Schumacher v. Loscalzo and Cohen v. Loscalzo

COURT OF CHANCERY
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
LORI W. WILL LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
VICE CHANCELLOR 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734

July 28, 2023

Blake A. Bennett, Esquire D. McKinley Measley, Esquire
Cooch and Taylor, P.A. Sebastian Van Oudenallen, Esquire
1000 N. West Street, Suite 1500 Morris, Nichols, Arsht &
Wilmington, Delaware 19801 Tunnell LLP
1201 N. Market Street
Seth D. Rigrodsky, Esquire Wilmington, Delaware 19801
Gina M. Serra, Esquire
Herbert W. Mondros, Esquire
Rigrodsky Law, P.A.
300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 210
Wilmington, Delaware 19801

RE: Schumacher v. Loscalzo, et al., C.A. No. 2022-0059-LWW;
Cohen v. Loscalzo, et al., C.A. No. 2022-0453-LWW

Dear Counsel:

The plaintiffs in the above-referenced actions alleged that non-employee

directors of nominal defendant Ionis Pharmaceuticals, Inc. overcompensated

themselves relative to the company’s peers. The Schumacher action was brought

first and quickly settled. The Cohen action, which followed a books and records

demand, commenced after the stipulation of settlement in the Schumacher action

was filed. Because Cohen was cut out of the Schumacher settlement, acrimonious

motions practice between the plaintiffs’ counsel resulted.
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I initially rejected the settlement of the Schumacher action because it

provided for the release of a claim that only Cohen advanced. The parties recut the

settlement and included Cohen. I then approved the revised stipulation of

settlement and took the plaintiffs’ respective fee applications under advisement.

This letter opinion resolves them.

Schumacher’s counsel is entitled to a fee and expense award of $282,500.

Cohen’s counsel is entitled to a fee and expense award of $50,000, but Cohen is

not granted an incentive award.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 19, 2022, plaintiff Leo Schumacher filed a Verified Stockholder

Derivative Complaint (the “Schumacher Complaint”) in a matter captioned

Schumacher v. Loscalzo, et al. (the “Schumacher Action”).1 The Schumacher

Complaint brought claims against certain officers and directors of nominal

defendant Ionis Pharmaceuticals, Inc. for purportedly excessive director

compensation. Schumacher alleged that the members of Ionis’s Board of Directors

“chose to grossly overcompensate themselves in relation to peer companies of

1
C.A. No. 2022-0059-LWW (Del. Ch.) (“Schumacher Action”) Dkt. 1 (“Schumacher
Compl.”).
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comparable size and market capitalization.”2 He asserted that Ionis’s

compensation plan “not only awarded directors well above-market compensation,

but . . . also fail[ed] to consider relevant performance metrics that typically

influence director compensation, such as the Company’s revenue and net income

(or, in this case, negative net income).”3 He sought to “recoup the excessive

compensation” and “to force meaningful corporate governance reforms” that

would “restrict the [n]on-[e]mployee [d]irector [d]efendants’ ability to award

themselves egregious compensation and align the factors driving compensation . . .

with the Company’s performance and long-term objectives.”4

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Schumacher Complaint on

March 18.5 The motion was never briefed.

On April 21, purported Ionis stockholder Robert S. Cohen filed a letter

informing the court that he was pursuing a related books and records demand and

2
Id. ¶ 1.
3
Id. ¶ 2.
4
Id. ¶ 5.
5
Schumacher Action Dkt. 9.
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asked the court to stay further proceedings in the Schumacher action.6 Cohen

moved to intervene and stay on April 29, which Schumacher opposed on May 3.7

On May 24, the parties to the Schumacher Action filed a Stipulation and

Agreement of Compromise, Settlement and Release (the “Settlement

Stipulation”).8 Cohen was not a party to the Settlement Stipulation.

Heated litigation between Schumacher and Cohen ensued.

On May 25, 2022, Cohen filed a separate Verified Stockholder Derivative

Complaint (the “Cohen Complaint”) in an action captioned Cohen v. Loscalzo, et

al. (the “Cohen Action”).9 The Cohen Complaint advanced claims substantially

like those in the Schumacher Complaint, with the addition of a claim that Ionis’s

directors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to disclose material

compensation-related information.10 Those claims were asserted against the same

defendants as those in the Schumacher Complaint.

6
Schumacher Action Dkt. 10.
7
Schumacher Action Dkts. 12, 15.
8
Schumacher Action Dkt. 17 (“Settlement Stip.”).
9
C.A. No. 2022-0453-LWW (Del. Ch.) (“Cohen Action”) Dkt. 1 (“Cohen Compl.”).
10
Id. ¶¶ 51-55, 129-32.
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Cohen subsequently moved to consolidate the Schumacher Action and the

Cohen Action.11 Because the Settlement Stipulation had been filed, I gave Cohen

the option of withdrawing his motion to consolidate (understanding that he

reserved the right to object to the settlement) or having it held in abeyance pending

the settlement hearing.12 Cohen moved for reargument on June 24.13 The motion

for reargument was denied on July 5.14

Also on July 5, I entered a scheduling order setting a settlement hearing in

the Schumacher Action and providing for notice of that hearing.15 The next month,

Schumacher filed a brief in support of the Settlement Stipulation and requested a

$475,000 award of attorneys’ fees and expenses.16

On August 16, Cohen served interrogatories on Schumacher and the

defendants.17 A week later, the parties to the Schumacher Action moved to enforce

the court’s July 5 scheduling order and to stay the Cohen Action.18 Cohen opposed

11
Schumacher Action Dkt. 18; Cohen Action Dkt. 3.
12
Schumacher Action Dkt. 21.
13
Schumacher Action Dkt. 24; Cohen Action Dkts. 10, 12.
14
Schumacher Action Dkt. 32; Cohen Action Dkt. 17.
15
Schumacher Action Dkt. 33.
16
Schumacher Action Dkt. 35 (“Schumacher Br.”) at 3.
17
Schumacher Action Dkt. 38.
18
Schumacher Action Dkt. 40; Cohen Action Dkt. 23.
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the motion. He also moved to compel responses to his interrogatories and to

adjourn the settlement hearing in the Schumacher Action.19 The parties to the

Schumacher Action opposed Cohen’s motion.20

On September 1, Cohen filed an objection to the proposed settlement of the

Schumacher Action. 21 He argued that the settlement should be rejected because,

among other things, the release was overbroad and Schumacher’s counsel

displayed a “lack of vigor” in prosecuting the claims.22 Alternatively, Cohen

requested an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses for “caus[ing] the production”

of Section 220 documents to Schumacher.23 Schumacher opposed Cohen’s

objection.24

On September 12, I granted the motion to enforce the scheduling order in the

Schumacher Action and stayed the Cohen Action.25 I also denied Cohen’s motion

19
Schumacher Action Dkt. 42; Cohen Action Dkt. 25.
20
Schumacher Action Dkt. 48; Cohen Action Dkt. 31; see also Schumacher Action Dkt.
52; Cohen Action Dkt. 32.
21
Schumacher Action Dkt. 49.
22
Id. at 25-26, 28-34.
23
Id. at 39-40.
24
Schumacher Action Dkt. 63.
25
Schumacher Action Dkt. 54; Cohen Action Dkt. 33.
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to compel, except that Cohen was given the opportunity to present argument on his

need for objector discovery at the settlement hearing.26

The Schumacher Action settlement hearing was held on September 21,

2022. I declined to approve the settlement due to the overbreadth of the release,

which explicitly included disclosure claims.27 The Schumacher Complaint did not

challenge Ionis’s disclosures or advance a disclosure claim. But the definition of

“Released Claims” in the Settlement Stipulation included claims concerning “any

disclosures to stockholders in connection []with” the “compensation Ionis paid to

its non-employee directors.”28 I explained that the Delaware Supreme Court had

admonished the Court of Chancery to “scrutinize releases to ‘ensure that the

fiduciary nature of [representative litigation] is respected’” and that the approval of

class-based (or derivative) settlements do not “offend due process.”29 The release

in the Settlement Stipulation contravened these principles.

On February 7, 2023, the parties to the Schumacher and Cohen Actions filed

a joint Amended Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise, Settlement, and

26
Schumacher Action Dkt. 55; Cohen Action Dkt. 34.
27
Schumacher Action Dkt. 70 (“Hr’g Tr.”) at 61-63.
28
Settlement Stip. ¶ 1.6.
29
Griffith v. Stein, 283 A.3d 1124, 1134 (Del. 2022) (quoting In re Celera Corp.
S’holders Litig., 59 A.3d 418, 434 (Del. 2012)).
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Release (the “Amended Settlement Stipulation”).30 The Amended Settlement

Stipulation included additional terms related to Ionis’s disclosures. It also resolved

my prior concerns about the release.

On February 14, Cohen filed a brief in support of the revised settlement and

an application for a $75,000 fee award.31

On April 24, I entered an Order and Final Judgment approving the

settlement and closing the Schumacher Action and the Cohen Action. Cohen and

Schumacher’s fee applications were taken under advisement at that time.32

II. ANALYSIS

The Court of Chancery recognizes “the corporate benefit doctrine by which

‘the Court may order the payment of counsel fees and related expenses to a

plaintiff whose efforts result in . . . the conferring of a corporate benefit.’ Such

results need not be pecuniary, so long as the litigation produces a substantial

benefit to the corporation or its stockholders.”33 Delaware courts look to the

Sugarland factors when assessing a fee request. These factors include “the benefit

30
Schumacher Action Dkt. 72; Cohen Action Dkt. 35.
31
Schumacher Action Dkt. 74 (“Cohen Br.”); Cohen Action Dkt. 37.
32
Schumacher Action Dkt. 77; Cohen Action Dkt. 40.
33
San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Bradbury, 2010 WL 4273171, at *7 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) (quoting Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio P’rs, 562 A.2d 1162, 1164 (Del.
1989)).
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achieved, the difficulty and complexity of the litigation, the effort expended, the

risk-taking, [and] the standing and ability of counsel.”34

Of the Sugarland factors, the benefit achieved is generally given the most

weight.35 It is the plaintiffs’ burden to establish the value of the claimed benefits

and to demonstrate the reasonableness of the amount sought for achieving such

benefits.36 “The determination of any award is a matter within the sound judicial

discretion of the Court of Chancery.”37

A. Schumacher’s Application

Schumacher’s counsel seeks a fee and expense award of $475,000 for the

therapeutic benefits provided to Ionis through the Settlement Stipulation. The

primary benefit is a change to Ionis’s Non-Employee Director Compensation

Policy:

34
Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1255 (Del. 2012).
35
See, e.g., In re Nat’l City Corp. S’holders Litig., 2009 WL 2425389, at *5 (Del. Ch.
July 31, 2009) (“This Court has consistently noted that the most important factor in
determining a fee award is the size of the benefit achieved.”), aff’d, 998 A.2d 851 (Del.
2010) (TABLE); In re Cox Radio, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2010 WL 1806616, at *20 (Del.
Ch. May 6, 2010) (stating that the size of the benefit is of “paramount importance” to the
Sugarland analysis), aff’d, 9 A.3d 475 (2010) (TABLE).
36
See Korn v. New Castle Cnty., 2007 WL 2981939, at *2, *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 3, 2007).
37
In re Abercrombie & Fitch Co. S’holders Deriv. Litig., 886 A.2d 1271, 1273 (Del.
2005) (quoting In re Infinity Broad. Corp. S’holders Litig., 802 A.2d 285, 293 (Del.
2002)).
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No incumbent non-employee director shall receive more than
$450,000 in annual equity compensation per year (based on the
aggregate grant date fair value), and no newly appointed non-
employee director shall receive more than $675,000 in initial equity
compensation (based on the aggregate grant date fair value).38
Three other changes are contemplated to the policy:

1. “The initial equity grant to a new Board member will vest over
three (3) years (instead of the current 1-year vest);”

2. “Within two (2) years of adoption of the amended Policy, and
through his/her tenure, each non-employee director agrees to
hold Ionis equity in an amount no less than five times (5x) the
annual base cash retainer;” and
3. “The Compensation Committee will annually review the set of
peer companies, with input from the Company’s independent
compensation consultant.”39

These terms are to remain in place for three years.

Schumacher asserts that these benefits are worth approximately $4.93

million to $9.29 million to the Company, relying on a report prepared by Cynthia

L. Jones, CFA.40 Jones opines that but for the settlement, Ionis would have paid its

ten incumbent directors $500,000 in total equity compensation and “two new

directors” $1,000,000 in total equity compensation, resulting in total equity

38
Schumacher Action Dkt. 76 (“Governance Enhancements”) ¶ 1(a).
39
Id. ¶¶ 1(b)-(d).
40
Schumacher Br. 24 n.4; Schumacher Action Dkt. 36 (“Norton Aff.”) Ex. E (“Jones
Rep.”).
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compensation of $7,000,000 per year.41 Jones compares that figure to the

$450,000 limit on equity compensation set by the settlement multiplied by ten

directors, since “the Company agree[d] to maintain the size of the Ionis Board at

no more than ten (10) members.”42

Jones’s analysis suffers from numerous problems.43 For one, Jones assumes

that Ionis will pay each director equity compensation equivalent to the preexisting

caps. But Ionis has previously paid less. In fiscal 2021, for example, the “grant

date fair value of annual awards” to directors “did not exceed $500,000.” 44 For

another, Jones’s assumption that Ionis would have paid its two new directors

$1,000,000 each is unsupported.45 Initial equity awards were already limited to

1.5x the amount of annual equity awards, which were capped at $500,000. Thus,

the maximum initial equity award could not exceed $750,000.46

41
Jones Rep. ¶ 6.
42
Governance Enhancements ¶ 2; see Jones Rep. ¶ 7.
43
Cf. Solak v. Sato, C.A. No. 2020-0775-JTL, at 45 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 2021)
(TRANSCRIPT) (rejecting an analysis by Cynthia Jones as “pie-in-the-sky” and not
“convincing”); Alvarado v. Lynch, C.A. No. 2020-0237-LWW, at 27 (Del. Ch. June 21,
2021) (TRANSCRIPT) (attributing little weight to an analysis by Cynthia Jones, which
used the highest median compensation in the relevant time period yielding an “inflated”
calculation of the benefit achieved by a settlement).
44
Ionis Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Schedule 14A, at 67 (Apr. 20, 2022).
45
Jones Rep. ¶ 6.
46
Ionis Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Schedule 14A, at 67 (Apr. 20, 2022).
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If Ionis were to award the maximum amount of equity compensation in the

first year the settlement was in place, the two new directors would receive $75,000

less each and the eight other directors would receive $50,000 less each. This totals

to a maximum savings of $550,000 in year one.47 After that, the maximum savings

would be $500,000 for each of year two and year three.48 Across the three years

the settlement terms will be in effect, this equates—at most—to a reduction of

$1,550,000 in director equity compensation.

Schumacher’s assertion that the settlement supplies a concrete monetary

benefit to Ionis is also flawed. The Schumacher Complaint alleged that the total

non-employee director compensation was excessive—not just equity

compensation. Yet the settlement only addresses equity compensation; it does not

cap other forms of compensation. It is unclear whether the settlement will

meaningfully reduce non-employee director compensation overall.49

Even generously accepting this $1,550,000 value, the award sought is

extreme. Schumacher’s counsel seeks a fee award of $475,000—or 30.6% of the

47
($500,000 * 8) – ($450,000 * 8) = $400,000 for existing directors. ($750,000 * 2) –
($675,000 * 2) = $150,000 for new directors.
48
($500,000 * 10) – ($450,000 * 10) = $500,000 per year.
49
Cf. Steinberg v. Casey, C.A. No. 10190-CB at 35-36 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2015)
(TRANSCRIPT) (questioning whether a cap on equity compensation was beneficial
where there was no cap on cash compensation, which could allow “leakage” whereby the
company could pay additional compensation in cash or another form in the future).
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quantifiable benefit. This well exceeds the range supportable for a case that was

swiftly resolved.50 A percentage of the benefit approach (to the extent one is

appropriate here) suggests that a fee in the range of $155,000 to $232,500 would

be supportable.51

The other purported governance enhancements are less significant. Some

provide modest improvements aimed at the harms alleged in the Schumacher

Complaint. Specifically, initial equity awards vesting over three years rather than

one and requiring each non-employee director to hold Ionis equity in an amount no

less than five times the annual base cash retainer provide only modest reforms.52

Other purported enhancements concern actions the Board was already taking. For

example, the Board had ten members and the Compensation Committee annually

reviews Ionis’s peer companies with input from a compensation consultant.53 The

final term is for Ionis to disclose “any ‘Golden Leash’ arrangements,”54 but it is not

50
See Ams. Mining Corp., 51 A.3d at1260 (explaining, in the context of common fund
settlements, that percentages above 25% are “warranted when cases progress to a post-
trial adjudication”).
51
Id. at 1259 (“When a case settles early, the Court of Chancery tends to award 10-15%
of the monetary benefit conferred.”).
52
Governance Enhancements ¶¶ 1(b), (c). The latter term needs only be adopted within
two years, meaning that it might be in place for just one year.
53
Id.¶¶ 1(d), 2; see Ionis Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Form 10-K, at 89 (Feb. 22, 2023) (listing
ten board members).
54
Governance Enhancements ¶ 3.
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apparent how this is different from the Company’s current disclosure obligations

and policies. These mild therapeutic benefits support a $50,000 fee, bringing the

total range to $205,000 to $282,500.

A reduction of the $475,000 sought is also supported by the remaining

Sugarland factors. The case was low risk, settled early, and was neither difficult

nor complicated. It “‘offered a ready-made settlement opportunity’ and was filed

‘with an obvious and well-marked exit in sight.’”55

The lodestar of Schumacher’s counsel serves as a useful cross-check.56

Schumacher’s counsel at Newman Ferrera LLP incurred 289.7 hours of time on the

matter. Although the total does not exclude hours incurred after the Settlement

Stipulation was filed, counsel estimates that approximately 90% was pre-signing

(or about 260.7 hours).57 This equates to a lodestar of approximately $200,000.

Delaware counsel incurred 16.4 hours of time on the matter, which also does not

55
Sciabacucchi v. Howley, 2023 WL 4345406, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 3, 2023) (quoting In
re Emerson Radio S’holder Deriv. Litig., 2011 WL 1135006, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28,
2011)); see Knight v. Miller, 2023 WL 3750376, at *7 (Del. Ch. June 1, 2023) (“Since
[Investors Bancorp], the Court of Chancery has had a steady diet of breach of fiduciary
duty suits regarding allegedly excessive director compensation.”).
56
See Brinckerhoff v. Texas E. Prods. Pipeline Co., LLC, 986 A.2d 370, 396-97 (Del. Ch.
2010).
57
Norton Aff. ¶ 74; see Hr’g Tr. 39.
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segregate time after the Settlement Stipulation was filed.58 Assuming the same

90% breakdown (or 14.76 hours), Delaware counsel’s lodestar is approximately

$11,808—for a total lodestar of $211,808. A fee at the high end of the range

calculated above indicates a multiplier of 1.3x and an hourly rate of $1025.56,

which exceeds the highest partner rate billed on the matter.59 Expenses total

$6,387.78.60

For these reasons, Schumacher’s counsel is awarded an all-in fee and

expense award of $282,500, which is at the top of the calculated range.

Considering the lodestar as a cross-check, this fee provides counsel with a

premium for their efforts and is generous considering the procedural history and

“squishi[ness]” of the settlement benefits.61 It is also in line with precedent

resolving claims for non-employee director compensation for modest therapeutic

benefits.62

58
Schumacher Action Dkt. 37 (“Bennett Aff.”) ¶ 5.
59
Norton Aff. ¶ 74 (listing the highest partner rate at $950 per hour); see Howley, 2023
WL 4345406, at *6 (concluding that an award for the early settlement of an action for
therapeutic benefits was appropriate where it “exceed[ed] the billing rate of every
attorney representing the plaintiff in th[e] action”).
60
Bennett Aff. ¶ 7; Norton Aff. ¶ 79.
See Steinberg, C.A. No. 10190-CB at 36 (describing the settlement as “squishier” than
61

what counsel quantified given the potential for leakage).
62
E.g., Sato, C.A. No. 2020-0775-JTL, at 42-44, 51(awarding $300,000 for “mild”
benefits in exchange for the release of claims based on the allegation that non-employee
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B. Cohen’s Application

Cohen’s counsel seeks a separate fee award for the benefits he asserts were

achieved through the Amended Settlement Stipulation. These benefits concern the

following “disclosure enhancements” that will be addressed in Ionis’s annual

proxy statements:

1. “The proxy statements shall disclose (1) if a compensation
consultant was retained; (2) the identity of the compensation
consultant; (3) any compensation paid to the compensation
consultant; and (4) any final written recommendation made by
the compensation consultant regarding the amounts of
nonemployee director compensation;”
2. “[T]he proxy statements shall disclose a detailed description of
the material terms of the Director Compensation Policy, and the
methodology for formulating the new director compensation
plan and determining the peer group;”
3. “The proxy statements shall identify the constituents of the
[Company’s] [p]eer [g]roup;” and

director compensation exceeded the average of the company’s peers); Solak v. Huff, C.A.
No. 2022-0400-LWW, at 38 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2023) (TRANSCRIPT) (awarding
$160,000 for reduction in non-employee director compensation). Higher fee awards were
granted in certain lawsuits that came earlier in the wave of cases challenging non-
employee director compensation and procured meaningful benefits for the nominal
defendants. E.g., In re Salesforce.com, Inc. Deriv. Litig., C.A. No. 2018-0922-ABG
(Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2019) (TRANSCRIPT). Such fee awards have trended downward.
Cf. supra note 55.
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4. “The proxy statements shall disclose and explain any
compensation paid to non-employee directors outside of the
Director Compensation Policy.”63

These disclosure-related benefits do not “seem to add meaningfully to what

the company is already disclosing or needs to disclose.”64 Only two seem to

require additional, potentially useful information: the requirements to disclose “any

final written recommendation made by the compensation consultant regarding the

amounts of non-employee director compensation” and the specifics of how the

plan and peer group were formulated.

Cohen requests $75,000 for these benefits (along with a fixed

implementation deadline for the settlement benefits).65 Since—at most—two-

thirds of the “disclosure enhancements” seem to modestly improve on what the

company was already doing, Cohen’s counsel will be awarded a corresponding

amount of the fee sought: $50,000. The other Sugarland factors support this

downward departure for the same reasons addressed regarding Schumacher.66

63
Governance Enhancements ¶ 1(e).
64
Huff, C.A. 2022-0400-LWW, at 28.
65
The original Settlement Stipulation required implementation “as soon as practicable.”
The Amended Settlement Stipulation requires implementation within 10 business days of
the court entering an order & final judgment. It is not apparent whether the two
timeframes would have been meaningfully different, and I attribute no weight to this
purported benefit.
66
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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It is not useful to use the lodestar as a cross-check here. Cohen’s counsel

avers that they spent 450.25 hours litigating the claims.67 This is undue for a

lawsuit brought after the Settlement Stipulation was filed in the Schumacher

Action and surely includes time that Cohen’s counsel spent unnecessarily

obfuscating and complicating proceedings.68

For similar reasons, I decline Cohen’s request for a $1,500 incentive award.

Based on my observations, representative plaintiffs have regularly been requesting

incentive awards in settlements—despite the “presumption” against such

bonuses.69 Sometimes, an award is appropriate because the plaintiff imparted time

and expertise “beyond that provided by a typical plaintiff.”70 Here, Cohen did not

undertake efforts above the baseline expected of litigants in this court. He is not

67
Cohen Br. 26.
68
See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
69
Raider v. Sunderland, 2006 WL 75310, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 4, 2006); Oliver v. Boston
Univ., 2009 WL 1515607, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 29, 2009) (stating that incentive awards
“should be rare” and only granted “in the exceptional case”).
70
Raider, 2006 WL 75310, at *2 (awarding a “bonus payment” to a lead plaintiff who
“spent over 200 hours of his time on th[e] matter over a period of five years continually
communicating with class counsel, investigating independently, providing analysis and
expertise, reviewing documents, being deposed, negotiating the class settlement
(including active direction and instruction to class counsel) and negotiating class
counsel’s fees”).
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entitled to a bonus for “review[ing] all of the pleadings and motions,” “sp[eaking]

with counsel,” and “agree[ing] to the [s]ettlement.”71

III. CONCLUSION

Schumacher’s counsel is awarded $282,500. Cohen’s counsel is awarded

$50,000. Cohen’s request for an incentive award is denied.

To the extent necessary for this decision to take effect, IT IS SO

ORDERED.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Lori W. Will

Lori W. Will
Vice Chancellor

71
Cohen Br. 28.