546.60 ($22,773.30 each).132

These payments are appropriately credited towards the parties’ capital contributions.

Konick has made capital contributions of $188,109.18, corresponding to a

60.51% interest. Gibson has made capital contributions of $122,773.30,

129
See Manti Hldgs., LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., 261 A.3d 1199, 1211 (Del. 2021)
(“[I]nterpretations that are commercially unreasonable or that produce absurd results must
be rejected.”).
130
PTO ¶ 8; see JX 26; Konick Tr. 123.
131
JX 26; PTO ¶ 8.
132
See JX 26; JX 35; PTO ¶ 11.

23
corresponding to a 39.49% interest. Declaratory relief will be issued to this effect

for Count II.

2. Reimbursement of Out of Pocket Expenses

At trial, the parties presented extensive evidence of their expenditures toward

improving the Property. Konick contends that they should be counted as capital

contributions. Gibson, however, insists that they are reimbursable out of pocket

expenses rather than capital contributions.

A capital contribution is funds or assets invested into the business itself.133

The LLC Agreement defines “Capital Contribution” as “the total amount of cash and

the fair market value of any other assets contributed or deemed contributed under

the [Internal Revenue Code].”134 The $100,000 payments to acquire the Property—

the focal point of the business—and pay the Note and Loan on the Property are

considered “Additional Capital Contributions” under Section 3.2.135 Expenses, on

the other hand, are costs incurred from operating the business. 136 Funds used for

133
See Capital Contribution, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “capital
contribution” as “[c]ash, property, or services contributed by partners to a partnership”).
134
LLC Agreement § 1.
135
Id. § 3.2.
136
See Expense, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “expense” as “[a]n
expenditure of money, time, labor, or resources to accomplish a result”).

24
materials, supplies, and contractors to improve the Property are fairly viewed as

expenses. The costs at issue fall into the latter category.137

Section 5.8 of the LLC Agreement states that “upon substantiation of the

amount and purpose thereof, the Members shall be entitled to reimbursement for

expenses reasonably incurred in connection with the business of the Company.”138

The record includes a spreadsheet detailing each member’s expenses toward the

remodeling and construction work at the Property.139 This spreadsheet states that

Konick’s expenses total $260,814.08 and that Gibson’s expenses total

$197,120.42.140 But these expenses include the payments on the Note, the

curtailment payment, and payments on the Loan.

To the extent that the expenses are not included in the capital contributions

discussed above, are substantiated, and were “reasonably incurred in connection

with” the Company’s business, they are recoverable under Section 5.8 of the LLC

Agreement.141 Certain expenses, though, are a stretch. For example, Gibson seeks

137
See JX 26 (summarizing expenses and attaching receipts); see JX 31; JX 33.
138
LLC Agreement § 5.8.
139
JX 26.
140
Id.
141
The LLC Agreement requires reimbursement of expenses to creditors and acknowledges
that Section 7.2 acknowledges that the members can be creditors. Pl.’s Post-trial Br. 24.
Gibson invokes this provision regarding the same expenses for which the parties seek
reimbursement under Section 5.8. See LLC Agreement §§ 5.8, 7.2. Because the expenses
are reimbursable under Section 5.8, I need not address Section 7.2.

25
reimbursement for the purchase of televisions and furniture, for Konick’s cell phone,

for cable television, and for a gas station gift card she purchased for Konick.142

These seem to be living expenses, rather than business expenses toward renovating

or improving the Property. Other expenses for which reimbursement is sought lack

substantiation.143 As discussed below, a liquidating trustee will assess the expenses

consistent with this guidance.

3. Compensation for Services

Konick also seeks to be paid for the “sweat equity” he contributed to the

Company, relying on unjust enrichment and quantum meruit theories.144 He asks to

be compensated for legal services at a rate of $250 per hour totaling $9,950. 145 He

also demands compensation for “design, construction, labor, and supervision”

services at a rate of $75 per hour for a total of $61,690.146

Konick insists that Gibson would be unjustly enriched if the Company were

to be dissolved since the value of the Property has increased from $550,000 in 2020

142
See JX 33.
143
See JX 31.
144
Def.’s Post-trial Br. 38-42. These theories were improperly raised as affirmative
defenses rather than compulsory counterclaims. Dkt. 18. Gibson opted not to challenge
them on that basis. See Dkt. 113. They fail in any event.
145
JX 23.
146
JX 24.

26
to over $1 million in value due (in part) to his efforts.147 Similarly, he claims

entitlement to payment “on a quantum meruit” basis.148 But Konick is constrained

by the very terms of the LLC Agreement he drafted.149 Delaware courts have

repeatedly held that there can be no recovery on unjust enrichment or quantum

meruit grounds when a contract governs the parties’ relationship.150

Section 5.8 of the LLC Agreement states that “[u]nless approved by the

members, no member shall be entitled to compensation for services performed by

the Company.”151 Konick argues that this provision is no bar to compensation

147
Gibson Tr. 138-39; see Def.’s Post-trial Br. 38-39.
148
Def.’s Post-trial Br. 41.
149
There is another problem with Konick’s request for “legal services” payments: he is not
barred in Delaware. His testimony prompts one to question whether his services
constituted the unauthorized practice of law in Delaware. See, e.g., Konick Tr. 205-06 (“I
was doing legal work to facilitate the implementation of the sale agreement for the
[Delaware] entity that I was supposed to get. So that may or may not be some technical
violation[.]”). Seeking compensation for these services heightens this concern.
150
See, e.g., Poppiti v. Conaty, 2013 WL 1821621, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 1, 2013)
(“[Q]uantum meruit is a quasi-contractual principal that only operates in the absence of an
express agreement.”); Kuroda v. SPJS Hldgs., L.L.C., 971 A.2d 872, 891 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(“A claim for unjust enrichment is not available if there is a contract that governs the
relationship between parties that gives rise to the unjust enrichment claim.”); S’holder
Representative Servs. LLC v. RSI Holdco, LLC, 2019 WL 2207452, at *1 (Del. Ch. May
22, 2019) (“[A]n unjust enrichment claim cannot lie when a contract governs the parties’
relationship[.]”); Wood v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 401 A.2d 932, 942 (Del. 1979)
(“Because the contract is the measure of [the movant’s] right, there can be no recovery
under an unjust enrichment theory independent of it.”). Konick acknowledges this reality.
See Def.’s Post-trial Br. 41 n.18 (“It is well established that the Court will not consider a
quantum meruit claim against an owner when a party has a contractual avenue for
recovery.”).
151
LLC Agreement § 5.8.

27
because these services “were not performed ‘by the Company.’”152 But as Lord

Chancellor Thurlow of England once observed, a business entity “has no soul to be

damned, and no body to be kicked.”153 An LLC lacks arms to put up drywall or

hands to draft legal agreements. The only reasonable reading of Section 5.8 is that

a member’s services provided “to” or “for the Company” are not compensable.

Accordingly, Konick is not entitled to recover for personal or renovation-related

services.

4. Advancement or Indemnification

Gibson also seeks a declaration that Konick is not entitled to use Company

funds to reimburse his legal fees and expenses in this litigation. 154 It is unclear

whether she continues to press this claim after trial. That may be because the parties

stipulated that the LLC Agreement “does not provide for indemnification or

advancement of the managing member’s expenses or attorneys’ fees.”155

I decline to issue declaratory relief on this aspect of Count II. The parties’

post-trial briefing is silent on the subject and there is agreement on the absence of a

contractual right to indemnification or advancement. Konick has also not sought

advancement or indemnification, leaving the issue unripe. To resolve it now would

152
Def.’s Post-trial Br. 38.
153
Mervyn King, Public Policy and the Corporation 1 (1977).
154
See Compl. ¶ 61; Pl.’s Opening Pre-trial Br. (Dkt. 96) 24-25.
155
PTO ¶ 18; see 6 Del. C. § 18-108.

28
amount to an advisory opinion. If Konick later pursues advancement or

indemnification out of the Company’s funds, Gibson is not barred from raising the

issue anew.

C. Appointment of a Liquidating Trustee

The parties’ post-trial briefs discuss potential plans of dissolution.156 They

have tentatively agreed on a local realtor to list and market the Property and that the

first priority after a sale is to pay off the Loan.157 They insist that there is no need

for the court to appoint a liquidating trustee.

There are, however, many issues left to be resolved in selling the Property and

winding up the Company’s affairs. Konick and Gibson’s deadlock leaves them

unable to direct this process. To limit any dysfunction, they ask that I determine the

fair market value of the Property and set a threshold price above which the parties

must accept an offer. They also ask that I oversee the disbursement of proceeds and

assess whether individual out of pocket expense are reimbursable.158

These issues fall at the outermost bounds of my purview—if not beyond. The

trial record leaves me with no confidence that the parties can cooperate on how the

winding up should proceed. And I am ill-suited to break up disagreements over the

156
Pl.’s Post-trial Br. 29-33; Def.’s Post-trial Br. 46-47.
157
Pl.’s Post-trial Br. 32; Def.’s Post-trial Br. 46.
158
See Pl.’s Post-trial Br. 29-33; Def.’s Post-trial Br. 46.

29
sale of a Fenwick Island beach house. Although Gibson did not seek the

appointment of a liquidating trustee under Section 18-803, I believe it is prudent to

appoint one pursuant to this court’s equitable powers.159 The court appoints Seth L.

Thompson, Esquire to serve in this capacity.

As liquidating trustee, Mr. Thompson will be tasked with overseeing the sale

of the Property. With notice to and in consultation with the parties, he will make a

recommendation to the court on how to dissolve the Company, dispose of its assets,

and resolve its affairs. This proposal will include the allocation of sale proceeds

among the members relative to their ownership interests and the reimbursement of

out of pocket expenses, consistent with this decision and the LLC Agreement.

Mr. Thompson is asked to prepare a proposed order of appointment and to

attempt to attain the parties’ assent to that order. The order should reflect that Mr.

Thompson has the broadest authority contemplated by the LLC Act.

159
See Spellman v. Katz, 2009 WL 418302, at *4 n.28 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2009) (“Although
the Court relies upon 6 Del. C. § 18-803(a) to appoint a liquidating trustee, the same
authority may well be found in the Court’s traditional equitable powers.”); see also Vila v.
BVWebTies LLC, 2010 WL 3866098, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2010) (appointing a
liquidating trustee “with the broadest possible fiduciary powers to wrap up its affairs”); 6
Del. C. § 18-803 (“[T]he Court of Chancery, upon cause shown, may wind up the limited
liability company’s affairs upon application of any member . . . and in connection
therewith, may appoint a liquidating trustee.”).

30
III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, judicial dissolution of the Company is

warranted under 6 Del. C. § 18-802. 23 West Bayard Street, LLC will be dissolved.

As for the declaratory relief sought in Count II, Gibson is a 39.49% member of the

Company and Konick is a 60.51% member of the Company. Seth L. Thompson,

Esquire will serve as liquidating trustee. Within 14 days, and after notice to the

parties, Mr. Thompson is asked to file a proposed order implementing this decision

and outlining the scope of his appointment.

31