George Assad v. Brian D. Chambers

COURT OF CHANCERY
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
NATHAN A. COOK LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
VICE CHANCELLOR 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734

June 2, 2025

Christine M. Mackintosh Blake Rohrbacher
Rebecca A. Musarra Matthew W. Murphy
Vivek Upadhya John M. O’Toole
William G. Passannante II Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A.
Grant & Eisenhofer P.A. One Rodney Square
123 Justison Street, 7th Floor 920 North King Street
Wilmington, DE 19801 Wilmington, DE 19801

Gregory V. Varallo
Andrew E. Blumberg
Daniel E. Meyer
Bernstein Litowitz
Berger & Grossmann LLP
500 Delaware Avenue, Suite 901
Wilmington, DE 19801

RE: George Assad v. Brian D. Chambers, et al.,
C.A. No. 2024-0688-NAC

Dear Counsel:

This letter addresses Defendants’ 1 motion to dismiss pursuant to Court of

Chancery Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For the reasons described below, Defendants’

motion to dismiss is granted.

1 Defendants are Brian D. Chambers, Eduardo E. Cordeiro, Adrienne D. Elsner, Alfred E.

Festa, Edward F. Lonergan, Maryann T. Mannen, Paul E. Martin, W. Howard Morris,
Suzanne P. Nimocks, John D. Williams, and Owens Corning.
C.A. No. 2024-0688-NAC
June 2, 2025
Page 2 of 14

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff George Assad is a stockholder of Owens Corning (the “Company”). 2

Owens Corning is a Delaware-incorporated building and construction materials

company. 3

In June 2023, the Company’s board of directors (the “Board”) amended Owens

Corning’s advance notice bylaws (the “Advance Notice Bylaws”). 4 One year later, in

June 2024, Plaintiff commenced this action challenging the Advance Notice Bylaws. 5

Plaintiff neither intends to nominate a director to the Owens Corning Board, nor

identifies a stockholder who does. 6

A. The Advance Notice Bylaws

On June 14, 2023, against the backdrop of the SEC’s adoption of Rule 14a-19

(the “Universal Proxy Rule”), the Company’s general counsel, Gina Beredo,

recommended that the Board’s Governance and Nominating Committee (the

“Committee”) revisit the Company’s advance notice bylaws. 7 The Universal Proxy

2 George Assad v. Brian D. Chambers, et al., C.A. No. 2024-0688-NAC, Docket (“Dkt.”) 50,

Corrected Am. Verified S’holder Class Action Compl. (“Am. Compl.”) ¶ 18.

3 Id. ¶ 29.

4 Id. ¶ 42.

5 Dkt. 1., Verified S’holder Class Action Compl. (“Original Compl.”).

6 See Am. Compl.; see also Dkt. 70, Tr. of Oral Arg. on Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss 69:15–22

(explaining that Plaintiff does not intend to run a proxy contest).

7 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35, 37.
C.A. No. 2024-0688-NAC
June 2, 2025
Page 3 of 14

Rule had gone into effect a year prior, and in December 2022, the SEC had issued

supplemental guidance clarifying that a company could still exclude stockholder

nominees from its proxy card if “the dissident shareholder[] fail[s] to comply with [the

Company’s] advance notice bylaw requirements.” 8

The memorandum the Committee received in connection with the Advance

Notice Bylaws noted that “[g]iven the possibility that dissidents will utilize a

universal proxy card, it is recommended that the advance notice provisions, among

other provisions, of the Bylaws be revised . . . to require stockholders to provide earlier

disclosure of an intention to use the universal proxy card and verify and enforce

stockholders’ compliance with the solicitation requirement under Rule 14a-19 of the

Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 . . . .” 9 The memorandum recommended that

“the advance notice provisions also be amended to align with current market practice

more closely by enhancing the procedures and disclosure requirements for director

nominations made and business proposals submitted by stockholders . . . .” 10 To that

end, the memorandum advised the Board adopt the “Enhanced Advance Notice

Provision Amendments,” which would “expand the required disclosure for submitting

stockholders to obtain more detailed information about the proposal’s proponent, the

8 Id. ¶ 35 (alterations in original).

9 Id. ¶ 37 (screenshot).

10 Id. ¶ 38 (screenshot).
C.A. No. 2024-0688-NAC
June 2, 2025
Page 4 of 14

proposal, other interested parties, and the ownership interest in the Corporation of

the proponent . . . .” 11 The memorandum explained that collecting “[t]his detailed

information may enable the Corporation to mount a stronger defense against [a]

proposal.” 12

The meeting minutes indicate that before the meeting, the Committee received

“benchmarking tables” which “showed the number of the Corporation’s proxy peers

that had adopted the proposed revisions.” 13 The Committee and Beredo also

discussed the benefits of adopting the Advance Notice Bylaws including “the

advantages of earlier notice of dissident stockholders to use a universal proxy card

and greater disclosure about nominating stockholders and their nominees.” 14

The Committee recommended the Board adopt the Advance Notice Bylaws. 15

The next day, the Board considered the Advance Notice Bylaws. The minutes note

the Board weighed the same benefits of the Advance Notice Bylaws that the

Committee had: “the advantages of earlier notice of dissident stockholders to use a

universal proxy card and greater disclosure about nominating stockholders and their

11 Id.

12 Id.

13 Id. ¶ 39 (screenshot)

14 Id.

15 Id. ¶ 40 (screenshot).
C.A. No. 2024-0688-NAC
June 2, 2025
Page 5 of 14

nominees.” 16 The Board formally adopted the Advance Notice Bylaws the same day. 17

Notably, Plaintiff’s original complaint alleged that the challenged bylaw

provisions “are facially invalid.” 18 Following the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision

in Kellner v. AIM ImmunoTech Inc. (“Kellner II”), 19 Plaintiff filed an amended

complaint that replaced the phrase “facially invalid” with “unenforceable” 20 and

expressly disclaimed any facial validity challenge. 21

Plaintiff takes issue with two features of the Advance Notice Bylaws: the

“Acting in Concert” definition and the “Ownership Provision.” 22 Plaintiff alleges that

these provisions are “preclusive both individually, and when they work together in

interlocking ways.” 23 But Plaintiff neither intends to nominate a director to the

Board, nor can Plaintiff identify a stockholder who does. Defendants have moved to

16 Id.

17 Id. ¶ 45.

18 Original Compl. ¶ 44.

19 320 A.3d 239 (Del. 2024).

20 Am. Compl. ¶ 66; accord id. Ex. 1 (redline).

21 Am. Compl. at 2 n.3 (“For the avoidance of doubt, Plaintiff does not challenge the facial

validity of the [Advance Notice Bylaws].”).

22 For the text of the “Acting in Concert” definition and the “Ownership Provision,” see Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 46–65; Am. Compl. Ex. 3.

23 Am. Compl. ¶ 45.
C.A. No. 2024-0688-NAC
June 2, 2025
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dismiss the amended complaint under Court of Chancery Rules 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6). 24

II. ANALYSIS

When board-adopted advance notice bylaws are challenged, this Court reviews

the bylaws first for legality, if contested, and second for equity. 25 Here, Plaintiff has

disavowed any facial validity challenge and asks the Court to undertake an equitable

review, declaring that the Advance Notice Bylaws are “unenforceable” and the

“Defendants . . . breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by adopting and maintaining

[them].” 26

But for this Court to undertake such an equitable review, it must be presented

with a ripe dispute. 27 Because Plaintiff has disclaimed a facial validity challenge but

has not demonstrated that a ripe controversy exists, the Court grants Defendants’

24 Dkt. 53, Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl.

25 See, e.g., Kellner II, 320 A.3d at 259 (“[W]hen corporate action is challenged, it must be

twice-tested – first for legal authorization, and second by equity. The same principles apply
to board-adopted advance notice bylaws.” (footnote omitted)).

26 Am. Compl. at 31.

27 Siegel v. Morse, 2025 WL 1101624, at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2025). The plaintiff in Siegel
filed a nearly identical complaint against the directors of the AES Corporation weeks before
Plaintiff filed this class action. The parties in both cases are clients of the same few law
firms. Although the two cases were never formally coordinated, counsel argued the motions
to dismiss at the same hearing.
C.A. No. 2024-0688-NAC
June 2, 2025
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motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). As such, Defendants’ motion to dismiss per

Rule 12(b)(6) is moot.

A. The Standard of Review

If a party moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the non-movant bears the

burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. 28 “Unlike the standards employed

in Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, the guidelines for the Court’s review of [a] Rule 12(b)(1)

motion are far more demanding of the non-movant.” 29 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1)

is appropriate if the record, including evidence outside the pleadings, indicates that

the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. 30

B. Plaintiff’s Claim Is Not Ripe

“Ripeness, the simple question of whether a suit has been brought at the

correct time, goes to the very heart of whether a court has subject matter

jurisdiction.” 31 “A ripeness determination requires a common sense assessment of

whether the interests of the party seeking immediate relief outweigh the concerns of

28 E.g., de Adler v. Upper New York Inv. Co. LLC, 2013 WL 5874645, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31,

2013).

29 CLP Toxicology, Inc. v. Casla Bio Hldgs. LLC, 2021 WL 2588905, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 14,

2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Appriva S’holder Litig. Co., LLC v. EV3, Inc., 937 A.2d
1275, 1284 n.14 (Del. 2007)).

30 K&K Screw Prods., L.L.C. v. Emerick Cap. Invs., Inc., 2011 WL 3505354, at *6 (Del. Ch.

Aug. 9, 2011).

31 Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 740 (Del. Ch. 2006).
C.A. No. 2024-0688-NAC
June 2, 2025
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the court ‘in postponing review until the question arises in some more concrete and

final form.’” 32 Delaware courts decline to exercise subject matter jurisdiction on

ripeness grounds where adjudicating the dispute “would prematurely resolve a highly

contentious and important matter before the court knows what pertinent facts might

develop in the future.” 33

Kellner II instructs that, before undertaking equitable review of an advance

notice bylaw, this Court must consider whether is a “‘genuine, extant controversy’

involving the adoption, amendment, or application of bylaws” warranting such

review. 34 The Court will examine whether “litigation is ‘unavoidable’ and the

‘material facts are static.’” 35 If not, the dispute is unripe. 36

As in Siegel, Plaintiff here acknowledges he will not, and has no interest in,

running a proxy contest. 37 And even if he did, Plaintiff does not allege that any of

challenged disclosure requirements would apply to him if he were to submit a

32 XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. WMI Liquidating Tr., 93 A.3d 1208, 1217 (Del. 2014) (quoting

Stroud v. Milliken Enters., Inc. (“Stroud I”), 552 A.2d 476, 480 (Del. 1989)).

33 Bebchuk, 902 A.2d at 744.

34 Kellner II, 320 A.3d at 258–59 (quoting Boilermakers Loc. 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp.,

73 A.3d 934, 949 (Del. Ch. 2013)).

35 Kellner II, 320 A.3d at 259 n.139 (citing Stroud I, 552 A.2d at 481).

36As in Siegel, Plaintiff expressly disclaims any facial validity challenge to the Advance
Notice Bylaws. Thus, I consider and decide only the question before me: whether Plaintiff
has a ripe claim for equitable review.

37 Tr. of Oral Arg. on Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 69:17–22.
C.A. No. 2024-0688-NAC
June 2, 2025
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nomination. Further, Plaintiff cannot identify a single Owens Corning stockholder

who is, in fact, deterred (or “chilled”) from nominating, or potentially nominating, a

director for election to the Owens Corning Board by the Advance Notice Bylaws.

Again, so too in Siegel.

Plaintiff instead generically alleges a hypothetical: that the Advance Notice

Bylaws “chill and impermissibly burden the free exercise of the stockholder

franchise.” 38 Having alleged this hypothetical, Plaintiff demands this Court set in

motion the gears of equitable review and all that entails—including, presumably,

discovery and a trial. Plaintiff further asks this Court to issue a ruling, in equity,

even though no stockholder can be identified who seeks to nominate, or is even

considering nominating, a director for election to the Owens Corning Board and who

perceives the Advance Notice Bylaws as an actual or possible impediment to doing

so.

At some point in the future, an Owens Corning stockholder may step forward

to say she is deterred, or “chilled,” from nominating, or even potentially nominating,

an individual for election to the Board. The Board will have an opportunity to

respond. 39 And the Court will have some practical footing on which to ground

38 Am. Compl. ¶ 80.

39 For example, the Board may modify the bylaws, as sometimes happens.
C.A. No. 2024-0688-NAC
June 2, 2025
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equitable analysis. 40 But without any of that, equitable review is ill-advised and ill-

suited to the circumstances, like a lever without a fulcrum.

Whether any such stockholder will step forward in the future is unknown, and

the facts that might arise in such an instance are not static. Until then, this Court

reasonably “cannot be expected to guess whether or how the dispute in this case might

eventually crystallize, and to announce a sweeping legal rule, which addresses all

those possibilities . . . .” 41

Tellingly, Plaintiff does not cite a single case where this Court has allowed a

stockholder to challenge the enforceability of an advance notice bylaw when no

stockholder intends to run a proxy contest or, at least, is contemplating one. 42

Instead, referencing the materials the Committee reviewed when considering the

Advance Notice Bylaws and Board meeting minutes, Plaintiff asserts that he

“adequately plead[ed] that the Board acted defensively in adopting the [Advance

Notice Bylaws]” which “suffices to state a ripe Unocal claim.” 43 Not so.

40 I leave for future cases where the dividing line between ripe and unripe might lie.
The best
answer is likely that there is no single, all-encompassing rule and instead it will depend on
the circumstances. Hence the “common sense assessment” this Court is instructed to make.

41 Bebchuk, 902 A.2d at 744.

42 See Am. Compl.

43 Dkt. 58, Pl.’s Answering Br. in Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 15.
C.A. No. 2024-0688-NAC
June 2, 2025
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Although “Delaware courts scrutinize closely corporate acts that affect

stockholder voting,” 44 as already explained, before a court will undertake such

equitable review, it must be presented with a “genuine, extant controversy.” 45

Pointing to a handful of vanilla memorandum excerpts and meeting minutes is just

not enough, in these circumstances, to demonstrate that a genuine, extant

controversy exists. Without a proxy contest, or even a stockholder saying she is

chilled from making a nomination, generic references to stockholder activism

contained in committee materials and meeting minutes do not transform this dispute

from an “imagined” one to a “real-world” one. 46 As noted in a footnote to the Kellner

II decision, the adoption of the Universal Proxy Rule prompted many other

corporations to revisit their advance notice bylaws. 47 Common sense suggests that,

absent any proxy contest threat, the Board’s decision to revise Owens Corning’s

bylaws in response to the Universal Proxy Rule here also is not the kind of

44 Kellner II, 320 A.3d at 259.

45 Id. at 258 (quoting Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 949).

46 Kellner II, 320 A.3d at 259 n.139 (“Fiduciary review standards are meant to address ‘real-

world concerns when they arise in real-world and extant disputes, rather than hypothetical
and imagined future ones.’” (quoting Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 963)).

47 Kellner II, 320 A.3d at 258 n.134 (citing Aaron Wendt & Krishna Shah, 2023 Proxy Season

Briefing: Key Trends and Data Highlights, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate
Governance (Aug. 17, 2023), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2023/08/17/2023-proxy-season-
briefing-key-trends-and-data-highlight/).
C.A. No. 2024-0688-NAC
June 2, 2025
Page 12 of 14

circumstance that the Supreme Court envisioned in Kellner II would trigger the

machinery of equitable review. 48

I have little doubt that circumstances exist where an equitable challenge to the

adoption of advance notice bylaws can be ripe in the absence of a pending or imminent

proxy contest. In this regard, equity is eminently flexible. Here, however, where

Plaintiff relies on generic references to activism defense, Plaintiff’s interests in

seeking immediate equitable review are outweighed by this Court’s concern in

postponing review until the question arises in some more concrete and final form.

Tackling Plaintiff’s hypothetical challenge suggests the adoption of a rule also

based in the hypothetical. But crafting such a rule merits “[e]special caution” as it

risks an “improvident or premature decision” in an important, complex and evolving

area of our law. 49 There is nothing new in this outcome. It aligns not only with

Kellner II but also Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., this

Court’s decision from over a decade prior. 50

48 See Siegel, 2025 WL 1101624, at *7 n.80.

49 Bebchuk, 902 A.2d at 740.

50 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013); see id. at 954 (“And as with all exercises of fiduciary authority,

the real-world application of a forum selection bylaw can be challenged as an inequitable
breach of fiduciary duty. But, as a distinguished scholar has noted, ‘[t]he presumption is not
that the [bylaw] is invalid upon adoption because it might, under some undefined and
hypothetical set of later-evolving circumstances, be improperly applied.’” (alterations in
original) (quoting Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A. Savelle, The Brouhaha over Intra-
Corporate Forum Selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 Bus.
Law 325, 331 (providing, in the sentence just after the passage quoted in Boilermakers, “In
C.A. No. 2024-0688-NAC
June 2, 2025
Page 13 of 14

Finally, Plaintiff attempts to sidestep ripeness by claiming that the Advance

Notice Bylaws have “inequitably chill[ed] the fair exercise of the Owens Corning

stockholders’ franchise,” 51 and analogizing the supposed deterrent effect of the

Advance Notice Bylaws to that of stockholder rights plans and dead hand proxy

puts. 52 Indeed, the amended complaint makes much of the notion that the Advance

Notice Bylaws “include ‘Wolfpack’ and ‘Daisy Chain’ provisions substantially similar

to the unenforceable entrenchment devices rejected in Williams.” 53 But, as this Court

has explained, an advance notice bylaw is not like a stockholder rights plan or dead

hand proxy put. 54 Plaintiff’s analogies do not ripen otherwise unripe claims.

fact, the intermediate level of scrutiny applied by the courts cannot be brought to bear until
the poison pill is actually threatened to be triggered and the court is aware of facts and
circumstances surrounding the pill’s potential application.”))); see also Openwave Sys. Inc. v.
Harbinger Cap. P’rs Master Fund I, Ltd., 924 A.2d 228, 240 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Delaware law
does not permit challenges to bylaws based on hypothetical abuses . . . .”) (first citing Stroud
v. Grace (“Stroud II”), 606 A.2d 75, 96 (Del. 1992); and then citing Bebchuk, 902 A.2d at 741);
Stroud II, 606 A.2d at 79 (“Delaware courts should exercise caution when invalidating
corporate acts based upon hypothetical injuries . . . .”). See generally Siegel, 2025 WL
1101624, at *3 n.30.

51 Am. Compl. ¶ 82.

52 See, e.g., id. at 23 n.45 (“Moreover, like a rights plan, an advance bylaw issued preemptively

that is never implicated is ‘a truly effective deterrent.’” (emphasis omitted)).

53 Am. Compl. ¶ 11.

54 See Siegel, 2025 WL 1101624, at *7–8.
C.A. No. 2024-0688-NAC
June 2, 2025
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Considering our Supreme Court’s analysis in Kellner II, and taking a common

sense view of the circumstances as I am instructed to do, I am compelled to conclude

Plaintiff’s claims here are unripe.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted without

prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Sincerely,

/s/ Nathan A. Cook

Nathan A. Cook
Vice Chancellor