Greenfield One III GmbH & Co. KG v. Chris Chaney

COURT OF CHANCERY
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
LORI W. WILL LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
VICE CHANCELLOR 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734
June 2, 2026

Andrew H. Lippstone, Esquire Chris Chaney, pro se
Lippstone Law LLC
122 Delaware Street, Suite E-3
New Castle, Delaware 19720

RE: Greenfield One III GmbH & Co. KG v. Chaney,
C.A. No. 2024-0663-LWW

Dear Counsel and Mr. Chaney:

I have reviewed the plaintiffs’ letter seeking leave to file a motion for

summary judgment, along with defendant Chris Chaney’s response letter.1 After

careful consideration, the request is denied.

“There is no ‘right’ to a summary judgment.”2 “[T]he court may, in its

discretion, deny summary judgment if it decides upon a preliminary examination

of the facts presented that it is desirable to inquire into and develop the facts more

thoroughly at trial in order to clarify the law or its application.”3 Here, the core

1
Pls.’ Letter Requesting Leave to File Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt. 100) (“Pls.’ Request”);
Def.’s Response to Pls.’ Request for Leave to File Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt. 101) (“Def.’s
Response”).
2
Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 262 (Del. 2002) (citation omitted).
3
In re El Paso Pipeline P’rs, L.P. Deriv. Litig., 2014 WL 2768782, at *9 (Del. Ch.
June 12, 2014).
C.A. No. 2024-0663-LWW
June 2, 2026
Page 2 of 3

disputes implicate issues of fact and credibility determinations that are unsuitable

for resolution on the papers.

Two claims remain in this suit: Count IV for breach of a Side Letter

Agreement (“SLA”), and Count V for breach of multiple Simple Agreements for

Future Equity (“SAFEs”).

In Count IV, the plaintiffs allege that Chaney breached the SLA by routing

over $2.7 million of nominal defendant 1Zer0 Labs, Inc. d/b/a Fancurve’s capital

to pay personal debts rather than financing corporate activities. They assert that

document metadata and German criminal authority records prove the relevant

promissory note and board consents were fabricated and backdated.4 As Chaney

points out, however, this authenticity dispute cannot be resolved without live

testimony and credibility assessments.5 Chaney notes that a severe decline in NFT

transaction volumes during the relevant period creates a triable issue of fact

regarding causation.6

As for Count V, a default judgment was entered against Fancurve on

February 24, 2026.7 The plaintiffs argue that because Fancurve’s breaches of the

4
Pls.’ Request 3.
5
Def.’s Response 2.
6
Id. at 3.
7
Dkt. 90.
C.A. No. 2024-0663-LWW
June 2, 2026
Page 3 of 3

SAFEs are legally admitted, calculating damages for Count V is a basic matter of

contract interpretation and operates independently of the SAFEs’ liquidation

priorities.8 Chaney counters that assessing damages under the SAFEs requires a

factual analysis of liquidation priorities, senior obligations, and Fancurve’s

insolvency that the existing record does not readily supply.9

Resolving Count IV will require the court to assess credibility and weigh

evidence. “If the matter depends to any material extent upon a determination of

credibility, summary judgment is inappropriate.”10 Resolving Count V requires

further factual development to clarify the application of the law.11 Accordingly, it

is most efficient to proceed to trial in July as scheduled.12 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Lori W. Will

Lori W. Will
Vice Chancellor

8
Pls.’ Request 4-5.
9
Def.’s Response 4.
10
Cerberus Int’l, Ltd. v. Apollo Mgmt., L.P., 794 A.2d 1141, 1150 (Del. 2002).
11
See El Paso, 2014 WL 2768782, at *9.
12
See Orloff v. Shulman, 2007 WL 1862742, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 20, 2007) (explaining
that the court denies requests for leave to file motions for summary judgment where such
proceedings “are apt to waste, rather than conserve, the resources of the parties and the
court”).