Eugenia Cole v. Simone Rayfield

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

EUGENIA COLE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. 2025-1091-SEM
)
SIMONE RAYFIELD, Executor, )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

WHEREAS, on September 25, 2025, Eugenia Cole (the “Plaintiff”) filed a

complaint (the “Complaint”) against Simone Rayfield (the “Defendant”) in her role

as executor of the estate of Dwight J. Cole (the “Estate”); 1

WHEREAS, the Complaint, styled as a “Request to Halt Sale of Estate,”

alleges that the Defendant engaged in self-dealing against the best interest of the

heirs of the estate and seeks an order for certain real property to be sold on the open-

market; 2

WHEREAS, concurrent with the Complaint, the Plaintiff filed exhibits

enclosed in a singular file that, in addition to labeled exhibits, contain multiple

documents including a “Petition to Halt Private Sale of Estate Property,” (the

“Petition”) and an “Emergency Request for Halt Sale of Estate Property,” (the

1
Docket Item (“D.I.”) 1 (“Compl.”).
2
Compl. at 3.

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“Request”) as well as a proposed order granting the Request; 3

WHEREAS, the Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis, in

which the Plaintiff wrote “I am bringing this issue to the courts in an effort to honor

my brothers [sic] wishes. I do not receive any financial gains[;]” 4 finding the

Plaintiff’s income and assets above the qualifying limits, I denied the application on

September 23, 2025; the Plaintiff, thereafter, paid the filing fee for this action;

WHEREAS, on October 14, 2025, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss

(the “Motion”) under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b), arguing that the Plaintiff lacks

standing because the Plaintiff is neither a beneficiary, executor, or creditor under the

decedent’s last will and testament nor under the codicil of Dwight J. Cole;5

WHEREAS, the Plaintiff responded on October 28, 2025, arguing that she

was an “alternate executor and co-trustee” under a previous addendum to the will;6

to support this claim, the Plaintiff attached an unsigned and unnotarized addendum,

purportedly executed the day before the operative codicil; 7

WHEREAS, on November 10, 2025, the Defendant filed a reply brief in

3
D.I. 4.
4
D.I. 5.
5
D.I. 14 (“Mot.”) ¶ 2.
6
D.I. 16.
7
D.I. 17.

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further support of the Motion; 8 on November 21, 2025, the Plaintiff moved to file a

sur-reply, attaching the proposed sur-reply; I granted that motion and took this

matter under advisement on November 24, 2025;9

WHEREAS, the following facts are accepted as true solely for purposes of

adjudicating the Motion:10

A. On June 12, 2018, Dwight J. Cole (the “Decedent”) executed his last

will and testament.11 He amended that will by specific directive codicil on October

17, 2024. 12 The codicil names the Defendant as Executrix of the Estate, and names

the Defendant and nonparties Tyree Eugene Cole, Jeavon Cole Sutton-Rayfield,

R.W.R., M.E.C., and S.D.R. as beneficiaries.13

B. In pertinent part, the codicil directs the Executrix to sell the Decedent’s

home—22 Broadleaf Drive, Newark, DE 19702 (the “Property”)—“immediately

upon [the Decedent’s] death, and the proceeds from the sale shall be distributed [to

the beneficiaries.]” 14

8
D.I. 18.
9
D.I. 20, 23.
10
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 860 A.2d 312, 318 (Del. 2004) (“Under
Rule 12(b)(6), the facts alleged in the complaint are taken as true.”).
11
Mot. Ex. A.
12
Compl. Ex. A.
13
Id. The previous will named “Simone Danette Cole and Tyree Eugene Cole” as Co-
Executors and disposed of all Estate property to the same. Mot. Ex. A.
14
Compl. Ex. A.

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C. After the Decedent’s death, the Plaintiff learned that the Defendant

planned to conduct a private sale of the Property at its appraised value. 15 The

Plaintiff believes that a private sale does not satisfy the directive that the property be

sold “as soon as practicable.” 16

D. Through email correspondence with the Defendant, beneficiary Tyree

Eugene Cole opposed the private sale, arguing “my father didn’t want either of his

kids to own the house, i was kicked out of my home and lied on so this could all take

place also if the house is half mine how can she buy something im not willing to sell

her?”17

WHEREAS, under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6) “the court (i) accepts as

true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, (ii) credits vague

allegations if they give the opposing party notice of the claim, and (iii) draws all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff[;] [w]hen applying this standard,

dismissal is inappropriate unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under

any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof[;]” 18 the Court

15
D.I. 4 (“Pet.”).
16
Pet.
17
Compl. Ex. C.
18
Delawareans for Educ. Opportunity v. Carney, 2018 WL 4849935, at *9 (Del. Ch. Oct.
5, 2018).

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“need not accept conclusory allegations as true, nor should inferences be drawn

unless they are truly reasonable[;]”19

WHEREAS, “[t]he term ‘standing’ refers to the right of a party to invoke the

jurisdiction of a court to enforce a claim or to redress a grievance. Standing is a

threshold question that must be answered by a court affirmatively to ensure that the

litigation before the tribunal is a case or controversy that is appropriate for the

exercise of the court’s judicial powers. The issue of standing is concerned only with

the question of who is entitled to mount a legal challenge and not with the merits of

the subject matter controversy[;]”20

WHEREAS, “state courts apply the concept of standing as a matter of self-

restraint to avoid the rendering of advisory opinions at the behest of parties who are

intermeddlers[;]” 21

WHEREAS, to have standing, a plaintiff must prove (1) it “suffered an injury

in fact - an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and

particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;” (2) there

is “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of - the injury

has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and not the result

19
MaD Invs. GRMD, LLC v. GR Cos., 2020 WL 6306028, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2020).
20
Dover Hist. Soc. v. City of Dover Plan. Comm'n, 838 A.2d 1103, 1110 (Del. 2003)
(citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).
21
Id. at 1111.

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of the independent action of some third party not before the court; and” (3) it is

“likely as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a

favorable decision[;]”22

WHEREAS, in the estate context:

[a] petitioner has standing to challenge a fiduciary’s actions taken to the
detriment of a decedent’s estate where the petitioner has standing to
challenge the decedent’s will. In the context of a will challenge or
caveat, standing depends on whether the petitioner is an interested
person whose interest must be pecuniary and one detrimentally affected
by the will, and not a mere sentimental interest. A beneficiary named
under the decedent’s current or prior will has standing to bring a caveat
challenging the validity of a will before it is admitted to probate. And
where the decedent’s current and prior wills disinherit the petitioner,
the petitioner is an interested person with standing to challenge a will
if she would be an intestate beneficiary. 23

WHEREAS, for a codicil to be enforceable under Delaware law, it must

comply with the requirements of 12 Del. C. § 202(a);24 the codicil must be “(1) [i]n

writing and signed by the testator or by some person subscribing the testator’s name

in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s express direction; and (2) . . . attested

and subscribed in testator’s presence by 2 or more credible witnesses[;]” 25

22
Burkhart v. Genworth Fin., Inc., 250 A.3d 842, 852 (Del. Ch. 2020) (citations
omitted).
23
In re Corbett v. Corbett, 2019 WL 6841432, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 12, 2019) (citations
and quotations omitted).
24
In re Maull, 1994 WL 374302, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 9, 1994).
25
12 Del. C. § 202(a)(1)–(2).

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 8th day of December 2025, as follows:

1. The Motion is GRANTED.

2. The Plaintiff’s filings fail to demonstrate standing, a threshold question

this court must affirmatively answer before exercising judicial authority over a

controversy. She is neither a beneficiary, creditor, nor executor to the Estate.

Because there are no circumstances where the Plaintiff would inherit from the

Decedent, the Plaintiff has no standing to challenge the administration of the Estate,

and the Complaint must be dismissed.

3. The Plaintiff argues that she was previously an alternate executor and

co-trustee under the October 16, 2024 addendum. But that addendum is not valid or

enforceable because it was not signed by Decedent and or any witnesses. On the

record before me, the Plaintiff has failed to plead a legally cognizable interest in the

Estate or its assets and, therefore, lacks standing to seek any relief relating to the

Defendant’s administration of the Estate. The Motion should be granted.

4. This is a final report under Court of Chancery Rule 144.

IT IS SO ORDERED

/s/ Selena E. Molina
Senior Magistrate in Chancery
Selena E. Molina

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