Adam Grabski v. Marc Andreessen

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

ADAM GRABSKI, derivatively on )
behalf of COINBASE GLOBAL, INC., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. 2023-0464-KSJM
)
MARC ANDREESSEN, BRIAN )
ARMSTRONG, SUROJIT )
CHATTERJEE, EMILIE CHOI, )
FREDERICK ERNEST EHRSAM III, )
ALESIA J. HAAS, KATHRYN HAUN, )
JENNIFER JONES, and FRED )
WILSON, )
)
Defendants, and )
)
COINBASE GLOBAL, INC., )
)
Nominal Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Date Submitted: October 16, 2023
Date Decided: February 1, 2024

Gregory V. Varallo, Mae Oberste, Daniel Meyer, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER
& GROSSMAN LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Edward G. Timlin, BERNSTEIN
LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMAN LLP, New York, New York; Robert E. Bishop,
Frank Partnoy, BISHOP PARTNOY LLP, Washington, District of Columbia; Brian
Schall, THE SCHALL LAW FIRM, Los Angeles, California; Counsel for Plaintiff
Adam Grabski.

David E. Ross, Adam D. Gold, S. Reiko Rogozen, ROSS ARONSTAM & MORITZ LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware; Andrew Clubok, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, Washington,
District of Columbia; Matthew Rawlinson, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, Menlo Park,
California; Morgan E. Whitworth, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, San Francisco,
California; Counsel for Individual Defendants Marc Andreessen, Brian Armstrong,
Surojit Chatterjee, Emilie Choi, Federick Ernest Ehrsam III, Alesia J. Hass, Kathryn
Haun, Jennifer Hones, Fred Wilson, and Nominal Defendant Coinbase Global, Inc.

McCORMICK, C.
Cryptocurrency platform Coinbase Global, Inc. went public through a direct

listing. The defendants were directors and officers of Coinbase and sold $2.9 billion

worth of stock in the direct listing. A month later, the company announced

disappointing quarterly earnings and that it was raising capital through a notes

offering. After this announcement, the company’s stock price declined precipitously.

By selling their shares before the announcement, the defendants avoided losses of

approximately $1.09 billion. The plaintiff, who acquired Coinbase stock through the

direct listing, filed this derivative suit alleging that the defendants sold their stock

based on material non-public information and were unjustly enriched by the sales.

The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Court of

Chancery Rules 23.1 and 12(b)(6). They argue that the plaintiff has failed to plead

facts sufficient to impugn the impartiality of the company’s board for purposes of Rule

23.1. They further argue that the plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that the

defendants had material non-public information and possessed the requisite scienter

when selling their shares for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6).

Although the defendants’ briefs read like a philosophical apology for direct

listings, the plaintiff’s claims do not place that relatively nascent transactional

structure on the chopping block. Rather, this is yet another instance where a

stockholder plaintiff calls on this court to deploy “well-worn fiduciary principles” to a

new transactional setting.1 Applying those principles and drawing the plaintiff-

1 In re MultiPlan Corp. S’holders Litig., 268 A.3d 784, 792 (Del. Ch. 2022) (applying

well-worn fiduciary principles in the SPAC context).
friendly inferences called for at this stage of the litigation, the court concludes that

plaintiff has met the demand requirement and stated a well-pled claim. The motions

are denied.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts are drawn from the Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint (the

“Complaint”) and documents it incorporates by reference.2

A. Coinbase

Founded in 2012 by defendants Brian Armstrong and Frederick Ernest

Ehrsam III, Coinbase is a Delaware corporation that owns and operates the largest

cryptocurrency trading platform in the United States by trading volume. Coinbase

was privately held until 2021, when it was directly listed on the Nasdaq exchange.

Over 90% of Coinbase’s revenue derives from brokerage fees. Before the direct

listing, the brokerage fee landscape was changing. Market analysts and research

firms had highlighted the importance of retail fees to Coinbase’s business model and

cautioned about the industry’s sensitivity to changes in brokerage fees. In early 2021,

the Coinbase Board of Directors (the “Board”) and its senior management considered

the sustainability of Coinbase’s fee revenues in the face of industry-wide “fee

compression”3 and learned that customers and corresponding fee revenues were

moving away from the Coinbase retail platform.

2 C.A. No. 2023-0464-KSJM, Docket (“Dkt.”) 1 (“Compl.”).

3 Id. ¶ 81.

2
Also at that time, Coinbase was reviewing various capital raising options.

Before the direct listing, the Board had studied projections on Coinbase’s liquidity

situation and sensitivity in shock situations.

B. Events Leading To The Direct Listing

The Board met on August 4, 2020, to discuss taking Coinbase public. A slide

deck presented to the Board listed the following among the Board’s objectives:

“liquidity (first to employees, then to existing investors)” and “no dilution.”4 Of the

two paths to going public discussed by the Board—a traditional initial public offering

(“IPO”) or a direct listing—the Board viewed the direct listing as best suited to

achieve its liquidity and anti-dilution goals. The Board therefore approved pursuing

a direct listing. In October 2020, Coinbase filed a confidential registration statement

on its Form S-1 with the SEC indicating its intent to go public by a direct listing

without raising any capital (the “Registration Statement”).

1. Overview Of Direct Listings

Through an IPO, a company sells a portion of its shares to one or more

underwriters who, in turn, make the offering with their own capital. The

underwriters’ role in an IPO has at least two important consequences. First, the

underwriters perform diligence before the transaction, which serves as a check on

management. Second, underwriters typically require the company to implement a

lock-up period for its directors and officers to prevent misuse of insider information.5

4 Id. ¶ 40.

5 Id. ¶¶ 32, 35.

3
Unlike an IPO, a direct listing involves the sale of existing company shares

directly to the public. No new shares are required, and no underwriters are involved.

Instead, the public purchases the shares held by the company’s existing stockholders,

who typically include directors and officers. The offering company has the option—

but is not required—to implement safeguards to protect investors.

Direct listings have increased in popularity since Spotify’s listing in 2018.6

Although a direct listing is cheaper and faster than an IPO, a direct listing’s limited

disclosure requirements, lack of underwriter diligence, and optional investor

safeguards has raised scholarly concern.7

The initial price in a direct listing, called the “reference price,” is determined

by the listing company with the help of accountants and other professionals.8 To

determine this price, Nasdaq requires the listing company to provide certain

information. Companies often hire investment bankers to run a mini-exchange—a

secondary trading program—to gauge the public perception of the company’s value.

When setting the reference price, considerations include the company’s public

financial information, previous private market valuations, value of competitors, and

6 See Andrew F. Touch & Joel Seligman, The Further Erosion of Investor Protection

Expanded Exemptions, SPAC Mergers, and Direct Listings, 108 Iowa L. Rev. 303, 356
(2022) (describing the 13 direct listings between 2018 and 2022 in the United States).
7 See, e.g., Brent J. Horton, Spotify’s Direct Listing: Is it a Recipe for Gatekeeper

Failure?, 72 SMU L. Rev. 177, 203–06 (2019) (outlining the reputational, contractual,
and statutory pressures that underwriters face as “gatekeepers” of investor
protection).
8 Compl. ¶¶ 6, 8, 40–51.

4
internal discounted cash flow valuations. Nasdaq works in concert with the

company’s financial advisor to determine the reference price.

2. The Secondary Trading Program

On November 13, 2020, the Board and Coinbase management met to discuss

running a secondary trading program (the “Secondary Trading Program”) that would

facilitate price discovery to set the reference price for the direct listing. The program

launched on January 7, 2021. The Board prohibited directors and officers from

participating in the secondary trading program due to the risk of material

information asymmetry between insiders and market participations.

3. Board Approval

On December 11, 2020, the Board, alongside Coinbase’s senior officers, met to

discuss initial feedback on Coinbase’s registration statement with the SEC. During

this meeting, the Board discussed “potential capital raising opportunities and

structures.”9 The Board considered the option of a modified IPO instead of a direct

listing. The Board’s objectives were to “minimize dilution and cost of issuance (i.e.,

banker’s fees and discount).”10 The Board discussed issuing convertible notes but

decided to deprioritize an issuance until “the right time.”11 Coinbase continued to

work toward a direct listing.

9 Id. ¶ 55.

10 Id. ¶ 57.

11 Id. ¶ 56.

5
On February 23, 2021, the Board and senior officers met to finalize the direct

listing. The Board learned that the “executive team [was] aligned on no lockups for

all stockholders (investors and employees).”12

On March 26, 2021, the Board approved a direct listing (the “Direct Listing”).

The Board did not impose a lock-up period on insiders.

4. The Andersen Report

Coinbase hired Andersen Tax LLC to prepare valuation reports in connection

with Section 409A regulations of the Internal Revenue Code, as well as prepare the

Financial Accounting Standards Board Accounting Standards Codification Topic 718

– Compensation.

Using a valuation date of March 15, 2021, Andersen issued a report (the

“Andersen Report”) determining that Coinbase’s fair value was $303.75 per share (the

“Andersen Valuation”). The Andersen Valuation gave 50% weight to the average

stock price that emerged out of the Secondary Trading Program, which was $343.58

per share, and 50% weight to the value produced under the weighted expected return

method (“PWERM”), which was $263.90 per share. The PWERM method involved

“the estimation of future potential outcomes for the company, as well as values and

probabilities associated with each respective potential outcome.”13

Andersen also conducted a discounted cash flow analysis based on

management’s projections to arrive at a value of Coinbase that was lower than the

12 Id. ¶ 87.

13 Id. ¶ 93.

6
value implied by the per-share price of the secondary trading program and the

PWERM.

The Board approved the Andersen Report on March 26, 2021.

5. Q1 Results And Guidance

In its April 6, 2021 guidance on earnings, Coinbase announced its first quarter

results and provided investors full year guidance on users, revenue, and expenses.

Coinbase did not disclose information concerning fee compression or potential

liquidity struggles. In response to the release, Compass Point, a research firm, noted

that the “somewhat limited financial information” in the guidance (such as the lack

of a breakdown in total revenues) and “inherent volatility of cryptocurrency” made it

difficult to analyze the value of the Company.14

6. The Direct Listing

On April 13, 2021, Nasdaq set Coinbase’s reference price at $250 per share.

The next day, Coinbase became a Nasdaq-listed company, and its stock opened at

$380, rising to as high as $429 on the first day of trading.

Not constrained by a lock-up period, the members of Coinbase’s board and its

senior officers sold Coinbase stock worth $2.9 billion. Thirteen of the eighteen sales

were completed by April 15, 2021. The only board member or officer who sold after

April 15 was Fred Ehrsam, whose last sale was on April 22, 2021.

14 Id. ¶ 102.

7
C. Events After The Direct Listing

By April 23, 2021, Coinbase’s stock price had fallen to a range of $282.75 to

$291.60 per share. During an April 28, 2021 meeting, the Board approved the

issuance and sale of up to $2 billion of convertible notes. The objective of the notes

offering was “to build [a] balance sheet for working capital and acquisition

capacity[.]”15

Two weeks after the Direct Listing, the Board reviewed Coinbase’s pricing

strategy and fee compression issues affecting peer companies.16 A slide from that

presentation noted the “inevitability of fee compression” in the crypto industry.17 The

Board also reviewed some initiatives under consideration to blunt the blow of fee

compression to Coinbase’s revenues.

On May 13, 2021, Coinbase announced that its retail transaction fee rate had

fallen. Analysts noted that the fee rate was “largely driven by retail mix shift towards

Coinbase Pro which has tiered pricing.”18 Coinbase’s stock dropped 2.54% on the day

of the earnings release.

Coinbase announced the notes offering on May 17, 2021. The offering was met

with market curiosity because Coinbase was “generat[ing] positive cash flow, [wa]s

15 Id. ¶¶ 109–12.

16 Id. ¶¶ 81–83.
17 Id.

18 Id. ¶ 124.

8
growing rapidly,” and had just completed the Direct Listing.19 Within minutes of the

issuance, Coinbase’s stock dropped 2.9%.

D. This Litigation

Plaintiff Adam Grabski (“Plaintiff”) bought Coinbase stock on the first day of

the Direct Listing. He filed this action on April 26, 2023, asserting claims for breach

of fiduciary duty (Count I) and unjust enrichment (Count II) against the five Coinbase

directors (the “Director Defendants”) and four Coinbase officers (the “Officer

Defendants”) (together, with the Director Defendants, “Defendants”) who sold stock

in the Direct Listing. The Director Defendants are Marc Andreessen, Ehrsam, Brian

Armstrong, Kathryn Haun, and Fred Wilson. The Officer Defendants are Emilie Choi

(Chief Operating Officer), Alesia Haas (Chief Financial Officer), Jennifer Jones (Chief

Accounting Officer), and Surojit Chatterjee (Chief Product Officer).

At the time Plaintiff filed this action, the Board (the “Demand Board”)

comprised Armstrong, Andreessen, Ehrsam, Haun, Wilson, Kelly Kramer, Gokul

Rajaram, and Tobias Lutke. All but Lutke were members of the Board at the time of

the Direct Listing.

On June 30, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to

Court of Chancery Rules 23.1 and 12(b)(6), and the parties completed briefing on

September 27, 2023.20 The court held oral argument on October 16, 2023.

19 Id. ¶ 129.

20 Dkt. 15 (“Defs.’ Opening Br.”); Dkt. 23 (“Pl.’s Answering Br.”); Dkt. 25 (“Defs.’ Reply

Br.”).

9
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

This analysis first addresses the dismissal arguments concerning Count I for

breach of fiduciary duty and then turns to the arguments concerning Count II for

unjust enrichment.

A. The Fiduciary Duty Claims

In Count I, Plaintiff claims under Brophy v. Cities Service Co.21 that the

Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by improperly selling their shares

through the Direct Listing while in possession of material, nonpublic company

information (“MNPI”).

Defendants have moved to dismiss Count I under Rule 12(b)(6). The Rule

12(b)(6) standard in Delaware “is reasonable ‘conceivability.’”22 When considering

such a motion, the court must “accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the

[c]omplaint as true . . . , draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and

deny the motion unless the plaintiff could not recover under any reasonably

conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.”23 The court, however, need not

“accept conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts or . . . draw unreasonable

inferences in favor of the non-moving party.”24

21 70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949).

22 Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Hldgs. LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 536

(Del. 2011).
23 Id. at 536 (citing Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896–97 (Del. 2002)).

24 Price v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 166 (Del. 2011) (citing Clinton

v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 977 A.2d 892, 895 (Del. 2009)).

10
Defendants have also moved to dismiss Count I under Rule 23.1. A Brophy

claim is derivative in nature “because it arises out of the misuse of corporate

property—that is, confidential information—by a fiduciary of the corporation, for the

benefit of the fiduciary and to the detriment of the corporation.”25 As a derivative

claim, Count I is subject to the demand requirement.

“A cardinal precept of [Delaware law] is that directors, rather than

shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation.”26 “In a derivative

suit, a stockholder seeks to displace the board’s authority over a litigation asset and

assert the corporation’s claim.”27 Because derivative litigation impinges on the

managerial freedom of directors in this way, “a stockholder only can pursue a cause

25 Latesco, L.P. v. Wayport, Inc., 2009 WL 2246793, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009).

26 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (citing 8 Del. C. § 141(a)), overruled

on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). In Brehm, 746 A.2d
at 253–54, the Delaware Supreme Court overruled seven precedents, including
Aronson, to the extent those precedents reviewed a Rule 23.1 decision by the Court of
Chancery under an abuse of discretion standard or otherwise suggested a deferential
appellate review. See id. at 253 & n.13 (overruling in part on this issue Scattered
Corp. v. Chi. Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70, 72–73 (Del. 1997); Grimes v. Donald, 673
A.2d 1207, 1217 n.15 (Del. 1996); Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 952
(Del. 1992); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d
180, 186 (Del. 1988); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624–25 (Del. 1984); and Aronson,
473 A.2d at 814). The Brehm Court held that going forward, appellate review of a
Rule 23.1 determination would be de novo and plenary. 746 A.2d at 253–54. The
seven partially overruled precedents otherwise remain good law. This decision does
not rely on any of them for the standard of appellate review. Although the technical
rules of legal citation would require noting that each was reversed on other grounds
by Brehm, this decision omits the subsequent history, which creates the
misimpression that Brehm rejected core elements of the Rule 23.1 canon.
27 United Food & Com. Workers Union & Participating Food Indus. Empls. Tri-State

Pension Fund v. Zuckerberg, 250 A.3d 862, 876 (Del. Ch. 2020), aff’d, 262 A.3d 1034
(2021).

11
of action belonging to the corporation if (i) the stockholder demanded that the

directors pursue the corporate claim and they wrongfully refused to do so or

(ii) demand is excused because the directors are incapable of making an impartial

decision regarding the litigation.”28 The demand requirement is a substantive

principle under Delaware law.29

Rule 23.1 is the “procedural embodiment” of the demand requirement.30 Under

Rule 23.1, a derivative complaint must “state with particularity: . . . any effort by the

derivative plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the entity; and . . . the reasons

for not obtaining the action or not making the effort[.]”31

A stockholders can satisfy the demand requirement by pleading that demand

is futile. To plead demand futility, the complaint must allege “particularized factual

statements that are essential to the claim.”32 Although the requirement of factual

particularity is a heightened pleading requirement, it “does not entitle a court to

discredit or weigh the persuasiveness of well-pled allegations.”33 If a plaintiff pleads

particularized facts, those factual allegations “are accepted as true” and “[p]laintiffs

28 Id.

29 Id.; see Ct. Ch. R. 23.1(a).

30 Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932 (Del. 1993).

31 Ct. Ch. R. 23.1(a)(1) (as amended Sept. 25, 2023).

32 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254.

33 Zuckerberg, 250 A.3d at 877 (citing cases).

12
are entitled to all reasonable factual inferences that logically flow from the

particularized facts alleged[.]”34

In Zuckerberg, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted Vice Chancellor Laster’s

“universal test” for demand futility that blends elements of the two precursor tests:

Aronson35 and Rales.36 When conducting a demand futility analysis under

Zuckerberg, Delaware courts ask, on a director-by-director basis:

(i) whether the director received a material personal
benefit from the alleged misconduct that is the subject of
the litigation demand;

(ii) whether the director faces a substantial likelihood of
liability on any of the claims that would be the subject of
the litigation demand; and

(iii) whether the director lacks independence from someone
who received a material personal benefit from the alleged
misconduct that would be the subject of the litigation
demand or who would face a substantial likelihood of
liability on any of the claims that are the subject of the
litigation demand.37

“If the answer to any of the questions is ‘yes’ for at least half of the members

of the demand board, then demand is excused as futile.”38 Although the Zuckerberg

34 Id. (citing cases).

35 473 A.2d 805.

36 634 A.2d 927.

37 Zuckerberg, 262 A.3d at 1059 (quoting Zuckerberg, 250 A.3d at 890).

38 Id.

13
test displaced the prior tests from Aronson and Rales, cases properly applying

Aronson and Rales remain good law.39

When Plaintiff initiated this action, the Demand Board comprised eight

directors. So, to adequately allege demand futility, Plaintiff must plead

particularized facts creating reason to doubt that at least four of the eight were

incapable of impartially considering a demand.40 Plaintiff argues that the five

Director Defendants (Andreeseen, Armstrong, Ehrsam, Haun, and Wilson) on the

Demand Board were incapable of impartially considering a demand.

Plaintiff advances arguments under the first and second prongs of Zuckerberg.

Plaintiff argues that the Director Defendants are interested because they received

material personal benefits when they sold stock worth billions of dollars in the Direct

Listing. Plaintiff also argues that the Director Defendants face a substantial

likelihood of liability based on the Brophy claims.

The analysis of Count I proceeds in three parts. First, the court addresses the

argument that the Director Defendants are interested under Zuckerberg because they

received material personal benefits.

39 Id. In 2023, the Court of Chancery amended its rules to reflect the Delaware
Supreme Court’s adoption of the Zuckerberg test and modernize the language and
presentation of the Rules to bring them closer in style to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See In re: Amendments to Rules 7, 10, 17–25, and 171 of the Court of
Chancery Rules, Sections, III, IV, and XVI (Del. Ch. Sept. 25, 2023) (ORDER).
40 In re INFOUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963, 989–90 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(“Plaintiffs must show that a majority—or in a case where there are an even number
of directors, exactly half—of the board was incapable of considering demand.”).

14
Second, the court addresses the Director Defendants face a substantial

likelihood of liability based on the Brophy claims. Because showing that a defendant

faces a substantial likelihood of liability from a claim requires that the claim be

legally viable, as to the Director Defendants, the Rule 23.1 analysis effectively folds

into the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis.

Third, the court turns to Count I against the Officer Defendants, which largely

overlaps with that of the Director Defendants. There is one point of divergence: The

factual bases for the Brophy claim against the Officers Defendants are slightly from

those alleged against the Director Defendants.

1. Material Personal Benefit

A director is disabled for demand futility purposes if they received a material

personal benefit from the wrongdoing that was not shared equally with the

stockholders.41 Whether a benefit is material is a question of fact that takes into

consideration the amount, the recipient’s wealth, and the circumstances surrounding

the benefit.

Plaintiff alleges with particularity the details of the Director Defendants’ (and

Officer Defendants’) trades, including the dates, number of shares, and amounts

sold.42 The sales were for staggering amounts. $52 million for Haun, $ 61 million for

Chatterjee, $99 million for Haas, $118 million for Andreessen, $219 million for

Ehrsam, $223 million for Choi, $291 million for Armstrong, $1.8 billion for Wilson,

41 Zuckerberg, 262 A.3d at 1058; Rales, 634 A.2d at 936.

42 Compl. ¶ 106.

15
and a paltry $43 million for Jones.43 These sales resulted in benefits to the

Defendants totaling almost $2.93 billion, with no Director Defendant receiving less

than $50 million.

Plaintiff argues that it is reasonably conceivable that this amount of money

was material to each Director Defendant such that none could impartially consider a

pre-suit litigation demand attacking the sales. Plaintiff need not allege facts

concerning each Director Defendant’s personal wealth to support this conclusion—

$50 million is presumptively material.44

Defendants advance three arguments in response. They first argue that

Plaintiff waived his ability to make arguments concerning the Director Defendants’

material personal benefits because he failed to adequately plead this legal theory in

his Complaint.45 Impliedly, the Director Defendants argue that Rule 23.1 requires

that a stockholder plaintiff plead their legal theories with particularity. But that is

not how Rule 23.1 works. Rather, Rule 23.1 requires that a derivative complaint

plead facts with particularity. Plaintiff did so here. At the pleadings stage, drawing

all inferences from the particularized facts in Plaintiffs’ favor, it is reasonably

43 Id. (approximate figures).

44See MultiPlan, 268 A.3d at 813 (“A greater than half-million-dollar payout is
presumptively material at the motion to dismiss stage.”); Orman v. Cullman, 794
A.2d 5, 31 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“I think it would be naïve to say, as a matter of law, that
$3.3 million is immaterial.”).
45 Defs.’ Reply Br. at 31.

16
conceivable that the Director Defendants received a material personal benefit that

would compromise their impartiality in considering demand.46

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff’s materiality arguments boil down to a

collateral attack on the Board’s decision to structure the Direct Listing without

a lock-up. From this premise, Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to

challenge the Board’s decision on how to structure the Direct Listing because Plaintiff

was not a stockholder at the time that the Board made that decision.47 But Plaintiff’s

materiality argument is not based—necessarily or actually—on the decision on how

to structure the Direct Listing. Rather, Plaintiff challenges the Defendants’ sales

made in that listing.

Defendants’ last argument is that selling stock cannot give rise to a “personal

benefit,” for the purpose of demand futility on a Brophy claim.48 For this proposition,

Defendants rely on Guttman v. Huang.49 There, the plaintiff brought a Brophy claim

against the officers and directors of NVIDIA who sold a total of $194.6 million worth

of company stock over two years.50 During that period, the defendants were allegedly

aware of accounting irregularities that inflated the company’s trading price and,

46 In re Carvana Co. S’holders Litig., 2022 WL 2352457, at *18 (Del. Ch. June 30,

2022) (holding same at pleadings stage in entire fairness context where a director
may have avoided the same level of dilution as public stockholders before a direct
offering).
47 Defs.’ Reply Br. at 31–33.

48 Defs.’ Opening Br. at 36–37; Defs.’ Reply Br. at 32–33.

49 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2013).

50 Id. at 493.

17
ultimately, caused the company to restate its financials.51 The defendants moved to

dismiss the complaint under Rule 23.1. The plaintiffs argued that demand was futile

because each of the demand board members traded stock during the relevant period.

The court rejected this argument, holding that selling stock in the market at a time

while in possession of MNPI did not give rise to a personal interest for demand futility

purposes.52

In reaching this conclusion, the Guttman court did not deny that, in the real

world, stock sales can provide a material personal benefit to directors. Rather, the

court based its holding on policy grounds. The court reasoned that it would be

“unwise to formulate a common law rule that makes a director ‘interested’ whenever

a derivative plaintiff cursorily alleges that he made sales of company stock in the

market at a time when he possessed material, non-public information.”53 The court

concluded that such a rule would create a “hair-trigger demand excusal” inconsistent

with the purpose of the demand requirement.54 To avoid setting a bar for demand

futility too low, the court held that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the director had

a substantial likelihood of liability.

Defendants characterize the court’s holding in Guttman as a categorical

rejection of “the notion that directors have a disabling ‘personal interest’ based on

51 Id. at 497.

52 Id. at 502.

53 Id.

54 Id.

18
stock sales alone.”55 And that is one fair reading of the case. But Defendants’ reading

improperly detaches the Guttman court’s holdings from the case-specific concerns.

Throughout Guttman, the court repeatedly emphasized that the plaintiff’s allegations

were “cursory.”56 The court, therefore, could have probably allayed the “hair-trigger”

concern by deeming the stock sales a material personal benefit and then running the

Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, under which the cursorily alleged MNPI and scienter elements

would have failed.

In all events, Guttman did not require that this court ignore basic aspects of

human nature when evaluating whether a director received a material personal

benefit. Just as it would be “unwise” to say that a director always materially benefits

55 Defs.’ Reply Br. at 33 (citing Guttman, 823 A.2d at 502.).

56 Guttman, 823 A.2d at 493–94 (“[w]hen the case most cries out for the pleading of

real facts—e.g., about the board’s knowledge of the accounting problems at the
company or the company’s audit committee process—the complaint is at its most
cursory””); id. at 495 (noting “[u]nhelpfully, the complaint fails to detail specifically
the net result of [the financial] restatements” and asserting that the omission
appeared “tactical[]” so as to “leav[e] the court without a way to assess the magnitude
of the corrections”); id. at 498 (noting “[t]he complaint is entirely devoid of
particularized allegations of fact demonstrating that the outside directors had actual
or constructive notice of the accounting improprieties”); id. at 498 (noting “the
complaint is devoid of any pleading regarding the full board’s involvement in the
preparation and approval of the company’s financial statements”); id. at 498 (noting
the complaint does not include information concerning “[t]he actual trading patterns
of the defendants—particularly the outside directors—during the periods preceding
the Contested Period, or the relationship of their trades to options vesting periods, or
to the end of restrictions on marketability that may have been imposed when NVIDIA
first went public”); id. at 504 (“The cursory allegations of the complaint in this action
do not come close to meeting the plaintiffs’ burden to show that these five defendants
face a substantial threat of liability for insider trading-based fiduciary duty
violations. Nothing in the complaint provides any particularized basis to infer that
these outside directors had any idea about the questionable accounting practices.
This is fatal to the plaintiffs’ effort to show demand excusal.”).

19
under Zuckerberg when she sells company stock, it would be unwise to say a director

never materially benefits under Zuckerberg even if she receives a gargantuan

financial benefit. In the real world, the billions of dollars made by the Director

Defendants constitutes a material personal benefit that would render a director

incapable of impartially considering a demand attacking those sales. Demand is

excused on this basis.

2. Substantial Likelihood Of Liability

Even if Guttman is read to categorically foreclose the possibility that a director

can receive a material personal benefit for demand futility purposes from the sale of

stock, Plaintiff has satisfied the demand requirement because the Director

Defendants face a substantial likelihood of liability based on the Brophy claims.

To state a claim under Brophy, a plaintiff must plead that the defendants:

(a) possessed MNPI; and (b) used that information to make trades because the

defendants were motivated by the substance of that information (the scienter

requirement).57 To plead a substantial likelihood of liability, a plaintiff must “make

a threshold showing, through the allegation of particularized facts, that their claims

have some merit.”58 At the pleading stage, a Brophy claim “rests on circumstantial

facts and a successful claim typically includes allegations of unusually large,

57 In re Oracle, Corp., 867 A.2d 904, 934 (Del. Ch. 2004); see also Guttman, 823 A.2d

at 505.
58 Rales, 634 A.2d at 934.

20
suspiciously timed trades that allow a reasonable inference of scienter.”59 Plaintiff

has made the threshold showing as to both elements.

a. Possession Of MNPI

Plaintiff alleges that the Director Defendants possessed four categories of

MNPI prior to the Direct Listing.60 Given that only one category must be pled, the

court will restrict the analysis to one—the Andersen Report. Plaintiff claims that the

Director Defendants knew that the Andersen Report valued the Company’s stock well

below its trading price when they sold into the Direct Listing.

Plaintiff has pled knowledge. Plaintiff alleges that the Board (containing the

Director Defendants) approved the Andersen Report by unanimous written consent

on March 26, 2021.61 From this, the court can infer that the Director Defendants had

knowledge of the contents of the Andersen Report.

Plaintiff has pled that the Andersen Report was not public. It was not disclosed

in the Registration Statement, the Q1 2021 pre-earnings release materials, or any

other public source. Defendants concede that the Andersen Report was non-public

because they consistently redacted its price out of the public versions of the

Complaint until after oral argument.62

59 In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Deriv. Litig., 2019 WL 4850188, at *15 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1,

2019) (quoting Oracle, 867 A.2d at 954).
60 Plaintiff argues that the following categories constituted MNPI in Defendants’

possession: (i) the Andersen Valuation; (ii) information on Coinbase’s future
performance after the Direct Listing; (iii) information on Coinbase’s cash struggles;
and (iv) information on fee compression.
61 Compl. ¶ 91.

62 Dkt. 35.

21
Plaintiff has pled that the information in the Andersen Report was material.

“For information to be material, there must be a ‘substantial likelihood’ that the

nonpublic fact ‘would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations’ of a

person deciding whether to buy, sell, vote, or tender stock.”63 If the information were

disclosed, it would “significantly alter[] the ‘total mix’ of information in the

marketplace.”64 In determining materiality, the court will consider the context and

reliability of the information, including whether the information was known to the

market.65

The Andersen Report determined that the fair value of the Company’s stock

was $303.75.66 This figure was the weighted average of the trading price of Coinbase

stock in the Secondary Trading Program ($343.58) and a probability-based figure

determined by Andersen ($263.90).67 Moreover, each Director Defendant knew that,

using the management projections, Andersen’s DCF analysis arrived at a valuation

of Coinbase of $50.025 billion, which was below the total equity value implied by

Andersen’s per-share analysis. It was the Secondary Trading Program valuation of

$343.58—set by buyers who had the same informational disadvantage as the rest of

the market—that pushed the Andersen Valuation to $303.75 per share. The $303.75

63 Oracle, 867 A.2d at 934 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del.

1985)).
64 Id.

65 Id.

66 Id.

67 Id. ¶¶ 93–96.

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valuation, DCF analysis, and underlying management projections concerning the

value of Coinbase would have had actual significance to persons who purchased stock

from Defendants in the Direct Listing in the $300s and $400s.68

Defendants argue that the Andersen Report should not be considered material

for three reasons. First, there is no caselaw citing a 409A valuation as material in

this or analogous contexts.69 Second, Andersen provided Coinbase with eight

valuation reports leading up to the Direct Listing, and each valuation was higher

than the one before.70 Third, the Board would have considered the prices in the

Secondary Trading Program, which were disclosed to the market, more reliable than

the 409A valuation, and they question the report’s reliability generally.71

Defendants’ arguments can be disposed of quickly. First, the lack of caselaw

concerning the 409A valuation is not dispositive of anything; this court encounters

new issues and new arguments with some frequency. Nor does the conclusion that it

is reasonably conceivable that the Andersen Report was MNPI render all 409A

valuations MNPI. The court has reviewed the contents of the Andersen Report. The

contents and its timing in relation to the Direct Listing inform the court’s conclusion.

Second, the fact that there were many valuations prior to the Andersen Report does

68 See generally Silverberg v. Gold, 2013 WL 6859282, at *10 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2013)

(noting that information is material if there is “a substantial likelihood that the
nonpublic fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of a
person deciding whether to buy, sell, vote, or tender stock”).
69 Defs.’ Reply Br. at 2, 10.

70 Id. at 10–11.

71 Id. at 10–12.

23
not diminish the materiality of the one closest to the timing of the Direct Listing.

Third, Defendants’ arguments attacking the reliability of the report invites the sort

of defendant-friendly inference that is inappropriate at the pleadings stage.

b. Scienter

To state a claim under Brophy, a plaintiff must allege that not only the

fiduciary possessed material, nonpublic company information, but also that “the

corporate fiduciary used that information improperly by making trades because she

was motivated, in whole or in part, by the substance of that information.”72

This court considers a variety of factors when evaluating whether a plaintiff

has adequately alleged the scienter necessary to support a Brophy claim.

“[A]llegations of unusually large, suspiciously timed trades”73 are informative.

Those allegations generally include:

 the timing of the trade, including the proximity between the trade and
the time the defendants learn of MNPI,74 and the expiration date for any
options or restrictions (like lock-ups);75

 the size of the trade relative to the defendant’s overall stock holdings;76
and

 the size of the trades and the type of compensation (cash or shares).77

The court considers all these factors in their totality.

72 Oracle, 867 A.2d at 934.

73 Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188 at *15.

74 Id.

75 Guttman, 823 A.2d at 504.

76 Id.

77 Id.

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Plaintiff has adequately alleged scienter. Plaintiff pleads facts concerning: the

timing of the trades; the size of the trades—above $40 million in the aggregate; the

amount of “each sale by each individual defendant”;78 the lack of a lock-up as

compared to the secondary trading program; the fact that management recommended

no lock-up; the lack of time between the valuation and the trading; and that the

Defendants received cash instead of options or some other renumeration.79 These

facts are sufficient to support an inference that the Director Defendants were

motivated by the substance of the MNPI.

Defendants advance two arguments in response. First, they cite Delaware

cases for the proposition that the Director Defendants must have sold a larger

proportion of their holdings to give rise to a pleadings-stage inference of scienter.80

Second, they argue that the Director Defendants lacked scienter because they could

have made more money by selling more stock after the initial sales but did not.

As to the first point, the portion of shares sold can speak to the reasonableness

of inferring scienter, but it is not the litmus test that the Director Defendants

78 Id. at 505.

79 There are competing inferences for why Defendants sold their stock right after the

Direct Listing opened. A defendant-friendly one is that Defendants were motivated
to rapidly create a liquid market for Coinbase. An alternative plaintiff-friendly
inference is that Defendants were selling quickly to make a profit. At this stage of
the litigation, the court must draw all inferences in favor of Plaintiff.
80 Defs.’ Opening Br. at 32–33 (citing Oracle, 867 A.2d at 955; TrueCar, 2020 WL

5816761, at *25; Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *15; Guttman, 823 A.2d at 503–04).

25
describe.81 To determine whether there is a reasonable inference of scienter, this

court considers the totality of facts alleged, including the timing and size, not just the

proportion of the sale to overall holdings. In In re Clovis Oncology, for example, the

court did not infer scienter where the sales were made well before (half a year) the

alleged MNPI was disclosed to the market, there were no deviations from past trading

practices, and the sales were for a total of only $4 million, representing a small

portion of each defendant’s overall holdings.82 By contrast, here, the sales were made

as soon as weeks before Coinbase’s earnings showed that the company was not doing

as well as the market originally anticipated. Further, Defendants sold $2.93 billion

to avoid over $1.09 billion in losses.83 The totality of circumstances in this case

support a pleadings-stage inference of scienter.

81 Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *15 (noting that the “size of trade relative” to an

overall holding is a “piece” of evidence to be considered “along with timing” in a
scienter determination).
82 Id. at *8, *16.
The largest sale in Clovis was $2.79 million (approximately). The
percentage holdings for three defendants ranged from .1% to 4%, and the other
defendant sold 10%. Id. at *16.
83 The other cases cited by Defendants similarly involved other factors, not present

here, which contributed to the court’s conclusion regarding scienter. See Guttman,
823 A.2d at 498–99 (granting a motion to dismiss where the complaint did not allege
numerous categories of “consequential” information, including trading patterns of
defendants, an explanation for why the trades seem random, and whether the
defendants had reason to know that the information was inaccurate); Oracle, 867
A.2d at 953 (granting summary judgment where the defendants had non-suspicious
trading patterns and motivations, such as avoiding excessive tax liability); TrueCar,
2020 WL 5816761, at *25–26 (granting motion to dismiss where plaintiffs had not
pled suspicious patterns of trading, “deviations from . . . past trading practices[,]” or
that a defendant knew of the MNPI until after the stock sales).

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As to the second point, Plaintiff need not allege that Director Defendants

maximized the value gained from their alleged impropriety or “misus[ed] [the]

information more effectively” to state a claim.84 The Director Defendants made a lot

of money from the trades. Maximum overindulgence is not a necessary element.

For these reasons, Plaintiff successfully alleges that the Director Defendants

face a substantial likelihood of liability for insider trading under Brophy. Demand

was therefore futile as to the Director Defendants.

3. The Officer Defendants

Where the factual allegations underlying claims against officers are

“congruous” with the facts underlying claims against directors, then adequately

alleging a substantial likelihood of liability as to the directors satisfies the demand

requirement concerning the claims against the officers.85 This is because an

investigation of the officers “would necessarily implicate the same set of facts” at issue

in the claim against the directors.86

Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants received the same MNPI at the same time

and traded on that MNPI around the same time. The factual allegations are therefore

84 Pfeiffer v. Toll, 989 A.2d 683, 694 (Del. Ch. 2010); see also In re Am. Int’l Gp., Inc.,

965 A.2d 763, 801 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[I]t is not a defense that [the defendants] could
have committed an even larger breach of their fiduciary duties[.]”).
85 In re CBS Corp. S’holder Class Action & Deriv. Litig., 2021 WL 268779, at *47 (Del.

Ch. Jan. 27, 2021), as corrected (Feb. 4, 2021).
86 Teamsters Loc. 443 Health Servs. & Ins. Plan v. Chou, 2020 WL 5028065, at *26

(Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2020); see also Hughes v. Hu, 2020 WL 1987029, at *18 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 27, 2020) (holding that demand was futile as to a count that “necessarily treads
the same path” as a count for which demand is futile).

27
congruous, and the analysis of the claims against the Officer Defendants “tread the

same path” as the claims against the Director Defendants.87 Given the near-total

overlap in allegations, the conclusion that the Director Defendants face a substantial

likelihood of liability in connection with the Brophy claims renders demand futile

under Rule 23.1 as to the claims against the Officer Defendants.

The Brophy claims against the Officer Defendants are also reasonably

conceivable under Rule 12(b)(6).88 The facts alleged against the Officer Defendants

are identical to those against the Director Defendants except for knowledge. The

court inferred that the Director Defendants knew of the Andersen Report due to the

unanimous written consent, which the Officer Defendants did not execute.

Nevertheless, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that the Officer Defendants

knew of the contents of the Andersen Report. Plaintiff alleges that Chatterjee, Choi,

and Haas attended meetings where interim Andersen valuations were reviewed.

Plaintiff also alleges that all the Officer Defendants attended the February 23, 2021

meeting where the Board approved the Direct Listing and were presented with

“market trends, valuation over time and an analysis of potential outcomes, including

first day trading” in relation to the Direct Listing.89 Plaintiff further alleges that

management assisted in the preparation of the Anderson report. Drawing plaintiff-

87 Hughes, 2020 WL 1987029, at *18.

88 The complaint sufficiently alleges the materiality of the Andersen Report for the

reasons described above. It also sufficiently alleges scienter given the size and timing
of the Officer Defendants’ trades.
89 Compl. ¶ 90.

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friendly inferences from these facts, is reasonably conceivable that the Officer

Defendants knew the Andersen Valuation given their presence at these meetings and

involvement with the report. The motion to dismiss the Brophy claim against the

Officer Defendants is therefore denied.

B. Unjust Enrichment

Generally, “where the Court does not dismiss a breach of fiduciary duty claim,

it . . . does not dismiss a duplicative unjust enrichment claim.”90 That is particularly

true here, as “Brophy is a species of unjust enrichment” that focuses on the benefit to

the wrongdoer.91 Accordingly, Defendants based their argument to dismiss Count II

for unjust enrichment on Plaintiff’s failure to state the predicate Brophy claim.

Defendants thereby acknowledge that Plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment rises or

falls with the Brophy claim.92 Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count II for unjust

enrichment is denied.

III. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motions to dismiss under Rule 23.1 and Rule 12(b)(6) are denied.

90 Frank v. Elgamal, 2014 WL 957550, at *31 (Del. Ch. Mar. 10, 2014).

91 Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *17 n.236 (“Brophy is a species of unjust enrichment

that does not require a showing of actual harm to the corporation, but instead focuses
‘on the public policy of preventing unjust enrichment based on the misuse of
confidential corporate information.’” (quoting Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co.,
L.P., 23 A.3d 831, 840 (Del. 2011)); see also In re Fitbit, Inc., 2019 WL 190933, at *4
n.26 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2019) (“[T]he public policy underlying a Brophy claim is to
prevent unjust enrichment based on the misuse of confidential corporate
information.” (internal citations omitted)).
92 Defs.’ Opening Br. at 38.

29