Latanya L. Richardson and Reginald E. Parker v. New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2019RPL3

EFiled: Aug 29 2025 02:57PM EDT
Transaction ID 76968835
Case No. 2024-0775-CDW
IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

LATANYA L. RICHARDSON and )
REGINALD E. PARKER, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
) C.A. No. 2024-0775-CDW
NEW RESIDENTIAL )
MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST )
2019RPL3, MR. COOPER, and )
LOGS LEGAL GROUP, LLP, )
)
Defendants. )

REPORT GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

Date Submitted: April 14, 2025
Date Decided: August 29, 2025

Latanya L. Richardson, Atco, New Jersey; Plaintiff

Reginald E. Parker, Atco, New Jersey; Plaintiff

Geoffrey G. Grivner, Kody M. Sparks, BUCHANAN INGERSOLL &
ROONEY PC, Wilmington, Delaware; Counsel for Defendants New
Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2019RPL3 and Nationstar Mortgage LLC
d/b/a Mr. Cooper

WRIGHT, M.
Plaintiffs own a house in New Jersey. The house has a mortgage on it,

issued in 2007 when plaintiffs refinanced their then-existing mortgage. Five

years ago, plaintiffs stopped paying on the mortgage. The mortgage holder

sought to foreclose on the house and filed a foreclosure action in New Jersey

state court. Plaintiffs fought the foreclosure there and lost—the court entered

a final judgment for the mortgage holder and ordered the property to be sold

at a sheriff’s sale.

Still hoping to prevent the sale of their house, plaintiffs tried to move

the battle across the Delaware River. They filed a complaint in this court

against the mortgage holder, the mortgage loan servicer, and the law firm

which represented the mortgage holder in the New Jersey foreclosure action.

The complaint—which is strikingly similar in substance to the defenses

plaintiffs raised in the New Jersey foreclosure action—asserts three claims,

arguing (1) the mortgage’s securitization in 2007 and the subsequent

assignments of the mortgage are invalid, (2) defendants are improperly

foreclosing on a paid note, and (3) defendants engaged in predatory lending

with the various mortgages issued to plaintiffs in the 2004–2007 timeframe.

For relief, plaintiffs ask the court to declare that the New Jersey foreclosure

action is “void and unenforceable” and award them damages. Two of the
three defendants say the complaint must be dismissed because it fails to state

any claim upon which relief can be granted.

The court agrees, for three reasons. First, the claims asserted in the

complaint are claims plaintiffs raised or could have raised in the New Jersey

foreclosure action, so the doctrine of res judicata bars plaintiffs from

relitigating them here. Second, the claims asserted in the complaint are

impermissible collateral attacks on the New Jersey court’s judgment. Third,

for two of the three claims, plaintiffs either lack standing to assert the claims

or the claims challenge conduct that occurred many years ago for which no

tolling exists, so plaintiffs cannot assert them now. In short, plaintiffs’ claims

are either repetitive, non-existent, or stale. I recommend the complaint be

dismissed in its entirety.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Parties

Plaintiffs Latanya L. Richardson (“Richardson”) and Reginald E.

Parker are the record owners of property located at 21 Yale Road in Atco,

New Jersey (“Property”).1

1
Pls.’ Compl. (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 1, 6, Docket Item (“D.I.”) 1. The Complaint contains
19 pages. The first three pages are the court’s form verified complaint filled out by
hand, and the remaining 16 pages are typewritten. Most citations in this report are
to the typewritten portion of the Complaint. The few citations to the handwritten

–2–
Defendant New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2019RPL3 (“New

Residential”) is the record holder of a mortgage on the Property, and the party

that filed a foreclosure action against Plaintiffs in New Jersey (“Foreclosure

Action”).2 Defendant Nationstar Mortgage LLC d/b/a Mr. Cooper

(“Nationstar” and, jointly with New Residential, “Loan Defendants”) issued

mortgage loans to Plaintiffs in 2006 and 2007.3 Nationstar is the party that

assigned and transferred the mortgage rights to New Residential.4 Defendant

Logs Legal Group, LLP is the law firm that represented New Residential in

the Foreclosure Action.5

B. Richardson Inherits the Property and Secures and Later
Refinances a Mortgage on It

Richardson inherited the Property from her grandparents in 2002, and

it was “free from any liens or encumbrances” when Richardson acquired it.6

In 2004, Plaintiffs “secured a $30,000 subprime adjustable-rate mortgage

portion of the Complaint will include the notation “handwritten” before the
paragraph or page citation.
2
See Compl. ¶¶ 3, 12, 15(a)–(c), 22–28(f).
3
See Compl. ¶¶ 7, 15(c), 28(c).
4
See Compl. ¶¶ 7, 14–15(c), 28–28(c).
5
Civil Action Compl., New Residential Mortg. Tr. 2019-RPL3 v. Richardson, et al.,
Dkt. No. F-012321-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div., Nov. 15, 2022) (“Foreclosure
Compl.”). Logs Legal Group has not participated in this action. The docket entries
also indicate that it may not have been properly served.
6
Compl. ¶ 6.

–3–
from Ameriquest[.]”7 (“2004 Mortgage”). Plaintiffs allege that the

Ameriquest agent “unjustly enriched themselves with $29,030 in equity

through unauthorized revisions to a HUD-1 statement . . . [that] inflated the

mortgage to $61,000[.]”8 In “August 2006 . . . Ameriquest went out of

business[.]”9 Around this time, Nationstar “issu[ed] another subprime

adjustable-rate mortgage” to Plaintiffs, to refinance the 2004 Mortgage from

Ameriquest.10

The next year, Plaintiffs refinanced their mortgage with Nationstar

(“2007 Mortgage”).11 The 2007 Mortgage was recorded in the “Camden

County Clerk’s Office on December 28 . . . as instrument number

2007126770, Book 8375, Page 1697.”12 On August 29, 2022, Nationstar

“assigned said Mortgage to New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2019-

RPL3” which was recorded “in the Clerk’s/Register’s Office of Camden

County, on October 25 [] in Book 12217, Page 905.”13

7
Compl. ¶ 6.
8
Compl. ¶ 6.
9
Compl. ¶ 7.
10
Compl. ¶¶ 7, 39.
11
Compl. ¶¶ 7, 39.
12
Compl. ¶ 9.
13
Foreclosure Compl. ¶ 5.

–4–
C. New Residential Forecloses on the Property

On November 15, 2022, New Residential filed a foreclosure action in

New Jersey Superior Court (“New Jersey Court”) against Plaintiffs.14 In its

complaint, New Residential alleged that Plaintiffs and Nationstar executed “a

loan modification agreement” in 2017.15 New Residential further asserted

that, beginning in June 2020, Plaintiffs “failed to pay the monthly installments

of principal and interest, insurance and taxes due” and have not paid since.16

On May 21, 2024, the New Jersey Court entered a final judgment

against Plaintiffs.17 The New Jersey Court found that New Residential was

owed “$221,255.42 on its mortgage described in the [Foreclosure Complaint]

together with interest[.]”18 The New Jersey Court ordered the Camden County

Sheriff to “make sale according to law of so much of the mortgaged premises

14
See Foreclosure Compl. (watermark from e-filing software). The court may take
judicial notice of documents whose contents are “capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.” D.R.E. 201(b). “If the accuracy of the subject document’s contents is
disputed, the Court may take judicial notice to discern . . . what was said therein . . .
but may not take judicial notice to establish the truth of its contents.” Indemnity
Insur. Corp., RRG v. Cohen, 2018 WL 487246, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 2018).
15
Foreclosure Compl. ¶ 3.
16
Id.
17
See Final J. for Foreclosure, New Residential Mortg. Tr. 2019-RPL3 v.
Richardson, et al., Dkt. No. F-012321-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. May 21, 2024)
(“Foreclosure J.”) at 2.
18
Id.

–5–
as will be sufficient to satisfy the said mortgage, interest and costs of [New

Residential] and that [the Sheriff] pay out of the proceeds of sale to [New

Residential] or its attorneys[.]”19

On February 5, 2025, the New Jersey Court stayed the Camden County

Sheriff’s sale of the property after Plaintiffs filed the complaint here.20

II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Plaintiffs filed their complaint pro se on July 22, 2024.21 Plaintiffs

assert three counts: (1) a permanent injunction, enjoining Defendants from

“foreclosing [on] [P]laintiffs [sic] property pursuant to the doctrine of

promissory estoppel[;]”22 (2) alternatively, finding the 2007 Mortgage was

satisfied, and enjoining Defendants from foreclosing on it;23 and (3) a

declaratory judgment that Defendants engaged in predatory lending and

awarding Plaintiffs damages.24 Plaintiffs allege that the 2004 Mortgage was

not properly conveyed to the special purpose entity created to hold the

mortgage, and that the subsequent note and mortgage assignments were

19
Id.
20
See Order to Stay Sheriff Sale, New Residential Mortg. Tr. 2019-RPL3 v.
Richardson, et al., Dkt. No. F-012321-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Feb. 5, 2025).
21
See generally Compl.
22
Id. ¶ 37.
23
Id. ¶¶ 29–37.
24
Id. ¶¶ 38–45.

–6–
fabricated or invalid, rendering them void.25 Plaintiffs also maintain that

Nationstar lacked the authority to enter into any agreement concerning rights

it did not legitimately own, and failed to inform Plaintiffs of the mortgage

assignment in violation of federal law, thereby voiding the transfer.26 Finally,

in 2007 Defendants allegedly induced Plaintiffs to take a subprime loan with

excessively high interest rates by misrepresenting and withholding key

mortgage terms.27

On September 26, 2024, Loan Defendants moved to dismiss,28 and on

October 18 filed the opening brief in support of their motion.29 On November

19, Plaintiffs filed their brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss.30 Besides

arguing in general terms they have alleged sufficient facts to defeat the motion

25
Id. ¶¶ 21–22.
26
Id. ¶ 31.
27
Id. ¶¶ 39–40. Plaintiffs also allege Nationstar engaged in an assortment of conduct
arising from the 2007 mortgage, but do not elaborate beyond listing what Plaintiffs
claim are “unsafe and unsound” financial practices. See id. ¶ 41.
28
D.I. 22.
29
D.I. 26.
30
D.I. 29.

–7–
to dismiss, Plaintiffs attempted to assert four new causes of action.31 On

December 5, Loan Defendants filed their reply brief.32

On January 17, 2025, the court scheduled oral argument on the motion

to dismiss for March 4.33 On February 3, Plaintiffs filed a “Pro Se Motion for

Emergency Temporary Restraining Order and Temporary Injunction.”34 That

same day, after reviewing the TRO motion, the court issued an order setting a

briefing schedule for the TRO motion and informing the parties that argument

on the TRO motion would be heard on March 4 with the motion to dismiss.35

31
Id. The claims are (1) ”Violation of the Paperwork Reduction Act—Failure to
Display Valid OMB Control Numbers”; (2) ”Discharge of Debt”; (3) ”Truth in
Lending Act (TILA) and Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)
Violations”; and (4) ”New Jersey Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (NJUFTA).”
Id. at 5–8. Delaware law does not allow Plaintiffs to amend the Complaint through
arguments in their brief opposing the motion to dismiss. See, e.g., MCG Cap. Corp.
v. Maginn, 2010 WL 1782271, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 5, 2010) (“When defendants
filed their motions to dismiss [plaintiff] had a choice to make under Court of
Chancery Rule [15(a)(5)]. It could either seek leave to amend its complaint or stand
on its complaint and answer the motion to dismiss. Having chosen the latter course
of action, it is bound to the factual allegations contained in its complaint. It cannot
supplement the complaint through its brief.”). Plaintiffs’ status as self-represented
litigants does not excuse them from this requirement. See Shaw v. New Castle
County, 2022 WL 3226773, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 10, 2022). The court therefore has
not considered these claims.
32
D.I. 32.
33
D.I. 33.
34
D.I. 34 (“TRO motion”).
35
D.I. 38.

–8–
On March 4, the court heard oral argument on both motions. The court

denied the TRO motion from the bench and took the motion to dismiss under

advisement.36

On April 14, Plaintiffs filed a document oddly titled “Defendant’s

Motion to Compel Production of Original Note and Mortgage,”37 along with

an affidavit from Plaintiffs38 and several exhibits.39 It is not a discovery

motion under Court of Chancery Rule 37(a) but instead contains an additional

(and new) argument against Loan Defendants’ motion to dismiss.40 The court

has not considered the arguments made in this submission because they are

untimely.41

III. ANALYSIS

Loan Defendants moved to dismiss this action under Court of Chancery

Rule 12(b)(6).42 Loan Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are (1) barred

by the doctrine of res judicata, (2) impermissible collateral attacks on a

36
D.I. 47–48.
37
D.I. 50.
38
D.I. 52.
39
D.I. 51.
40
See D.I. 50 at 1–4.
41
“The argument was not raised in the briefing on the [m]otion to [d]ismiss, and,
therefore, has been waived.” Asbestos Workers Loc. 42 Pension Fund v. Bammann,
2015 WL 2455469, at *17 n.136 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2015).
42
D.I. 26.

–9–
foreign state court’s judgment, (3) time barred under the relevant statutes of

limitations, and (4) barred because Plaintiffs lack standing to bring them.43

When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Delaware

courts “(1) accept all well pleaded factual allegations as true[;] (2) accept even

vague allegations as ‘well-pleaded’ if they give the opposing party notice of

the claim; [and] (3) draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving

party[.]” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald Home Farm, LLC, 2024 WL 1071970, at *2

(Del. Ch. Mar. 12, 2024) (citing Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg.

Cap. Hldgs. LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535 (Del. 2011)). The court need not accept

conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts, nor draw unreasonable

inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor. Garfield ex rel. ODP Corp. v. Allen, 277 A.3d

296, 319 (Del. Ch. 2022) (citing Clinton v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 977 A.2d

892, 895 (Del. 2009)); see also In re Hennessy Cap. Acq. Corp. IV S’holder

Litig., 318 A.3d 306, 318 (Del. Ch. 2024).

“[T]he governing pleading standard in Delaware to survive a motion to

dismiss is reasonable ‘conceivability.’” Cent. Mortg. Co., 27 A.3d at 537.

Delaware courts must “deny the motion unless the plaintiff[s] could not

recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances.” Cent.

43
See D.I. 26 at 5–10.

– 10 –
Mortg. Co., 27 A.3d at 536 (citing Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894,

896–97 (Del. 2002)). Under this standard, “[w]hen a defendant asserts an

affirmative defense, like res judicata, as a basis for pleading stage dismissal,

that motion to dismiss will be granted only if ‘the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts to avoid it[.]’” Fortis Advisors LLC v. Shire US Hldgs., Inc., 2020 WL

748660, at *3 (Del Ch. Feb. 13, 2020) (quoting Reid v. Spazio, 970 A.2d 176,

183–84 (Del. 2009)).

The rest of this report analyzes the first three arguments offered by

Loan Defendants in favor of dismissal. First, the court addresses Loan

Defendants’ res judicata defense. Second, the court addresses Loan

Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’ claims are collateral attacks on the

Foreclosure Action. Finally, the court addresses Loan Defendants’ arguments

that Plaintiffs lack standing to assert claims or the claims are time-barred

under the applicable statute of limitations or the equitable doctrine of laches.

A. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Barred by Res Judicata

Loan Defendants contend that since the Foreclosure Action was

resolved by a final judgment in the New Jersey Court, this court must grant

their motion to dismiss. Loan Defendants argue this court is bound by the

Foreclosure Judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United

– 11 –
States Constitution and thus this lawsuit cannot proceed under the doctrine of

res judicata.44

The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires that full faith and credit be

given “in each State to the . . . judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S.

Const. art. IV, §1; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012) (requiring all courts to

treat a state court judgment as it would be treated in the courts of the rendering

state). The Full Faith and Credit Clause “has long been understood to

incorporate the concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel.” Matter of

Vale, 2014 WL 721038, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 2015).

Res judicata is an affirmative defense that “prevents a party from

“bringing a second suit based on the same cause of action after a judgment

has been entered in a prior suit involving the same parties.” MHS Capital

LLC v. Goggin, 2018 WL 2149718, at *17 (Del. Ch. May 10, 2018); see also

Ct. Ch. R. 8(c). “The doctrine of res judicata exists for many reasons, but

among the most important are to prevent vexatious litigation and to promote

the stability and finality of judicial decrees.’” Fitzgerald, 2024 WL 1071970,

at *2 (citing Maldonado v. Flynn, 417 A.2d 378, 381 (Del. Ch. 1980)). The

doctrine bars a claim if five elements are met:

44
See D.I. 26.

– 12 –
(1) the original court had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties;

(2) the parties to the original action were the same
as those parties, or in privity, in the case at bar;

(3) the original cause of action or the issues decided
was the same as the case at bar;

(4) the issues in the prior action must have been
decided adversely to the [plaintiffs] in the case at
bar; and

(5) the decree in the prior action was a final decree.

Dover Hist. Soc., Inc. v. City of Dover Plan. Comm’n, 902 A.2d 1084, 1092

(Del. 2006) (paragraph breaks added). “The bar of res judicata applies to all

theories which were or could have been litigated in the earlier proceeding.”

Showalter v. Cnty. Council of Sussex, 1984 WL 159374, at *2 (Del. Ch.

Dec. 13, 1984).

The court finds all five elements necessary to apply the doctrine of res

judicata exist in this case: the New Jersey Court had jurisdiction; the parties

in the Foreclosure Action are the same parties or in privity with them; the

Foreclosure Action decided each of the issues in this case; and the Foreclosure

Judgment was a final decree. My examination of each element follows.

– 13 –
1. The New Jersey Court Had Jurisdiction Over the
Parties in the Foreclosure Action

Plaintiffs are the owners of the Property, which is located in New

Jersey.45 Because Plaintiffs say they reside at the Property, the court

concludes that the New Jersey court had jurisdiction over Plaintiffs. See Lebel

v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 558 A.2d 1252 (N.J. 1989) (discussing when New

Jersey courts have general personal jurisdiction); Helicopteros Nacionales de

Colum., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984) (outlining general personal

jurisdiction); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (A.L.I.

1988).46 The New Jersey Court had jurisdiction over New Residential because

New Residential consented to the New Jersey Court’s jurisdiction when it

field the Foreclosure Action. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF

LAWS § 79 (A.L.I. 1988).

2. The Parties in This Litigation Are the Same or in
Privity with Those in the Foreclosure Action

Privity is a legal determination by a court as to whether a relationship

between parties is close enough to support preclusion. Aveta Inc. v.

Cavallieri, 23 A.3d 157, 180 (Del. Ch. 2010) (quoting Higgins v. Walls, 901

A.2d 122, 138 (Del. Super. 2005)). Parties are in privity for the purposes of

45
See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 8.
46
See also Compl. ¶ 1 (stating Plaintiffs reside in New Jersey).

– 14 –
res judicata when “their interests are identical or [so] closely aligned such that

they were actively and adequately represented in the first suit.” Aveta Inc. v.

Cavallieri, 23 A.3d 157, 180 (Del. Ch. 2010).

New Residential and Nationstar were the transferee and transferor of

Plaintiffs’ mortgage.47 Plaintiffs attacked the Foreclosure Action, in part, by

challenging the validity of the mortgage assignments.48 Because New

Residential acquired Nationstar’s rights and interests in Plaintiffs’ mortgage,

Loan Defendants have an identical interest in affirming the validity of that

assignment. Their interests in the Foreclosure Action were identical and New

Residential’s participation was enough to “actively and adequately” represent

Nationstar in the Foreclosure Action. New Residential and Nationstar are in

47
Compl. ¶¶ 3, 7, 12, 14–15(c), 22–28(f).
48
See Contested Answer, New Residential Mortg. Tr. 2019-RPL3 v. Richardson, et
al., Dkt. No. F-012321-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Mar. 27, 2023), Transaction ID
CHC202389777.

– 15 –
privity for purposes of res judicata. The parties here are either parties in the

Foreclosure Action49 or in privity with those in the Foreclosure Action.50

3. The Foreclosure Judgment Resolved the Same Issues
Plaintiffs Raise in This Action

Plaintiffs ask the court to declare their mortgage obligation satisfied,

declare its 2022 transfer from Nationstar to New Residential invalid, find that

Loan Defendants engaged in predatory lending practices, and award Plaintiffs

damages.51

Loan Defendants contend the issues Plaintiffs seek to litigate are the

same as those brought in the previous case or are claims that could have been

raised in the New Jersey litigation.52 Further, Loan Defendants assert

49
Logs Legal was Nationstar’s counsel of record in the Foreclosure Action, and
Plaintiffs do not allege Logs Legal participated or engaged in any of the underlying
activity giving rise to this dispute. Plaintiffs do allege in general terms that all
defendants here committed wrongdoing. See generally Compl. But New
Residential was not formed until September 27, 2019, long after the events
described in Plaintiffs’ complaint. Entity Details, File Number 7629716, Delaware
Department of State: Division of Corporations (Aug. 25, 2025),
https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/Ecorp/EntitySearch/NameSearch.aspx.
50
See D.I. 26, Defs.’ Ex. (“DX”) B (naming Plaintiffs and New Residential in the
Foreclosure Action and listing Defendant Logs Legal as counsel of record); Compl.
(outlining the transfer of mortgage rights to New Residential and their predecessors
in interest, including Nationstar).
51
See Compl. ¶¶ 3 (handwritten), 6–7 (handwritten), 15–16, 20–32, 37, 39–41, 43,
45. See also id. at 16 (wherefore clauses).
52
See D.I. 26 at 5–6; D.I. 32 at 6–7. Compare Compl. with Contested Answer, New
Residential Mortg. Tr. 2019-RPL3 v. Richardson, et al., Dkt. No. F-012321-22 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div., Mar. 27, 2023), Transaction ID CHC202389777.

– 16 –
Plaintiffs have not pled any facts that explain why their claims could not have

been raised in the Foreclosure Action. Plaintiffs counter that they only

recently learned of these claims “despite due diligence[,]” and this warrants

relitigating this dispute here.53 Plaintiffs’ argument is not persuasive.

Delaware courts follow the transactional approach to res judicata.

LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 970 A.2d 185, 193 (Del. 2009). Under

the transactional approach, Delaware courts must determine whether “the

plaintiff ‘neglected or failed to assert claims which in fairness should have

been asserted in the first action.’” LaPoint, 970 A.2d at 193–94 (quoting

Kossol v. Ashton Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 1994 WL 10861, at *2 (Del. Jan. 6,

1994)). “[R]es judicata does not operate to bar claims based on facts that were

not, and could not have been, known to the plaintiff” at the time of the first

action. LaPoint, 970 A.2d at 193 (citing AmBase Corp. v. City Inv. Co. Liquid.

Tr., 326 F.3d 63, 73 (2d Cir. 2003)).

Plaintiffs failed to plead any facts that create a reasonable inference that

they could not have known the basis for their claims at the time of the

Foreclosure Action. Additionally, every claim Plaintiffs assert in their

complaint mirrors or closely resembles Plaintiffs’ defenses in the Foreclosure

53
See D.I. 29 at 5. The court interprets this as an attempt to invoke the discovery
rule, which is explained below.

– 17 –
Action.54 The issues Plaintiffs seek to litigate were thus already decided in

the Foreclosure Action for the purposes of res judicata.

4. The Foreclosure Judgment Is a Final Judgment That
Was Decided Adversely to Plaintiffs

A final judgment is one “which determines the merits of the controversy

or rights of the parties and leaves nothing for future determination or

consideration.” Showell Poultry, Inc. v. Delmarva Poultry Corp., 146 A.2d

794, 796 (Del. 1958). “The test is whether such judgment or decree

determines the substantial merits of the controversy and the material issues

litigated[.]” Id.

New Residential initiated litigation in New Jersey for the sole purpose

of foreclosing on the Property. Loan Defendants attached an order from the

New Jersey Court to their motion.55 The order states that it is a “Final

Judgment For Foreclosure” and orders the Property be sold and proceeds paid

to New Residential.56 The court is satisfied that this is a final judgment for

the purposes of res judicata. The order resolved all material issues at

controversy in the Foreclosure Action on the merits. Finally, the Foreclosure

54
Compare Compl., with Contested Answer, New Residential Mortg. Tr. 2019-
RPL3 v. Richardson, et al., Dkt. No. F-012321-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Mar.
27, 2023), Transaction ID CHC202389777.
55
See D.I. 26, DX B.
56
Id.

– 18 –
Action was decided adversely to Plaintiffs, since it was decided in favor of

New Residential.57

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata, and their complaint raises

no reasonably conceivable facts or inferences that can avoid dismissal. The

court recommends Loan Defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted on this

ground.

B. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Also Impermissible Collateral
Attacks on the Foreclosure Judgment

Even if res judicata does not foreclose Plaintiffs’ claims, the claims are

also impermissible collateral attacks on the Foreclosure Judgment. “A

collateral attack is an attempt to ‘avoid, defeat, evade, or deny the force and

effect of a final order or judgment in an incidental proceeding other than by

appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or motion for new trial.’” Matter of Vale, 2015

WL 721038, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 2015) (citing Fransen v. Conoco, Inc.,

64 F.3d 1481, 1487 (10th Cir. 1995)). “The ‘principle barring collateral

attacks’ is ‘a longstanding and deeply rooted feature of . . . the common law.’”

ETC Northeast Field Servs., LLC v. Muse, 2024 WL 2797337, at *9 (Del. Ch.

May 31, 2024) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 490 n.10 (1994)).

The intent is to preclude attacks on other courts’ judgments because “‘it is for

57
See D.I. 26, DX B.

– 19 –
the binding forum of the first instance to determine the question of validity of

the law, and until its decision is reversed for error by orderly review . . . its

orders based on its decision are to be respected.’” ETC Northeast Field Servs.,

2024 WL 2797337, at *9 (quoting In re Vale for Asche, 2013 WL 721038, at

*5 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2013)).

The test for whether an action is an impermissible collateral attack is to

determine if the claim aims to modify or nullify the other court’s final

judgment by revisiting the core issue in the previous claim. Cf. ETC Northeast

Field Servs., 2024 WL 2797337, at *10 (articulating the standard in the

context of an arbitration award). A claimant “may not transform what would

ordinarily constitute an impermissible collateral attack into a proper

independent action by changing defendants and altering the relief sought.”

Gulf LNG Energy, LLC v. Eni USA Gas Mktg. LLC 242 A.3d 575, 591 n.96

(Del. 2020) (quoting Corey v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1212–13 (6th

Cir. 1982)). “Where a claim involving ‘different issues’ between ‘different

parties’ ‘directly contradict[s]’ a final order or judgment, it is considered a

collateral attack and must be dismissed.” ETC Northeast Field Servs., 2024

WL 2797337, at *9.

– 20 –
New Residential obtained the Foreclosure Judgment, a final judgment

permitting it to foreclose on the Property.58 Plaintiffs seek an injunction from

this court barring Loan Defendants59 from foreclosing on the Property in

accordance with the Foreclosure Judgment.60 Irrespective of the “different”

claims and additional parties, the heart of the relief Plaintiffs seek directly

contradicts and revisits the core issue of the Foreclosure Action—whether

New Residential has the right to foreclose on the Property.

Plaintiffs assert the Property was not subject to a mortgage because the

mortgage was discharged, the mortgage transfers were invalid, and Plaintiffs

were victims of predatory lending practices or fraud.61 These claims are

attempts to have the court conclude that Plaintiffs were excused from paying

on the mortgage and that Loan Defendants have no right to foreclose on the

Property. Ruling in Plaintiffs favor would directly contradict what the New

Jersey Court already concluded—that Plaintiffs are bound by the 2007

Mortgage and did not fulfill their obligations. The court finds this action is

58
D.I. 24, DX B.
59
Plaintiffs request that all Defendants be barred from foreclosing on the Property.
Compl. at 13 (wherefore clause). New Residential is the only party with a current
interest and valid judgment to do so. See Foreclosure J. at 1.
60
See Compl. ¶¶ 18–37.
61
See generally Compl.

– 21 –
an impermissible collateral attack on the Foreclosure Judgment and

recommends that it be dismissed on those grounds.

C. Count I, Count III, and Plaintiffs’ Free-Floating RESPA
Claim Are Untimely or Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Pursue
Them Even If They Are Not Precluded By Res Judicata or
the Collateral Attack Doctrine

Three of Plaintiffs’ claims suffer from two fatal defects. First, Plaintiffs

lack standing to assert claims for breach of the pooling and servicing

agreement (“PSA”) governing the securitization of the 2007 Mortgage.

Second, Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of the PSA (Count I), predatory lending

(Count III), and violation of the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures

Act62 are untimely because each of the claims appears to concern conduct that

occurred between 11 and 20 years before Plaintiffs filed the Complaint.

Plaintiffs waited too long to file their claims here, and the only defense

Plaintiffs offer to contest the untimeliness of their claims—that these claims

should not be precluded because Plaintiffs only recently discovered them—

does not apply. The court recommends Plaintiffs’ claims be dismissed on

these bases also.

62
12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617 (“RESPA”).

– 22 –
1. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Assert a Claim for Breach
of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement Governing
the Securitization of the Loan

Plaintiffs call Count I a promissory estoppel claim,63 but that is not what

the substance of the claim appears to be. Rather, it appears Count I argues

that the securitization of the loan associated with the 2007 Mortgage was

improper, leading to breaches of the pooling and servicing agreement64

governing the securitization,65 so the court treats it as a claim that Defendants

breached the PSA. Plaintiffs lack standing to allege the PSA’s breach.

Generally, “only parties to a contract and intended third-party

beneficiaries may enforce an agreement’s provisions.” NAMA Hldgs., LLC v.

Related World Mktg. Ctr., LLC, 922 A.2d 417, 434 (Del. Ch. 2007). “A third-

party beneficiary is an incidental beneficiary unless the parties to the contract

intended to confer a benefit upon it.” Id. “Mere incidental beneficiaries have

no legally enforceable rights under a contract.” Id. This doctrine applies to

the injury element of standing because a party who has no rights under a

63
See Compl. at 6.
64
A pooling and servicing agreement is a contract that is executed in the process of
securitizing asset-backed debt. See generally Toelle v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding,
Inc., 2015 WL 5158276, at *4 (Del. Super. Apr. 20, 2015) (discussing securitization
and the role PSAs play in the process).
65
Compl. ¶ 28.e (“Defendants, and each of them, violated the pertinent terms of the
PSA.”).

– 23 –
contract is not injured by a breach alone. See JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Smith,

2014 WL 7466729, at *5 (Del. Super. Dec. 15, 2015) (holding that a litigant

who is not a party or intended beneficiary “may not contest the validity of the

assignment because any alleged misconduct would not be traceable to an

injury suffered by the [litigant].”); see also Citi Mortg., Inc. v. Bishop, 2013

WL 1143670, at *4 (Del. Super. Mar. 4, 2013) (collecting cases); Blagg v.

HB2 Alt. Hldgs., LLC, 2024 WL 4836715, at *5–6 (Del. Super. Nov. 20,

2024).

In the case of a securitized mortgage governed by a PSA, a mortgagor

is typically not a party nor an intended beneficiary of the PSA. See Toelle,

2015 WL 5158276, at *3–4; In re Walker, 466 B.R. 271, 286 (Bankr. E.D.

P.A. Feb. 13, 2012).

[A]bsent a violation of the PSA affecting a debtor’s
ability to pay on the underlying loan, or the debtor
being named a third party beneficiary to the PSA,
the debtor lacks standing to contest the validity of
an assignment of its note on the grounds that the
PSA’s terms were not followed by the parties
involved in the transfer.

Toelle, 2015 WL 5158276, at *4 (citing In re Walker, 466 B.R. at 286).66

66
Some courts have suggested plaintiffs may have standing to contest a foreclosure
where the transfer is invalid but have required plaintiffs to allege facts that parties
to the assignment contest its validity outside of merely separating the debt from the
note. See Shrewsbury v. The Bank of New York Mellon, 160 A.3d 471, 476–78 (Del.

– 24 –
To assert a claim for violation of the PSA, Plaintiffs must allege they

will suffer a separate, concrete injury affecting their mortgage obligations

from the assignment or that they were parties to the PSA to have standing.

Plaintiffs have not done either. Plaintiffs thus do not have standing to bring

their claims asserting breach of the PSA and improper assignment.

2. Plaintiffs’ Claims For Breach of the PSA, Predatory
Lending, and Violation of RESPA Are Untimely

Under Delaware law, there are two methods the court uses to analyze

the timeliness of a claim: the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches.

See Lebanon Cnty. Empls.’ Ret. Fund v. Collis, 287 A.3d 1160, 1194 (Del.

Ch. 2022). If a claim is legal and a party seeks relief which is available in a

court of law, the court will apply the applicable statute of limitations. Id. If

a claim is equitable or if equitable relief is sought for a legal claim, the court

will apply the doctrine of laches to determine if the claim is timely. Id.

“Laches is an affirmative defense that the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in

bringing suit after learning of an infringement of [their] rights.” Levey v.

Brownstone Asset Mgmt., LP, 76 A.3d 764, 769 (Del. 2013). “Laches consists

of two elements: (i) unreasonable delay in bringing a claim by a plaintiff with

knowledge thereof, and (ii) resulting prejudice to the defendant.” Id. “A filing

2017) (collecting cases); see also Branch Banking Tr. Co. v. Eid, 2013 WL
3353846, at *2–3 (Del. Super. June 13, 2013).

– 25 –
after the expiration of the analogous limitations period is presumptively an

unreasonable delay for purposes of laches,” id., and the analogous statute of

limitations applies absent “unusual conditions or extraordinary

circumstances,” IAC/InterActiveCorp v. O’Brien, 26 A.3d 174, 178 (Del.

2011).67

Under Title 10, Section 8121 of the Delaware Code, when a cause of

action arises outside of Delaware, the shorter of the Delaware or foreign

jurisdiction’s statute of limitations controls. 10 Del. C. § 8121. Here, the

Property is in New Jersey, Plaintiffs live in New Jersey, and Plaintiffs do not

67
In IAC/InterActiveCorp, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that what constitutes
“unusual conditions or extraordinary circumstances” can be hard to define and
offered the following:
There is no precise definition of what constitutes
unusual conditions or extraordinary circumstances. The
Court of Chancery must exercise its discretion, after
considering all relevant facts. But several factors that
could bear on the analysis include: 1) whether the
plaintiff had been pursuing his claim, through litigation
or otherwise, before the statute of limitations expired;
2) whether the delay in filing suit was attributable to a
material and unforeseeable change in the parties’
personal or financial circumstances; 3) whether the
delay in filing suit was attributable to a legal
determination in another jurisdiction; 4) the extent to
which the defendant was aware of, or participated in,
any prior proceedings; and 5) whether, at the time this
litigation was filed, there was a bona fide dispute as to
the validity of the claim.
26 A.3d at 178.

– 26 –
allege that any act took place in Delaware,68 so the applicable statute of

limitations for any of Plaintiffs’ claims will be the shorter of the federal, New

Jersey, or Delaware law governing Plaintiffs’ claims.

Construing the allegations of the Complaint with the “forgiving eyes”

this court routinely evaluates submissions from self-represented litigants,69

Plaintiffs expressly assert three claims: breach of the PSA (Count I);70 a claim

seeking a declaratory judgment that Defendants cannot foreclose on the 2007

Mortgage because the associated note was paid off when the loan was

securitized (Count II);71 and a claim that Defendants engaged in “predatory

lending” practices relating to Plaintiffs’ various mortgages and refinancings

for the Property in the 2004–2007 timeframe (Count III).72 Plaintiffs also

assert a free-floating claim that Defendants violated the federal Real Estate

68
See, generally, Compl.
69
E.g., Hall v. Coupe, 2016 WL 3094406, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2016).
70
See Compl. ¶¶ 19–28 (Count I). Count I is titled as a promissory estoppel claim
(see Compl. at 6), but it alleges “Defendants, and each of them, violated the pertinent
terms of the PSA” (id. ¶ 28.e), so the court treats it as a claim for breach of the PSA.
71
See Compl. ¶¶ 29–37. Plaintiffs refer to this count as “Defendants Cannot
Foreclose on a Paid Note.” See id. at 10.
72
See Compl. ¶¶ 39–45 (Count III).

– 27 –
Settlement Procedures Act73 by failing to respond to a Qualified Written

Request sent to Nationstar in 2013.74

The court addresses each in turn.

a. Breach of the PSA75

The PSA is a contract. Breach of contract is a legal claim, but Plaintiffs

seek both equitable and legal relief for Defendants’ alleged breach of the PSA,

so the court applies the doctrine of laches to this claim. Plaintiffs allege the

first breach of the PSA occurred in 2007.76 Whether the statute of limitations

for this claim is governed by Delaware or New Jersey law, the 17 years

between this breach and the filing of this action is well outside either

73
12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617 (“RESPA”).
74
See Compl. (handwritten ¶ 4 (“On May 9, 2013, Ms. Richardson sent a QWR to
Nationstar Mortgage.”), handwritten ¶ 7 (seeking “[c]ompensatory damages
resulting from defendants’ violation [of] . . . RESPA”). RESPA is mentioned
nowhere else in the Complaint. Under RESPA, a borrower can submit a qualified
written request (“QWR”) to a mortgage servicer to request information about the
servicing of the loan or to tell the servicer why the borrower thinks their account is
in error. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e); see also 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.35, 1024.36. A mortgage
servicer violates RESPA if they fail to respond to the QWR. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f).
The Complaint does not identify the contents of Plaintiffs’ 2013 QWR, nor did
Plaintiffs attach the 2013 QWR to the Complaint. But see Compl. Ex. B (May 22,
2013 letter from Nationstar to plaintiff Richardson acknowledging receipt of May
9, 2013 correspondence).
75
This analysis assumes, of course, Plaintiffs have standing to allege breach of the
PSA, which, for the reasons the court explained earlier, they do not.
76
Compl. ¶ 12.

– 28 –
jurisdiction’s statute of limitations.77 This cause of action is presumptively

untimely under the doctrine of laches.

b. Improper Foreclosure on a Paid Note

It is difficult to discern what law Plaintiffs say was violated in Count

II.78 The crux of the claim is that Defendants79 cannot foreclose on the 2007

Mortgage because the note associated with the 2007 Mortgage was paid off

when it was securitized, and that sometime in the past decade Defendants

fraudulently manufactured evidence to claim ownership of the underlying

note.80 Plaintiffs conclude Count II by asking the court to enjoin the

77
See 10 Del. C. § 8106 (default limitations period for breach of contract claims in
Delaware is three years); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-14.1 (breach of contract claims in
New Jersey are subject to a six-year limitations period). There are no allegations
nor is there any evidence in the record from which the court could conclude that the
PSA contains an extended statute of limitations period such that Title 10, Section
8106(c) might apply. But even if there were, Title 10, Section 8121 would require
application of New Jersey’s six-year limitations period.
78
See Compl. ¶¶ 29–37.
79
Plaintiffs assert Count II against all defendants, even though the only entity which
has sought to foreclose on the 2007 Mortgage is New Residential. Compare Compl.
¶¶ 29–37, with Foreclosure Compl. at 1 (listing New Residential as the sole
plaintiff).
80
Compl. ¶¶ 31–32. Plaintiffs do not limit their argument to the 2007 Mortgage and
its associated note. On the contrary, they assert that the securitization of mortgage
notes by anyone—the entire industry—is impossible because mortgage notes
“cannot be both paid and securitized and still outstanding” so “[t]here is no injured
party to whom a debt is owed at this time or at the time of filing of this foreclosure.”
Id. ¶¶ 29, 32. See also id. ¶ 29 (“That is the paradox in securitized original [n]otes;
they are first paid when securitized.”).

– 29 –
Property’s foreclosure “pursuant to the doctrine of promissory estoppel,”81 but

the claim really seems to request a declaratory judgment that the Foreclosure

Action was wrongful because nothing was owed on the 2007 Mortgage.82

Viewed through that lens, the court cannot conclude that Count II is

untimely, as it would not have arisen until New Residential filed the

Foreclosure Action on November 15, 2022,83 less than two years before

Plaintiffs filed the Complaint here.84 The court will therefore not dismiss

Count II as untimely. But viewing Count II through this lens makes it that

much more clear why Count II must be dismissed as an impermissible

collateral attack on the Foreclosure Judgment: Plaintiffs contend that the

filing of the Foreclosure Action itself was the wrongful act triggering liability

under Count II. The New Jersey Court disagreed, definitively ruling that New

Residential may foreclose on the Property when it issued the Foreclosure

Judgment.

81
Compl. ¶ 37.
82
Compl. ¶ 32 (“There is no injured party to whom a debt is owed at this time or at
the time of filing this foreclosure. Denies that there is any outstanding principal
balance or accrued interest or unpaid expenses of any kind to any creditor until the
present date.”).
83
See Foreclosure Compl., supra n.13.
84
The court says “appears to be timely” because the difficulty in discerning the
actual substantive claim underlying Count II makes it impossible to identify the
applicable statute of limitations.

– 30 –
c. Predatory Lending

Turning to Count III, Plaintiffs’ predatory lending claim, Plaintiffs also

appear to seek both equitable and legal relief for it, so the court applies the

doctrine of laches. “Predatory lending” is not a denominated cause of action

under federal, New Jersey, or Delaware law, and it is impossible to tell from

the Complaint what law Plaintiffs think was violated.85 But it does not

matter—whether the predatory lending claim might arise under the federal

Truth in Lending Act,86 the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act,87 the Delaware

Consumer Fraud Act,88 common law fraud, or breach of contract, the relevant

statutes of limitations are all significantly shorter than the 16 years between

the last concrete “predatory” act complained of in the Complaint (December

85
The predatory lending claim also suffers from conclusory allegations of
wrongdoing, some of which sound in fraud, with no attempt to plead fraud with
particularity. See Compl. ¶¶ 39–44. It also makes internally inconsistent
statements, like alleging all three defendants here made false representations in
connection with the 2004 Mortgage (id. ¶ 39), even though that mortgage was, as
the Complaint itself alleges, issued by a different entity (id. ¶ 6). And it engages in
temporal gymnastics, taking conduct purportedly occurring in the 2004–2007
timeframe and applying it to an entity (New Residential) that the Division of
Corporations’ records indicate was not formed until September 27, 2019. Compare
Compl. ¶ 39 (alleging defendants’ “false representations” occurred “[o]n or about
August 16, 2004, September 22, 2006, [and] December 11, 2007 . . .”), with Entity
Details, File Number 7629716, Delaware Department of State: Division of
Corporations (Aug. 25, 2025),
https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/Ecorp/EntitySearch/NameSearch.aspx.
86
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f.
87
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1–8-25.
88
6 Del. C. §§ 2511–2527.

– 31 –
2007) and Plaintiffs filing the Complaint (July 2024).89 Count III is

presumptively untimely under the doctrine of laches.

d. Violation of RESPA

Claims for violation of the mortgage servicing provisions of RESPA,

including claims that servicers failed to respond to QWRs, are subject to a

three-year statute of limitations.90 Plaintiffs submitted their QWR to

Nationstar on May 9, 2013 and Nationstar acknowledged receipt of the QWR

on May 22, 2013.91 If, as Plaintiffs allege, Nationstar never responded further

to the QWR, then their claim that Nationstar violated RESPA arose no later

than June 2013, more than 11 years before Plaintiffs filed the Complaint.

Plaintiffs’ RESPA claim is untimely.92

89
See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (for Truth in Lending Act claims arising under 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1639, 1639b or 1639c, a plaintiff has three years from the date of violation to
bring a claim for damages; other claims are subject to a one-year limitations period);
Catena v. Raytheon Co., 145 A.3d 1085, 1090 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2016) (claims
for violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act or common law fraud are
subject to a six-year statute of limitations); State ex rel. Brady v. Pettinaro Enters.,
870 A.2d 513, 526 (Del. Ch. 2005) (private claims under the Delaware Consumer
Fraud Act are subject to 10 Del. C. § 8106’s three-year limitations period);
Winklevoss Cap. Fund, LLC v. Shaw, 2019 WL 994534, at *5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1,
2019) (common law fraud claims in Delaware must also be brought within 10 Del.
C. § 8106’s three-year limitations period); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-14.1 (breach of
contract claims in New Jersey are subject to a six-year limitations period).
90
12 U.S.C. § 2614.
91
See Compl. Ex. B.
92
Only legal relief—in the form of actual and statutory damages—is available for
RESPA violations. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f). The court therefore applies the statute of
limitations for RESPA without considering laches. See Lebanon Cnty. Empls.’ Ret.

– 32 –
2. The Discovery Rule Does Not Save Plaintiffs’ Claims
For Breach of the PSA, Predatory Lending, or
Violation of RESPA

To counter Loan Defendant’s untimeliness argument, Plaintiffs offer

only one basis on which this court might conclude that the statute of

limitations or laches does not preclude Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of the

PSA, predatory lending, and violation of RESPA. According to Plaintiffs,

their claims are not precluded because “they only recently learned of these

[claims] despite due diligence.”93 The court interprets this statement as

Fund v. Collis, 287 A.3d 1160, 1194 (Del. Ch. 2022) (noting that for legal claims
seeking legal relief, the court applies the applicable statute of limitations). The court
notes Plaintiffs argue in their opposition that the RESPA claim is not untimely
because they served a new QWR on Nationstar in July 2024 and Nationstar did not
respond to it. See D.I. 29 at 1 (“Defendants are ignoring . . . the fact that a July,
2024 QWR was served and received no response[.]”). This new QWR was sent the
same day Plaintiffs filed the Complaint, so it is no surprise the Complaint does not
mention it. Compare D.I. 29 Ex. D at 7 (containing handwritten date of July 22,
2024), with Compl. at 1 (showing File & ServeXpress time stamp of 4:00 p.m. on
July 22, 2024). As the court has noted, Plaintiffs cannot inject new issues into this
case through their opposition, so the court does not consider the new QWR here.
See Pls.’ Opp. Br., supra n.31; see also Carroll v. Burstein, 2025 WL 2446891, at
*7 n.69 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2025) (“Briefs relating to a motion to dismiss are not
part of the record and any attempt contained within such documents to plead new
facts or expand those contained in the complaint will not be considered.”) (quoting
Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 28 n.59 (Del. Ch. 2002)).
93
D.I. 29 at 4.

– 33 –
Plaintiffs arguing that the discovery rule94 is enough to justify ignoring the

applicable statutes of limitations.

“Even after a cause of action accrues, the ‘running’ of the limitations

period can be ‘tolled’ in certain circumstances.” Lehman Bros. Hldgs., Inc. v.

Kee, 268 A.3d 178, 186 (Del. 2021) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life

Ins., 860 A.2d 312, 319 (Del. 2004)). “Under the ‘discovery rule’ the statute

is tolled where the injury is ‘inherently unknowable and the claimant is

blamelessly ignorant of the wrongful act and the injury complained of.’” Wal-

Mart, 860 A.2d at 319 (quoting Coleman v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLC,

854 A.2d 838, 842 (Del. 2004)). If the discovery rule applies, “the statute of

limitations is tolled until the plaintiff discovers the ‘facts constituting the basis

of the cause of action or the existence of facts sufficient to put a person of

ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry which, if pursued, would lead

to the discovery of such facts.’” Lehman Bros. Hldgs., 268 A.3d at 186

(quoting Wal-Mart, 860 A.2d at 319).

Here, Plaintiffs’ claims are untimely, and they do not plead sufficient

facts to support application of the discovery rule. Plaintiffs’ conclusory

assertions fail to allege when or how they discovered the claims or why they

94
Also referred to as the “inherently unknowable injury” doctrine. See Cent. Mortg.
Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Hldgs. LLC, 2012 WL 3201139, at *22 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 7, 2012).

– 34 –
could not have discovered them earlier—in other words, whether Plaintiffs

were blamelessly ignorant. The discovery rule does not overcome the

application of the statutes of limitations. The claims are time-barred.

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs are understandably unhappy with the New Jersey Court’s

ruling that New Residential can foreclose on and sell the Property. But their

unhappiness there—where they had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their

claims—does not entitle them to a do-over here. I recommend that the

complaint be dismissed in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be grated, whether on grounds of res judicata, the collateral attack

doctrine, lack of standing, or untimeliness.

This is a final report. Under Court of Chancery Rule 144(d)(1), any

party taking exceptions to this report or to a prior report issued in this case

must file a notice of exceptions by September 9, 2025.

– 35 –