Perceptive Advisors, LLC v. Gina Bartasi

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

PERCEPTIVE ADVISORS, LLC, )
PERCEPTIVE CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES )
FUND IV, LP, ELLEN HUKKELHOVEN, KBI )
SERVICES, INC., KINDBODY, INC., TARA )
COMONTE, RIVKA FRIEDMAN, KATHY )
HARRIS, LINDA MINTZ, and THERESA )
SEXTON, )
Plaintiffs, )
v. ) C.A. No. 2025-1136-MTZ
)
GINA BARTASI, )
Defendant. )

ORDER GRANTING ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTION

WHEREAS:

A. In late 2024, plaintiff KBI Services, Inc. (“Kindbody”) underwent a

financing round led by plaintiffs Perceptive Advisors, LLC (“Perceptive Advisors”),

and Perceptive Credit Opportunities Fund, IV, LP (“Perceptive Credit”). In

connection with that financing round, defendant Gina Bartasi, Kindbody’s founder

and CEO, agreed to several restrictions in several agreements.

a. In a Separation Agreement, Bartasi stepped down from her positions

as CEO and director, and released all claims against Kindbody and

its directors with respect to any matters related to her ownership of

Kindbody equity and the financing round’s term sheet.1 The

1
Docket item (“D.I.”) 1 Ex. 6 §§ 7, 8.
Separation Agreement has a New York choice of law provision and

no forum selection clause, and specifies that other agreements are to

be construed in accordance with the terms of those agreements.2 In

the Separation Agreement, Bartasi agreed to support the financing

round by voting in favor of it, refraining from backing competing

proposals, and executing the transaction agreements.3

b. Bartasi also agreed to support the financing round via a Support

Agreement and a Voting Agreement that both have a Delaware

forum selection clause.4

c. To implement the financing round, she agreed to an Amended

Certificate for Kindbody with a Delaware forum selection clause;5 a

Stock Purchase Agreement with a Delaware forum selection clause;6

a Right of First Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement with a Delaware

2
Id. § 22.
3
Id. § 6(b).
4
D.I. 1 Ex. 6, Ex. B § 17 (addressing “any Action between any of the parties arising out of
or relating to this Agreement”); D.I. 1 Ex. 2 § 8.14 (addressing “any suit, action or other
proceeding arising out of or based upon this Agreement”).
5
D.I. 1 Ex. 1 Art. X (addressing “any derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf of
the Corporation,” “any action asserting a claim of breach of fiduciary duty owed by any
director,” and “any action asserting a claim against the Corporation [or] its directors . . .
governed by the internal affairs doctrine or that otherwise relates to the internal affairs of
the Corporation”).
6
D.I. 1 Ex. 3 § 6.13 (addressing “any suit, action or other proceeding arising out of or
based upon this Agreement”).

2
forum selection clause;7 and a Investors’ Rights Agreement with a

Delaware forum selection clause.8 The Stock Purchase Agreement

contained a “pay-to-play” provision, under which Bartasi was

diluted after she did not participate.9

B. On May 30, 2025, Bartasi sued Perceptive Advisors in New York state

court.10 The complaint alleges Perceptive Advisors “breached its fiduciary duty” to

Bartasi by coercing her to resign and diminish her preferred equity rights.11 The sole

cause of action asserts Perceptive Advisors breached its duty of loyalty by coercing

Bartasi to sign the release in the Separation Agreement, and seeks a declaration the

release is voidable.12 Bartasi had shared a version of that complaint with Kindbody,

Inc. before she filed, and had been convinced not to sue Kindbody, Inc.13 After

Bartasi sued Perceptive Advisors in May, Perceptive Advisors and its affiliates

engaged with Kindbody concerning that case.14 Perceptive Advisors moved to

7
D.I. 1 Ex. 4 § 7.13 (addressing “any suit, action or other proceeding arising out of or
based upon this Agreement”).
8
D.I. 1 Ex. 5 § 7.12 (addressing “any suit, action or other proceeding arising out of or
based upon this Agreement”).
9
D.I. 1 Ex. 3 § 1.2.3.
10
D.I. 57 Ex. B.
11
Id. ¶ 4.
12
Id. ¶¶ 54–55.
13
D.I. 57, Bartasi Aff. ¶¶ 4–5.
14
Id.

3
dismiss that complaint, asserting, among other arguments, that Bartasi had not pled

a breach of fiduciary duty.15

C. On October 1, Bartasi filed an amended complaint in New York, adding

Perceptive Credit, Kindbody, and six Kindbody directors as defendants (the “New

Defendants”).16 The amended complaint brought two causes of action: one for

breach of the defendants’ duty of loyalty, and one for conspiracy and aiding and

abetting breaches of fiduciary duty.17 Bartasi alleged all named defendants

“breached their fiduciary duties” to Bartasi by coercing her to resign her position

and diminish her preferred equity rights.18 And she alleged Kindbody and one of its

directors conspired with and aided and abetted Perceptive Advisors in breaching its

fiduciary duties.19 The amended complaint seeks damages, declaratory relief that

the Separation Agreement’s release is voidable, and Bartasi’s reinstatement as

Kindbody’s Chairman, CEO and Founder.20

D. On October 3, Bartasi moved to enjoin Kindbody from proceeding with

a contemplated sale of its assets, which she initially believed was scheduled for mid-

15
D.I. 57 Ex. C.
16
D.I. 1 Ex. 7.
17
Id. ¶¶ 81, 84.
18
Id. ¶ 12.
19
Id. ¶ 84.
20
Id. at 17.

4
October of 2025,21 but now believes will close around the end of the year.22 Bartasi

asserts the 2024 financing round, brought about by disloyal fiduciaries and

facilitated by incomplete disclosures, favored Perceptive but “crippled” Bartasi and

Kindbody.23 Bartasi contends the upcoming sale should be enjoined until she can

obtain the relief she seeks, namely regaining her equity, voting rights, and Kindbody

leadership positions.24 The New York court is scheduled to hear Bartasi’s request

for an injunction on October 31, 2025.25

E. Perceptive Advisors and Perceptive Credit came to this Court on

October 6, seeking an expedited antisuit injunction based on the Delaware forum

selection clauses in the Amended Certificate and the financing agreements.26

Kindbody and its directors quickly joined; the matter was promptly briefed; Bartasi

conducted limited discovery; and I heard argument on October 28.27

21
D.I. 1 Ex. 8, Ex. 9.
22
D.I. 70.
23
D.I. 1 Ex. 8 ¶ 55.
24
Id. ¶¶ 52, 57, 59.
25
D.I. 66 at 5.
26
D.I. 1.
27
D.I. 62.

5
F. This Court has broad discretion in granting or denying a preliminary

injunction.28 “A preliminary injunction may be granted where the movants

demonstrate: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits at a final hearing;

(2) an imminent threat of irreparable injury; and (3) a balance of the equities that tips

in favor of issuance of the requested relief. The moving party bears a considerable

burden in establishing each of these necessary elements. Plaintiffs may not merely

show that a dispute exists and that plaintiffs might be injured; rather, plaintiffs must

establish clearly each element because injunctive relief ‘will never be granted unless

earned.’ Yet, ‘there is no steadfast formula for the relative weight each

deserves. Accordingly, a strong demonstration as to one element may serve to

overcome a marginal demonstration of another.’”29 This Court will enforce a valid

forum selection clause by enjoining a first-filed action that violates it, particularly

when an emergency decision is required and there is no opportunity for the first

forum to consider whether the action can proceed there.30

IT IS ORDERED this 29th day of October, 2025 that:

28
Data Gen. Corp. v. Dig. Comput. Controls, Inc., 297 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1972) (citation
omitted).
29
Village Green Holding, LLC v. Holtzman, 2018 WL 4849964, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 5,
2018) (collecting cases).
30
See Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc., 8 A.3d 1143, 1146–48 (Del. 2010); Advent Int’l Corp.,
2024 WL 3580934, at *12–13.

6
1. Plaintiffs have demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the

merits. As a stockholder, Bartasi is bound by the Amended Certificate. Her May

New York complaint asserted derivative claims against Perceptive Advisors,31

which fall within the Amended Certificate’s forum selection clause.32 Her October

amended complaint additionally asserted Kindbody and its directors breached their

duty of loyalty, and aided and abetted the predicate breaches.33 Those claims

likewise fall within the Amended Certificate’s forum selection clause.34 Bartasi’s

31
That complaint brought derivative claims for dilution of minority preferred stock, D.I.
57 Ex B. ¶¶ 48, 54, and for diminished corporate value arising from deficient disclosures,
D.I. 57 Ex B ¶ 37. Perceptive Advisors’ alleged self-dealing impaired Kindbody’s coffers
and overall value, and harm to stockholders (including Bartasi) was indirect and pro rata.
See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004)
(whether a stockholder’s claim is direct (personal) or derivative (on behalf of the
corporation) turns on the two-pronged test, i.e.,“(i) who suffered the alleged harm (the
corporation or the stockholders, individually); and (ii) who would receive the benefit of
any recovery or other remedy (the corporation or the stockholders, individually)[.]”);
Brookfield Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Rosson, 261 A.3d 1251, 1266 (Del. 2021) (affirming that
claims for wrongful dilution or overpayment––even when a controlling stockholder is on
the other side––“are exclusively derivative”); Siegel v. Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., 2025 WL
1074604, at *7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 10, 2025) (dilution claims are derivative because any harm
“flow[s] indirectly to [minority stockholders] in proportion to, and via, their shares”).
32
Ex. 1 Art. X. (“Dispute Resolution. Unless the Corporation consents in writing to the
selection of an alternative forum, the Court of Chancery in the State of Delaware shall be
the sole and exclusive forum for any stockholder (including beneficial owner) to bring (a)
any derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf of the Corporation . . . .”).
33
D.I. 57 Ex. D.
34
Ex. 1 Art. X. (“Dispute Resolution. Unless the Corporation consents in writing to the
selection of an alternative forum, the Court of Chancery in the State of Delaware shall be
the sole and exclusive forum for any stockholder (including beneficial owner) to bring . . .
(b) any action asserting a claim of breach of fiduciary duty owed by any director, officer
or other employee of the Corporation to the Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholder,
. . . or (d) any action asserting a claim against the Corporation, its directors, officers or
7
derivative, internal affairs, and fiduciary duty claims must be brought in Delaware,

not New York.35

2. Independently, Bartasi contractually chose Delaware for claims based

on the financing round. The Support Agreement, Stock Purchase Agreement, and

Voting Agreement each contain an exclusive Delaware forum selection clause for

any claim “arising out of or relating to”36 or “arising out of or based on”37 the

agreement or the transactions it governs, with submission to Delaware courts and

waivers of venue and personal jurisdiction objections. Her fiduciary duty and aiding

and abetting claims arise from the financing round that is the subject of those

employees governed by the internal affairs doctrine or that otherwise relates to the internal
affairs of the Corporation . . . .).
35
See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 962–63
(Del. Ch. 2013) (upholding Delaware-exclusive forum bylaws for internal corporate
claims); 8 Del. C. § 115 (permitting charter provisions requiring fiduciary duty and intra-
corporate claims to be filed in Delaware); D.I. 1 Ex. 1 Art. X (Delaware-exclusive forum
provision).
36
D.I. 1 Ex. 6 § 17.
37
D.I. 1 Ex. 2 § 8.14 (binding Perceptive Credit as a contract party); Ex. 3 § 6.13.

8
agreements, bringing the claims against the New Defendants squarely within those

clauses.38 Bartasi agreed to bring those claims here.39

3. Bartasi does not dispute that the Delaware forum selection clauses

cover the fiduciary duty claims against Kindbody directors and Perceptive Advisors.

Rather, to avoid this conclusion, Bartasi tries to reframe those claims based on the

relief she seeks—voiding the release in the Separation Agreement—to argue her

claims arise out of the Separation Agreement and do not trigger any Delaware forum

selection clause. For this argument to prevail, I would have to blind myself to the

claims Bartasi actually brought. And the forum selection clauses apportion actions

38
Under settled Delaware authority, Bartasi’s claims asserting the financing was a breach
of fiduciary duty and a disloyal “cramdown” must be litigated in Delaware pursuant to the
forum selection clauses in the agreements implementing that financing. Delaware courts
construe those clauses’ broad language, covering “any action” and all disputes “arising out
of or relating to” the agreements, to encompass causes of action with a meaningful nexus
to the contracts or their subject. See Newark v. Donald M. Durkin Contracting, Inc., 305
A.3d 674, 680 (Del. 2023) (noting Delaware courts recognize the phrases “relating to” and
“arising out of” as “paradigmatically broad terms”); Ashall Homes Ltd. v. ROK Ent. Grp,
Inc., 992 A.2d 1239, 1252 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“A claim that a party to a contract was
fraudulently induced to enter that contract undoubtedly ‘originate[s]’ or ‘stem[s] from the
contractual relationship.’”) (enforcing an exclusive forum clause against a signatory and
held that even tort claims were covered, since all of the plaintiff’s claims “arose from the
contract” and thus had to be brought in the designated forum); SPay, Inc. v. Stack Media
Inc., 2021 WL 1109181, at *3–5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2021) (enforcing a Delaware forum
selection clause for fraudulent inducement arising out of the contract that was induced, and
a declaratory judgment for covenants in the contract).
39
This conclusion means Bartasi also consented to personal jurisdiction in the Court,
contrary to her argument that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over her. In re Pilgrim’s
Pride Corp. Deriv. Litig., 2019 WL 1224556, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sep. 30, 2019).

9
to Delaware based on the claims brought, not the relief sought.40 And the Separation

Agreement does not have a forum selection clause that would require that relief to

be awarded elsewhere.41 Bartasi’s internal affairs claims must be brought in

Delaware, and a Delaware court can decide if Bartasi has proven that breaches of

fiduciary duty warrant voiding the release in the Separation Agreement.

4. Finally, Bartasi contends the plaintiffs here are guilty of laches or

acquiescence. A laches-based defense requires a showing of knowledge by the

claimant, unreasonable delay in bringing the claim, and resulting prejudice to the

defendant.42 An acquiescence-based defense requires a showing that the claimant,

with full knowledge of his rights and the material facts, either (1) “remains inactive

for a considerable time”; (2) “freely does what amounts to recognition of the

40
D.I. 1 Ex. 1 Art. X (discussing “any action asserting a claim” for breach of fiduciary duty
or governed by the internal affairs doctrine”); see e.g., SPay, Inc., 2021 WL 1109181, at
*2 (reading a forum selection clause containing similar language as apportioning cases
based on claims brought).
41
Ingres Corp., 8 A.3d at 1146 (“[Plaintiff] argues that the Court of Chancery erred because
one of the executed agreements between the parties did not contain an express forum
selection clause. But in denying [plaintiff]’s motion to stay, the Court of Chancery
explained that in determining which contracts governed the various disputes, the court must
consider the entire collection of related contracts, including those that contained forum
selection clauses specifying Delaware or New York courts as the chosen forum.”).
42
Advent Int’l, LP v. Servicios Funerarios GG S.A. de C.V., 2024 WL 4598884, at *18
(Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2024).

10
complained-of act”; or (3) “acts in a manner inconsistent with the subsequent

repudiation, which leads the other party to believe the act has been approved.”43

5. For the New Defendants, those defenses are easily rejected. Kindbody,

Inc. learned Bartasi intended to sue it in May, but Bartasi agreed to remove

Kindbody, Inc. from that complaint.44 Kindbody had no obligation to respond, and

its silence as a nonparty did not prejudice Bartasi in her ongoing litigation against

Perceptive Advisors.45 Bartasi makes no attempt to show Perceptive Credit or the

six directors knew they would be sued at that time. As soon as Bartasi filed her

amended complaint naming Kindbody, its directors, and Perceptive Credit, those

New Defendants turned to this Court immediately.

6. The New Defendants have shown a reasonable likelihood of success on

the merits. The other elements of a preliminary injunction follow. The New

Defendants are suffering, and would continue to suffer, imminent irreparable harm

by litigating Bartasi’s fiduciary duty claims in a forum other than Delaware.46 And

43
Klaassen v. Allegro Dev. Corp., 106 A.3d 1035, 1047 (Del. 2014).
44
D.I. 57, Bartasi Aff. ¶ 5.
45
See Advent Int’l Corp., 2024 WL 3580934, at *6 n.66.
46
Village Green Holding, LLC, 2018 WL 4849964, at *7 (“[u]nder binding Delaware
Supreme Court precedent, a party suffers irreparable harm when forced to litigate in a
jurisdiction other than the one selected by a valid forum-selection clause. This Court
consistently has held that the procession of a claim in an unwarranted forum poses a threat
of irreparable harm warranting a preliminary injunction.”) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted); D.I. 1 Ex. 6 § 9 (“The parties hereto agree that irreparable damage would
11
no harm will come to Bartasi by holding her to the bargain she struck; the New York

case against the New Defendants is not so advanced that she will be unduly

prejudiced by shifting her case to Delaware.47 An antisuit injunction is GRANTED

as to the New Defendants.

7. Laches and acquiescence are a closer call for Perceptive Advisors.

Perceptive Advisors engaged Bartasi’s claims on the merits in the New York forum

for months before raising any forum selection argument. After Bartasi sued

Perceptive Advisors in May, Perceptive Advisors moved to dismiss in August based

on failure to state a claim—not any Delaware forum selection clause.48 Bartasi has

also affirmed that Perceptive Advisors sought indemnification from Kindbody for

those claims before coming here.49 Perceptive did not seek to enforce the Delaware

forum selection clauses until October, after Bartasi added Kindbody, its directors,

and Perceptive Credit as defendants. Perceptive Advisors had knowledge of the

forum selection clauses in its agreements; unreasonably delayed in bringing its claim

occur in the event that any of the provisions of this Agreement were not performed in
accordance with their specific terms or were otherwise breached.”).
47
D.I. 66 at 21.
48
D.I. 57 Ex. C.
49
D.I. 57 Bartasi Aff. ¶¶ 10–12.

12
to enforce them; and prejudiced Bartasi by digging in substantively in New York for

months before opening up a second front here.50

8. Perceptive Advisors points out that Bartasi agreed to nonwaiver clauses

in the financing agreements, providing that no delay in exercising any right in the

financing agreements “shall impair any such right, power or remedy,” or be

construed as waiver or acquiescence.51

Non-waiver clauses serve an important purpose in contract law, which
is generally to ensure that a party to a contract is given an opportunity
to make a thoughtful and informed decision about whether or not to
enforce a particular contract right. They give a contracting party some
assurance that its failure to require the other party’s strict adherence to
a contract term during the hectic course of day-to-day business will not
result in a complete and unintended loss of its contract rights if it later
decides that strict performance is desirable. Moreover, with regard to
commercial contracts entered into between legal entities that can only
act through authorized agents, they ensure that a contracting party will
not lose its rights due to spontaneous words and acts of corporate
agents. In this sense, non-waiver clauses serve to inform the other
contracting party that no individual agent has the authority to waive or
alter contract terms. Rather, they make clear that some official act is
required in order to actually change the original agreement. Ordinarily,
that official action is a signed writing modifying the contract.52
50
See Tracker Marine, LLC v. Pena, 2017 WL 3528633, at *2–3 (Del. Ch. July 17, 2017);
Naples Ctr. for Dermatology & Cosmetic Surgery, PA v. Trisan, 2025 WL 1276207, at *4–
6 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2025).
Perceptive argues that under New York law, Bartasi’s amended complaint permitted
it to assert defenses for the first time, even if it had not asserted those defenses against the
original complaint. That may be so. But the laches inquiry asks whether Perceptive
delayed in bringing its claim before this Court, not whether Perceptive could have wielded
a forum selection clause in New York in both October and May.
51
D.I. 1 Ex. 2 § 8.9; Ex. 3 § 6.11.
52
Viking Pump, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WL 1207107, at *27 (Del. Ch. Apr. 2,
2007); accord Central Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Holdings LLC, 2012
13
9. Assuming Perceptive Advisors benefits from these provisions, I do not

believe they foreclose a finding it is guilty of laches. In my view, laches is distinct

from the claimant’s waiver of its rights or acquiescence to a breach of its rights.53

Waiver and acquiescence speak to the cessation of contractual rights where one party

allows the other party to intrude on those rights: a nonwaiver provision is designed

to smooth over those intrusions. But laches speaks to the inequity in allowing the

wronged party to bring a claim after unreasonable and prejudicial delay. I could find

no case in which a nonwaiver or “no delay or omission” provision precluded a

finding of laches: rather, Delaware courts have been careful to step around laches

when considering these provisions.54 I conclude that while Bartasi might have

agreed to a “no delay or omission” provision governing contractual rights, that

provision, like irreparable harm stipulations, does not bind this Court in considering

WL 3201139, at *26 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 2012) (“A nonwaiver clause is designed to give
parties a low-cost method of resolving some disputes arising under their agreement.”).
53
Elster v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 128 A.2d 801, 805 (Del. Ch. 1957) (distinguishing laches
from express or strict waiver); Gurney-Goldman v. Goldman, 321 A.3d 559, 597–98 (Del.
Ch. 2024) (considering an argument a plaintiff knew about the defendant’s actions and
waited too long, and observing, “Laches advances the waited-too-long argument directly.
Acquiescence . . . and waiver treat a long delay as implied consent. Estoppel treats the
long delay as an implied representation on which [the defendant] relied.”).
54
Fidelity Nat’l Info Servs., Inc. v. Rentner, C.A. No. N24C-09-089 SKR (CCLD), at 9–
10 (Del. Super. July 2, 2025) (addressing those provisions’ effects on a defense of waiver,
but addressing laches separately); Gower v. Trux, Inc., 2022 WL 534204, at *12 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 23, 2022) (declining to decide whether such a provision precludes a laches defense);
see Lennox Indus., Inc. v. Alliance Compressors LLC, 2021 WL 4958254, at *9 (Del.
Super. Oct. 25, 2021) (addressing waiver and acquiescence, not laches).

14
the equities of litigation.55 Nor do the nonwaiver provisions amount to a stipulation

that delay would not prejudice Bartasi.56 Bartasi has made a strong showing that

Perceptive Advisors is guilty of laches, and the “no delay or omission” provisions

do not preclude this Court from enforcing that equitable doctrine.

10. Perceptive Advisors’ delay weighs against granting it the injunction it

seeks. Its dilatory conduct has tainted its merits position, and its willingness to

litigate in New York undermines its claim that doing so amounts to irreparable harm.

11. But the equities of the situation take into account the strong policy

considerations favoring a single, consistent forum for this dispute. Delaware policy

strongly favors adjudicating all closely related claims in the same forum. Splitting

a dispute between two jurisdictions risks inefficiency, conflicting outcomes, and

unfairness.57 Delaware courts routinely enforce forum selection clauses to confine

litigation to the bargained-for forum and avoid parallel suits, as allowing related

matters to proceed in different forums “would risk conflicting results, duplicative

55
E.g., Kansas City Southern v. Grump TMM, S.A., 2003 WL 22659332, at *5 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 4, 2003)
56
D.I. 1 Ex. 2 § 8.9; Ex. 3 § 6.11.
57
McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Eng’g Co., 263 A.2d 281, 283
(Del. 1970) (noting the “duplication of time, effort, and expense” that occurs when the
same action proceeds in two courts, wasting resources and risking inconsistent judgments);
Ashall Homes Ltd. v. ROK Ent. Grp., Inc., 992 A.2d 1239, 1251–52 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(stressing bifurcating intertwined claims between courts would lead to “obvious
inefficiencies and confusion,” and the potential for injustice from parallel litigation is
precisely why long-standing doctrines like res judicata and the McWane first-filed rule
exist––to minimize claim-splitting and discourage forum shopping).

15
damage awards . . . and undue expense, making the ‘efficient administration of

justice’ unlikely.”58

12. And Bartasi will not suffer material harm by having Perceptive

Advisors’ claims decided in Delaware, given she must bring her claims against the

New Defendants here. In other words, adding Perceptive Advisors to the Delaware

proceeding does not inflict more prejudice on Bartasi; it prevents the harm, and

added cost to her, from splitting her claims between two fora. Perceptive Advisors’

request for an antisuit injunction is GRANTED.

/s/ Morgan T. Zurn
Vice Chancellor Morgan T. Zurn

58
Sprint Nextel Corp. v. iPCS, Inc., 2008 WL 2737409, at *17 (Del. Ch. July 14, 2008)
(highlighting the duplication of effort and potential for inconsistent judgments if parallel
actions were maintained); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Trustwave Ltd., 2017 WL 7803921,
at *2 (Del. Super. Dec. 21, 2017).

16