Melissa Garlington v. Two Rivers Farm, LLC

COURT OF CHANCERY
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
BONNIE W. DAVID COURT OF CHANCERY COURTHOUSE
VICE CHANCELLOR 34 THE CIRCLE
GEORGETOWN, DE 19947

Date Submitted: March 27, 2025
Date Decided: April 7, 2025

Matthew D. Perri, Esquire Carl D. Neff, Esquire
Mari Boyle, Esquire Maura L. Burke, Esquire
Steven J. Fineman, Esquire Pierson Ferdinand LLP
Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. CSC Station
One Rodney Square 112 S. French Street
920 North King Street Wilmington, DE 19801
Wilmington, DE 19801

RE: Melissa Garlington v. Two Rivers Farm, LLC,
C.A. No. 2024-0917-BWD

Dear Counsel:

This letter opinion follows entry of a default judgment ordering defendant

Two Rivers Farm, LLC (“Defendant” or the “Company”), a Delaware limited

liability company, to produce certain books and records to plaintiff Melissa

Garlington (“Plaintiff”). Defendant failed to comply with the default judgment,

Plaintiff moved to enforce it, and Defendant finally appeared through Delaware

counsel. Defendant moved to set aside the default judgment on the grounds that

when the complaint was served, Defendant had been cancelled by operation of law

for failure to designate a registered agent. The Court held that the default judgment
Melissa Garlington v. Two Rivers Farm, LLC,
C.A. No. 2024-0917-BWD
April 7, 2025
Page 2 of 13

was valid but would be reopened in equity, solely to address confidentiality issues

implicating the interests of third parties. This letter opinion resolves those issues.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 3, 2024, Plaintiff initiated this action through the filing of a

Verified Complaint for Inspection of Books and Records (the “Complaint”).

Verified Compl. for Inspection of Books & Records [hereinafter Compl.], Dkt. 1.

The Complaint seeks to enforce an August 14, 2024 demand (the “Demand”) to

inspect the books and records of Defendant, a Delaware limited liability company.

Id. ¶ 3. The Demand states that Plaintiff seeks to value her interests in the Company,

investigate potential mismanagement, and call a meeting of the Company’s

members, among other purposes. Compl., Ex. 2 at 4.

The Complaint alleged that “[t]he Company was technically cancelled by the

Delaware Secretary of State on December 6, 2023 after the Company’s manager

failed to name a new registered agent following its registered agent’s resignation on

November 6, 2023.” Compl. ¶ 5. Title 6, Section 18-104(d) directs that:

The registered agent of a limited liability company . . . may resign
without appointing a successor registered agent by paying a fee as set
forth in § 18-1105(a)(2) of this title and filing a certificate of resignation
with the Secretary of State, but such resignation shall not become
effective until 30 days after the certificate is filed. After receipt of the
notice of the resignation of its registered agent, the limited liability
company for which such registered agent was acting shall obtain and
Melissa Garlington v. Two Rivers Farm, LLC,
C.A. No. 2024-0917-BWD
April 7, 2025
Page 3 of 13

designate a new registered agent, to take the place of the registered
agent so resigning. If such limited liability company fails to obtain and
designate a new registered agent as aforesaid prior to the expiration of
the period of 30 days after the filing by the registered agent of the
certificate of resignation, the certificate of formation of such limited
liability company shall be canceled. After the resignation of the
registered agent shall have become effective as provided in this section
and if no new registered agent shall have been obtained and
designated in the time and manner aforesaid, service of legal process
against each limited liability company . . . for which the resigned
registered agent had been acting shall thereafter be upon the
Secretary of State in accordance with § 18-105 of this title.

6 Del. C. § 18-104(d) (emphasis added). In accordance with Section 18-104(d),

Plaintiff served the Complaint on the Delaware Secretary of State. See Summons &

Return of Serv. on Def. Two Rivers Farm, LLC, Dkt. 6. Plaintiff also emailed a

copy of the Complaint to Defendant’s counsel at Brown Winick Law (“Brown

Winick”). Pl.’s Mot. for Default J. Against Def. Two Rivers Farm, LLC ¶ 8, Dkt.

10. Brown Winick informed Plaintiff that it would be representing Defendant in this

action, and eventually produced some, but not all, of the documents sought in the

Demand. Id. ¶¶ 10, 13, 16.

Defendant did not engage Delaware counsel, nor did Brown Winick enter an

appearance in this action. Defendant failed to answer the Complaint by the deadline

agreed upon by the parties, and Plaintiff moved for default judgment (the “Motion

for Default Judgment”). Id. The Court held a hearing on the Motion for Default
Melissa Garlington v. Two Rivers Farm, LLC,
C.A. No. 2024-0917-BWD
April 7, 2025
Page 4 of 13

Judgment, at which a corporate representative of Defendant appeared. The Court

advised that the Company must retain Delaware counsel to appear in the case and

extended the deadline to respond to the Complaint. See Tr. Telephonic Hr’g &

Rulings of Ct. on Pl.’s Mot. for Default J. 9, Dkt. 17. Defendant failed to respond

to the Complaint by the extended deadline and default judgment was entered (the

“Default Judgment”). Order Granting Pl.’s Mot. for Default J. Against Two Rivers

Farm, LLC, Dkt. 16. The Default Judgment required Defendant to produce to

Plaintiff all documents sought in the Demand and did not condition such production

on entry of a confidentiality order. Id. Two weeks later, Plaintiff filed a Motion for

Expedited Coercive Sanctions (the “Motion for Sanctions”), seeking, among other

things, the appointment of a limited purpose receiver to coerce compliance with the

Default Judgment. Pl.’s Mot. for Expedited Coercive Sanctions, Dkt. 18.

Delaware counsel then appeared on behalf of Defendant to oppose the Motion

for Sanctions and separately moved to set aside the Default Judgment (the “Motion

to Set Aside Default Judgment”). See Entry of Appearance, Dkt. 22; Def.’s Opp’n

to Mot. for Expedited Coercive Sanctions & Cross-Mot. to Set Aside Default J.

[hereinafter Mot. to Set Aside], Dkt. 23. As detailed in that motion, Defendant’s

primary argument for setting aside the Default Judgment was that at the time the
Melissa Garlington v. Two Rivers Farm, LLC,
C.A. No. 2024-0917-BWD
April 7, 2025
Page 5 of 13

Complaint was served, Defendant was cancelled by operation of law, and service

was therefore invalid. See Mot. to Set Aside ¶¶ 9–10.

At an initial hearing on the Motion for Sanctions, it appeared that Defendant

had revived, or would soon revive, itself by designating a registered agent, and

would moot the Demand by producing the books and records sought. See JAF, Dkt.

29. The Court therefore encouraged the parties to resolve outstanding issues without

its further involvement. Id. But the parties could not agree and chose instead to file

supplemental briefing on both the Motion for Sanctions and the Motion to Set Aside

Default Judgment. See Def. Two Rivers Farm, LLC’s Suppl. Br. in Support of

Opp’n to Mot. for Expedited Coercive Sanctions & Cross-Mot. to Set Aside Default

J. [hereinafter DOB], Dkt. 44; Pl.’s Suppl. Opening Br., Dkt. 45; Pl.’s Suppl.

Answering Br., Dkt. 48; Def.’s Suppl. Answering Br., Dkt. 49.

By the time the Court heard supplemental argument on the Motion for

Sanctions and the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, Defendant’s entity status

had been revived, and Defendant had mooted all but one request in the Demand.

DOB at 1–2. Specifically, although Defendant agreed to produce a redacted list of

the Company’s members, it refused to produce an unredacted list showing members’

contact information. Id. at 2. Defendant argued, among other things, that enforcing

the Default Judgment in this regard would work a manifest injustice because the
Melissa Garlington v. Two Rivers Farm, LLC,
C.A. No. 2024-0917-BWD
April 7, 2025
Page 6 of 13

member “list is subject to confidentiality and privacy expectations of others over

whom Defendant has no control but for whom Defendant is bound to maintain

privacy.” Mot. to Set Aside at 1; see also id. ¶ 21 (“[Defendant] has an obligation

to maintain the privacy and confidentiality of its investors.”).

The Court largely denied the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment,

concluding that Plaintiff properly served Defendant “in accordance with the

applicable statute, and that the [D]efault [J]udgment is valid.” Tr. Telephonic

Guidance of Ct. Regarding Jan. 24, 2025 Ruling [hereinafter Mar. 6 Ruling] 7, Dkt.

67. It reasoned:

The primary argument raised in the Motion to Set Aside the
Default Judgment is that the default judgment is void. According to the
defendant, when its certificate of formation was cancelled for failure to
identify a new registered agent under 6 Del. C. [§] 18-104(d), it ceased
to exist and could not be sued. The defendant further argues that, even
if the defendant could be sued, the only permissible method of service
of process was through publication.

That service argument, though, is directly contrary to the plain
language of Section 18-104(d), which, again, expressly states that “if
no new registered agent shall have been obtained and designated in the
time and manner aforesaid, service of legal process against each limited
liability company . . . shall thereafter be upon the Secretary of State in
accordance with § 18-105 of this title.” That is how service was made
in this case, and it was therefore effective under the statute.

In support of its contrary position, the defendant cites In re Reinz
Wisconsin Gasket, LLC, 2023 WL 3300042, for the proposition that
“[b]y statute, a limited liability company’s existence ‘as a separate legal
Melissa Garlington v. Two Rivers Farm, LLC,
C.A. No. 2024-0917-BWD
April 7, 2025
Page 7 of 13

entity shall continue until cancellation of the limited liability
company’s certificate of formation.’ When a certificate of cancellation
is filed for an entity, its ‘existence as [a] jural entit[y] cease[s].’ Its
‘legal existence ends.’ A defunct entity ceases to be a ‘body
corporate.’”

That decision also explains that “[a]fter a certificate of
cancellation has been filed, a defunct entity may speak only through a
receiver to manage litigation or any other outstanding business: the
receiver is appointed because there are no other fiduciaries to make
decisions for the entity. A defunct entity cannot otherwise make any
decisions or take any action.”

Importantly, the Reinz case did not address a cancellation under
Section 18-104(d). Here, there was no certificate of cancellation filed.
Instead, cancellation occurred by operation of law due to the LLC’s
failure to timely identify a registered agent.

The defendant suggests that a precondition to suing the entity
while defunct was to petition for the appointment of a receiver under 6
Del. C. [§] 18-805. But that statute permits application for a receiver
“[w]hen the certificate of formation of any limited liability company
formed under this chapter shall be cancelled by the filing of a certificate
of cancellation pursuant to § 18-203 of this title . . . .” And, again, no
such filing was ever made here.

Tr. Hr’g & Rulings of Ct. on Pl.’s Mot. for Expedited Coercive Sanctions & Def.’s

Cross-Mot. to Set Aside Default J. 44–46, Jan. 24, 2025, Dkt. 56. However, the

Court further directed that, because “the confidentiality of personal information of

third parties is implicated,” “in the interest of equity,” the Court would “reopen[] the

[D]efault [J]udgment solely for the purpose of determining whether the member list
Melissa Garlington v. Two Rivers Farm, LLC,
C.A. No. 2024-0917-BWD
April 7, 2025
Page 8 of 13

must be produced in unredacted form and/or subject to a confidentiality order.” Mar.

6 Ruling at 7.

Thereafter, the parties submitted supplemental briefing addressing

confidentiality of the member list. Def.’s Br. in Support of Protection of Its

Members & Member List, Dkt. 69 [hereinafter DB]; Pl.’s Answering Br. in Support

of Production of Members List [hereinafter PB], Dkt. 71; Def.’s Reply Br. in Support

of Protection of Its Members & Members List, Dkt. 75.

II. ANALYSIS

The Court reopened the Default Judgment to address Defendant’s argument

that concerns about confidentiality and the privacy of third parties support producing

the member list in redacted form and/or subject to a confidentiality order.

Defendant’s supplemental briefing does not address privacy issues, however.

Instead, Defendant now argues that (1) Plaintiff seeks the member list for an

improper purpose, and (2) if Defendant is ordered to produce an unredacted copy of

the member list, Plaintiff should be prohibited from using it. Even if those

arguments were responsive to the narrow issue the parties were permitted to brief,

they fail on the merits.

Defendant’s primary argument is that Plaintiff is not entitled to the unredacted

member list because she seeks it for an improper purpose. The Demand states that
Melissa Garlington v. Two Rivers Farm, LLC,
C.A. No. 2024-0917-BWD
April 7, 2025
Page 9 of 13

Plaintiff seeks to value her interests in the Company, investigate potential

mismanagement, and call a meeting of the Company’s members. Compl., Ex. 2 at

4. Plaintiff has stated she also wishes to “discuss with other Members their

experiences in receiving information” from management. Compl., Ex. 2 at Ex. B.

But according to Defendant, Plaintiff’s true purpose for seeking the member list is

“to foment discord amongst the Members with the aim of harassing and ultimately

replacing the Company’s management” with Plaintiff’s former employer, Galtere,

Inc. DB at 11.

The Court did not invite the parties to relitigate the propriety of Plaintiff’s

purpose; it expected the parties to address potential harm to third parties in revealing

confidential information without the protection of a confidentiality order. But even

if Plaintiff’s purposes were at issue, the Demand plainly states a proper purpose for

the member list. Title 6, Section 18-305(a)(3) entitles a member of a Delaware

limited liability company to obtain “[a] current list of the name and last known

business, residence or mailing address of each member and manager.” 6 Del. C.

§ 18-305(a)(3). Similarly, Section 7.2 of the Company’s operating agreement

entitles members to “the information and documents kept by the Company pursuant

to Section 7.1[,]” which includes “[a] current list of the full name and last known

business or residence address of each Member and Assignee set forth in alphabetical
Melissa Garlington v. Two Rivers Farm, LLC,
C.A. No. 2024-0917-BWD
April 7, 2025
Page 10 of 13

order, together with the Capital Contributions, Capital Account and Units of each

Member and Assignee.” Compl., Ex. 1 §§ 7.1–7.2. And Plaintiff has identified a

facially proper purpose for seeking a member list. See, e.g., Marilyn Abrams Living

Tr. v. Pope Invs. LLC, 2017 WL 1064647, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 2017)

(“Contacting other members to discuss an investment is a proper purpose.”), aff’d,

177 A.3d 69 (Del. 2017).1

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s “real reason for contacting the Members is

to convince as many Members as possible of [her] theory that the Company has been

mismanaged” so that she can “build a coalition of enough Members to overthrow

management.” DB at 14. Even if Defendant is correct that Plaintiff seeks to

communicate with stockholders to change management, that purpose is proper. See

Marathon P’rs L.P. v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 2004 WL 1728604, at *8 (Del. Ch.

July 30, 2004) (holding that inspection of a stock list to communicate with other

1
See also, e.g., Arbor Place, L.P. v. Encore Opportunity Fund, L.L.C., 2002 WL 205681,
at *3–4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 2002) (granting a member’s request to inspect the member list
to “contact the other members and discuss with them the business and affairs” of the
company). Cf. Stock v. Sustainable Energy Techs., Inc., 2023 WL 7131028, at *10 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 30, 2023) (“[C]ommunication with other stockholders about specific matters of
corporate concern, has consistently been held to be a proper purpose for a stockholder to
obtain a stock list.”); LeRoy v. Hardwicke Cos., 1983 WL 21022, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 16,
1983) (holding that a stockholder’s purpose “to discuss corporate finances and
management’s inadequacies and then, depending on the responses, determine stockholder
sentiment for either a change in management or a sale pursuant to a tender offer,” was
proper).
Melissa Garlington v. Two Rivers Farm, LLC,
C.A. No. 2024-0917-BWD
April 7, 2025
Page 11 of 13

stockholders to effect a change in management was a proper purpose); Skoglund v.

Ormand Indus., Inc., 372 A.2d 204, 214 (Del. Ch. 1976) (holding that inspection of

a stock list “to communicate with other shareholders on matters relating to their

common interest, including, among other things, the desirability of changing the

board of directors[,]” was proper).2

Second, Defendant urges that if the Court orders production of an unredacted

member list, Plaintiff should be prohibited from using it. DB at 21. As support,

Defendant cites Section 18-305(c), which states:

The manager of a limited liability company shall have the right to keep
confidential from the members, for such period of time as the manager
deems reasonable, any information which the manager reasonably
believes to be in the nature of trade secrets or other information the
disclosure of which the manager in good faith believes is not in the best
interest of the limited liability company or could damage the limited
liability company or its business or which the limited liability company
is required by law or by agreement with a third party to keep
confidential.

2
Defendant also argues that “Plaintiff is nothing more than Galtere’s proxy[]” and “[h]er
demands are Galtere’s demands[,]” but has not met its burden to prove that is the case. DB
at 18. Defendant says “[t]his is where discovery would have been illuminating” and
“renews its bid to continue with the discovery that was already served and the depositions
previously requested so that the question of a proper or improper purpose does not have to
be guided solely by the limited documents already exchanged as demands and responses.”
Id. n.2. The Court once again rejects that bid; the Default Judgment entered against
Defendant is valid and the Court has set it aside in equity solely to address privacy issues
affecting third parties.
Melissa Garlington v. Two Rivers Farm, LLC,
C.A. No. 2024-0917-BWD
April 7, 2025
Page 12 of 13

6 Del. C. § 18-305(c); DB at 21. Defendant argues that the statute “grant[s] the

Company the right, exercised through its management, to condition the provision of

the Member List on confidentiality procedures and guidelines established by the

Company[,]” including the conditions that “the unredacted Member List cannot be

used by Plaintiff to contact other Members[,]” “Plaintiff may not share any

information on the Member List publicly, and . . . Plaintiff is also prohibited from

sharing the Member List or any information therein with Galtere.” 3 DB at 22–23.

This Court has rejected similar arguments, explaining that the Company “bears the

burden to prove [the manager]’s good faith belief that disclosing any information

sought in the Demand would not be in the best interest of the Company[,]” 4 and a

“member list[] bear[s] no resemblance to trade secrets, nor are member lists typically

the kind of information ‘the disclosure of which . . . could damage the Company’s

business’ (as opposed to the Manager’s business).” Marilyn Abrams Living Tr.,

3
Defendant also points out that the Company’s operating agreement makes a request for
books and records “expressly subject to compliance by such Member with the safety,
security and confidentiality procedures and guidelines of the Company, as such procedures
and guidelines may be established from time to time.” Compl., Ex. 1 § 7.2.
4
Gill v. Regency Hldgs., LLC, 2023 WL 4607070, at *18 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2023) (citing
Bond Purchase, L.L.C. v. Patriot Tax Credit Props., L.P., 746 A.2d 842, 846 (Del. Ch.
1999)), R. & R. adopted, 2023 WL 4761810 (Del. Ch. July 25, 2023).
Melissa Garlington v. Two Rivers Farm, LLC,
C.A. No. 2024-0917-BWD
April 7, 2025
Page 13 of 13

2017 WL 1064647, at *6. Defendant’s request for an order prohibiting Plaintiff’s

use of the member list is, therefore, unwarranted.

Plaintiff has, however, agreed to treat the member list confidentially, which is

appropriate given the personal information of third parties reflected on the list. The

Court will enter Plaintiff’s proposed form of confidentiality order, which

appropriately protects third parties’ confidential information by prohibiting Plaintiff

from disclosing member information without the member’s permission, unless that

information is publicly available, previously known, or independently acquired by

Plaintiff. See PB, Ex. A § 2.

III. CONCLUSION

Defendant must produce to Plaintiff an unredacted copy of the member list,

subject to Plaintiff’s proposed form of confidentiality order.

Sincerely,

/s/ Bonnie W. David

Bonnie W. David
Vice Chancellor

cc: All counsel of record (by File & ServeXpress)