Karen Callahan v. Joseph Nelson

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

KAREN CALLAHAN, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. 2024-1099-BWD
)
JOSEPH NELSON, )
)
Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING
MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR PARTITION

Date Submitted: May 2, 2025
Date Decided: May 7, 2025

William B. Larson, Jr., John J. Klusman, III, MANNING GROSS +
MASSENBURG LLP, Wilmington, DE; Attorneys for Petitioner Karen Callahan.

Josiah R. Wolcott, CONNOLLY GALLAGHER LLP, Wilmington, DE; Attorneys
for Respondent Joseph Nelson.

DAVID, V.C.
“You get a dog on your mind, it seems to fill up the whole space. Everything

you do reminds you of that dog.”1 The petitioner and respondent in this partition

action suffer that affliction. The parties acquired a Goldendoodle named Tucker

while they were dating. After their relationship ended, a years-long legal battle over

Tucker’s ownership ensued—first in the Justice of the Peace Court, next in the Court

of Common Pleas, then in the Superior Court, and now in the Court of Chancery.

Prior court rulings determined that the parties jointly own Tucker.

In this latest action, the petitioner seeks to partition Tucker. The respondent

has moved to dismiss, arguing that the relief sought is “unprecedented” and that a

companion animal should not be partitioned. This short memorandum opinion

denies the motion to dismiss. “While dog owners and lovers may shudder at the

thought,” 2 the law recognizes dogs as property, even if many of us do not consider

them so. If the parties had been married, the Family Court could determine

ownership of Tucker under the framework of a recently enacted statute that takes

into consideration the well-being of a companion animal. 3 But the parties were not

married, and in equity, partition provides the remedy for co-owners wishing to sever

their interests in jointly owned property.

1
Phyllis Reynolds Naylor, SHILOH ch. 11 (1991).
2
Callahan v. Nelson, 2024 WL 2764433, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 29, 2024).
3
See 17 Del. C. § 1513(g)(2).

1
This memorandum opinion does not decide how to partition a dog; only that

the Court can, and should, do so here. Concerned readers may rest assured that

Tucker will not be partitioned in kind (i.e., physically divided), nor will he be

publicly auctioned. The right procedure will result in one party owning Tucker and

the other receiving a monetary award. The parties will meet and confer, and submit

supplemental briefing if necessary, on the appropriate procedure to govern the

partition.

I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Petition for Partition (the “Petition”)

and the documents incorporated by reference therein. Pet. for Partition [hereinafter

Pet.], Dkt. 1.4

Petitioner Karen Callahan (“Petitioner”) and respondent Joseph Nelson

(“Respondent”) previously dated but never married. Pet. ¶ 3. While they were a

couple, Petitioner and Respondent purchased a pet Goldendoodle named Tucker. Id.

¶ 4. Petitioner and Respondent ended their relationship in May 2022, and Petitioner

has not seen Tucker since. Id. ¶ 8.

4
See Allen v. Encore Energy P’rs, L.P., 72 A.3d 93, 96 n.2 (Del. 2013) (“A judge may
consider documents outside of the pleadings only when: . . . the document is integral to a
plaintiff’s claim and incorporated in the complaint . . . .” (citing Vanderbilt Income &
Growth Assocs., L.L.C. v. Arvida/JMB Managers, Inc., 691 A.2d 609, 612 (Del. 1996))).

2
In June 2022, Petitioner filed a petition for replevin in the Justice of the Peace

Court (“JP Court”), seeking the return of Tucker and other items. Callahan v.

Nelson, 2024 WL 2764433, at *1 (Del. Super. May 29, 2024). In December, the JP

Court issued a post-trial decision, “which ruled that [Petitioner] was the rightful

owner of the dog.” Id. Respondent appealed the JP Court’s ruling to the Court of

Common Pleas (“CCP”) and Petitioner filed a de novo petition for replevin in CCP.

Id. at *2. CCP held a two-day trial, after which it “ruled in favor of [Respondent],

finding that [Petitioner] could not obtain replevin because the dog was jointly owned

by both [Respondent] and [Petitioner].” Id. Petitioner appealed the CCP’s ruling to

the Superior Court, which affirmed, explaining that the CCP’s finding of joint

ownership was supported by the evidence. Id.

Petitioner then initiated this action through the filing of the Petition, seeking

an order for partition of Tucker. Dkt. 1. Respondent moved to dismiss the Petition

(the “Motion to Dismiss”).5 Dkt. 4. The Court heard oral argument on the Motion

to Dismiss on May 2, 2025.

5
Opening Br. in Support of Def. Joseph Nelson’s Mot. to Dismiss “Pet. for Partition” of
Pl. Karen Callahan, Dkt. 7; Answering Br. in Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss “Pet. for
Partition” of Pet’r, Dkt. 8; Reply Br. in Further Support of Def. Joseph Nelson’s Mot. to
Dismiss “Pet. for Partition” of Pl. Karen Callahan, Dkt. 7.

3
II. ANALYSIS
Respondent has moved to dismiss the Petition for failure to state a claim under

Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6).6 He argues that the Court should refuse to order

the “unprecedented” relief—partition of a companion animal—sought in the

Petition. OB at 6–7.

The equitable remedy of partition developed under English law to provide a

remedy to co-owners wishing to sever their undivided interests in jointly owned

property. Peters v. Robinson, 636 A.2d 926, 928 (Del. 1994). “The purpose of a

partition proceeding is to eliminate a present concurrent interest in the same property

so that each owner may enjoy and possess his or her interest in severalty.” Id. at

929. Without a partition remedy, co-owners could be locked into joint ownership

indefinitely.

Delaware’s partition statute governs only the right to partition real property,7

but courts of equity also “have historical[ly] upheld the right of a tenant in common

6
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), Delaware
courts “(1) accept all well pleaded factual allegations as true, (2) accept even vague
allegations as ‘well pleaded’ if they give the opposing party notice of the claim, [and] (3)
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party . . . .” Cent. Mortg. Co. v.
Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Hldgs. LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535 (Del. 2011) (citing Savor, Inc.
v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896–97 (Del. 2002)).
7
25 Del C. § 721(a) (“When any 2 or more persons hold lands and tenements within this
State as joint tenants or tenants in common, . . . any 1 or more of them, . . . may present a

4
to seek a partition of personal property.” Burkett v. Ward, 2012 WL 6764072, at *1

(Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2012) (citing JLF, Inc. v. NJE Aircraft Corp., 1988 WL 58274,

at *2 (Del. Ch. June 2, 1988)).8 And the law views a pet as personal property. See

16 Del. C. § 3050F(a) (“All dogs shall be deemed personal property . . . .”); see also,

e.g., Conte v. Fossett, 2013 WL 1143329, at *1 (Del. Super. Mar. 19, 2013) (“[T]he

law views a dog as property.”); Naples v. Miller, 2009 WL 1163504, at *2 (Del.

Super. Apr. 30, 2009) (same). A jointly owned pet, then, is subject to a partition

remedy.

Respondent urges the Court to dismiss the Petition, however, on the grounds

that partition of a companion animal is inconsistent with recent legislation aimed at

protecting the well-being of companion animals. On June 27, 2023, Delaware

enacted three laws enhancing protections for companion animals, 9 including an

petition to the Court of Chancery of the county wherein the lands and tenements are situate
. . . . The petition shall state the facts, describe the lands and tenements so held, and pray
partition thereof among the several parties entitled to such lands and tenements according
to their several and respective interests.”).
8
See also Reed v. Greene, 2020 WL 7239574, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 8, 2020) (finding
equitable jurisdiction over partition of a bank account), R. & R. adopted, 2020 WL 7239574
(Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2020); Carradin v. Carradin, 1980 WL 10015, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31,
1980) (“A court of equity is the proper tribunal for the partition of personal property
whether the title is legal or equitable . . . .”).
9
Del. H.B. 95, 152d Gen. Assem. (2023); Del. S.B, 70, 152d Gen. Assem. (2023); Del.
S.B. 71, 152d Gen. Assem. (2023).

5
amendment to Title 13, Section 1513, 10 which now directs the Family Court to “take

into consideration the well-being of [a] companion animal” when awarding

ownership of a family pet in a divorce proceeding. 11 Pointing out that “‘equitable

principals may be invoked’ to prevent partition,” Respondent argues that the Court

should dismiss the Petition “as a matter of [this] recent public policy in Delaware.”12

Respondent’s policy argument does not support dismissal of the Petition. If

the parties had been married, the Family Court could have determined ownership of

Tucker under Title 13, Section 1513. But because they were not, partition provides

the mechanism for these co-owners to sever their property interests. Without that

equitable remedy, the parties might remain trapped in joint ownership of their pet

indefinitely, notwithstanding what I assume is a mutual desire to go separate ways.

To the extent public policy and equity support protecting companion animals,

crafting a fair and orderly process to resolve the rights of these co-owners so they

10
Section 1513 itself recognizes that a companion animal is property. See 13 Del. C.
§ 1513 (“If the Court finds that a companion animal of the parties is marital property
. . . .” (emphasis added)).
11
The factors include “[t]he ability of each party to own, support, and provide necessary
care for the companion animal,” “[t]he attachment between the companion animal and each
of the parties,” and “[t]he time and effort each party spent with the companion animal
during the marriage tending to the companion animal’s needs.” 17 Del. C. § 1513(g)(2).
12
OB at 7 (citing Berry v. Abbott, 16 Del. Ch. 449, 491 (Del. Orph. Ct. 1927), for the
proposition that a petition for partition may be denied if the request is “so revolting to the
public at large that it would be contrary to public policy to permit it”).

6
can move on is in the best interests of everyone involved, including Tucker. The

Motion to Dismiss the Petition is, therefore, denied.

This begs the question of what comes next. Under Delaware’s real property

partition statute, the default is “a physical, in kind, division of the real property”13

unless division would “be detrimental to the interests of the parties entitled[.]” 14 The

alternative, absent agreement of the parties, is a sale at “public vendue”—in other

words, a public auction. But the partition statute does not control here. The parties

need not worry that the Court will order partition in kind,15 nor would it make much

sense to order a public auction when the parties here attach far more value to Tucker

than would any member of the public.

13
Est. of CTC E., LLC v. Goldstein, 2022 WL 4592055, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2022)
(quoting Peters, 636 A.2d at 929), aff’d sub nom. In re CTC E., LLC v. Goldstein, 2022
WL 4592055 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2023).
14
Id. (citing 25 Del. C. § 729).
15
But see Seokoh, Inc. v. Lard-PT, LLC, 2021 WL 1197593, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 2021)
(“When conjuring an image of compromise, many invoke King Solomon, or Jedidiah, the
proverbial source of the classic aphorism, ‘split the baby.’”) (citing Kings 3:16–28));
Sequoia Presidential Yacht Gp. LLC v. FE P’rs LLC, 2016 WL 6678444, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 14, 2016) (“[King] Solomon offered to cut the infant in two—which is considered the
epitome of wisdom.”).

7
Luckily, this Court can fashion another remedy in equity.16 It seems clear that

a partition process should result in one party owning Tucker, with the other receiving

a monetary award. As one possibility, the parties could submit themselves to a blind

bidding auction, where the highest bidder buys out the lower bidder’s interest. 17 Or

the Court could award ownership of Tucker based on his best interests and grant the

other party a money judgment based on an appraisal. Or the parties could propose a

better alternative. The parties should meet and confer to see if they can reach

agreement on a proposed process, and if they cannot, they should submit briefing

that describes their respective positions on next steps.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

16
Hogg v. Walker, 622 A.3d 648, 654 (Del. 1993) (explaining the Court of Chancery “has
broad latitude to exercise its equitable powers to craft a remedy”); In re Columbia Pipeline
Gp., Inc. Merger Litig., 299 A.3d 393, 494 (Del. Ch. 2023) (“The court’s remedial powers
‘are complete to fashion any form of equitable and monetary relief as may be appropriate’
and ‘to grant such other relief as the facts of a particular case may dictate.’” (quoting
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983))).
17
See Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Unif. State L., Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act
§ 10(a) (Oct. 19, 2010), https://www.uniformlaws.org/viewdocument/final-act-
97?CommunityKey=50724584-e808-4255-bc5d-8ea4e588371d&tab=librarydocuments
(permitting “a sale by sealed bids” where it “would be more economically advantageous
and in the best interest of the cotenants as a group”).

8