Goldstein v. Denner

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STEWART N. GOLDSTEIN, individually and )
on behalf of all others similarly situated, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. 2020-1061-JTL
)
ALEXANDER J. DENNER, SARISSA )
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P., SARISSA )
CAPITAL DOMESTIC FUND LP, SARISSA )
CAPITAL OFFSHORE MASTER FUND LP, )
and SARISSA CAPITAL MANAGEMENT GP )
LLC, )
)
Defendants. )

OPINION IMPOSING SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO PRESERVE
ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION

Date Submitted: January 16, 2024
Date Decided: January 26, 2024

Kevin H. Davenport, John G. Day, Jason W. Rigby, PRICKETT, JONES & ELLIOT
P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; R. Bruce McNew, COOCH & TAYLOR P.A.,
Wilmington, Delaware; Christopher H. Lyons, ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN &
DOWD LLP, Wilmington; Delaware; Randall J. Baron, Rick T. Atwood, ROBBINS
GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP, San Diego, California; Brett Middleton,
JOHNSON FISTEL, LLP, New York, New York; Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Stephen E. Jenkins, Richard D. Heins, ASHBY & GEDDES, P.A., Wilmington,
Delaware; Tariq Mundiya, Sameer Advani, Richard Li, M. Annie Houghton-Larsen,
WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP, New York, New York; Attorneys for
Defendants Alexander J. Denner, Sarissa Capital Management LP, Sarissa Capital
Domestic Fund LP, Sarissa Capital Offshore Master Fund LP, and Sarissa Capital
Management GP LLC.

LASTER, V.C.
The plaintiff contends that the principal of an activist hedge fund breached his

fiduciary duties by engaging in insider trading. The plaintiff has moved for sanctions

based on the defendants’ failure to preserve electronically stored information (“ESI”).

The plaintiff served document requests that asked for the hedge fund

principal’s texts. The defendants did not produce any texts and averred that texting

was contrary to the fund’s business policies. When other parties produced texts with

the hedge fund principal, the plaintiff pressed the issue. After concluding that the

hedge fund and its principal had spoliated evidence, the plaintiff filed a motion for

sanctions for failing to preserve ESI.

The hedge fund principal received three litigation hold notices that instructed

him to take affirmative steps to preserve texts on his personal devices. The hedge

fund principal did nothing. He now posits that his texts were lost in October 2021,

when he upgraded to a new iPhone. Even the defendants admit his explanation

makes no sense, because Apple backs up iMessages and other data to the cloud. The

hedge fund principal has not suggested that other data was lost, such as pictures,

applications, or contacts. Rather than remembering a devastating loss of all his data,

he barely recalls the event. The iPhone upgrade thus not only uncharacteristically

resulted in a loss of data, but strangely resulted only in the loss of texts.

The plaintiff then asked for texts from other key hedge fund personnel. Eight

months later, the hedge fund responded that its general counsel had no texts and

couldn’t explain why. He now posits that his texts disappeared in early October 2020.

He recalls that he was personally cleaning his swimming pool when he accidentally
dropped his phone into the water. He sent the phone to be repaired, and he thinks

the repair must have caused his texts to be lost. Like the hedge fund principal, the

general counsel does not recall a painful disappearance of all his data, including

treasured pictures, his applications, and contacts. He only dredged an insignificant

event from memory after finding a receipt for the repair.

For purposes of this litigation, the disappearance of the hedge fund principal’s

texts proved serendipitous. The plaintiff had just served a comprehensive document

request. Weeks later, the defendants moved to stay discovery, where they argued

carefully that a stay would not prejudice the plaintiff because no then-existing

evidence would be lost. The court denied the stay.

The hedge fund’s head trader also has no texts. But in lieu of a third

suspiciously flukey data loss, he admits setting his iPhone to delete texts after thirty

days. Even after receiving a litigation hold, he never changed that setting.

Court of Chancery Rule 37(e) governs when a requesting party can obtain

sanctions for a responding party’s failure to preserve ESI. To obtain sanctions, the

requesting party must show (i) the responding party had a duty to preserve the ESI,

(ii) the ESI is lost, (iii) the loss is attributable to the responding party’s failure to take

reasonable steps to preserve the ESI, and (iv) the requesting party suffered prejudice.

To obtain a presumption or a default judgment, the requesting party must show that

the responding party acted recklessly or with the intention of preventing another

party from using the evidence in litigation.

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The plaintiff made each showing. The hedge fund and its principal had a duty

to preserve ESI. That duty arose at least as early as February 2018, when the hedge

fund principal received the first litigation hold notice. The hedge fund and its

principal failed to take reasonable steps to preserve texts, most notably by not

imaging any personal devices. The texts were lost due to that failure.

The plaintiff suffered twofold prejudice from the loss. The plaintiff cannot use

the evidence to prove its affirmative case. The plaintiff also cannot use the evidence

to cross-examine the hedge fund principal and other defense witnesses when they

attempt to prove their defenses.

To remedy the first category of prejudice, the court will presume at trial that

the hedge fund traded on the basis of a non-public approach from an acquiror. The

court also will presume that the hedge fund’s trading caused the sale process to fall

outside a range of reasonableness.

To remedy the second category of evidence, the court will require the

defendants to meet a burden of proof that is increased by one level. Rather than

rebutting the presumptions or proving issues by a preponderance of the evidence, the

defendants will have to adduce clear and convincing evidence.

The plaintiff also has been prejudiced by having to spend time and resources

on this issue. The defendants must pay all of the fees and expenses that the plaintiff

incurred. That includes not only the motion itself, but also the time required to pin

down the defendants on their positions and to confirm that the ESI was not available

from other sources.

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts are drawn from the parties’ submissions in connection with the

motion seeking sanctions for spoliation.1 The court has also considered other

documents of record.

A. Denner, Bioverativ, and Sanofi

Defendant Alexander J. Denner is the founder and controlling principal of

Sarissa Capital, an activist hedge fund. Four of his affiliates are defendants

(collectively, “Sarissa”).

In 2017, Denner was a director of Bioverativ, Inc., a publicly traded

biotechnology company. In May, Sanofi S.A. approached Denner and another director,

Brian S. Posner. Sanofi expressed interest in acquiring Bioverativ for $90 per share.

Bioverativ’s common stock closed that day at $54.86 per share, so the proposal

represented a 64% premium to market.

Denner and Posner told Sanofi that the time was not right for an acquisition.

The discovery record to date indicates that Posner reported Sanofi’s interest to

Bioverativ’s other directors, but did not mention the price. There are no

contemporaneous documents evidencing board consideration or acknowledgement of

the offer, and there was no board vote on a response. All of the Bioverativ directors

testified that they knew about Sanofi’s approach. Except for Posner and Denner, none

1 Citations in the form “PX __” refer to exhibits the plaintiff submitted by affidavit

Dkts. 195, 204. Citations in the form “DX __” refer to exhibits the defendants submitted by
affidavit. Dkt. 199.

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recalled knowing the price. A contemporaneous email from Posner to outside counsel

references the Sanofi approach without mentioning the price. DX 14.

B. Sarissa Buys Stock.

Just days after Denner’s meeting with Sanofi, Sarissa’s head trader began

purchasing Bioverativ stock.

• On May 24, 2017, Sarissa purchased 340,000 shares.

• On May 25, 2017, Sarissa purchased 130,000 shares.

• On May 26, 2017, Sarissa purchased 450,000 shares.

• On May 30, 2017, Sarissa purchased 90,000 shares.

There is no contemporaneous evidence of any prior plan to rapidly acquire such a

large position. The only written communication relating to the trades is an email in

which Denner tells the head trader to “Keep going.” PX 3.

Before those purchases, Sarissa only owned 155,000 shares. Within a week

after Denner’s meeting with Sanofi, Sarissa had purchased 1,010,000 shares for $56.3

million. Bioverativ stock went from 3.3% of Sarissa’s portfolio to 27.7%.

Before Sarissa’s first purchase, its general counsel (Mark DiPaolo) emailed

Bioverativ’s general counsel (Andrea DiFabio) to ask if she was aware of any material

non-public information that could limit Sarissa’s ability to trade. DiPaolo did not

mention Sanofi’s $90 per share offer, and DiFabio testified that she did not know

about it. She therefore told DiPaolo that she did not know of anything.

Posner was the only other Bioverativ director who knew about the price. He

bought 2,000 shares for approximately $53.80 per share, representing a total

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investment of $107,600. No one has suggested that the other Bioverativ directors

suddenly purchased shares.

C. Denner Strings Sanofi Along.

Sarissa stood to make massive profits if Sanofi acquired Bioverativ, but Section

16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 loomed as an impediment. That statute

requires that an insider disgorge short-swing profits from any sale that takes place

less than six months after the purchase. Denner’s solution was to delay any

engagement with Sanofi so that the sale would take place after the short-swing period

closed.

When Sanofi reapproached in June 2017 and again in September 2017, Denner

responded that Bioverativ was not for sale. The discovery record indicates that he did

not report those contacts to the board. See PX 11.

D. Bioverativ Agrees To A Sale.

By October 2017, the short-swing period was about to expire. This time, when

Sanofi came calling, Denner proposed a single-bidder process. The board knew

nothing about that inquiry.

Several weeks later, in late November 2017, Sanofi offered to acquire

Bioverativ for $98.50 per share. Bioverativ’s management team and its financial

advisors valued the company at more than $150 per share. After receiving Sanofi’s

offer, the directors asked for a higher bid, and Sanofi increased its offer to $101.50.

At that point, the directors countered at $105 per share, almost one-third below the

standalone valuation. Sanofi accepted.

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Denner led the negotiations for Bioverativ. Stephen Sands, a Lazard banker,

led the negotiations for Sanofi. Denner and Sands had known each other

professionally for over a decade. The discovery record reveals that they texted during

the negotiations. None of those texts exist.

E. The Bioverativ Hold

On January 21, 2018, the companies announced the transaction. On February

8, 2018, Bioverativ filed its proxy statement.

Stockholders filed putative class actions challenging the sufficiency of the

proxy statement. On February 21, 2018, Bioverativ’s general counsel circulated a

litigation hold. PX 12 (the “Bioverativ Hold”). Denner received it.

The Bioverativ Hold informed its recipients that “Bioverativ and its employees

are under an obligation to hold on to any and all information and documents

(including electronically-stored information, such as emails) within their possession,

custody or control that may relate to Bioverativ’s acquisition by Sanofi.” Id. The

Bioverativ Hold instructed recipients to take affirmative steps to preserve

documents. Under a heading titled, “What do I need to do?” it stated:

You must take affirmative steps to prevent any alteration, deletion,
destruction, or modification of any information or documents you
possess now or in the future that could be related to the hold

To be clear, this legal hold applies to documents and information within
Bioverativ’s possession, custody or control or your individual or future
possession, custody or control.

Id.

The Bioverativ Hold expressly extended to texts. Under a heading titled,

“Other than email, what items do I need to hold on to?” the notice stated:

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Please review the list below. You must hold on to any information,
documents and data stored in or on any medium—paper, electronic, or
other—that may be relevant to Bioverativ’s acquisition by Sanofi even
if you keep it on your mobile device or on your home computer. This
includes but is not limited to: . . .

• SMS or text messages; . . .

• Documents and information stored in a cloud environment.

To be clear, any and all documents, data and information that may
relate to Bioverativ’s acquisition by Sanofi should be preserved
regardless of whether they are favorable or unfavorable to Bioverativ,
or whether they appear unimportant or trivial.

Id. The Bioverativ Hold extended explicitly to “personally-owned computers or

devices (including cell phones, tablets, etc.).” Id.

There is no evidence Denner took any action in response to the Bioverativ Hold.

There is no evidence that Sarissa took any action either. If they had, the lost texts

would have been preserved.

F. The Sanofi Hold

On March 15, 2018, Sanofi issued a litigation hold. PX 13 (the “Sanofi Hold”).

Denner received it.

The Sanofi Hold specifically called out texts on smart phones. Under the

heading “YOU MUST PRESERVE BOTH DOCUMENTS AND

ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION,” it stated:

You must retain paper documents and ESI regardless of location or
media format. For example, you must retain relevant ESI on computers
and external storage devices such as cell phones, smartphones, iPads,
tablets, and removable media such as USB drives. . . .

Examples of ESI: . . . text messages . . . on any personal devices.

Id.

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The Sanofi Hold specifically identified the need to take affirmative steps to

preserve ESI. Under a heading titled, “DO NOT DELETE RELEVANT

INFORMATION,” the Sanofi Hold stated:

Do not delete e-mail or ESI that relates to this matter . . . If you are
aware of any other documents or information that may relate to this
Matter that are stored in any other format or location where they are
likely to be modified or deleted (either due to automatic or manual
processes), you must take affirmative actions to preserve these
documents and information.

Id.

There is no evidence that Denner took any action in response to Sanofi Hold.

There is no evidence that Sarissa took any action either. If they had, the lost texts

would have been preserved.

G. The Sarissa Hold

On September 4, 2019, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)

served subpoenas on Denner and Sarissa seeking “All Documents Concerning

[Bioverativ] or trading in the securities of [Bioverativ],” “All Communications with

Sanofi,” and “All Communications with Denner Concerning Sanofi, [Bioverativ], or

trading in the securities of [Bioverativ].” Dkt. 212, Ex. A at Request Nos. 3–5 & Ex.

B at Request Nos. 3, 5. On September 5, 2019, Sarissa’s general counsel (DiPaolo)

circulated a litigation hold to “All staff.” PX 15 (the “Sarissa Hold”).

The Sarissa Hold instructed all staff to “preserve any and all documents and/or

communications with, concerning, relating to, or in any way discussing or mentioning

Bioverativ, Inc. or Sanofi S.A.” Id. It continued: “Until otherwise notified, do not

discard, delete, alter or destroy any such materials in your possession or

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under your control even if such documents would otherwise be routinely

discarded or destroyed in the ordinary course of your business.” Id.

The Sarissa Hold expressly encompassed texts on personal devices:

You must preserve all potentially responsive documents now in
existence or that may be created in the future, whether in hard-copy
form or stored electronically, including electronic documents stored on
or in any form of media, including, but not limited to, the following:
mobile devices, whether firm issued or personal (including iPhones,
Androids, and Blackberries), . . . iPads, tablet devices, PDAs, . . . and
information available in the “cloud” or on social media websites. . . . All
destruction or recycling programs, protocols and routines that
would otherwise apply to the documents being preserved must
be suspended immediately.

Id.; accord id. (defining “document” to include “text messages”).

After circulating the Sarissa Hold, DiPaolo consulted with outside counsel

about how to implement it.2 Outside counsel asked DiPaolo about texts. DiPaolo

responded that he did not text for business and that he did not believe Denner did

either, but he would verify that. DiPaolo and outside counsel decided they would not

collect text messages at that time, but outside counsel asked that Sarissa’s users

preserve text messages and check with counsel before buying a new phone and

transferring data to a new device.

DiPaolo avers that he personally went through Denner’s phone looking for text

messages relating to “Sarissa’s purchases of Bioverativ securities.” DiPaolo Aff. ¶ 6.

The scope of the SEC subpoenas was much broader: They sought “All

2 Sarissa produced notes from two meetings subject to a Rule 510(f) order. Neither the

production of the evidence nor this decision’s reference to it waives any privilege that
otherwise might attach to the documents.

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Communications with Denner Concerning Sanofi, [Bioverativ], or trading in the

securities of [Bioverativ].” Dkt. 212, Ex A at Request No. 4.

DiPaolo claims he did not find any responsive texts. In this action, other parties

have produced texts from Denner relating to Bioverativ. There are also emails

referring to texts from Denner relating to Bioverativ. DiPaolo either applied his

narrow definition to exclude them, missed them inadvertently, or consciously ignored

them. The latter is a concern, because to the extent that Denner texted about

Sarissa’s trading, he likely texted with DiPaolo. Allowing DiPaolo to review Denner’s

texts meant DiPaolo was looking for texts that could implicate himself.

At a follow-up meeting with outside counsel, DiPaolo reported that Sarissa’s

policies prohibited the use of text for business purposes. He reiterated that he had no

recollection of texting himself. He said that he had reviewed Denner’s texts and found

nothing.

Based on DiPaolo’s representations, outside counsel agreed to “table any

collection of mobile data/text messages at this time but asked [Denner] to preserve

this data.” Outside counsel also asked Denner to contact counsel “for guidance should

he want to buy a new device or discard the current device.”

There is no evidence that any steps were taken to preserve Denner’s data.

There is no evidence that Denner contacted anyone for guidance before replacing his

phone.

Because the Sarissa Hold went to all staff, it inferably went to Pat Garofalo,

Sarissa’s head trader. He had his phone set to delete texts after thirty days. He did

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not turn off that setting after receiving the Sarissa Hold. He did nothing to preserve

his texts.

DiPaolo sent the Sarissa Hold, so he necessarily knew about it. He did nothing

to preserve his texts either.

The three custodians for the SEC collection ended up being Denner, DiPaolo,

and Denner’s former personal assistant, who had left Sarissa in September 2018. No

one collected her cell phone before she left. The SEC collection thus did not involve

any collection of texts, nor any imaging of phones to preserve ESI. DiPaolo conducted

the only search for texts by reviewing Denner’s phone. That was a manual self-

collection by an inferably interested party.

H. The Pool Incident

After the SEC collection, the DiPaolo was personally cleaning his swimming

pool when he accidentally dropped his phone into the water. He has a receipt showing

he had the phone repaired on September 28, 2020.

DiPaolo believes that he lost his texts when the phone was repaired. Strangely,

the repair seems to have affected his texts and nothing else. DiPaolo has not

suggested that he lost other data, such as pictures, applications, or contacts. Rather

than recalling a traumatic event involving the disappearance of treasured photos and

the hassle of rebuilding his contacts and restoring other information, DiPaolo barely

remembers the incident. Only the repair receipt jogged his memory.

Nor do the dates work. DiPaolo believes he lost his texts as a result of the

repair, yet the missing texts are not tied to September 28, 2020. He has no texts from

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before October 9, 2020. It would be strange for a repair to cause the loss of texts sent

during the twelve days after the repair took place.

I. This Lawsuit

On December 15, 2020, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit. Based on Sarissa’s stock

purchases, the plaintiff asserts a claim against Denner for breach of fiduciary duty,

plus a claim against Sarissa for aiding and abetting Denner’s breaches. In substance,

the plaintiff asserts that Denner and Sarissa engaged in insider trading. The

plaintiffs also asserted claims against other defendants that have been settled.

Denner and Sarissa moved to dismiss the claims against them under Rule

12(b)(6). After completing briefing, the plaintiff served document requests on

September 27, 2021. Dkt. 44.

The defendants responded by moving to stay discovery. They relied on a line of

Court of Chancery decisions that freely grant stays of discovery pending resolution of

motions to dismiss. See Dkt. 47. Those rulings presume that a stay will not prejudice

the plaintiff because the defendants will preserve potentially relevant evidence.

Citing those precedents, the defendants argued that the plaintiff would not suffer

prejudice in this case due to the absence of “any serious risk of currently-available

information becoming unavailable while the Court considers the pending Motions to

Dismiss.” Id. ¶ 17. In reply, the defendants reiterated that the plaintiff did not face

any risk of prejudice from his “professed concerns” about failures to preserve

evidence. Dkt. 52 ¶ 17. Although not conspicuous at the time, the defendants’

reference to “currently-available information becoming unavailable” now seems

carefully worded.
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On November 18, 2021, the court issued an order that denied the defendants’

motion for a stay, explaining:

As the plaintiffs’ authorities recount, defendants are not entitled to an
automatic stay of discovery pending disposition of a pleading-stage
motion. There must be good reason to grant the stay. Here, the court has
reviewed the pleading-stage record, and it appears highly unlikely that
the motion to dismiss will be granted, much less dispose of the case in
its entirety. It is perhaps possible that a limited aspect of the complaint
might be dismissed, but the probability is sufficiently low that discovery
should not be stayed pending the outcome of the defendants’ pleading-
stage motion.

Dkt. 55.

J. The Defendants Belatedly Take Steps To Identify And Preserve
Evidence.

It was only after the court’s order that defense counsel began thinking about

what sources of evidence would be responsive and should be identified, preserved,

collected, reviewed, and potentially produced. That was too late. The plaintiff filed

the case in December 2020. Defense counsel should have started taking steps to

identify and preserve information by at least then.

Defense counsel acted too late in another sense as well. To repeat, the plaintiff

served document requests in September 2021. Soon after, for reasons that no one has

been able to explain, Denner lost all of his texts from before an as-yet unidentified

date in October 2021. Denner recalls upgrading his iPhone to a new model, and he

thinks the upgrade caused the loss. That would be bizarre, because Apple facilitates

upgrades by transferring data to the new iPhone from the cloud. No one on the

defendants’ side has been able to explain why Denner’s iPhone upgrade could have

caused the loss of his texts.

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There is no evidence that Denner consulted with anyone before replacing his

iPhone. The litigation holds told him to do that. Outside counsel asked him to do that.

Like DiPaolo, Denner has not suggested that he lost other data, such as

pictures, applications, or contacts. Denner also does not vividly recall discovering that

he had lost cherished photos, nor does he rue the burdens of restoring his data from

other sources. He barely remembers it. Like DiPaolo’s pool mishap, the atypical

iPhone upgrade seems to have affected his texts and nothing else.

K. The Defendants Fail To Produce Any Texts.

As noted, defense counsel only began to consider their preservation and

collection responsibilities after the court denied the defendants’ motion to stay

discovery. For their baseline document collection, defense counsel decided to use the

documents gathered in response to the SEC subpoenas in September 2019. Defense

counsel did not take any affirmative steps to identify custodians or sources.

In January 2022, defense counsel proposed to the plaintiff that Denner be the

only custodian. The plaintiff initially did not ask for more custodians. The plaintiff

did ask for confirmation that the production would include Denner’s personal email,

Sarissa email, other business email, instant message, mobile devices, laptops and

desktops, cloud storage, and shared network drives. At that point, defense counsel

compared those data sources with what had been gathered for the SEC collection and

identified additional data that needed to be secured, including potentially text

messages, nonbusiness email addresses, cloud-based data, and paper documents.

Once again, defense counsel did not act independently or take initiative. They did not

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fulfill their own responsibilities to identify data sources; they merely considered what

the plaintiff identified.

To learn about texts, defense counsel consulted with Sarissa’s general counsel

(DiPaolo). He repeated his mantra that Sarissa had a policy against using text

messages for business purpose and that he did not believe that Denner had any

responsive text messages. Rather than imaging Denner’s phone or reviewing his text

messages themselves, defense counsel asked Denner’s assistant to search his texts.

The plaintiff had requested documents from Denner for months in 2016 that

were outside the scope of the SEC collection. In February 2022, defense counsel

collected additional documents from Denner’s email account. Later that month, the

plaintiff and defense counsel agreed on a search protocol for Denner’s emails, and the

plaintiff agreed that Sarissa did not need to run searches on any other Sarissa

personnel. Defense counsel ran the agreed-upon search terms and reviewed the hits

for responsiveness, then produced those documents on a rolling basis.

In March 2022, Denner’s assistant reported to defense counsel that no text

messages from 2017 to 2018 existed on Denner’s phone and that the earliest text

messages were from October 2021. Denner’s assistant also said that Denner did not

have any messages available in iCloud. Defense counsel asked for the first time about

Denner’s iPad and was told no text messages from 2017 to 2018 existed there either.

No one told the plaintiff.

In June 2022, the court issued a decision that largely denied Denner and

Sarissa’s motion. Goldstein v. Denner, 2022 WL 1797224 (Del. Ch. June 2, 2022). That

16
decision found it “reasonable to infer that Denner bought the shares with the

expectation that Sarissa would profit from a near-term sale of [Bioverativ]” and

“reasonably conceivable that the conduct giving rise to the Insider Trading Claims

tainted the sale process.” Id. at *9, *12. The decision noted that discovery would play

an important role in supporting or refuting those inferences and that on a developed

record, the court might reject or question whether the defendants had traded based

on inside information. For example, discovery might show that Denner “would have

increased Sarissa’s equity position after the Spinoff in any event.” Id. at *9 n. 5.

L. The Plaintiff Questions The Lack Of Texts.

Although Denner and Sarissa’s production did not contain any texts, other

parties produced texts from Denner. Two directors produced forty-five texts,

including texts sent during board meetings in which Denner complained about

management’s opposition to the Sanofi transaction. See PX 1.

On June 14, 2022, the plaintiff informed defense counsel that Denner appeared

to have texted for business purposes. The plaintiff asked defense counsel to add the

following custodians to the search protocol: Sarissa’s general counsel (DiPaolo),

Sarissa’s Chief Compliance Officer Patrice (Patrice Bonfiglio), and Sarissa’s head

trader (Pat Garafalo). The plaintiff’s counsel also asked to add Denner’s assistant.

At this point, defense counsel finally had one of its lawyers inspect Denner’s

devices. The inspection confirmed that Denner did not have any text messages from

before October 2021. Counsel checked Denner’s iPad and saw text messages from

March 2020, but not earlier. Denner reported that he had not intentionally deleted

any text messages relevant to this action and said he did not understand why his text
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messages from the 2017-2018 time period were missing. Denner suggested that that

he had upgraded his iPhone and then provided his old phone to one of his sons. Later

that month, DiPaolo reported that Denner’s sons had newer devices acquired after

the Bioverativ-Sanofi transaction.

Defense counsel discussed the issue of texts with Sarissa’s general counsel

(DiPaolo) and its chief compliance officer (Bonfiglio), but did not conduct any formal

custodian interviews. DiPaolo and Bonfiglio each represented that they adhered to

Sarissa’s policy of not texting for business. Defense counsel accepted that

representation and decided again against imaging phones.

In October 2022, defense counsel finally answered the plaintiffs’

interrogatories, which included a question about whether the defendants had

preserved potentially responsive information. Seven months after learning that

Denner had no texts from before October 2021, defense counsel served an

interrogatory response that stated the following:

[O]n or around October 2021, Alex Denner replaced his iPhone solely for
the purposes of upgrading the device, a process which the Sarissa
Defendants believe inadvertently caused his text messages prior to that
date to no longer be accessible or retrievable from his current device. By
way of further response, the Sarissa Defendants state that, in the
Sarissa Capital Management LP Compliance Manual and Code of
Ethics, Sarissa employees are not permitted to use text messages for
official business correspondence (see SAR-BIVVID00000183). The
Sarissa Defendants have sought to obtain iCloud backups, have
contacted Verizon, have conducted searches of Denner’s current iPhone
and iPad devices for backup phone data (including with the assistance
of Sarissa’s outside counsel. . . .), and have been unavailable to identify
any means of recovering any text messages during the relevant time
period agreed-to by the parties.

PX 17 at Interrogatory No. 27.

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The defendants thus asserted that Denner lost his texts on some unidentified

date in October 2021, one year before. Id. To reiterate, that was after Denner had

received three litigation hold notices, after this litigation began, after the plaintiff

served discovery requests seeking texts, and just before the defendants moved to stay

discovery.

The plaintiff understandably viewed Denner’s upgrade story as inherently

suspicious. During an upgrade, data is transferred to the new iPhone.3 Denner and

Sarissa’s representation that they contacted Verizon also did not help. When texting

on his iPhone, Denner likely used iMessage, which is an over-the-top (“OTT”)

messaging service that operates through the web. Unlike SMS texts, OTT messages

do not run through a cellular carrier’s system, so the carrier has no record of them.

Denner and Sarissa thus offered an explanation for lost texts that made no

sense and took steps to locate texts that did not help. Denner and Sarissa also sought

to minimize the import of the loss by representing that under Sarissa’s Compliance

Manual and Code of Ethics, “Sarissa employees are not permitted to use text

messages for official business correspondent.” Id. That reference implied that there

were no texts to lose.

3 Moving to a New iPhone or iPad, Apple Device Support Tutorials, Apple, https://it-

training.apple.com/tutorials/support/sup010 (last visited Jan. 26, 2024). Defense counsel
agrees. See PX 19 at 3 (“I have personally replaced my own iPhones twice over the years, and
to the best of my knowledge did not lose any data.”).

19
Equally important, the defendants’ response was misleadingly incomplete. The

response said nothing about DiPaolo’s prior loss of all of his texts due to the post-

swimming-pool repair.

The defendants also provided an incomplete response to another interrogatory.

The plaintiff asked defendants to “Identify and describe the methods and/or processes

that You used to search for, Identify, collect and review Documents and

Communications.” PX 17 at Interrogatory No. 28. The response said nothing about

the SEC subpoenas, the self-review of Denner’s phone in 2019, or almost anything we

now know about defense counsel’s collection efforts.

On November 14, 2022, Sarissa’s Chief Compliance Officer (Bonfiglio)

circulated an email to all staff informing them that the Sarissa Hold “initially

circulated September 5, 2019, is still in effect, as litigation surrounding the

Bioverativ/Sanofi transaction remains pending.” PX 18. In other words, there was

never a time after September 5, 2019, when Sarissa personnel were released from

their obligation to retain ESI, including texts.

M. The Plaintiff Tries To Obtain Texts From Other Sources

The plaintiff made efforts to obtain Denner’s texts from other sources. They

subpoenaed Verizon themselves, but Verizon responded that it did not maintain

records of Denner’s texts. That makes sense for texts from an OTT messaging

application.

The plaintiff also subpoenaed Lazard, which advised Sanofi on the transaction.

Recall that Sands was the primary Lazard banker, and he had known Denner for a

decade. PX 21 at 12. The two had a friendly relationship, and Lazard emails reference
20
Denner and Sands’ texting each other. See PX 5, 7, 10. But Lazard could not produce

any texts either. Lazard represented that Sands “no longer has the phone that he

used during the relevant time period” and “his current phone does not have any text

messages dating back to the relevant period.” PX 16.

N. More Issues With Texts

On December 7, 2022, during deposition preparation, Sarissa’s head trader

(Garofalo) informed defense counsel that he recalled using texts to communicate with

Denner. But he said he had no recollection of any text messages relating to Bioverativ.

Based on this disclosure, defense counsel finally collected cell phones from

DiPaolo, Bonfiglio, and Garofalo.

• DiPaolo’s phone had no messages from before October 9, 2020. He claimed not
to know why.

• Garofalo’s phone had no messages. It was set to delete text message data
routinely every thirty days.

• Bonfiglio’s device contained 116,868 text messages. The earliest text message
was dated January 30, 2014. None of the search terms hit on any texts. In
addition, defense counsel reviewed all of the texts and determined that none
are responsive.

In short, none of the additional custodians had responsive texts.

In February 2023, the plaintiff pushed for more information about the

defendants’ failure to produce texts. DX 32. Defense counsel responded with a letter

plus a declaration from Denner. In both documents, they stuck to Denner’s story

about losing his texts when he upgraded his iPhone. At the same time, they seemed

to know that the story did not make sense. See PX 19. The defendants also reported

for the first time that DiPaolo, Garafalo, and Bonfiglio did not possess any responsive

21
texts. And they reported for the first time that Denner’s assistant during the relevant

period had left Sarissa in September 2018 and that no one had collected her phone.

O. The Motion For Sanctions

On November 14, 2023, the plaintiff moved for sanctions for spoliating

evidence. The parties briefed the motion, and the court held a hearing on January 4,

2024. During the hearing, defense counsel was unable to answer basic questions

about the collection process. To ensure that the defendants had the opportunity to

document what they had done, the court directed the defendants to file an affidavit

describing their preservation and collection plan and how they carried it out.

The defendants filed two affidavits. Defense counsel submitted an affidavit

detailing their collection efforts. DiPaolo submitted a separate affidavit in which he

recounted the swimming pool story for the first time. DiPaolo also reported that he

had notes documenting the advice defense counsel gave for collecting and preserving

documents in response to the SEC subpoenas. Sarissa offered to produce the notes

under a Rule 510(f) order. The court entered a Rule 510(f) order and authorized the

plaintiff to file a sur-reply.

DiPaolo did not address in his affidavit whether any of his data was backed up

to the cloud or whether counsel had made any efforts to check his other devices. The

court directed defense counsel to file a supplemental affidavit “explaining whether

any efforts were made to examine DiPaolo’s other devices, the cloud, or other sources

for texts after the . . . swimming pool incident.” Dkt. 213.

Defense counsel reported that no data was backed up to the cloud or available

from other devices. Defense counsel did not say what they did, or when, to make this
22
determination. Their silence suggests that they only took those steps after the court

asked. In any event, the failure to provide any detail beyond a clipped response is a

further example of defense counsel’s lack of transparency and parsimony regarding

the release of information. That approach has undermined their credibility on the

spoliation issues.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

The plaintiffs seek sanctions for spoliating text messages. Spoliation is the

destruction or significant alteration of evidence, the failure to preserve evidence

properly for another’s use, or the improper concealment of evidence.4

The plaintiff sought texts, which “fit comfortably within the scope of materials

that a party may request under Rule 34.”5 Text messages are a form of ESI.6

Court of Chancery Rule 37(e) addresses sanctions for failure to preserve ESI.

It states:

If ESI that should have been preserved in the reasonable anticipation of
or actual notice of imminent litigation is lost because a party failed to
take reasonable steps to preserve it, and it cannot be restored or
replaced through additional discovery, the court:

(1) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of information, may
order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice; or

4 See West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999); Matter of

In re Skanska USA Civ. Se. Inc., 340 F.R.D. 180, 184 (N.D. Fla. 2021).

5 Paisley Park Enters., Inc. v. Boxill, 330 F.R.D. 226, 234 (D. Minn. 2019); accord Flagg

v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 352–53 (E.D. Mich. 2008).

6 Living Color Enters., Inc. v. New Era Aquaculture, Ltd., 2016 WL 1105297, at *3

(S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2016).

23
(2) only upon finding that the party acted recklessly or with the intent
to deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation, may,
among other things:

(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the
party; or

(B) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.

Ct. Ch. R. 37(e).

Rule 37(e) reflects longstanding public policies. Seven decades ago, the

Delaware Supreme Court cited the maxim that “everything will be presumed against

the despoiler” and explained that it is “the duty of a court . . . to adopt a view of the

facts as unfavorable to the wrongdoer as the known circumstances will reasonably

admit.” Equitable Tr. Co. v. Gallagher, 102 A.2d 538, 541 (Del. 1954). Imposing

sanctions for spoliation embodies the more general policy that “[n]o one shall be

permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to

found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.” Riggs

v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889).

Court of Chancery Rule 37(e) closely resembles Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

37(e), as amended in 2015, but with changes to conform to Delaware law and

Chancery practice. The federal rules first addressed the preservation of ESI in 2006,

but that version of Rule 37(e) proved unsatisfactory. Different federal courts reaching

different conclusions “about how to determine when sanctions were warranted, what

standards of culpability should apply to different kinds of sanctions, and what types

of sanctions should be ordered.” Tanya Pierce, Righting the Ship: What Courts Are

Still Getting Wrong About Electronic Discovery, 72 SMU L. Rev. 785, 787 (2019).

24
The federal rules were amended in 2015 to provide a clearer and more

consistent standard for the federal courts. Federal Rule 37(e) now states:

If electronically stored information that should have been preserved in
the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost because a party failed to
take reasonable steps to preserve it, and it cannot be restored or
replaced through additional discovery, the court:

(1) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the information,
may order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice; or

(2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive
another party of the information’s use in the litigation may:

(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the
party;

(B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information
was unfavorable to the party; or

(C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e). The Advisory Committee notes offer extended commentary to

guide its interpretation and application. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s

notes [hereinafter AC Notes].

There are two differences between current Court of Chancery Rule 37(e) and

current Federal Rule 37(e). One is that Court of Chancery Rule 37(e) omits the

reference to instructing a jury that it “may or must presume the information was

unfavorable,” for the obvious reason that the Court of Chancery does not have juries.7

7 Technically, that is an overstatement. The Court of Chancery has the discretionary

authority to empanel a jury to try discrete factual issues. 10 Del. C. § 369 (“When matters of
fact, proper to be tried by a jury, arise in any cause depending in Chancery, the Court of
Chancery may order such facts to trial by issues at the Bar of the Superior Court.”). Today,
that power is largely vestigial. See Preston Hollow Cap. LLC v. Nuveen LLC, 216 A.3d 1, 11
n. 64 (Del. Ch. 2019) (“[T]o the extent a jury in the Court of Chancery is not extinct, it is a
vestigial structure, more evocative of the human appendix or coccyx than that vital organ,
25
The federal rule nevertheless provides insight into the types of inferences that a court

can draw. First, the court might hold that when acting as factfinder, it may presume

the information was unfavorable to the party when considering evidence at trial.

Alternatively, a court might hold that when acting as factfinder, it will presume that

the information was unfavorable to the party when considering evidence at trial.

The other difference between current Court of Chancery Rule 37(e) and current

Federal Rule 37(e) is the mental state required for imposing the identified sanctions.

The Delaware Supreme Court held in 2006 that a court must make an evidence-based

“finding of intentional or reckless destruction of evidence as a predicate to an adverse

inference . . . .” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Midcap, 893 A.2d 542, 550 (Del. 2006).

Consistent with Sears, Court of Chancery Rule 37(e) authorizes the court to impose

sanctions requiring a culpable mental state if the party “acted recklessly or with the

intent to deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation.” Ct. Ch. R.

37(e)(2). The federal version requires that the party have acted “with the intent to

the Superior Court petit jury.”); Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Park Oil, Inc., 385 A.2d 147, 151
(Del. Ch. 1978), aff’d, 407 A.2d 533 (Del. 1979) (observing that “[t]he old procedure of framing
of issues by the Court of Chancery for jury trial is now probably outmoded and this Court is
certainly not equipped to hold jury trials itself even if permissible.”). Furthermore, “[a] jury
trial in Chancery is advisory only. An advisory jury verdict which may be disregarded by the
Chancery judge is not entirely equivalent to a jury verdict at law.” Getty, 385 A.2d at 151;
accord Scotton v. Wright, 122 A. 541, 542 (Del. Ch. 1923) (“[T]he verdict of the jury on an
issue sent by the Court of Chancery to be tried at the bar of the Superior Court, is not binding
on the Chancellor; [] the verdict of the jury is only advisory. . . .”). Presumably in a
hypothetical case where the Court of Chancery empowered an advisory jury, the court would
have the inherent authority to grant the type of instruction contemplated by Federal Rule
37(e)(2)(B). Given the cosmic rarity of this possibility, Chancery Rule 37(e)(2) streamlines
practice by omitting it.

26
deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(e)(2).

A. The Threshold Issue Of Timing

Before considering the motion on its merits, the defendants have raised a

threshold question of timing. They argue that the court should not consider the

motion now, maintaining that the Court of Chancery generally makes spoliation

findings just before or after trial. The defendants have collected examples to support

that contention,8 but their examples are just that. They do not establish a general

rule, much less a requirement.

As part of its case management authority, a trial court has discretion regarding

when to address motions. “Delaware trial courts have inherent power to control their

dockets.” Solow v. Aspect Res., LLC, 46 A.3d 1074, 1075 (Del. 2012). That authority

includes determining how to proceed for the “orderly adjudication of claims.”

Unbound P’rs Ltd. P’ship v. Invoy Hldgs. Inc., 251 A.3d 1016, 1030 (Del. Super. 2021)

(cleaned up). Rule 1 instructs the members of this court that the rules “shall be

construed, administered, and employed by the Court and the parties, to secure the

8 See, e.g., Fortis Advisors LLC v. Johnson & Johnson, C.A. No. 2020-0881-LWW, at

61–62, 78, 129–36 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2023) (TRANSCRIPT) (deferring ruling on spoliation
motion until trial or a separate evidentiary hearing because the court “can’t possibly make
credibility determinations or assess [the custodian’s] state of mind on the record that I have
before me right now.”); Twitter, Inc. v. Musk, 2022 WL 5078278, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 5, 2022)
(reserving ruling on a motion for adverse inference “pending post-trial briefing, when I have
a fuller understanding of the record.”); Kan-Di-Ki v. Suer, C.A. No. 7937-VCP, at 52–55 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 24, 2014) (TRANSCRIPT) (deferring resolution of motion for sanctions at pre-trial
conference); Williams Companies, Inc. v. Energy Transfer LP, 2020 WL 3581095, at *22 (Del.
Ch. July 2, 2020) (ruling that the motion for sanctions at issue “should be dealt with at trial
or a separate evidentiary hearing.”).

27
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding.” Ct. Ch. R. 1.

Commenting on the sibling federal rule, a leading treatise states that “[t]here

probably is no provision in the federal rules that is more important than this

mandate. It reflects the spirit in which the rules were conceived and written, and in

which they should be interpreted.” 4 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Adam

N. Steinman, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1029 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database

updated Apr. 2023).

Court of Chancery Rule 16(a) similarly contemplates that a court may take

steps to “formulat[e] and simplif[y] . . . . the issues” and to address “[s]uch other

matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.” Ct. Ch. R. 16(a)(1), (5). The same

authoritative treatise explains that “case management [is] an express goal of pretrial

procedure.” 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 1521 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2023). To

that end, the Advisory Committee’s note to the federal rule emphasizes the need for

“a process of judicial management that embraces the entire pretrial phase.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. The commentary recognizes

that “[t]he timing of any attempt at issue formulation is a matter of judicial

discretion.” Id.

Rule 37 “does not contain any specific reference to the timing of the filing of a

motion seeking spoliation sanctions.” Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp.

2d 494, 506 (D. Md. 2009). A review of federal decisions suggests that federal courts

primarily encounter the problem of parties raising spoliation issues too late, rather

28
than too early.9 For that to be a major concern undercuts the defendants’ argument

that spoliation issues should wait until trial.

When to address a spoliation issue depends on a variety of factors, including

the nature of the issue, the stage of the case, the court’s ability to provide case-specific

relief, and any scheduling order that might apply.10 If a party seeks an order

compelling the defendants to provide additional discovery or to pay for the movant to

conduct additional discovery, then it would be foolish to defer the motion until trial.

If a ruling on the motion will help the parties prepare for trial or limit the issues to

be addressed at trial, then it often will make sense to address the motion before trial.

If the motion turns on evidentiary issues that the court will evaluate at trial, then it

will make sense to defer the motion until trial. Ultimately, the decision rests in the

discretion of the court based on the facts of each case.

Here, the plaintiff seeks sanctions that will frame the issues for trial. The

plaintiff asks for a combination of adverse inferences and preclusion orders. Whether

the court grants the requested sanctions or imposes others will determine how the

9 See GMS Indus. Supply, Inc. v. G&S Supply, LLC, 2022 WL 853626, at *4 (E.D. Va.

Mar. 22, 2022) (analyzing whether motion was filed late); McEachron v. Glans, 1999 WL
33601543, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. June 8, 1999) (collecting authorities). In those settings, courts
have acknowledged that “spoliation sanctions motions often follow only where extensive ESI
recovery efforts have failed, or after forensic review gives the movant a much better idea of
the quantity and nature of unproduced, deleted ESI.” Steves & Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc.,
327 F.R.D. 96, 108 (E.D. Va. 2018); accord GMS Indus., 2022 WL 853626, at *4.

10 See Gruenstein v. Browning, 2022 WL 3213261, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 2022)
(listing factors); GMS Indus., 2022 WL 853626, at *4 (same).

29
parties plan for trial and present evidence. The proper time to consider the plaintiff’s

motion is now.

B. The Rule 37(e) Analysis

The federal courts have established a step-by-step framework for analyzing

spoliation issues under Rule 37(e). See Thomas J. Joyce, Finding Prejudice from Lost

ESI: An Analysis of Courts’ Standards Under Amended Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 37(e), 71 Okla. L. Rev. 979, 980–81 (2019) (collecting cases). This decision

adopts and applies that framework.

1. Was There A Duty To Preserve The Texts?

The first question is whether the ESI “should have been preserved.” Ct. Ch. R.

37(e). “Rule 37(e) does not apply . . . when information or evidence is lost before a

duty to preserve attaches.” Living Color, 2016 WL 1105297, at *4.

“A party in litigation has an affirmative duty to preserve potentially relevant

evidence.” Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 142, 150 (Del. 2017). A party also must preserve

potentially relevant evidence as soon as the party either actually anticipates

litigation11 or reasonably should have anticipated litigation.12 The latter inquiry is an

11 See, e.g., Gener8, LLC v. Castanon, 2023 WL 6381635, at *17 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29,

2023) (tying duty of preservation to defendant’s subjective anticipation of litigation while
noting that the duty arguably arose earlier); Beard Rsch., Inc. v. Kates, 981 A.2d 1175, 1185
(Del. Ch. 2009) (same). For federal cases, see, e.g., Paisley Park, 330 F.R.D. at 233.

12 See, e.g., Gener8, 2023 WL 6381635, at *14 (“A party in litigation or who has reason

to anticipate litigation has an affirmative duty to preserve evidence that might be relevant
to the issues in the lawsuit.” (quoting TR Inv’rs, LLC v. Genger, 2009 WL 4696062, at *17
(Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2009)); Beard Rsch., 981 A.2d at 1185 (“A party in litigation or who has
reason to anticipate litigation has an affirmative duty to preserve evidence that might be
relevant to the issues in the lawsuit.”); Triton Const. Co., Inc. v. E. Shore Elec. Servs., Inc.,
2009 WL 1387115, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 18, 2009) (“An affirmative duty to preserve evidence
30
objective one: “[W]hether a reasonable party in the same factual circumstances would

have reasonably foreseen litigation.” The Sedona Conference Commentary on Legal

Holds, Second Edition: The Trigger & The Process 354 (2019) (quoting Micron Tech.,

Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). “The duty to preserve

relevant evidence must be viewed from the perspective of the party with control of

the evidence.” Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Boeing Co., 319 F.R.D. 730, 740 (N.D. Ala.

2017). The Advisory Committee notes to Federal Rule 37(e) explain that the duty to

preserve arises when litigation is “reasonably foreseeable.” AC Notes. They observe

that “[a] variety of events may alert a party to the prospect of litigation.” Id.

The reasonably foreseeable standard turns on the prospect of litigation, not the

specific case or claims that ended up being filed. The reasonable anticipation of one

attaches upon the discovery of facts and circumstances that would lead to a conclusion that
litigation is imminent or should otherwise be expected.”). For federal precedent, see, e.g.,
Gruenstein v. Browning, 2022 WL 3213261, at *6 (“A duty to preserve evidence can arise
before litigation starts, and Rule 37(e), which applies to ESI ‘that should have been preserved
in the anticipation or conduct of litigation,’ expressly contemplates this scenario.”); Hollis v.
CEVA Logistics U.S., Inc., 603 F. Supp. 3d 611, 619 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (“The duty to preserve
under Rule 37(e) is based on the common law, and so is triggered when litigation is
commenced or reasonably anticipated.”); Eshelman v. Puma Biotechnology, Inc., 2017 WL
2483800, at *4 (E.D.N.C. June 7, 2017) (acknowledging that the duty to preserve evidence
arises not just during litigation but also before litigation when it is reasonably anticipated);
Core Labs. LP v. Spectrum Tracer Servs., L.L.C., 2016 WL 879324, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 7,
2016) (recognizing a duty to preserve evidence when a party knew or reasonably should have
known that litigation is imminent); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D.
212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The obligation to preserve evidence arises when the party has
notice that the evidence is relevant to litigation or when a party should have known that the
evidence may be relevant to future litigation.” (quoting Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Express Corp.,
247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)).

31
lawsuit may trigger a preservation obligation, which may then continue because of

other lawsuits.13

Once the duty to preserve evidence applies, the party “must not destroy unique,

relevant evidence that might be useful to an adversary.” Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at

217.

While a litigant is under no duty to keep or retain every document in its
possession it is under a duty to preserve what it knows, or reasonably
should know, is relevant in the action, is reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence, is reasonably likely to be
requested during discovery and/or is the subject of a pending discovery
request.

Id. (cleaned up). “The duty to preserve extends to those employees likely to have

relevant information—the ‘key players’ in the case.” Id. at 218. An organization’s

decision to circulate a litigation hold notice is a strong indication that a duty to

13 E.g., Stinson v. City of New York, 2016 WL 54684, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2016)

(finding that “summons quotas were a major issue in . . . an earlier challenge to the NYPD’s
‘stop and frisk’ program. Since the existence of an alleged quota was a ‘[h]otly contested’ issue
in [the earlier case] and that case continued up to and beyond the filing of the Complaint in
the instant litigation, the City has been on notice that evidence relating to an alleged
summons quota is relevant to litigation since at least . . . the date of the filing of the
Complaint in [the earlier case], which contained significant quota-related allegations. The
duty to preserve evidence therefore arose on that date.”) (internal citations omitted); In re
Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (“[The defendant]
should have remained on notice that litigation against them was probable even after the
[initial] suit was dismissed. [The defendant] had already been sued once, and there were
several indicators that they would be sued again. . . . Accordingly, [the defendant] had a
continuing duty to preserve documents after the [initial] lawsuit was dismissed.”). See
generally The Sedona Guidelines: Best Practice Guidelines & Commentary for Managing
Information & Records in the Electronic Age 44–47 (2007).

32
preserve evidence exists, because it shows that the organization subjectively

anticipated litigation.14

In this case, at a minimum, Denner and Sarissa had a duty to preserve

evidence starting on February 21, 2018, when Bioverativ’s general counsel circulated

the Bioverativ Hold. The duty undoubtedly arose much earlier, because litigation

involving M&A transactions is sufficiently common that Denner and Sarissa should

have reasonably anticipated litigation challenging the Bioverativ-Sanofi transaction

well before that. It would be easy to find that Denner and Sarissa’s duty to preserve

evidence arose in May 2017, when Denner caused Sarissa to rapidly accumulate a

large position in Bioverativ’s stock after Sanofi approached Denner and Posner about

buying Bioverativ at a price of $90 per share. But such a finding is not necessary to

resolve the issues in the case. Relying on the Bioverativ Hold is sufficient.15

The duty to preserve evidence extended to all of the Sarissa custodians at issue

on this motion. Four of the custodians were obviously key players in Sarissa’s

14 E.g., Skanska USA, 340 F.R.D. at 186. So is a demand letter threatening litigation.

E.g., Trask-Morton v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 534 F.3d 672, 681 (7th Cir. 2008) (tying
preservation obligation to receipt of demand letter); Does 1–5 v. City of Chicago, 2019 WL
2994532, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2019) (“A demand letter threatening litigation may trigger
the duty to preserve documents within its scope.”); Stevenson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco,
2015 WL 6177363, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2015) (“Before litigation begins, courts agree that
the receipt of a demand letter, a request for evidence preservation, a threat of litigation, or a
decision to pursue a claim will all trigger the duty to preserve evidence.” (quoting In re
Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prod. Liab. Litig., 299 F.R.D. 502, 512 (S.D. W.V. 2014) (citing
cases)).

15 For the obligation to preserve Denner and DiPaolo’s texts, the Sarissa Hold is
sufficient. The earlier Bioverativ and Sanofi Holds only matter for the imaging of Denner’s
assistant’s phone and for turning off the head trader’s autodelete function.

33
accumulation of stock: Denner himself, Sarissa’s general counsel (DiPaolo), Sarissa’s

head trader (Garafalo), and Sarissa’s Chief Compliance Officer (Bonfilglio). Another

obvious custodian was Denner’s personal assistant, who would possess many of

Denner’s documents.

The duty to preserve evidence extended to the ESI at issue on this motion. The

preservation obligation extended to evidence in Denner or Sarissa’s possession,

custody, or control. ESI on Denner’s personal device was plainly within his

possession, custody, or control. Business-related texts on employee personal devices

are likewise within an organization’s possession, custody, or control.16

16 E.g., Miramontes v. Peraton, Inc., 2023 WL 3855603, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2023)

(rejecting argument that the defendant did not need to preserve text messages because they
were located on custodian’s personal phone and holding “the Court finds persuasive
Miramontes’ evidence that Peraton did not issue company cell phones and Peraton employees
regularly conducted business on their cell phones. Under these circumstances, the Court
finds Peraton had control over the text messages . . . .”); Colonies P’rs, L.P. v. Cty. of San
Bernardino, 2020 WL 1496444 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2020) (holding that the defendant had a
duty to preserve employee’s personal emails and text messages and stating “[a]dditionally,
although the County did not necessarily have direct access to the personal emails and text
messages, Ramos was an employee of the County engaging in County business and business
that implicated Plaintiffs on his devices and campaign email. Additionally, as a Defendant
in the case, and defending Ramos—an employee—and responsible for any potential judgment
in Plaintiffs’ favor, a duty to preserve ESI can be imputed to the County.”), report and
recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1491339 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2020); see also Alter v. Rocky
Point Sch. Dist., 2014 WL 4966119, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (“Finally, Defendants
claim that they were not obliged to preserve work-related ESI which employees such as
Defendant Superintendent Ring utilized on their personal computers. However, to the extent
that the School District employees had documents related to this matter, the information
should have been preserved on whatever devices contained the information (e.g.[,] laptops,
cellphones, and any personal digital devices capable of ESI storage.”). See generally The
Sedona Conference Commentary on BYOD: Principles and Guidance for Developing Policies
and Meeting Discovery Obligations, 19 Sedona Conf. J. 495, 528 (2018) (“It should come as no
surprise that ESI that falls within the scope of discovery is often stored on mobile devices.
Organizations cannot ignore their discovery obligations merely because a device containing
unique, relevant ESI is also used for personal purposes.”);

34
Eliminating any doubt, the Bioverativ Hold, the Sanofi Hold, and the Sarissa

Hold explicitly encompassed texts and expressly extended to personal devices as well

as company-issued devices. When outside counsel advised DiPaolo about how to

implement the Sarissa Hold, they specifically discussed texts and personal devices.

Denner and Sarissa therefore had an obligation to preserve the lost texts

starting at least as early as February 21, 2018 (though undoubtedly that duty arose

much earlier). That satisfies the first element of the Rule 37(e) test.

2. Are The Texts Lost?

The second issue is whether the ESI “is lost” and “cannot be restored or

replaced through additional discovery.” Ct. Ch. R. 37(e). “Information is lost for

purposes of Rule 37(e) only if it is irretrievable from another source, including other

custodians.”17 “Because [ESI] often exists in multiple locations, loss from one source

may often be harmless when substitute information can be found elsewhere.” AC

Notes.

The plaintiff has not shown that Bonfiglio’s texts are lost. Her device contained

116,868 text messages going back to January 30, 2014. Defense counsel has

determined that none of her texts are responsive, but that is a different issue than

spoliation. There was no failure to preserve Bonfiglio’s texts, so this decision does not

discuss her further.

17 Steves & Sons, 327 F.R.D. at 107; accord Agility Pub. Warehousing Co. K.S.C. v.

Dep’t of Def., 2017 WL 1214424, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2017).

35
Everyone agrees that the other custodians’ texts are lost. The defendants do

not argue that the plaintiff could obtain their texts from other sources. The plaintiff

does not contend that the defendants could recover their texts by engaging in

remedial efforts such as by restoring backup tapes or searching unstructured data.

Denner and Sarissa might have avoided or mitigated a sanctions ruling by coming

forward with other locations where the texts might be found. Given how thoroughly

iMessage backs up texts to the cloud and synchs across devices, it is hard to believe

that Denner, DiPaolo, and Garafalo successfully deleted all texts across all devices.

But everyone agrees that they achieved that feat.

This is also not a case where discovery from other parties can fill the gap. After

learning that Sarissa could not produce any responsive texts, the plaintiff subpoenaed

Verizon, Denner’s cell phone provider. Verizon responded that it did not maintain

records of Denner’s texts. To reiterate, a cellular provider will not have records for an

OTT application like iMessage.

The plaintiff also subpoenaed Lazard, but Lazard could not produce any texts

either. Lazard represented that Sands “no longer has the phone that he used during

the relevant time period” and “his current phone does not have any text messages

dating back to the relevant period.” PX 16.

Deposition testimony is not a sufficient substitute. Occasionally an alleged

spoliator can testify with a sufficient degree of specificity that deposition testimony

will suffice to replace the lost information. E.g., Floeter v. City of Orlando, 2007 WL

486633, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2007) (denying sanctions where spoliator testified in

36
such detail about the type, number, and content of lost emails that the trier of fact

did not need to see the emails to understand their contents). That is the exception,

not the rule. When custodians cannot recall the details of the texts, whom they texted,

or other key information, then depositions do not remedy the loss of evidence.

Skanska USA, 340 F.R.D. at 187.

During his deposition, Denner’s memory repeatedly failed him.

• He had no memory of any phone calls with Sands of Lazard in early May of
2017 about Sanofi’s interest in Bioverativ. PX 21 at 6.

• He had no recollection of Sanofi making its initial expression of interest at
about a 66% premium to market. Id. at 9.

• He had no recollection of telling anyone to begin accumulating a position in
Bioverativ stock. Id. at 10–11.

• He could not recall a meeting with Sands of Lazard in May 2017. Id. at 20. Nor
could he recall generally meeting with Sands during that period. Id. at 21–22.

• He could not recall calls a series of calls with Sands during May 2017. Id. at
28–35, 50.

• He did not recall any discussions with anyone about the short-swing profit rule.
Id. at 56–57.

• He did not recall a meeting with Sands in October 2017. Id. at 63.

• He did not recall any substantive conversations with Sands during October
2017. Id. at 64–65.

• He could not recall whether “us” meant “Sarissa” or ‘Bioverativ” and “them”
meant “Sanofi.” Id. at 66.

• He did not recall discussions with Sands in January 2018. Id. at 78–79.

• He did not recall attempting to revise the proxy statement to assert that Posner
reported to each director about Sanofi’s original offer. Id. at 87.

37
Add to this that the defendants have provided information about the spoliation

belatedly and begrudgingly. Testimony from defense witnesses will not suffice.

The texts are well and truly lost. That satisfies the second element under Rule

37(e).

3. Were The Texts Lost Due To A Failure To Take Reasonable Steps
To Preserve Them?

The third question is whether the ESI was lost “because a party failed to take

reasonable steps to preserve it.” Ct. Ch. R. 37(e). ESI discovery involves five

fundamental steps: (1) identification, (2) preservation, (3) collection, (4) review, and

(5) production. DR Distribs., LLC v. 21 Century Smoking, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 3d 839,

923 (N.D. Ill. 2021).18 The issues here are identification and preservation.

When a duty to preserve evidence arises, a party must act reasonably to

preserve the information that it knows, or reasonably should know, could be relevant

to the litigation, including what an opposing party is likely to be request.19 The

standard is reasonableness. Parties need not “preserve every shred of paper, every e-

mail or electronic document, and every backup tape.” Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217.

18Judge Iain Johnston’s decision in DR Distributors takes a deep dive into the
discovery process with a particular focus on ESI and attendant obligations. It also provides
helpful citations to authoritative treatises and other sources. The analysis in DR Distributors
is spot on for Delaware cases.

19 See In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2016 WL 3951339, at *16 (Del. Ch. July 20, 2016),

aff’d sub nom. Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 142 (Del. 2017); accord Steves & Sons, 327 F.R.D.
at 107 (“Once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must preserve what it knows, or
reasonably should know, is relevant in the anticipated action, is reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence, or is reasonably likely to be requested during
discovery.”) (cleaned up).

38
Taking reasonable steps to preserve evidence requires first taking reasonable

steps to identify the information that should be collected and preserved. See Skanska

USA, 340 F.R.D. at 186. That process requires “locating the relevant people and the

locations and types of ESI.” DR Distribs., 513 F. Supp. at 927. “The relevant people

are the individuals who have custody of the relevant ESI or the ability to obtain the

ESI. Counsel must interview them to learn the relevant facts regarding ESI and to

identify, preserve, collect, and produce the relevant ESI.” Id. “The relevant locations

are those places where the ESI can be found so that it can be both (a) preserved and

(b) collected and produced. Although both are necessary, preserving ESI is distinct

from collecting and producing ESI.” Id.

Identifying custodians and locations requires an intentional and systematic

approach that includes custodian interviews. Id.at 924.

As with an initial client interview, a reasonable custodian interview can
require counsel to cross-examine the client and test the accuracy of the
client’s response to document requests to ensure that all appropriate
sources of data have been searched and that responsive ESI has been
collected—and eventually reviewed and produced. Simply relying on a
client's say so may not be reasonable. And like an initial client interview,
the custodian interview can be an iterative process, requiring follow up.

Id. at 927 (citations omitted). “[T]the custodian interview is not merely a theoretical

best practice. Instead, like the initial client interview, a proper and thorough

custodian interview is mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the

Rules of Professional Conduct.” Id. at 926–27. The same is true under this Court’s

rules.

After identifying the reasonably likely sources of information, the party must

take reasonable steps to collect and preserve it. “Though a party need not preserve
39
all documents in its possession—again, perfection is not the standard—it must

preserve what it knows and reasonably ought to know is relevant to possible litigation

and is in its possession, custody, or control.” Id. at 929. When considering what is

reasonable, a court “should be sensitive to the party’s sophistication with regard to

litigation in evaluating preservation efforts; some litigants, particularly individual

litigants, may be less familiar with preservation obligations than others who have

considerable experience in litigation.” AC Notes.

For an organization, simply circulating a litigation hold is not enough.20 The

organization must take steps to ensure that the recipients of the hold understand

what it means and abide by it.21 The organization also must suspend or modify

20 DR Distribs., 513 F. Supp. at 933 (“The issuance of a litigation hold does not end

counsel’s duty in preserving ESI. . . . They must continue to monitor and supervise or
participate in a party’s efforts to comply with the duty to preserve.”) (citations omitted)); see
Youngevity Int’l v. Smith, 2020 WL 7048687, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 28, 2020) (finding that
litigation hold consisting of a conference call with unidentified defendants was insufficient
where custodians “took no affirmative steps to preserve text messages, resulting in their
deletion.”); CrossFit, Inc. v. Nat’l Strength & Conditioning Ass’n, 2019 WL 6527951, at *9
(holding retention policies under litigation hold remained unreasonable); Apple Inc. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 976, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (finding steps taken to
implement litigation hold were insufficient); see also Procaps, S.A. v. Patheon, Inc., 2014 WL
800468, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2014) (awarding attorneys’ fees, in part, because counsel
“failed to realize that its client never actually implemented the litigation hold. . . .”).

21 See Skanska USA, 340 F.R.D. at 186 (“[N]ot only did Skanska fail to collect the cell

phone data when the litigation hold was put in place, but Skanska failed to ensure its
employees, particularly those who had any role to play with regard to securing the barges or
preparing for Hurricane Sally, understood its litigation hold.”); Alter, 2014 WL 4966119, at
*10 (finding it “troubling” that the litigation hold was not communicated to key players and
holding overwriting backup drives constituted a breach of obligation).

40
routine document retention or document destruction policies so that evidence is not

lost.22

Individuals must take similar steps. Pertinent to this case, they must disable

auto-delete functions that otherwise would destroy emails or texts.23 “It takes, at

most, only a few minutes to disengage the auto-delete function on a cell phone.”

Paisley Park, 330 F.R.D. at 233. They also must back up data from personal devices

before disposing of them.24 Failing to either disengage the auto-delete setting or to

22 Steves & Sons, 327 F.R.D at 108 (observing that a party generally must “suspend

its routine document retention/destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation hold’ to ensure
the preservation of relevant documents.”) (cleaned up)); Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218
(same); see Skanska USA, 340 F.R.D. at 186 (finding that organization failed to meet its
preservation obligations where it “failed [to] suspend its routine document destruction
policies, which allowed employees to delete text messages, and did not require cell phone data
to be backed up.”).

23See Gener8, 2023 WL 6381635, at *14 (finding that individual acted unreasonably

when “[h]e did not disable the auto-delete function on his email” and “never stopped deleting
his texts . . . .”). Many federal cases stand for the same proposition. E.g., Youngevity, 2020
WL 7048687, at *2 (“The Relevant Defendants’ failure to prevent destruction by backing up
their phones’ contents or disabling automatic deletion functions was not reasonable because
they had control over their text messages and should have taken affirmative steps to prevent
their destruction when they became aware of their potential relevance.”); CrossFit, 2019 WL
6527951, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2019) (holding failure to modify default settings to prevent
destruction of emails was not reasonable because the party was on notice of their duty to
preserve); Paisley Park, 330 F.R.D. at 233–35 (finding spoliating party failed to take
reasonable steps to preserve text messages when multiple defendants failed to suspend auto-
delete function on their phones).

24 E.g., Freeman v. Giuliani, 2023 WL 5600316, at *13 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2023) (“With

respect to preserving ESI on phones or other electronic devices, courts have normally held
that litigants must prevent destruction of ESI on such devices by backing up the data to that
device’s cloud network.”); Youngevity, 2020 WL 7048687, at *2 (“The Relevant Defendants’
failure to prevent destruction by backing up their phones’ contents or disabling automatic
deletion functions was not reasonable because they had control over their text messages and
should have taken affirmative steps to prevent their destruction when they became aware of
their potential relevance.”); Laub v. Horbaczewski, 2020 WL 9066078, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July
22, 2020) (finding plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps when he “chose not to backup his
text messages that were stored on his iPhone.”); Paisley Park, 330 F.R.D. at 233 (finding
41
back up messages before deleting them “is sufficient to show” that a defendant “acted

unreasonably.”25

An individual cannot claim ignorance. After receiving a litigation hold, an

individual must take steps to determine what is necessary to comply. That obligation

includes learning of systems “to prevent destruction or automatic deletion.”

Youngevity, 2020 WL 7048687, at *2. As one court explained,

Defendant Kormanis reasonably should have investigated (or asked his
counsel, who received the letter, to investigate) (a) what text messages
his iPhone held, and (b) whether any setting on his iPhone might cause
the deletion of existing or future text messages. Defendant Kormanis
did not take that basic step and his unreasonable failure to do so led to
the loss of text messages he should have preserved. Next, . . . Defendant
Kormanis should have obtained appropriate advice about saving back-
up copies of his text messages . . . .

NuVasive, Inc. v. Kormanis, 2019 WL 1171486, at *8 (M.D. N.C. Mar. 13, 2019), report

and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 1418145 (M.D. N.C. Mar. 29, 2019).

Put simply, “in cases involving ESI, to satisfy their preservation duties, parties

must investigate and disable autodelete functions on email accounts (client and web-

based) at the onset of litigation if those accounts reasonably contain relevant

parties failed to take reasonable steps when they did not use the “relatively simple options
to ensure that their text messages were backed up to cloud storage.”); Brewer v. Leprino Foods
Co., Inc., 2019 WL 356657, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2019) (finding party failed to take
reasonable steps where the was “no effort to back-up or preserve the Galaxy S3 prior to its
loss . . . .”) (cleaned up); Gaina v. Northridge Hosp. Med. Ctr., 2018 WL 6258895, at *5 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 21, 2018) (similar).

25 Paisley Park, 330 F.R.D. at 233; accord Mod. Remodeling, Inc. v. Tripod Hldgs.,

LLC, 2021 WL 3852323, at *10 (D. Md. Aug. 27, 2021); see Steves & Son., 327 F.R.D. at 108–
09 (explaining that to suspend an automatic delete policy would “at worst” clutter a party’s
inbox, which is a “reasonable burden to assume” in the context of litigation).

42
information and it is reasonable under the circumstances of the case to do so.” DR

Distribs., 513 F. Supp. 3d at 931. The same duties apply to text messages or other

types of messaging applications.

Counsel’s role in this process is essential. The obligation to preserve evidence

“runs first to counsel, who has a duty to advise his client of the type of information

potentially relevant to the lawsuit and of the necessity of preventing its destruction.”

Orbit One Commc’ns. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (cleaned

up).

a. The Failure To Take Reasonable Steps In Response To The
Bioverativ Hold

Under these principles, Denner and Sarissa failed to take reasonable steps to

preserve ESI after receiving the Bioverativ Hold. Starting on February 21, 2018,

Denner and Sarissa had a legal duty to preserve evidence, including ESI, relating to

the Bioverativ-Sanofi transaction. As a highly sophisticated party and the principal

of an activist hedge fund, Denner was obligated to consult with counsel about his

preservation obligations, identify likely sources of information, and take steps to

preserve them.

After Denner received the Bioverativ Hold, he should have met with DiPaolo

to identify the key individuals at Sarissa who were involved with the transaction,

including Sarissa’s trading in Bioverativ stock. At a minimum, those individuals

would have included Denner himself, DiPaolo, and Garofalo, the head trader who

carried out Sarissa’s purchases. They logically should have considered Bonfiglio as

Chief Compliance Officer, but her omission was not-consequential.

43
Denner and DiPaolo also should have identified the key locations where data

could be kept. Through that evaluation, they should have identified Denner’s

assistant as a custodian. Eighteen months later, Denner and DiPaolo identified

Denner’s assistant as a custodian in response to the SEC subpoenas. They should

have figured that out in February 2018.

After identifying those five custodians, Denner and Sarissa should have taken

steps to preserve ESI, including by imaging phones or backing up their data. The

Bioverativ Hold expressly extended to ESI on personal phones. In a world where

people primarily communicate using personal devices, it will almost always be

necessary to image or backup data from phones.

If Denner and Sarissa had proceeded in that fashion, they would have learned

that Garafalo had set his phone to delete texts automatically after thirty days and

could have instructed him to turn off that function and take steps to preserve his

data. Texts from before the date he turned off the auto-delete function would have

been lost, but Denner and Sarissa would have known about the lost texts in February

2018 and could have investigated what other sources of data were available at that

time. Perhaps they would have come to the same conclusion that they reached in

December 2022, when they finally looked at Garofalo’s phone, and decided his texts

were irretrievably lost. If they had acted earlier, they would have had more

alternatives.

If Denner and Sarissa had proceeded in that fashion, they would now have

data from the phones belonging to Denner, his assistant, and DiPaolo. Those texts

44
were lost because Denner and Sarissa failed to take reasonable steps to identify and

preserve ESI in response to the Bioverativ Hold.

b. The Failure To Take Reasonable Steps In Response To The
Sanofi Hold

Just as Denner and Sarissa failed to take reasonable steps to preserve ESI

after receiving the Bioverativ Hold, they also failed to take reasonable steps to

preserve ESI after receiving the Sanofi Hold on March 15, 2018. The steps that should

have been taken after the Sanofi Hold are identical to the steps that should have been

taken after the Bioverativ Hold, with the additional qualifier that the second hold

should have made the necessity of those steps all the more apparent.

If Denner and Sarissa had taken those reasonable steps, it would not have

made a difference for the texts on Garofalo’s phone. It would have made a difference

for the phones belonging to Denner, his assistant, and DiPaolo, where the texts would

have been preserved. Those texts were lost because Denner and Sarissa also failed to

take reasonable steps to identify and preserve ESI in response to the Sanofi Hold.

c. The Failure To Take Reasonable Steps To Implement The
Sarissa Hold

In addition to failing to take reasonable steps to preserve ESI after the

Bioverativ Hold and the Sanofi Hold, Denner and Sarissa failed to take reasonable

steps to implement the Sarissa Hold. DiPaolo issued the Sarissa Hold on September

5, 2019, after Sarissa received the SEC subpoenas on September 4. DiPaolo consulted

with outside counsel about implementing the hold, yet DiPaolo and outside counsel

failed to take reasonable steps to implement the hold.

45
If Denner and Sarissa had fulfilled their preservation obligation after the

Bioverativ and Sanofi Holds, then Sarissa already would have had images of, or

backed up data from, those phones and could have continued to preserve them. They

also would have already had an image of, or backed up data from, Denner’s assistant’s

phone, which they could have continued to preserve. Denner and Sarissa’s failures to

respond to the earlier holds prevented them from responding properly to the Sarissa

hold.

Taking the Sarissa Hold in isolation, Denner and Sarissa would not have

breached their preservation obligations as to Denner’s assistant’s phone, because she

left Sarissa in September 2018. One year later, her phone was no longer in Denner

or Sarissa’s possession, custody, or control, so they did not have an obligation to

preserve it. That does not mean that Denner and Sarissa had no obligation to identify

and preserve other sources where the assistant’s data might have been maintained.

They had an obligation to preserve ESI then in existence. But they did not have a

duty, at that point, to secure the phone of an employee who had departed one year

before.

For purposes of Garafalo, the analysis of the Sarissa Hold is the same as the

Bioverativ and Sanofi Holds. Denner and Sarissa breached their preservation

obligations by not identifying Garafalo, not instructing him to turn off his auto-delete

function, not taking steps to image his phone or preserve his data, and not looking

for other sources where his lost data could have been preserved.

46
Most significantly, Denner and Sarissa failed to fulfill their preservation

obligation by not imaging or backing up data from Denner’s and DiPaolo’s phones.

That occurred because DiPaolo seems to have pushed outside counsel to “table” the

collection and imaging of personal devices by stressing that Sarissa’s policies

prohibited using text for business and by representing that he reviewed Denner’s

phone and did not identify responsive texts.

To fulfill their own obligations, outside counsel needed to be more assertive.

“Relying solely on the client to identify the universe of relevant information, without

reasonable inquiry to verify that the client accurately captured that universe, can

lead to sources of information being overlooked.”26 “An attorney may not simply rely

on custodian self-collection of ESI. Instead, counsel must test the accuracy of the

client’s response to document requests to ensure that all appropriate sources of data

have been searched and that responsive ESI has been collected—and eventually

reviewed and produced.”27 Self-collection of documents is particularly risky, because

26 DR Distributors, 513, F.Supp.3d at 935; see Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Neb. v.

BASF Corp., 2007 WL 3342423, at *2, *6 (D. Neb. Nov. 5, 2007) (imposing sanctions where
counsel simply relied on employees’ representations about where responsive evidence could
be found); Tarlton v. Cumberland Cty. Corr. Facility, 192 F.R.D. 165, 170 (D. N.J. 2000)
(“[Defense c]ounsel had a duty to explain to their client what types of information would be
relevant and responsive to discovery requests and ask how and where relevant documents
may be maintained. . . . It was not their option to simply react to plaintiff’s fortuitous
discovery of the existence of relevant documents by making disjointed searches, each time
coming up with a few more documents, and each time representing that was all they had.”).

27 Waskul v. Washtenaw Cty. Cmty. Mental Health, 569 F. Supp. 3d 626, 636 (E.D.

Mich. 2021) (cleaned up); see Auriga Cap. Corp. v. Gatz Props. LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 881 (Del.
Ch. 2012) (noting that “[defendant] and his counsel also created evidentiary uncertainty by
leaving to [the defendant] himself the primary role of collecting responsive documents, and
having had [the defendant], who appears not to have been adequately counseled by his legal
47
clients may not remember or understand where ESI can be located, may not collect

ESI correctly, or may not find or provide counsel with all responsive documents. See

DR Distribs., 513 F. Supp. 3d at 935–36. Self-collection also puts an interested party

in charge of the effort, which may result in the conscious or subconscious omission of

damaging documents. Id. at 936. And clients may not fully document how they

conducted their collections, which is necessary to defend a collection and preservation

process when challenges arise. Id. at 937.

Outside counsel should have given little weight to DiPaolo’s representation

that no one used texts because it was contrary to Sarissa policy. Outside counsel

should have reviewed both Denner’s phone and DiPaolo’s phone. A reasonable

preservation effort would have resulted in counsel imaging or backing up both

phones. By failing to take these steps, Denner and Sarissa breached their duty to

preserve evidence.

Denner and DiPaolo also breached their preservation obligation by failing to

follow outside counsel’s instructions about preserving evidence. Despite mistakenly

tabling the collection and imaging of personal devices, outside counsel gave DiPaolo

and Sarissa explicit advice about preserving texts. At two successive meetings,

outside counsel asked for users to preserve text messages and check with counsel

before buying a new phone and transferring data to a new device. There is no evidence

that anyone did that.

advisors, delete relevant documents while litigation was either pending or highly likely.”)
(footnotes omitted), aff’d, 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012).

48
If Denner and Sarissa had taken those reasonable steps, texts from Denner

and DiPaolo would still exist. Those texts were lost because Denner and Sarissa failed

to take reasonable steps to identify and preserve ESI in response to the Sarissa Hold.

d. The Failure To Take Reasonable Steps To Preserve
Documents In Response To This Litigation

Finally, Denner and Sarissa failed to take reasonable steps to preserve

documents in response to this litigation. The plaintiff filed this case in December

2020. Denner and Sarissa did not do anything to identify and preserve sources of ESI

until November 2021, after the court denied the defendants’ motion to stay discovery.

Serendipitously for Denner, his texts disappeared just weeks before.

After the plaintiff filed this litigation, all of the defendants had an obligation

to identify potential sources of evidence and take steps to preserve them. For Denner

and Sarissa, that meant reviewing what had already been collected, evaluating what

else should be collected, and taking steps to preserve that evidence.

As part of that process, defense counsel should have imaged or backed up

Denner’s and DiPaolo’s phones. That did not happen. The affidavits that DiPaolo and

defense counsel submitted show no meaningful efforts to identify and preserve

potential sources of evidence until November 2021, after the court denied the

defendants’ motion to stay. At that point, defense counsel checked what existed from

the SEC collection in 2019, but otherwise remained passive. Rather than taking

affirmative steps to identify custodians and locations, Defense counsel waited for the

plaintiff to identify sources.

49
If defense counsel had acted when the plaintiff filed this litigation, they would

have determined that no one ever imaged Denner and DiPaolo’s phones as part of the

SEC production. Defense counsel should have promptly informed the plaintiff about

the loss of DiPaolo’s data and taken steps to image Denner’s phone. Working

collaboratively, the parties might have agreed on other steps to preserve data and

avoid another mishap like DiPaolo’s errant repair after the pool cleaning incident.

Denner’s data would have been preserved well before October 2021, when his texts—

but seemingly no other data—were permanently and irretrievably lost. In short, texts

were lost because Denner and Sarissa failed to take reasonable steps to identify and

preserve ESI after this litigation was filed.

e. The Failure To Provide Timely Disclosure

When defending their conduct, the defendants and their counsel have stressed

what they did after November 2021, when they began considering their discovery

obligations. They have also stressed the efforts they took after the plaintiff informed

the defendants in June 2022 that Denner sent texts relating to Bioverativ. That was

too late and too little.

In their post-November 2021 and post-June 2022 efforts, the defendants were

reactive. Instead of seeking to fulfill their discovery obligations, they sought to

respond to the plaintiff’s inquiries. The defendants had an independent obligation to

identify and preserve evidence. They did not take reasonable steps to fulfill it.

In their post-November 2021 and post-June 2022 efforts, defense counsel failed

to provide timely and candid information to the plaintiff. It was not until October

2022 that defense counsel revealed how Denner had lost his texts. That information
50
should have been provided shortly after March 2022, when defense counsel

determined that Denner had no texts on any of his devices from before October 2021.

Defense counsel was all the more dilatory in providing information about other

custodians. In June 2022, the plaintiffs asked about DiPaolo, Garafalo, Bonfiglio, and

Denner’s assistant. It took until February 2023—eight months later—for defense

counsel to provide any information about those custodians, and at that point defense

counsel offered no explanation for DiPaolo not having any texts. Even in January

2024, when the court held a hearing on the sanctions motion, defense counsel could

not provide any explanation the absence of DiPaolo’s texts. No one addressed that

issue until the court ordered defense counsel to provide an affidavit describing their

collection efforts. Defense counsel described what they had done, and DiPaolo

provided a separate affidavit in which he described the swimming pool incident and

subsequent repair gone wrong.

“Electronic discovery requires cooperation between opposing counsel and

transparency in all aspects of preservation and production of ESI.” William A. Gross

Const. Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2009);

see Beard Rsch., 981 A.2d at 1187 (calling for “early and, if necessary, frequent

communications among counsel” regarding ESI). A problem like spoliation rapidly

festers. Defense counsel should have disclosed it earlier and with greater candor.

4. Determining The Appropriate Sanction

The final issue is the appropriate sanction. Like its federal counterpart, Court

of Chancery Rule 37(e) authorizes sanctions to cure prejudice, then conditions an

adverse inference or a default judgment on a culpable mental state. The Advisory
51
Notes to the federal rule observe that sanctions for curing prejudice should not

include or have the same effect as an adverse inference or a default judgment unless

the requisite mental state is shown.

Rule 37(e) establishes a framework for ESI-related sanctions that requires

prejudice before sanctions can be imposed. Rule 37(e)(i) does not identify the possible

sanctions that could be warranted, but the Advisory Notes to the federal rule refer to

orders forbidding a party from putting on certain evidence, permitting other parties

to present evidence, or authorizing arguments to the factfinder about the loss of

evidence. Delaware decisions have identified additional possibilities, including orders

establishing certain facts as true, precluding the use of certain evidence, striking

particular pleadings or claims, modifying the burden of proof for particular issues,

allowing additional discovery, entering default judgments, or awarding attorneys’

fees and costs. See Ct. Ch. R. 37(b); Fortis Advisors, LLC v. Dematic Corp., 2020 WL

6784129, at *3–4 (Del. Super. Nov. 18, 2020); Terramar Retail Ctrs., LLC v. Marion

#2-Seaport Tr. U/A/D June 21, 2002, 2018 WL 6331622, at *14 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4,

2018).

Rule 37(e)(2) specifies a mental culpability requirement for two sanctions.

Under that rule, a court may only presume that the lost information was unfavorable

or enter a default judgment if a party “acted recklessly or with the intent to deprive

another party of the information’s use in the litigation.” Ct. Ch. R. 37(e)(2).

Here, the plaintiff asks that the court to:

• presume Denner’s stock purchases were motivated by Sanofi’s initial
expression of interest;

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• preclude any testimony, from fact witnesses or experts, that would disavow
scienter;

• preclude any testimony about alternative reasons for Sarissa’s trades, such as
a preexisting plan;

• infer that the destroyed texts would have supported plaintiffs’ argument that
the sale process fell outside the range of reasonableness because Denner
maneuvered to secure a near-term sale that would lock in the profits from his
insider trading.

These sanctions are sufficiently significant to require both prejudice and a culpable

mental state.

a. Prejudice

Rule 37(e)(1) requires that that a party have suffered prejudice before a court

will impose sanctions for failing to preserve ESI. Prejudice exists when spoliation

prevents a party from obtaining and potentially using relevant evidence. See Paisley

Park, 330 F.R.D. at 236. Proving that lost evidence is relevant, however, can be

difficult, precisely because the evidence no longer exists.

Like its federal counterpart, Court of Chancery Rule 37(e) does not allocate the

burden of proving or disproving prejudice to one party or the other. Instead, “[t]he

rule leaves judges with discretion to determine how best to assess prejudice in

particular cases.” AC Notes. Federal courts have taken different positions when

allocating the burden of showing prejudice. There are three broad positions: (1) the

requesting party generally has the burden to show prejudice; (2) the spoliating party

generally has the burden of proof to show lack of prejudice; or (3) the spoliating party

bears the burden to show non-prejudice if it acted with a culpable state of mind. Joyce,

supra, at 982.

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The majority rule imposes some level of burden on the requesting party, but

decisions vary in the level of burden imposed. All strive not to make the burden too

heavy. Joyce, supra, at 983–87 (collecting cases). In a case involving the loss of an

entire hard drive, a court required only that the plaintiff explain how the lost evidence

could have been relevant to the case. Core Labs. LP v. Spectrum Tracer Servs., L.L.C.,

2016 WL 879324, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 7, 2016). Another line of cases requires

“plausible, concrete suggestions” about what the lost evidence could have shown.28 A

more demanding requirement calls for “some evidence regarding the particular

nature of the missing ESI . . . .” Eshelman v. Puma Biotechnology, Inc., 2017 WL

2483800, at *5 (E.D. N.C. June 7, 2017).

A minority of district courts place the burden on the non-producing party to

show a lack of prejudice. Joyce, supra, at 987. The rationale for the burden shift is

that the spoliating party is better positioned to know what evidence was destroyed

and “should not be able to benefit from its wrongdoing.” Joyce, supra, at 987–88. That

approach also comports with the Advisory Committee notes to the federal rule, which

suggest it is reasonable for the requesting party to bear the burden when the nature

of the lost information is self-evident, the information seems relatively unimportant,

or the remaining preserved information appears sufficient to meet all parties’ needs.

As a general rule, the Advisory Committee observes that “[d]etermining the content

28 Matthew Enter., Inc. v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, 2016 WL 2957133, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May

23, 2016); accord TLS Mgmt. & Mktg. Servs. LLC v. Rodriguez-Toledo, 2017 WL 1155743, *1
(D.P.R. 2017); Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 897 F. Supp. 2d 939, 981 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (quoting Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).

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of lost information may be a difficult task in some cases, and placing the burden of

proving prejudice on the party that did not lose the information may be unfair.” AC

Notes.

A small number of courts, including the District of Delaware, have analyzed

the non-producing party’s mental state first. Joyce, supra, at 990, 992. If there is

evidence that the non-producing party destroyed evidence intentionally, then the

court may infer that the evidence was unfavorable, shifting the burden of proof to the

non-producing party to show lack of prejudice.29 “The primary justifications for this

approach are that only the party engaged in the destruction of evidence can know

how much prejudice was caused by the spoliation, and it is unlikely that the non-

spoliating party will be able to prove what was contained within the destroyed

information.” Joyce, supra, at 990. That is the same rationale for shifting the burden

to the non-producing party in the first place, but the additional requirement of

showing bad faith narrows the situations when the burden shifts.

Based on how Delaware approaches disputes over relevance, a plaintiff seeking

to establish prejudice under Rule 37(e) must provide a plausible explanation as to

why the evidence could have been relevant such that the failure to preserve is

prejudicial. When a party seeks discovery under Rule 26(b)(1), the party bears an

initial burden to “provide some minimal explanation as to why the discovery satisfies

the requirements of relevance and conditional admissibility.” In re Appraisal of Dole

29 E.g., Ala. Aircraft, 319 F.R.D. at 743–44; GN Netcom, Inc. v. Plantronics, Inc., 2016

WL 3792833, at *9 (D. Del. July 12, 2016).

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Food Co., Inc., 114 A.3d 541, 551 (Del. Ch. 2014) (collecting authorities). The party

opposing discovery then must “show that the explanation is erroneous and that the

Rule 26(b)(1) standard has not been met.” Id.

Likewise when showing prejudice from spoliation, the requesting party must

provide some minimal explanation as to why the lost ESI could have been relevant

and either admissible in its own right or reasonably likely to lead to the discovery of

admissible evidence. At that point, the party that failed to preserve the ESI must

convince the court that the lost material could not have been relevant, would not have

been admissible or potentially led to the discovery of admissible evidence, or

otherwise could not have been used by the requesting party to its advantage.

In this case, the plaintiff has shown prejudice. The extant record is virtually

devoid of contemporaneous documents about Sarissa’s purchases, yet someone at

Sarissa approved them, someone informed DiPaolo so that he could reach out to

Bioverativ’s general counsel to ask about them, and someone told the head trader to

start and stop buying. There are no substantive internal Sarissa emails about the

purchases. The only email that references the purchases involved Denner

encouraging the head trader to “[k]eep going.” PX 3. There are no communications

about why Sarissa octupled its stake so rapidly, but in internal Lazard notes, the

bankers expressed the view that Denner turned down a high offer outright in May

2017 because “Denner would like to build up a stake in the firm prior to selling.” PX

2. Lazard later reported that Sanofi viewed Sarissa’s massive purchases of stock in

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May 2017 as “a positive for the deal” from Sanofi’s perspective. PX 4. The no-longer

extant texts plausibly could have shed light on all of those issues.

The extant record is also virtually devoid of contemporaneous documents from

within Sarissa about Sanofi’s acquisition of Bioverativ. The only substantive internal

emails from Sarissa about the acquisition involve Denner and DiPaolo discussing the

Schedule 14D-9, after the deal was signed. The no-longer-extent texts inferably would

have included exchanges between Denner and Sands about Sanofi’s attempts to

engage. They also inferably would have included exchanges about the negotiations

that Denner led on behalf of Bioverativ after October 2017. See PXs 5, 7, 23 at ’15827.

If the texts existed, the plaintiff could use them to prove their affirmative case.

But that is not the only harm the plaintiff has suffered. Denner and Sarissa intend

to present testimony at trial about a preexisting plan to purchase stock, such that the

timing of Sarissa’s sudden and significant investment was unrelated to Sanofi’s offer.

If the plaintiff had access to contemporaneous texts, the plaintiff could have used the

texts to cross-examine the defense witnesses and impeach their story.

Denner and Sarissa lack any credible response. The plaintiff has pointed to

prejudice, and the defendants have not shown that it does not exist.

b. The Sanctions Necessary To Cure The Prejudice

Rule 37(e)(1) authorizes the court to impose sanctions as necessary to cure the

prejudice. For sanctions to alleviate the harm in this case, they must address both of

its dimensions. They must address the lack of evidence that the plaintiff has to prove

its affirmative case and compensate for the greater ability of the defendants to testify

with impunity.
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To address the first issue, the court will presume at trial that Denner and

Sarissa traded based on Sanofi’s initial approach. The court also will presume at trial

that the lost texts would have supported plaintiffs’ position that the sale process fell

outside the range of reasonableness because Denner maneuvered to secure a near-

term sale that would lock in the profits from his insider trading.

Both presumptions are rebuttable. Under Delaware Rule of Evidence 301, “[i]n

a civil case, unless a statute or these Rules provide otherwise, the party against whom

a presumption is directed has the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the

presumed fact is more probable than the existence of the presumed fact.” D.R.E. 301;

see Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Brown, 988 A.2d 412, 418 n. 19 (Del. 2010)

(“Delaware law does not embrace the ‘bursting bubble’ rule adopted by the Federal

Rules of Evidence.”).

This is a meaningful sanction. Although Delaware decisions assert that

presumptions and their close cousin—the burden of proof by a preponderance of the

evidence—merely determine how a judge rules when the evidence is precisely in

equipoise,30 that is an incomplete description of their effect. Far more often, they

30 See In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Deriv. Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 792 (Del. Ch.

2011) (asserting that “the burden becomes relevant only when a judge is rooted on the fence
post and thus in equipoise . . . .”), aff’d sub nom. Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d
1213 (Del. 2012); In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 548 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(asserting that the practical effect of shifting the burden of persuasion under a preponderance
standard “is slight” because “the outcome of very few cases hinges on what happens if . . . the
evidence is in equipoise.”). If allocating the burden of proof was such a non-issue, then it
would be strange for it to be an issue of law that warrants reversal when mis-imposed.
Compare State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Spine Care Del., LLC, 238 A.3d 850, 858–60 (Del.
2020) (reversing trial court for misallocating burden of proof), with Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Univ.
58
determine what happens if there is no credible evidence on a topic, or if there is some

credible evidence, but not enough that either side could carry a burden by a

preponderance. In each of those common situations, the party favored by the

presumption prevails. The party with the burden loses.31

In this case, the presumption could be outcome-determinative. The plaintiff

has represented that no contemporaneous evidence exists on particular topics. If so,

and if the court discredits the testimony of Sarissa’s witnesses, then neither party

could carry a burden. The side with the burden loses; the side with the presumption

of Del., 267 A.3d 996, 1008 (Del. 2021) (rejecting request for reversal based on misallocation
of burden of proof).

31 For a concrete example of the latter scenario, assume three equally likely scenarios.

With each one-third likely, none prevails by a preponderance. For a concrete example of the
former scenario, recall the debates over appraisal arbitrage and the inability of anyone to
prove under the federally imposed system of immobilized record ownership how individual
shares were voted. Whoever bore the burden of proof would lose. If an investor bought shares
in the public market after the record date, no one could match the shares to a proxy and
determine how the shares were voted. If the investor bore the burden of proving that those
shares were not voted in favor of the merger, then the investor could not seek appraisal. See
In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 2007 WL 1378345, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. May 2,
2007).

For a more recent example, consider the problem of proving whether a dispositive
number of stockholders relied on a material misstatement or omission for purposes of
establishing damages for a disclosure claim. As a practical matter, it is impossible to gather
first-hand evidence about whether thousands of stockholders relied on a particular
misstatement or omission. If a class plaintiff bears the burden of proving reliance, then class
claims for damages from disclosure claims cannot succeed. See In re Columbia Pipeline Grp.,
Merger Litig., 299 A.3d 393, 494 (Del. Ch. 2023) (“The only reasonable takeaway from the
Dismissal Decision was that the plaintiffs would have to prove reliance, causation, and
quantifiable damages. TransCanada’s post-trial argument called attention to the
implications of such a rule—a practical impossibility to recover class-wide compensatory
damages for breaches of the duty of disclosure.”).

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wins. Because the defendants spoliated evidence, the plaintiff should prevail in that

setting.

The presumption thus helps remedy the problem created by the absence of

evidence, but it does not remedy the difficulties that the plaintiff will face cross-

examining Sarissa’s witnesses without contemporaneous documents. To address that

issue, the plaintiff asks for preclusion orders, but the court will not go that far.

Instead, the court will impose a sanction that this court previously deployed

when a party engaged in spoliation: raising that party’s standard of proof by one level

on any issue where that party has the burden. TR Invs., LLC v. Genger, 2010 WL

541687, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 3, 2010). By way of example, if the defendants would

have to prevail by a preponderance of the evidence, they will instead have to prevail

at trial by producing clear and convincing evidence.

In Genger, the court went further and held that because the spoliator’s conduct

called his credibility into question, he “will be unable to prevail on any material

factual issue if the only evidence in support of his position is his own testimony.” Id.

Under that ruling, “[a]bsent corroborating testimony or documents, [the spoliator’s]

mere word will be insufficient to meet his burden of persuasion.” Id. Although the

court could take that additional step in this case, the court will consider the testimony

of Sarissa witnesses and give it the weight due, taking into account when the

testimony is uncorroborated.

Finally, the plaintiff is awarded the reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses

incurred pursing the spoliation issue, including the correspondence relating to that

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issue, the subpoena issued to Verizon, and the briefing of the motion. The parties will

exchange information about their respective attorneys’ fees and costs and attempt to

reach accord in good faith. If they cannot agree, the plaintiff may file an application.

c. A Culpable Mental State

To remedy the prejudice that the failure to preserve ESI caused in this case,

the court has awarded sanctions under Rule 37(e)(1) that include presumptions that

are adverse to the defendants. Because of the significance of the presumptions, it

seems likely that the court only can impose them only if Denner and Sarissa acted

recklessly or intentionally. They at least acted recklessly, so that standard is met.

Under Delaware law, “[i]ntentional conduct means conduct that a person

undertook with a knowing desire or with a conscious objective or purpose.” Urb.

Concepts LLC v. Gruber, 2023 WL 4423978, at *4 (Del. Super. July 7, 2023) (cleaned

up). “Reckless conduct reflects a knowing disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable

risk. It amounts to an ‘I don’t care’ attitude.” Id. (cleaned up). For purposes of

spoliation, a court can find recklessness when

an actor is under a duty to preserve evidence and takes part in the
destruction of evidence while being consciously aware of a risk that he
or she will cause or allow evidence to be spoiled by action or inaction and
that risk would be deemed substantial and unjustifiable by a reasonable
person.

Beard Rsch., 981 A.2d at 1192.

i. Denner and DiPaolo

Based on the current record, the court could find that Denner and DiPaolo

acted intentionally in not preserving ESI. At a minimum, they were reckless.

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A party can prove a culpable mental state through either direct or

circumstantial evidence. See Skanska USA, 340 F.R.D. at 188; E*Trade Sec., LLC v.

Deutsche Bank AG, 230 F.R.D. 582, 590 (D. Minn. 2005). A court ultimately looks for

evidence of a “serious and specific sort of culpability regarding the loss of relevant

ESI.” Paisley Park, 330 F.R.D. at 236 (cleaned up). This court previously found that

a party “was at least reckless” in failing to preserve ESI on a personal phone where

the party (i) moved to stay discovery and represented that no potentially relevant

information would be in jeopardy, (ii) subsequently lost his phone, (iii) never

identified any actions taken to preserve the contents of the phone—or to even consider

that issue—after the duty to preserve arose and before the phone was lost, (iv)

initially represented that he had no text messages and claimed that he generally did

not text for business purposes. Kan-Di-Ki, LLC v. Suer, 2015 WL 4503210, at *29

(Del. Ch. July 22, 2015).

Here, Denner and DiPaolo engaged in comparable conduct. Both knew about

their obligation to preserve texts on their personal devices. Denner received three

litigation hold notices: the Bioverativ Hold, the Sanofi Hold, and the Sarissa Hold.

DiPaolo issued the Sarissa Hold. Each litigation hold discussed the need to take

affirmative steps to preserve texts on personal devices.

For the Sarissa Hold, outside counsel gave DiPaolo specific advice about

preserving texts. DiPaolo induced outside counsel to defer gathering texts from

personal phones by representing (incorrectly) that Denner did not text and claiming

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that he had personally reviewed Denner’s texts and not found any relating to

Bioverativ. The limited texts that the plaintiff has been able to obtain disprove that.

Outside counsel nevertheless instructed DiPaolo that Sarissa employees

needed to preserve their texts and to consult with counsel before upgrading their

phone. There is no evidence that anyone took any steps to implement that instruction.

DiPaolo lost his texts in October 2020. That was after he had personally issued

the Sarissa Hold and received instructions from outside counsel on how to preserve

texts.

Denner lost his texts in October 2021. That was just after the plaintiff served

a document request seeking texts and just before the defendants moved to stay

discovery based in part on the assertion that the plaintiff would not suffer any

prejudice.

Both Denner and DiPaolo lost their texts through inexplicable failures of their

phones to back up their texts from the cloud. For Denner, that supposedly happened

when he upgraded his iPhone, but everyone agrees that an iPhone upgrade does not

have that effect. For DiPaolo, that supposedly happened after he was personally

cleaning his swimming pool, dropped the phone in the water, and then sent it to be

repaired.

No one has suggested that Denner or DiPaolo lost other data from their phones.

Neither have described emotionally crushing losses of beloved family photos. Neither

have suggested that they had to rebuild their contacts from other sources or

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repurchase all of their applications. The strange failure to transfer data to their new

phones seems only to have affected their texts.

That is a lot to believe, particularly when neither explanation is credible, and

when Denner and DiPaolo claim merely to be speculating about how their texts could

have been lost. This court previously found a party to be reckless where the party

took no steps to preserve devices and “threw up his hands up in bewilderment as to

what happened to them.” Triton, 2009 WL 1387115, at *8. That is basically what

Denner and DiPaolo have done.

Both Denner and DiPaolo have averred that they never intentionally deleted

any texts. The objective facts speak more loudly. Denner’s failures to recall anything

about more memorable issues provide additional reason to question whether he would

accurately remember intentionally deleting texts. DiPaolo’s failure to identify texts

on Denner’s phone about Bioverativ, when we now know Denner sent them, provides

additional reason to question whether he would know whether he intentionally

deleted texts.

Denner and DiPaolo had ample motive to delete their texts. The texts violated

Sarissa’s internal policies and federal record keeping laws. They could have (i)

subjected the defendants to fines, (ii) incriminated them in an SEC investigation, (iii)

supported the plaintiff’s claims, or (iv) undermined the defendants’ explanations.

Denner and DiPaolo also had the opportunity and ability to delete their texts, because

their devices were never imaged or backed up.

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For purposes of sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2), recklessness is sufficient. For

now, the court finds only that Denner and DiPaolo acted recklessly. Both sides may

present evidence regarding spoliation at trial. As part of its post-trial findings, the

court may revisit this issue and evaluate whether Denner and DiPaolo’s conduct went

beyond recklessness to reach the level of intentionality.

ii. Sarissa

Just as the court could find that Denner and DiPaolo acted intentionality, the

court could reach the same finding regarding Sarissa. Here again, the court finds only

that Sarissa was at least reckless.

There are multiple paths to finding Sarissa acted with culpable intent. The

most straightforward is imputation. When senior officers of an investment firm act

with a particular state of mind, Delaware law imputes that knowledge to the firm.32

Denner is the founder and principal of Sarissa; DiPaolo is its general counsel. When

they acted recklessly, at a minimum, to spoliate evidence in a case brought against

32 See In re PLX Tech. Inc. S’holders Litig. 2018 WL 5018535, at *49 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16,

2018) (“In this case, Singer was a co-managing member of Potomac and its agent, and his
knowledge is imputed to Potomac in those capacities.”), aff’d, 211 A.3d 137 (Del. 2019);
Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Techs., Inc., 65 A.3d 618, 642–43 (Del. Ch. 2013 (imputing
knowledge of fund principals to investment funds for purposes of “knowing participation”
element of aiding and abetting claim), abrogated in part on other grounds by El Paso Pipeline
GP Co., L.L.C. v. Brinckerhoff, 152 A.3d 1248 (Del. 2016) (rejecting analysis of dilution claim
as having both direct and derivative dimensions) see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Tremont Gp.
Hldgs., Inc., 2012 WL 6632681, at *19 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2012); Khanna v. McMinn, 2006 WL
1388744, at *27 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2006); Carlson v. Hallinan, 925 A.2d 506, 542 (Del. Ch.
2006). Cf. Forsythe v. ESC Fund Mgmt. Co., 2007 WL 2982247, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2007)
(“These investment decisions form the basis of the plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claims.
Therefore, the court may infer CIBC’s knowledge of the Special Limited Partner’s and
Investment Advisor’s breaches of fiduciary duty.”).

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both Denner and Sarissa, their culpable state of mind is imputed to Sarissa for

purposes of the spoliation motion.

Garofalo’s actions in failing to turn off his auto-delete function are also

attributable to Sarissa. This court has found that the failure to turn off an auto-delete

feature “was at least reckless.” Gener8, 2023 WL 6381635, at *15. Federal decisions

reach the same conclusion. See, e.g., Skanska USA, 340 F.R.D. at 185. Garafalo was

Sarissa’s head trader, and Sarissa had an obligation to preserve his texts. For

purposes of the sanctions motion, Garofalo’s recklessness is attributable to Sarissa.

iii. Culpability Requirement Met

The findings regarding recklessness satisfy the requirements of Rule 37(e)(2)

for purposes of the sanctions that the court finds necessary to cure the plaintiff’s

prejudice. The court therefore need not search for alternative sanctions that would

be less well suited to the harm the plaintiff suffered.

III. CONCLUSION

The motion for sanctions based on the failure to preserve ESI is granted. The

allocation of burdens and presentation of evidence at trial will conform to the rulings

in this decision.

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