In re Dura Medic Holdings, Inc. Consolidation Litigation

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN RE DURA MEDIC HOLDINGS, INC. ) Cons. C.A. No. 2019-0474-JTL
CONSOLIDATED LITIGATION )

POST-TRIAL OPINION ADDRESSING CONTRACT CLAIMS

Date Submitted: December 19, 2024
Date Decided: February 20, 2025

Raymond J. DiCamillo, Robert L. Burns, Matthew W. Murphy, Kyle H. Lachmund,
Sandy Xu, Alfred P. Dillione, RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A., Wilmington,
Delaware; David L. Barrack, WINSLETT STUDNICKY MCCORMICK & BOMSER
LLP, New York, New York; Counsel for Greg Bailey; Karen Lee Bryant; Gary Lee
Campbell; Selle D’Shanna Campbell; Robert Chicoine; Crown Predator Holdings 1,
LLC; DM Seller Representative LLC; James T. Doody; Grant Eckberg; Tim
Einwechter; Jessica Evans; Deborah Fedorak; Rick Ferreira; Fisher Holdings LLC;
G&D Progressive Services, Inc.; Kevin J. Harrington; Sherrie Horton; Becki Jaynes;
KLBK Investments, LLC; Lewin Investments, LLC; Marc Mazur; Steven Mintz; Steve
E. Nelson; Don Newton; Mark Newton; Stephen J. Nicholas, MD; George Shelton
Ochsner; Stephen Ochsner; Jason Pauletto; Richard A. Danzig Profit Sharing Plan &
Trust; Martin J. Rucidlo; Kim Sauber; Gavin Scotti; Morton Stayton; Steve E. Nelson
Trust; Symcox Family Limited Partnership; Jay Symcox; Ellen Walsh; WIU
Foundation; and Edward J. Zecchini.

David S. Eagle, KLEHR HARRISON HARVEY BRANZBURG LLP, Wilmington,
Delaware; Stuart Singer, Carl Goldfarb, BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida; Counsel for Jonathan Black; Maneesh Chawla; Comvest
Investment Partners Holdings, LLC; Dura Medic Holdings, Inc.; Dura Medic, Inc.;
Dura Medic Parent Holdings, LLC; and Roger Marrero.

Steven L. Caponi, Megan E. Hunt, K&L GATES LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Counsel
for AdaptHealth, LLC, and DM Acquisition Sub LLC.

LASTER, V.C.
A private equity firm acquired a privately held company through a reverse

triangular merger. The acquired company performed terribly.

The private equity buyer brought contract claims against the selling

stockholders. The buyer alleges the sellers breached three representations in the

merger agreement. The first addressed the company’s collection rate and earnings.

The second represented that the company had not received notice that any material

customers were terminating or limiting their accounts, except as disclosed on a

related schedule. The third represented that the company was not subject to any

audits, again except as disclosed on a related schedule.

At trial, the buyer failed to prove the first claim. The sellers did not make any

representations about the company’s collection rate and earnings except to state that

particular figures were used when preparing the company’s financial statements. The

sellers made good-faith estimates of both figures and used them when preparing the

financial statements. The buyer did not obtain a representation about a future

collection rate or level of earnings.

The buyer succeeded in proving that the sellers failed to disclose the imminent

loss of two significant customers. The buyer proved that the breach caused $2,847,890

in damages.

The buyer also succeeded in proving a failure to disclose audits. The buyer

proved that the breach caused $100,000 in damages.

The sellers counterclaimed for breach of the merger agreement. The sellers

contend that the buyer intentionally withheld billings and depressed the company’s
earnings to gin up a claim for breach of a representation and avoid paying a note that

was part of the merger consideration. At trial, the sellers failed to prove their claim.

The buyer withheld bills as part of a good-faith effort to meet federal requirements

for invoices, not to depress the earnings of the company or avoid paying the note.

Judgment will be entered for the buyer.1

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts are drawn from the post-trial record. Having evaluated the credibility

of witnesses and weighed the evidence, the court makes the following findings.2

A. The Company

In 2004, Mark Newton co-founded Dura Medic, Inc. (“Dura Medic” or the

“Company”). As its name implies, the Company supplied durable medical equipment

(“DME”), such as crutches, splints, and braces.

The Company conducted business using a stock-and-bill model. That means

the Company entered into contracts with hospitals to stock a supply closet with DME.

1 This decision addresses a subset of the claims in this consolidated case. One

of the sellers, a co-founder who rolled over his equity into an upstream parent of the
post-merger company, asserted derivative claims challenging the private equity
firm’s management of the company and its later asset sale to a strategic buyer. The
sellers also alleged the asset sale was a fraudulent transfer. The court addressed
those claims in its first post-trial decision, In re Dura Medic Holdings, Inc.
Consolidated Litigation (Dura Medic I), 2025 WL 323796 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 2025).

2 The parties agreed to stipulations of fact in the pre-trial order, cited as “PTO

¶ __.” Citations in the form “[Name] Tr. __” refer to witness testimony from the trial
transcript. Citations in the form “[Name] Dep. __” refer to witness testimony from a
deposition transcript. Citations in the form “JX __ at __” refer to trial exhibits. When
more convenient, references to trial exhibits use internal paragraphs or sections.

2
The hospital did not pay the Company for this service. Instead, when a physician

prescribed an item of DME, the hospital would take the item from the supply closet

and provide it to the patient. The hospital would notify the Company, and the

Company would bill a third-party payor, typically a private insurer or a government

health insurance program like Medicare or Medicaid. Before the merger, Medicare

claims made up about 20% of the Company’s gross billings. Sometimes—but rarely—

the Company billed the patients. The Company also sometimes negotiated with a

hospital to pay cost for any item of DME where the Company otherwise would go

unpaid.

The Company did not expect to collect on every claim, but it could operate

profitably if it charged sufficiently high prices and collected on enough claims. From

2015 through the first half of 2017, the Company generally billed at 200% of the

standard Medicare fee schedule. At that rate, the Company could generate profits

even if it collected on a relatively small percentage of claims.

The Company’s financial statements distinguished between the gross amount

billed, known as “Gross Patient Revenue,” and the net amount the Company

collected, known as “Net Patient Revenue.” The Company recognized Gross Patient

Revenue when billed. To derive Net Patient Revenue, the Company started with

Gross Patient Revenue and deducted a “Net Revenue Adjustment,” representing

amounts that the Company likely would not or in fact did not collect.

The Company calculated Net Revenue Adjustment by adding together

“Contractual Adjustments,” “Bad Debt Expense,” and “Adjustments to Patient

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Revenue.” The Contractual Adjustments estimated the amount of Gross Patient

Revenue that the Company would not collect based on historical averages. The

Company applied the Contractual Adjustment when it billed the payor. As of June

2017, the Company used a Contractual Adjustment of 70%, meaning the Company

estimated that it would only collect 30% of Gross Patient Revenue.

The Bad Debt Expense reflected amounts the Company no longer expected to

collect. The Company based the Bad Debt Expense on the actual accounts receivable

in the billing system that management wrote off as uncollectable.

The Adjustments to Patient Revenue represented amounts that the Company

billed directly to patients but could not collect. Because billing patients directly

involved high collection risk, the Company often negotiated with hospitals to bill

them at cost for unpaid patient claims.

The Company referred to the ratio of Net Patient Revenue to Gross Patient

Revenue as its “Gross-to-Net Ratio,” “Gross-to-Net Cash Conversion Ratio,” or

“GNR.” The resulting percentage used Net Patient Revenue as the numerator and

Gross Patient Revenue as the denominator.

The Company’s collections were unpredictable, both as to timing and amount.

The Company collected the bulk of its payments within a year, but some receivables

remained outstanding longer, and some could linger for five to seven years.

Eventually, management wrote off the amounts it could not collect.

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B. The Company’s Pre-Merger Performance

From 2006 to 2013, Newton ran the Company. During this period, it “limped

along” financially. Newton Tr. 17. That changed in late 2013, when Grant Eckberg

and his spouse Deborah Fedorak took over the Company’s operations. Both were early

investors in the Company.

Eckberg became CEO and managed the Company’s day-to-day operations.

Fedorak served as CFO. Having Eckberg and Fedorak at the helm freed up Newton

to focus on what he did best: establishing and maintaining relationships with hospital

clients. He took on the title of chief marketing officer.

With Eckberg and Fedorak in charge, the Company generated healthy

revenue. Between 2014 and 2017, the Company increased its yearly revenue from

about $3.5 million to $12 million.

During the same period, however, the Company’s Gross-to-Net Ratio steadily

declined. In other words, the Company was submitting claims with a higher

aggregate dollar value, but it was getting paid at an increasingly lower rate. As long

as that trend continued, the Company’s financial statements risked overstating the

Company’s value by understating the amount of revenue the Company could

eventually collect.

C. Early Regulatory Activity

By 2016, the Company’s claims began to attract regulatory scrutiny. The

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) administers Medicare and

Medicaid. CMS regulations impose requirements that payees must meet when

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submitting claims. For example, CMS requires that any claim for DME include the

doctor’s signatures, the patient’s signatures, and item descriptions.

CMS contracts with private firms to administer and enforce its requirements.

The pertinent types for this case are Medicare Administrative Contractors (“MACs”),

Zone Program Integrity Contractors (“ZPICs”), and Recovery Audit Contractors

(“RACs”).3

MACs are private healthcare insurers that manage Medicare claims in

designated geographical regions. A MAC can deny payment if a claim lacks the

required documentation. MACs also conduct prepayment reviews of some or all of a

provider’s claims. When conducting a prepayment review, a MAC may require the

provider to provide additional documentation, such as information demonstrating

that the equipment was medically necessary.

MACs also administer the Target Probe and Educate Program (“TPE”). Under

that program, a MAC identifies a provider with a high claim error rate, reviews a

sample of twenty to forty claims, then provides feedback to the provider about the

errors in the sample and how the provider can improve. A TPE audit can involve

multiple rounds of review. If a provider fails the first round, then the provider has

3 Some ZPICs are now called Uniform Program Integrity Contractors
(“UPICs”). ZPICs and UPICs are functionally identical, with ZPICs maintaining the
zone terminology from an earlier version of the CMS regime. Over time, UPICs have
replaced ZPICs. For simplicity, this decision uses the ZPIC nomenclature.

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forty-five days to improve its procedures, and the MAC conducts a second round of

review. The process can continue through at least three rounds.

If a provider does not show sufficient improvement after three rounds, then the

MAC can refer the provider to CMS for further review plus a range of possible

consequences. If warranted, CMS can revoke the provider’s authorization to submit

claims to Medicare. CMS may also refer a provider to the Office of Inspector General,

which can pursue litigation against the provider or impose civil or criminal penalties.

ZPICs audit claims that providers have submitted to Medicare to ensure

compliance with CMS rules. ZPICs focus their audits on potential fraud, waste,

abuse, and overpayments. ZPICs can audit claims before providers have been paid

and require additional documentation before approving the claim. ZPICs also can

audit claims that already have been paid.

RACs investigate whether Medicare or Medicaid paid non-compliant claims. A

RAC can pursue a provider for any improper payments.

On June 1, 2017, a ZPIC named Health Integrity, LLC, informed the Company

it would be reviewing selected claims. Health Integrity was the ZPIC for Zone 4, so

this decision calls it the “Zone 4 ZPIC.”

On July 10, 2017, a RAC named Performant Recovery, Inc. (the “RAC Auditor”)

contacted the Company as part of a nationwide review aimed at identifying improper

Medicare payments. In the letter, the RAC Auditor told the Company that it was no

longer reviewing a list of Company claims from 2016 and 2017 (the “2017 RAC

Audit”). The RAC Auditor did not say whether or not it was reviewing other claims.

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D. The Company Explores A Potential Sale.

In spring 2017, the Company’s board of directors decided to explore a sale or

other strategic transaction. To reduce the level of concern that buyers might have

about the Company’s financial performance, the Company commissioned a quality-

of-earnings report from FTI Consulting Inc.

FTI calculated that the Company generated $7.5 million in EBITDA for the

trailing twelve months ending June 30, 2017. FTI estimated EBITDA using a Gross-

to-Net Ratio of 29.7%. That ratio assumed a Contractual Adjustment of 70%. FTI

observed that the Company “calculate[d] contractual adjustments using a [year-end]

hindsight review of closed-out patient accounts.” JX 16 at 21. FTI concluded that

“[m]anagement’s contractual process appears reasonable.” Id.

The Company hired Covington Associates, a boutique investment bank, to

contact potential buyers. The Company hired Tim Einwechter as a consultant to help

with the sale process. The Company also contracted with Rick Ferreira, then

chairman of the board, to help with the sale process as a paid consultant.

In September 2017, Covington pitched the Company to Jonathan Black, an

executive partner with a private equity firm known as Comvest Partners. At

Comvest, executive partners are former executives charged with looking for deals in

sectors that align with their experience. If a deal looked sufficiently attractive, then

Comvest could back the executive partner in an acquisition.

Black had been chief development officer and later chief executive officer at

Liberty Medical Supply, a DME provider of diabetes testing supplies. After leaving

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Liberty, Black started his own business manufacturing and selling blood glucose

meters and test strips, two other types of DME.

Black recruited Timothy Tidd to help him evaluate the Company. Tidd had

been Liberty’s chief information officer and chief operating officer.

Black liked the Company and pitched an acquisition to Roger Marrero, a

Comvest senior partner and member of its investment committee. Intrigued, Marrero

staffed Comvest vice president Will Callahan and associate Gordon Carroll to a deal

team. Comvest partner Maneesh Chawla later joined the team.

E. The Negotiations

In September 2017, Comvest began conducting due diligence, assisted by a

phalanx of advisors. On October 19, 2017, Comvest sent the Company an initial letter

of intent (the “Initial LOI”). It contemplated a purchase price of $60 million, based in

part on the FTI quality-of-earnings report. The Initial LOI gave Comvest a forty-five-

day exclusivity period.

On October 24, 2017, Comvest and the Company executed the Initial LOI.

Meanwhile, CMS contractors continued to audit the Company.

• From August 4 to October 26, 2017, a MAC called Noridian Healthcare
Solutions, LLC (the “TPE Reviewer”) conducted a first round of TPE review.
On November 14, the TPE Reviewer informed the Company that twenty-four
of the thirty claims it reviewed contained errors, for an error rate of 80%. The
TPE Reviewer advised the Company that it would be “moved to the second
round of review.”4

4 JX 49 at 6; accord PTO ¶ 70. Company management didn’t focus on the TPE

audit. Newton testified that he was not aware of it. Newton Tr. 37. Eckberg testified
that he “never paid a lot of attention to the TPE.” Eckberg Tr. 142. Both claimed that
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• On December 7, 2017, the Zone 4 ZPIC informed the Company that it was
initiating a “comprehensive [prepayment] medical review of [the Company’s]
billing for Medicare services.” JX 67. The Zone 4 ZPIC selected the Company
for the review based on an analysis suggesting “aberrancies in your billing.”
Id. The Zone 4 ZPIC later sent the Company several hundred document
requests about its Medicare claims. PTO ¶ 71. The Zone 4 ZPIC also told the
Company that ZPICs from the areas where patients lived could send additional
document requests. JX 67. This decision refers to this audit as the “Second
Zone 4 ZPIC Audit,” because the Company later learned that it had been the
subject of an earlier Zone 4 ZPIC audit.

• In December 2017, AdvanceMed, a Zone 5 ZPIC, sent the Company several
hundred document requests about its Medicare claims. Those requests were
part of the Second Zone 4 ZPIC Audit.

• In December 2017 and January 2018, SafeGuard Services, a Zone 7 ZPIC, sent
the Company eleven document requests about its Medicare claims. Those
requests were part of the Second Zone 4 ZPIC Audit.

• On January 5, 2018, the Zone 4 ZPIC told the Company that it had performed
a post-payment review of claims for services provided from July 11, 2016,
through September 21, 2017. JX 98 at 1. The Zone 4 ZPIC reported that
twenty-six claims out of a sample of thirty-seven had errors, for an error rate
of 68.8%. Id. Although the Company learned of this audit after the Second Zone
4 ZPIC Audit, the audit itself happened first. This decision therefore refers to
it as the “First Zone 4 ZPIC Audit.”

The Company retained the van Halem Group to respond to the audits and

document requests, and to improve its claim submission process. The Company also

consulted with Denise Leard, the Company’s longtime CMS compliance counsel.

they did not regard a TPE as an “audit.” Id. at 142–43; Newton Tr. 81. The Company’s
compliance counsel made clear that a TPE is an audit, albeit “the least worrisome”
kind of audit. Leard Dep. 35.

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On January 8, 2018, Leard sent a letter to Newton and Einwechter that

summarized the TPE process and provided advice about the Second Zone 4 ZPIC

Audit. On January 30, Leard sent a letter to Ferreira that summarized van Halem’s

findings about the Second Zone 4 ZPIC Audit. Leard reported that the Company’s

documentation was likely “not sufficient to justify payment in all cases.” JX 139 at 4.

Damning the Company with faint praise, she added that “the errors do not amount

to fraud.” Id. Leard advised the Company that it needed to lower its error rate to exit

from the Second Zone 4 ZPIC Audit. Ferreira forwarded Leard’s letter to Black.

Kim Sauber was a key employee for the audits. She was the Company’s

business analyst and oversaw its billing operations. On February 12, 2018, Sauber

told Newton, Einwechter, and Eckberg that CMS contractors had conducted 193

reviews of claims relating to a range of the Company’s products and that only fourteen

were approved. Einwechter forwarded the email to Ferreira with the following

comment:

So they pick 193 claims and of this ONLY 14 were approved. That is
scary with over 90% rejection. Sure the $’s were not large however if if
[sic] was sitting on the purchaser side of this transaction the
“perception” would clearly be I have revenue model out of control. I will
craft email to Comvest tomorrow and try to avoid discussion of number
of claims and only report on $’s.

JX 150 at 3. Referring to Comvest, Ferreira responded: “Not sure how we report this

and not make these guys nervous.” Id. at 2–3. Ferreira later added, “F*&k - I don’t

know how you even defend that!!” Id. at 2. He concluded, “Can’t get this [deal] closed

fast enough!!!” Id. at 1–2.

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F. Comvest Learns About The Second Zone 4 ZPIC Audit.

In early January 2018, Comvest learned about the Second Zone 4 ZPIC Audit.

Comvest put the Initial LOI on hold to see how the ZPIC audit played out. Marrero

described the deal as “now on life support given some recent diligence findings.” JX

119. Later that month, Comvest learned that the Company also had “an ongoing audit

in Zone 5.” JX 131.

Because of the audits, Comvest sought additional information from the

Company. Comvest learned that the Company’s monthly cash collections declined

from $1,454,000 in October 2017 to $862,000 in February 2018, then rebounded

slightly to $947,000 in March 2018. Comvest attributed the decline to the distraction

of the Second Zone 4 ZPIC Audit and the sale process. Comvest estimated that

without those distractions, the Company would have generated approximately

$150,000 more in collections per month.

Ferreira thought selling the Company would be a challenge. On April 1, 2018,

he reminded Einwechter in an email that “21 banks looked at this deal and ALL

turned it down. A variety of reason [sic] here but three main ones were the ever-

increasing contractual allowance, the industry headwinds and the ZPIC audit.” JX

231 at 1.

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G. The Revised Letter of Intent

Having learned about the CMS audits and identified a declining trend in

collections, Comvest recalculated the Company’s adjusted EBITDA for 2017, reducing

it from $7.5 million to $4.3 million.

In April 2018, Comvest sent a revised letter of intent to the Company. It

lowered the deal price to $30 million, with $18 million paid in cash at closing plus

another $12 million taking the form of an unsecured subordinated promissory note

that would be paid over six years.

Eckberg thought the lowered price was reasonable in light of the trend in

collections and the audits. In an email to Newton, he noted that the Company was

struggling to meet Medicare’s requirements for submitting claims and that fixing the

Company’s problems would require overhauling its procedures, slowing down the

submission rate, and spending 30% to 50% more to process claims. Eckberg told

Newton, Ferreira, and Einwechter that without a sale to Comvest, it would take “at

least a year (or probably more) to address issues that have been recently created and

discovered.” JX 230 at 2.

With the Company putting more upfront work into the quality of its claims,

the rate of claim submission slowed precipitously from 2,507 in January to 217 claims

in April 2018.5 The average submission rate for February and March (1071 claims

5 JX 240 at 1; see Tidd Tr. 556 (estimating the Company released about 50% of

Medicare claims in January–February 2018 but about 10–20% in March–May 2018).

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per month) was about a third of the average submission rate for October 2017 through

January 2018 (3181 claims per month). As of May 30, 2018, the Company had a

backlog of over 5,000 unsubmitted claims.

H. More Bad News For The Company

In April and May 2018, the Company received negative feedback from key

customers. The Company’s largest client by revenue was Stanford Health Care. On

April 11, 2018, Stanford gave notice that the Company’s contract would terminate in

six months. Newton received a copy of the notice.

Baptist Health System was another of the Company’s largest customers. That

same month, Baptist Health System reduced the Company’s coverage from five of its

hospitals to four.

The Company also continued to struggle with the audits. In April 2018, a Zone

3 ZPIC started an inquiry and sent the Company document requests. Van Halem told

the Company to expect follow-up requests because of the Company’s high error rate.

In May, the contractor leading the Zone 5 ZPIC audit told the Company that it had

reviewed 220 claims and found errors in 214 of them for an error rate of 97%.

In emails between themselves, Ferreira and Einwechter candidly

acknowledged the Company’s problems and plummeting value. In a May 13, 2018

email exchange, Ferreira told Einwechter that “we are selling a house that is

springing leaks every day.” JX 283 at 1.

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I. The Merger Agreement

On May 22, 2018, the Company entered into a merger agreement. See JX 312

(the “Merger Agreement”). Its counterparties were two newly created Comvest

affiliates: an acquisition vehicle named Dura Medic Merger Sub, Inc. (“Merger Sub”)

and a holding company named Dura Medic Holdings, Inc. (“Holdings”). Holdings was

a wholly owned subsidiary of another newly created entity, Dura Medic Parent

Holdings, LLC (“Parent”), but Parent was not a party to the Merger Agreement.

Thirty-nine selling stockholders (the “Sellers”) were parties to the Merger

Agreement.6 DM Seller Representative LLC, a newly created entity managed by

Ferreira and Eckberg, served as the “Seller Representative.”

Under the Merger Agreement, Merger Sub would merge with and into the

Company, with the Company surviving as a wholly owned subsidiary of Holdings (the

“Merger”). At closing, the selling stockholders’ shares would be converted into the

right to receive a total of $18 million in cash from Holdings, subject to potential

6 The Sellers are Greg Bailey; Karen Lee Bryant; Gary Lee Campbell; Selle

D’Shanna Campbell; Robert Chicoine; Crown Predator Holdings 1, LLC; James T.
Doody; Grant Eckberg; Tim Einwechter; Jessica Evans; Deborah Fedorak; Rick
Ferreira; Fisher Holdings LLC; G&D Progressive Services, Inc.; Kevin J. Harrington;
Sherrie Horton; Becki Jaynes; KLBK Investments, LLC; Lewin Investments, LLC;
Marc Mazur; Steven Mintz; Steve E. Nelson; Don Newton; Mark Newton; Stephen J.
Nicholas, MD; George Shelton Ochsner; Stephen Ochsner; Jason Pauletto; Richard
A. Danzig Profit Sharing Plan & Trust; Martin J. Rucidlo; Kim Sauber; Gavin Scotti;
Morton Stayton; Steve E. Nelson Trust; Symcox Family Limited Partnership; Jay
Symcox; Ellen Walsh; WIU Foundation; and Edward J. Zecchini.

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adjustments. The selling stockholders also would share in a note issued by Holdings

with a face value of $12 million (the “Seller Note”).

The Merger Agreement called for the Company to make representations about

its condition. Three are pertinent to this case.

First, the Company represented that its financial statements were “true,

complete and accurate in all material respects and fairly present in all material

respects the financial position of the Company” for calendar year 2017 and the last

twelve months (“LTM”) ending on April 30, 2018. The representation stated that the

Company used a Gross-to-Net Ratio of 25.7% in the financial statements. JX 312

§ 4.5(a), (b), (e); JX 313 Schedule 4.5(a) (collectively, the “Financial Statements

Representation”).

Second, the Company represented that it had complied in all material respects

with all laws, including healthcare laws, during the three years before the Merger,

except as stated in a disclosure schedule. JX 312 §§ 4.7(a), 4.8(a); JX 313 Schedule 4.8

(collectively, the “Law Compliance Representation”). The disclosure schedule

identified the Second Zone 4 ZPIC Audit. It did not identify the First Zone 4 ZPIC

Audit, the TPE audit, or the 2017 RAC Audit. See JX 313 Schedule 4.8.

Third, the Company represented that no counterparty to a material contract

had notified the Company that it intended to terminate or restrict its contract during

the twelve months before closing. JX 312 § 4.23; JX 313 Schedule 4.23 (together, the

“Counterparty Representation”). The Company identified Stanford Health Care and

Baptist Health System as counterparties to material contracts, but did not identify

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them as having sought to terminate or restrict their agreements with the Company.

See JX 313 Schedule 4.23.

The indemnification provisions in the Merger Agreement entitled Comvest to

recover any losses that resulted from inaccurate representations. JX 312 § 9.1(a). The

Merger Agreement defined “Losses” to include “any and all damages,” including

“damages based on a multiple of earnings, revenue or other metric.” Id. § 9.1(c).

The Merger Agreement provided that the Sellers would only be liable to

Comvest for indemnification if Comvest’s losses exceeded $300,000. Id. § 9.4(c). That

deductible did not apply to breaches of “Fundamental Representations,” which

included the representations regarding the Company’s financial statements and law

compliance. Id.; id. § 9.4(b) (listing, among others, §§ 4.5(a), 4.5(e), 4.8).

The Merger Agreement stated that if Comvest claimed losses based on a

multiple of earnings, then the Sellers would only be liable to Comvest for

indemnification if Comvest’s losses exceeded $1.5 million. Once that limit was

reached, then Comvest could recover all of its losses starting with dollar one. Id.

§ 9.1(c). Comvest also could offset any indemnifiable losses against the amount due

under the Seller Note. Id. § 9.5. Offset was optional, not required.

The Merger closed June 6, 2018. That day, Holdings delivered the Seller Note

to the Seller Representative.

After the Merger, Parent owned 100% of Holdings, which owned 100% of the

Company. A Comvest affiliate owned 63.6% of Parent’s units. Other investors,

including Black, his friends and family, and Tidd, owned 26.7% of Parent’s units.

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Newton rolled over $1 million of his proceeds from the Merger and received Parent

units.

The investors in Parent were structurally subordinated to the Seller Note,

which Holdings had issued. The Seller Note in turn was structurally subordinated to

any debt at the Company level.

After the Merger, Comvest controlled the boards of Parent, Holdings, and the

Company. Each entity’s governing board had the same five members: Marrero,

Chawla, Callahan, and Stacie Brachter, plus Black as the Company’s CEO. Tidd

became the Company’s COO.

J. The Bad News Continues.

Even before the Merger closed, Black and Tidd decided to withhold all

Medicare claims until the Company improved its submission process. After the

Merger, they implemented that decision but continued to submit claims to third-party

payors and private insurers.

On June 8, 2018, two days after closing, Black learned about the ongoing TPE

audit. Two weeks later, the TPE Reviewer reported that the Company had reduced

its error rate from 80% to 41.85%, but that still required a third round of review. If

the Company failed the third round, then it could lose its ability to submit claims to

Medicare. A sanction of that magnitude was unlikely but possible.

On June 21, 2018, Black emailed the Seller Representative about the TPE

audit. Black was blunt: “The ramifications of a failed round three are not only serious,

but also potentially threatening to the continuance of Dura Medic’s business, whereby

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failure could mean everything from an extrapolation and fine to revoking Dura

Medic’s Medicare provider number.” JX 381. He continued: “We are doing everything

in our power to ensure clean claims are going out the door to be process [sic] and paid,

and in the interim, holding all claims until thoroughly reviewed. This will put a

serious burden on our cash flow, but for the long-term good (and compliance) of the

business, this is what needs to be done.” Id.

Ferreira and Einwechter thought they had dodged a bullet by selling the

Company. Ferreira emailed Einwechter, asking, “Remember the game ‘pass the

parcel’????” Id. Einwechter responded by describing the deal as “[t]he all-time escape

job.” Id.

Meanwhile, the Company learned that it was the subject of additional audits.

A new Zone 7 ZPIC audit started one day before closing. PTO ¶ 86. There was also a

RAC audit that resulted in demands for reimbursement of noncompliant claims. By

October 2019, the Company had received over 100 recoupment demands for the pre-

Merger period from 2016 to 2018. The total claims amounted to several hundred

thousand dollars of reimbursements.

K. This Litigation

After taking over the Company, Comvest concluded that its claims processes

and financial performance were sufficiently poor to support claims against the

Sellers. By February 2019, Comvest had retained litigation counsel. On March 28,

2019, Comvest’s counsel delivered a claim notice to the Seller Representative that

demanded $16,585,605 in indemnification.

19
On June 21, 2019, Comvest caused the Company and Holdings (together, the

“Buyers”) to sue the Seller Representative and each of the Sellers individually (the

“Contract Action”). In the Contract Action, the Buyers sought indemnification for

breaches of representations in the Merger Agreement.

On August 27, 2019, the Seller Representative asserted counterclaims and

third-party claims in the Contract Action. The Seller Representative contended that

Holdings breached the Seller Note through non-payment. The court granted

summary judgment in the Seller Representative’s favor for breach of the Seller Note.

The Seller Representative also contended that the Buyers breached the Merger

Agreement by intentionally withholding Medicare claims to sabotage the Company’s

short-term revenues, maximize Comvest’s indemnification claims, and deprive

Holdings of distributions that could be used to pay the Seller Note.

Trial lasted five days. The parties introduced 1288 exhibits and deposition

transcripts from nineteen individuals. Eleven fact witnesses and three expert

witnesses testified live.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

The Buyers seek indemnification for breaches of three categories of

representations in the Merger Agreement: the Financial Statements Representation,

the Law Compliance Representation, and the Counterparty Representation.7 The

7 The Buyers’ complaint alleged other breaches. After trial, the Buyers
helpfully narrowed their claims to those three categories. Dkt. 368 (Comvest Parties’
Opening Post-Trial Brief) at 72.

20
Seller Representative counterclaims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith

and fair dealing in the Merger Agreement.

Each of those claims asserts a breach of contract. Under Delaware law, the

elements of that claim are “(i) a contractual obligation, (ii) a breach of that obligation

by the defendant, and (iii) a causally related injury that warrants a remedy, such as

damages or in an appropriate case, specific performance.”8 No one disputes that the

Merger Agreement is a binding obligation. No one disputes that money is the

appropriate remedy. The only issues are determining the scope of the obligation,

assessing breach, and quantifying the amount of damages.

A. Applicable Principles of Contract Law

When determining the scope of a contractual obligation, “the role of a court is

to effectuate the parties’ intent.”9 The “parties’ intent” is a term of art. Rather than

referring to what the parties subjectively believed, it refers to the parties’ shared

intent as “would be understood by an objective, reasonable third party.”10

If the contractual language is clear, the court “will give priority to the parties’

intentions as reflected in the four corners of the agreement, construing the agreement

8 AB Stable VIII LLC v. MAPS Hotels & Resorts One LLC, 2020 WL 7024929,

at *47 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020), aff’d, 268 A.3d 198 (Del. 2021).

9 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 903 A.2d 728, 739 (Del. 2006).

10 Salamone v. Gorman, 106 A.3d 354, 367–68 (Del. 2014).

21
as a whole and giving effect to all its provisions.”11 “[T]he meaning which arises from

a particular portion of an agreement cannot control the meaning of the entire

agreement where such inference runs counter to the agreement’s overall scheme or

plan.”12 A writing is clear “[w]hen the plain, common, and ordinary meaning of the

words lends itself to only one reasonable interpretation.”13

By contrast, if a writing is ambiguous, then a court must look to other sources

to determine what any objectively reasonable third party would have understood the

parties’ intent to be.14 “[A] contract is ambiguous only when the provisions in

controversy are reasonably or fairly susceptible of different interpretations or may

have two or more different meanings.”15 “A contract is not rendered ambiguous simply

because the parties do not agree upon its proper construction.”16 Nor is a contract

unambiguous simply because both sides contend that its meaning is plain.17

11 In re Viking Pump, Inc., 148 A.3d 633, 648 (Del. 2016) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

12 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 498 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del.

1985).

13 Sassano v. CIBC World Mkts. Corp., 948 A.2d 453, 462 (Del. Ch. 2008).

14 United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Hldgs., Inc., 937 A.2d 810, 834–35 (Del. Ch.

2007).

15 Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192,

1196 (Del. 1992).

16 Id.

17 See Sunline Com. Carriers, Inc. v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 206 A.3d 836,

847 n.68. (Del. 2019).

22
The parties do not agree on the proper construction of several provisions of the

Merger Agreement. But the contract is nonetheless unambiguous. The parties’

contract claims turn on the plain, common, and ordinary meaning of the words in

each provision.

B. The Financial Statements Representation

The Buyers contend that the Sellers breached the Financial Statements

Representation. The Buyers failed to prove breach.

The Financial Statements Representation initially states:

The Company has furnished to Purchaser (i) the annual consolidated
balance sheet of the Company at December 31, 2015, 2016, and 2017
and the related consolidated statements of (A) income (including any
Net Revenue Adjustments related thereto) for the fiscal years then
ended, and (B) cash flows for the (1) twelve (12) month period ended
December 31, 2017, and (2) four (4) month period ended April 30, 2018,
and (ii) the interim consolidated balance sheet of the Company at each
of January 31, 2018, February 28, 2018, March 31, 2018, and April 30,
2018 (the latter of which is referred to herein as the “Recent Balance
Sheet”) and the related consolidated statements of income (including
any Net Revenue Adjustments related thereto), for the twelve (12)
month period ended April 30, 2018 (the financial statements referenced
in clauses (i) and (ii) are collectively referred to as the “Financial
Statements”), copies of which are attached hereto as Schedule 4.5(a),
and in the case of the Financial Statements for fiscal year 2017 and for
the twelve (12) month period ended April 30, 2018 are presented on a
monthly basis.

JX 312 § 4.5(a). Subsequent subsections make representations about the Financial

Statements.

In Section 4.5(e), the Company made representations about its Gross-to-Net

Cash Conversion Ratio (or Gross-to-Net Ratio) and its EBITDA. It stated:

The Net [Patient] Revenue (as such term is used in the Financial
Statements) of the Company for each of the (i) twelve (12) month period

23
ended December 31, 2017, and (ii) twelve (12) month period ended April
30, 2018 is based upon the Financial Statements (attached hereto as
Schedule 4.5(a)), including for each such measurement period the
aggregate Patient Revenue (as such term is identified as 4001 in the
Financial Statements) of the Company and the Gross-to-Net Cash
Conversion Ratio (as such term is used in the Financial Statements) of
the Company of 25.7%, in each case, inclusive of the Net Revenue
Adjustment for such period.

Id. § 4.5(e) (emphasis added). In simplified form, Section 4.5(e) represented that the

Net Patient Revenue calculation that appeared in the Financial Statements was

based on two things: (i) the Financial Statements and (ii) a Gross-to-Net Ratio of

25.7%.

At trial, the Buyers demonstrated that the Company’s Gross-to-Net Ratio for

LTM April 2018 was 22.5%, not 25.7%.18 The Buyers contend that because the

Company’s actual Gross-to-Net Ratio was 3.2% lower than the Gross-to-Net Ratio

specified in Section 4.5(e), the Sellers breached that representation.

That argument fails. The Financial Statements Representation did not

represent that the Company’s actual Gross-to-Net Ratio was 25.7%. The

representation explained how the Sellers calculated Net Patient Revenue, not what

the actual collections would be. If the Buyers had worked backwards from Net Patient

18 To reach this figure, the Buyers demonstrated that the Company’s actual

Net Patient Revenue for LTM April 2018 was $12,750,675, compared to the
$14,521,945 figure in the Financial Statements. Using the actual figure, the Buyers
calculated the Company’s actual Gross-to-Net Ratio. JX 1155 at 9. For purposes of
liability, the Sellers agree that the Company’s actual Gross-to-Net Ratio differed from
the figure of 25.7% in Section 4.5(e). See Dkt. 385 (Sellers’ Post-Trial
Reply/Answering Brief) at 52–55.

24
Revenue to solve for the Gross-to-Net Ratio, and if that exercise revealed a Gross-to-

Net Ratio different than 25.7%, then the representation would have been breached.

The Company did not make a forward-looking representation about what its actual

Gross-to-Net Ratio would be. The Buyers therefore failed to prove a breach of Section

4.5(e).

Along similar lines, the Buyers contend that the Company breached Section

4.5(b). It stated:

The Financial Statements are true, complete and accurate in all
material respects and fairly present in all material respects the financial
position of the Company and its Subsidiaries at the indicated dates and
the results of operations for the indicated periods, and have been
prepared in accordance with GAAP consistently applied, except that the
Financial Statements do not contain footnotes and the interim financial
statements may be subject to normal year-end adjustments (the effect of
which will not, individually or in the aggregate, be material in amount
or effect). The Financial Statements were compiled from and are in
accordance with the books and records of the Company and its
Subsidiaries, which in turn are true, correct, and complete in all
material respects.

JX 312 § 4.5(b).

According to the Buyers, because the Company’s actual Gross-to-Net Ratio

turned out to be 22.5%, rather than the 25.7% used to calculate Net Patient Revenue,

the Company’s Financial Statements were not “true, complete and accurate in all

material respects” and did not “fairly present in all material respects the financial

position of the Company and its Subsidiaries at the indicated dates and the results

of operations for the indicated periods.”

Again, the Buyers miss the mark. The Gross-to-Net Ratio in the Financial

Statements depended on a forward-looking estimate of collections. The actual figure
25
would depend on the Company’s success in collecting accounts receivable. The

collection rate varied because payors often delayed payment or rejected claims.

Because the Gross-to-Net Ratio was a forward-looking estimate, the

representation was truthful and accurate as long as it reflected the Sellers’ actual,

good-faith belief about what the future collections would be.19 The Buyers failed to

prove that the collections estimate did not represent the Sellers’ good-faith belief.

The Buyers could have bargained for a warranty that the actual level of

collections would result in a Gross-to-Net Ratio of 25.7%. Justice Holmes explained

the relevant concepts a century ago:

An assurance that it shall rain to-morrow, or that a third person shall
paint a picture, may as well be a promise as one that the promisee shall
receive from some source one hundred bales of cotton, or that the
promisor will pay the promisee one hundred dollars. What is the
difference in the cases? It is only in the degree of power possessed by the
promisor over the event. He has none in the first case. He has equally
little legal authority to make a man paint a picture, although he may
have larger means of persuasion. He probably will be able to make sure
that the promisee has the cotton. Being a rich man, he is certain to be
able to pay the one hundred dollars, except in the event of some most
improbable accident.

But the law does not inquire, as a general thing, how far the
accomplishment of an assurance touching the future is within the power
of the promisor. In the moral world it may be that the obligation of a
promise is confined to what lies within reach of the will of the promisor

19 See Steffen Tr. 1159–61; JX 1160 at 10–11; Bouchner Tr. 1315 (“Q: Right. So

the use of the past tense is wrong, isn’t it? A: Again, I don’t think I was using it as
past tense in that it was in the past. I was saying that’s what it was in the
document.”); id. (“Q: Right. There’s a number in the document that is a future-looking
estimate. Right? A: Yes.”); Dkt. 385 at 53 (“[Section 4.5(e)] is not a representation by
the Sellers of what those collections would later turn out to be.”) (second emphasis
added)).

26
(except so far as the limit is unknown on one side, and misrepresented
on the other). But unless some consideration of public policy intervenes,
I take it that a man may bind himself at law that any future event shall
happen. He can therefore promise it in a legal sense. It may be said that
when a man covenants that it shall rain to-morrow, or that A shall paint
a picture, he only says, in a short form, I will pay if it does not rain, or if
A does not paint a picture. But that is not necessarily so. A promise could
easily be framed which would be broken by the happening of fair
weather, or by A not painting. A promise, then, is simply an accepted
assurance that a certain event or state of things shall come to pass.20

Just as the Buyers could have insisted on a warranty about the weather, they also

could have insisted on a warranty that the Company’s actual Gross-To-Net Ratio

would be 25.7%. They did not secure it. The Buyers therefore failed to prove that the

Sellers breached the representation in Section 4.5(b).

C. The Counterparty Representation

The Buyers next contend that the Sellers breached the Counterparty

Representation by failing to disclose that two significant customers intended to

terminate or limit their relationship with the Company. The Buyers proved that the

Company breached the Counterparty Representation.

Titled “Significant Third Party Payors, Significant Customers, and Significant

Suppliers,” Section 4.23 of the Merger Agreement provides as follows:

No Significant Third Party Payor, Significant Customer, or Significant
Supplier has given notice to the Company that it intends to terminate,
limit, or negatively alter its business relationship (including with
respect to pricing or volume) with the Company or its Subsidiaries.

20 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 298–99 (1881) (footnotes
omitted).

27
There are no outstanding disputes with any of the Significant Third
Party Payors, Significant Customers, or Significant Suppliers.

JX 312 § 4.23. The same section defines “Significant Customers” as “the ten (10)

largest Customers of the Company and the Subsidiaries, in the aggregate (in terms

of revenue to the Company and the Subsidiaries) during (i) the twelve (12) month

period ended December 31, 2017, and (ii) the four (4) month period ended April 30,

2018.” Id. Schedule 4.23 lists the Company’s Significant Customers and includes

Stanford Health Care and Baptist Health System. JX 313 Schedule 4.23.

The Buyers proved that Stanford notified the Company that it intended to end

its customer relationship. On April 11, 2018, the Company’s account representative

for Stanford, Marianne Hidalgo, emailed Stephen Ochsner, the pre-Merger vice

president of operations who stayed on after the Merger. Hidalgo reported that,

according to Stanford representative Jonathan Chang, Dura Medic would be exiting

in the next six months. JX 247; Ochsner Tr. 715–16. Ochsner was concerned about

losing the account. Ochsner Tr. 741. He forwarded that email to Newton and

scheduled a call with him the next morning. JX 247.

The Sellers did not identify Stanford as an exception to the representation.

Shortly after the Merger, Stanford terminated its relationship with the Company.

Black Tr. 247–48.

Those facts establish a straightforward breach of the Counterparty

Representation. In response, the Sellers argue that customers sent emails like that

all the time, that the email simply reported on a rumor, and that the Company

regularly succeeded in convincing jumpy clients to remain with the Company. But
28
the Counterparty Representation did not contain language conditioning the

representation on those factors. The representation called for identifying whether a

Significant Customer had given notice to the Company that it would terminate or

limit its contract. That is what happened here.

The Buyers also proved that Baptist Health System, another Significant

Customer, sought to limit its relationship with the Company. Before the execution of

the Merger Agreement, Baptist Health System informed the Company that one of its

five hospitals would no longer participate in its services agreement with the

Company. JX 235 at 1; JX 237. The amendment to the services agreement became

effective April 20, 2018, about six weeks before the Merger closed. JX 235 at 1; JX

237.

This too is a straightforward breach of the Counterparty Representation. In

response, the Sellers argue that the one hospital was not a Significant Customer. But

Baptist Health System was. Reducing the number of participating hospitals by one

constituted a limitation of its contract with the Company. The Counterparty

Representation called for disclosure.

The Sellers also argue that Baptist Health System’s decision helped the

Company because that hospital was the “[l]owest performing facility in the system

and [had] low profitability.” Dkt. 385 at 57. The Counterparty Representation does

not turn on the performance or profitability of the relationship. It turns on notice.

If the Sellers had disclosed the notifications received from Stanford and Baptist

Health System to the Buyers, then a discussion could have ensued. Perhaps the

29
Sellers would have convinced the Buyers that the changes were immaterial. Instead,

the Sellers represented that “[n]o . . . Significant Customer . . . has given notice to the

Company that it intends to terminate, limit, or negatively alter its business

relationship (including with respect to pricing or volume) with the Company.” JX 312

§ 4.23. That representation was false. The Buyers are entitled to indemnification for

losses related to that breach.

D. The Law Compliance Representation

The Buyers last contend that the Sellers breached the Law Compliance

Representation by failing to identify past or pending audits. The Buyers proved a

breach here as well.

The Law Compliance Representation initially states:

The Company and its Subsidiaries, and their respective predecessors
and Affiliates, have since January 1, 2015 complied in all material
respects with, and are in compliance in all material respects with, all
applicable Laws and Orders, and no Proceeding has been filed or
commenced or, to the Knowledge of the Company and the Sellers,
threatened alleging any failure so to comply.

Id. § 4.7(a).

Later, the Law Compliance Representation includes a more specific

representation about compliance with healthcare laws:

Except as disclosed on Schedule 4.8, the Company and its Subsidiaries
are, and have been in the past three (3) years, in material compliance
with all applicable Health Care Laws. Neither Company nor any
Subsidiary of the Company has received written notice in the past three
(3) years from any Governmental Authority of any threatened or
pending legal, administrative, enforcement or other Proceeding against
or affecting the Business alleging any material failure to comply with
Healthcare Laws.

30
Id. § 4.8(a). Under these provisions, the Company had to disclose any CMS audits on

the associated Schedule 4.8.

Schedule 4.8 contained the following information:

On June 1, 2017, the Company received correspondence from the Zone
Program Integrity Contractor (ZPIC) – Zone 4, notifying the Company
that Health Integrity would be conducting a review of selected claims
the Company had submitted to Medicare and/or Medicaid. On December
7, 2017, the Company received further correspondence notifying the
Company that Health Integrity would be initiating prepayment medical
review of the Company’s claims, effective December 12, 2017 (the review
process and related matters are collectively referred to as the “ZPIC
Audit”). As of the date hereof, the ZPIC Audit is ongoing.

JX 313 Schedule 4.8.

Schedule 4.8 thus disclosed the Second Zone 4 ZPIC Audit. Schedule 4.8 did

not identify other audits.

1. The TPE Audit

The Buyers proved at trial that for the Law Compliance Representation to be

accurate, the Sellers needed to disclose the TPE audit. The Sellers respond that they

informed the Buyers about the TPE audit during a conference call in February 2018.

Dkt. 385 at 17. The Sellers also contend that the TPE audit is not material.

For purposes of the contractual representation in the Merger Agreement,

whether the Sellers disclosed the TPE audit to the Buyers outside the Merger

Agreement has no bearing on the legal analysis. While serving as a Vice Chancellor,

Chief Justice Strine addressed whether a buyer who had reason to be concerned about

the accuracy of a representation and had the ability to conduct due diligence to

confirm its accuracy could nevertheless claim to have relied on the representation for

31
purposes of a breach of contract claim.21 The seller argued that the buyer did not in

fact rely on the representation in that setting and waived its claim for breach. The

Chief Justice rejected this argument:

[A] breach of contract claim is not dependent on a showing of justifiable
reliance. That is for a good reason. Due diligence is expensive and
parties to contracts in the mergers and acquisitions arena often
negotiate for contractual representations that minimize a buyer’s need
to verify every minute aspect of a seller’s business. In other words,
representations like the ones made in [the agreement] serve an
important risk allocation function. By obtaining the representations it
did, [the buyer] placed the risk that [the seller’s] financial statements
were false and that [the seller] was operating in an illegal manner on
[the seller]. Its need then, as a practical business matter, to
independently verify those things was lessened because it had the
assurance of legal recourse against [the seller] in the event the
representations turned out to be false. . . .

[H]aving given the representations it gave, [the seller] cannot now be
heard to claim that it need not be held to them because [the buyer’s] due
diligence did not uncover their falsity. . . . Having contractually
promised [the buyer] that it could rely on certain representations, [the
seller] is in no position to contend that [the buyer] was unreasonable in
relying on [the seller’s] own binding words.22

Other Delaware decisions reach the same conclusion.23

21 Cobalt Operating, LLC v. James Crystal Enters., LLC, 2007 WL 2142926

(Del. Ch. July 20, 2007), aff’d, 945 A.2d 594 (Del. 2008) (TABLE).

22 Id. at *28 (footnotes omitted).

23 See Gloucester Hldg. Corp. v. U.S. Tape & Sticky Prods., LLC, 832 A.2d 116,

127–28 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“Reliance is not an element of a claim for indemnification”
for “breach of any of the representations or warranties in [the agreement] . . . .”); id.
at 127 (rejecting contention that justifiable reliance was an element of breach of
contract as “simply incorrect”); Interim Healthcare, Inc. v. Spherion Corp., 884 A.2d
513, 548 (Del. Super. 2005) (“No such reasonable reliance is required to make a prima
facie claim for breach.”), aff’d, 886 A.2d 1278 (Del. 2005) (TABLE). See generally
Victor P. Goldberg, Protecting Reliance, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1033, 1080 (2014) (“The
32
The Delaware cases comport with how a leading treatise describes the

intersection between the due diligence process and representations in a merger

agreement. As the treatise explains,

a party may well ask for a specific representation and warranty on a
certain topic because its investigation of the business being acquired has
convinced it that such topic is particularly important to that business or

weight of authority, and practice, is with the pro-sandbagging side.”). Commentators
often use the term “sandbagging” to refer to the practice of asserting a claim based
on a representation despite having had reason to suspect it was inaccurate. See, e.g.,
Charles K. Whitehead, Sandbagging: Default Rules and Acquisition Agreements, 36
Del. J. Corp. L. 1081, 1087, 1092–93 (2011) (surveying jurisdictions and acquisition
agreements; concluding that New York and Delaware are pro-sandbagging and that
very few acquisition agreements have anti-sandbagging clauses). This is a loaded and
pejorative term: It “originates from the 19th century where gang members would fill
socks full of sand to use as weapons against unsuspecting opponents. While at first
glance, the socks were seemingly harmless, when used to their full potential they
became very effective and would inflict substantial damage on a ‘sandbagged’ victim.”
Stacy A. Shadden, How to Sandbag Your Opponent in the Unsuspecting World of High
Stakes Acquisitions, 47 Creighton L. Rev. 459, 459 (2014) (footnote omitted). From
my perspective, the real question is whether the risk allocation in the contract
controls, or whether a more amorphous and tort-like concept of assumption of risk
applies. To my mind, the latter risks having cases routinely devolve into fact disputes
over what was provided or could have been provided in due diligence. The former
seems more in keeping with Delaware’s contractarian regime, particularly in light of
Delaware’s willingness to allow parties to restrict themselves to the representations
and warranties made in a written agreement. See ChyronHego Corp. v. Wight, 2018
WL 3642132, at *4–7 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2018); Novipax Hldgs. LLC v. Sealed Air
Corp., 2017 WL 5713307, at *10–13 (Del. Super. Nov. 28, 2017); IAC Search, LLC v.
Conversant LLC, 2016 WL 6995363, at *4–8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2016); Prairie Cap.
III, L.P. v. Double E Hldg. Corp., 132 A.3d 35, 50–51 (Del. Ch. 2015); Anvil Hldg.
Corp. v. Iron Acq. Co., Inc., 2013 WL 2249655, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 17, 2013); ABRY
P’rs V, L.P. v. F & W Acq. LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1035–36, 1051–64 (Del. Ch. 2006);
Homan v. Turoczy, 2005 WL 2000756, at *17 & n.53 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 2005) (Strine,
V.C.); H–M Wexford LLC v. Encorp, Inc., 832 A.2d 129, 142 & n.18 (Del. Ch. 2003);
Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Pharmacia Corp., 788 A.2d 544, 555–56 (Del. Ch. 2001).
See generally Steven M. Haas, Contracting Around Fraud Under Delaware Law, 10
Del. L. Rev. 49 (2008).

33
has made it aware of a specific problem or concern as to which it wants
the added comfort of a specific representation.24

Rather than constituting some form of waiver, a buyer’s knowledge about an issue

shapes the representations that it bargains for:

Suppose the Buyer requests the Seller to represent that the Company
being sold is not in material breach of any material contracts. The
Company may in fact be in violation of three material agreements, two
of which violations the Seller is sure are material and one of which it
believes to probably be immaterial. What does the Seller do? It modifies
the representation to state: “Except as set forth on the Disclosure
Schedule, the Company is not in material breach of any material
agreement.” The referenced schedule will then list the two, or possibly
all three, of the agreements in question.25

From the seller’s perspective, the representation is now true.26 But if the parties do

not qualify the representation, then the party making the representation assumes

the risk for a deviation.

The integration clause in the Merger Agreement also forecloses the Sellers’

argument that the Buyers’ pre-signing knowledge of an audit modified the terms of

the Merger Agreement. The integration clause states:

Entire Agreement. This Agreement (including the Exhibits and
Schedules hereto) and the other Transaction Documents constitute the
entire agreement and supersedes all prior agreements and
understandings, both written and oral, between the Parties with respect
to the subject matter hereof, and no Party shall be liable or bound to the

24 Lou R. Kling & Eileen T. Nugent, Negotiated Acquisitions of Companies,

Subsidiaries and Divisions § 1.06, at 1-43 (2024 ed.).

25 Id. § 10.02, at 10-3.

26 See id.

34
other in any manner by any representations or warranties not set forth
herein.

JX 312 § 11.3. While a standard integration clause alone will not bar a fraud claim,27

a standard integration clause does bar the admission of extrinsic evidence “for

the purpose of varying or contradicting the terms of that contract.”28 The Sellers

cannot alter the Law Compliance Representation by pointing to information the

Buyers allegedly learned in due diligence.

27 To bar a fraudulent inducement claim, an agreement must also contain

explicit anti-reliance language. Kronenberg v. Katz, 872 A.2d 568, 593 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(“Stated summarily, for a contract to bar a fraud in the inducement claim, the
contract must contain language that, when read together, can be said to add up to a
clear anti-reliance clause by which the plaintiff has contractually promised that it did
not rely upon statements outside the contract’s four corners in deciding to sign the
contract. The presence of a standard integration clause alone, which does not contain
explicit anti-reliance representations and which is not accompanied by other
contractual provisions demonstrating with clarity that the plaintiff had agreed that
it was not relying on facts outside the contract, will not suffice to bar fraud claims.”);
ABRY P’rs, 891 A.2d at 1059 (“[M]urky integration clauses, or standard integration
clauses without explicit anti-reliance representations, will not relieve a party of its
oral and extra-contractual fraudulent representations.”); Airborne Health, Inc. v.
Squid Soap (Squid Soap I), 984 A.2d 126, 141 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“An anti-reliance
provision must be explicit, and a standard integration clause is not enough.”). The
Buyers do not allege they were fraudulently induced to enter into the Merger
Agreement.

28 Phillips v. Wilks, Lukoff & Bracegirdle, LLC, 2014 WL 4930693, at *3 (Del.

Oct. 1, 2014) (ORDER); accord TrueBlue, Inc. v. Leeds Equity P’rs IV, LP, 2015 WL
5968726, at 4 (Del. Super. Sept. 25, 2015); see also Taylor v. Jones, 2002 WL
31926612, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2002) (describing the parole evidence rule as “a
principle of substantive law that prevents the use of extrinsic evidence of an oral
agreement to vary a fully integrated agreement that the parties have reduced to
writing”).

35
Regardless, the trial record does not support the Sellers’ contention that they

disclosed the TPE audit. The Sellers point to a conference call on February 28, 2018,

where the topics included regulatory compliance. Newton Tr. 38–41; PTO ¶ 80; JX

181. Newton testified that the participants discussed the TPE audit. Another witness

“believe[d]” that the participants discussed the TPE audit but could not remember

any specifics. Leard Dep. 52–53 (“It was a long time ago.”). The subject line in the

conference call invitation read “Dura Medic ZPIC update call.” JX 181. The subject

line did not mention the TPE audit. Most important, shortly after the call, Einwechter

circulated an internal email that stated, “They never asked about the October audit—

so we didn’t bring it up since this data is in the data room.”29 A Comvest employee

testified that he performed targeted searches for audit-related materials in the data

room and did not find the TPE audit. Carroll Dep. 314–15, 319. Black and Tidd

testified credibly that they learned about the TPE audit after the Merger closed.

Black Tr. 238; Tidd Tr. 444. Other Comvest internal documents corroborate that

testimony.30 Having weighed the evidence, this decision finds that the Sellers did not

disclose the TPE audit before the Merger closed.

The Sellers also argue that the TPE audit was not material. When used to

qualify a representation, the adjective “material” “seeks to exclude small, de minimis,

29 JX 186. The reference to the October audit means the TPE audit. The first

round of the audit ended in October 2018. JX 49 at 1.
30 See JX 442 at 2, 5; JX 557 at 1–2; JX 381.

36
and nitpicky issues that should not derail an acquisition.”31 For the breach of a

representation to be material, there need only be a “substantial likelihood that

the . . . fact [of breach] would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having

significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information.”32 That interpretation “strives to

limit [a contract term with a materiality qualifier] to issues that are significant in the

context of the parties’ contract, even if the breaches are not severe enough to excuse

a counterparty’s performance under a common law analysis.”33

In Section 4.8(a), the Sellers represented that during the previous three years,

“[n]either [the] Company nor any Subsidiary of the Company has received written

notice . . . from any Governmental Authority of any threatened or pending

31 Akorn, Inc. v. Frensenius Kabi AG, 2018 WL 4719347, at *85 (Del. Ch. Oct.

1, 2018).

32 Id. at *86.

33 Id.; accord Snow Phipps Gp., LLC v. KCAKE Acq., Inc., 2021 WL 1714202,

at *38 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2021) (“Put differently, the materiality standard at issue
asks whether the business deviation significantly alters the buyer’s belief as to the
business attributes of the company it is purchasing.”); see Williams Cos., Inc. v.
Energy Transfer LP, 2021 WL 6136723, at *25–26 (Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2021) (applying
Akorn meaning of “in all material respects” qualifier to a covenant in a merger
agreement); AB Stable, 2020 WL 7024929, at *73 (same); Snow Phipps, 2021 WL
1714202, at *38 (same); Dermatology Assocs. of San Antonio v. Oliver St. Dermatology
Mgmt. LLC, 2020 WL 4581674, at *26–29 (Del. Ch. Aug. 10, 2020) (applying Akorn
meaning of “in all material respects” qualifier to a representation in a merger
agreement); Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 2019 WL 6896462, at *17
(Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2019) (same); see also In re Anthem-Cigna Merger Litig., 2020 WL
5106556, at *134 n.426 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2020) (distinguishing common law
“material breach” standard from “in all material respects” standard), aff’d sub
nom. Cigna Corp. v. Anthem, Inc., 251 A.3d 1015 (Del. 2021) (TABLE).

37
administrative, enforcement, or other Proceeding against or affecting the Business

alleging any material failure to comply with Healthcare Laws.” JX 312 § 4.8(a).

Section 1.1 of the Merger Agreement defines “Governmental Authority” to include

“any governmental . . . agency . . . or agent thereof.” It defines “Proceeding” to include

“any . . . audit” and “Health Care Laws” to include “any and all

federal . . . regulations.” Id. § 1.1.

On November 14, 2017, the Company received written notice from the TPE

Reviewer about a TPE review. The TPE Reviewer is an agent of CMS, which is a

federal agency. A TPE review is a type of audit. JX 102 at 1.

The existence of the TPE audit was material. In the first round of the TPE

audit, the TPE Reviewer reviewed a thirty-claim sample and identified twenty-four

claims that failed to comply with various Medicare regulations, establishing a “failure

to comply with Healthcare Laws.” JX 312 § 4.8(a). A TPE audit can lead to the

revocation of a supplier’s Medicare provider number, a referral to the Office of

Inspector General, or other enforcement actions.34 The Buyers’ regulatory expert also

testified about the seriousness of a TPE audit. Shickle Tr. 1139.

It was substantially likely that the existence of the TPE audit “would have

been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’

34 Leard Dep. 33–34. Leard regards TPEs as “very serious.” Id. at 34.

38
of information.”35 By failing to include the TPE audit on Schedule 4.8, the Sellers

breached the Law Compliance Representation.

2. The First Zone 4 ZPIC Audit

The Buyers proved at trial that for the Law Compliance Representation to be

accurate, the Sellers needed to disclose the First Zone 4 ZPIC Audit. The Sellers

contend that the First Zone 4 ZPIC Audit was not material, but the Buyers proved

otherwise.

A ZPIC audit is more worrisome than a TPE audit. See Leard Dep. 35, 99.

Because the TPE audit was material, so was the First Zone 4 ZPIC Audit. The Sellers’

decision to disclose the Second Zone 4 ZPIC Audit shows that the Sellers understood

that ZPIC audits were material.36

The First Zone 4 ZPIC Audit was plainly material in its own right. In a letter

dated January 5, 2018, the Zone 4 ZPIC reported examining a time period from July

11, 2016, to September 21, 2017, and rejecting twenty-six of the thirty-seven claims

it reviewed, resulting in an error rate of 68.8%. JX 98 at 1. The length of the audit

period and the high error rate indicated a large audit that the Company needed to

35 Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at *86.

36 See Teamsters Loc. 237 Additional Sec. Benefit Fund v. Caruso, 2021 WL

3883932, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2021) (“Plaintiffs have identified a discussion
between Caruso and the acquiror’s representative that was not disclosed in the Proxy,
even though the Proxy discloses other, similar communications between them
regarding the Merger price. It is reasonably conceivable that this omission was
material in light of the related disclosures.”).

39
take seriously. The Buyers proved at trial that the Sellers breached the Law

Compliance Representation by failing to disclose the First Zone 4 ZPIC Audit.

3. The 2017 RAC Audit

The Buyers proved at trial that for the Law Compliance Representation to be

accurate, the Sellers needed to disclose the 2017 RAC Audit. The Sellers respond that

the 2017 RAC Audit was not material.

The same reasoning that governs the TPE audit and the First Zone 4 ZPIC

Audit holds for the 2017 RAC Audit. A rational buyer would want to know that a

CMS contractor charged with seeking recoupment of improperly paid claims

subjected the Company to an audit for services billed in 2016 and 2017. In addition

to seeking recoupment, a RAC auditor can refer a company to the Office of Inspector

General or CMS for legal action. Leard Dep. 34–35. Tidd testified that the Company

faced recoupment demands after the Merger closed. Tidd Tr. 457, 485–86, 487–88.

The Buyers were entitled to know about the 2017 RAC Audit and to assess the risk

for themselves.

The Buyers proved that by failing to disclose the 2017 RAC Audit on Schedule

4.8, the Sellers breached the Law Compliance Representation.

E. Damages For The Proven Breaches

The Buyers had the burden of proving an amount of damages that flowed from

the breaches of the Merger Agreement.37 As a general matter, a remedy for breach of

37 OptimisCorp. v. Waite, 2015 WL 5147038, at *55 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 2015).

40
contract should seek to give the non-breaching party the benefit of its bargain.38 “In

Delaware, the traditional method of computing damages for a breach of contract claim

is to determine the reasonable expectations of the parties.”39

In addition to showing the existence of damages, the plaintiff must show “that

the damages flowed from the defendant’s violation of the contract.” 40 The court

evaluates but-for causation by considering “how the positions of the parties would

differ in the ‘but-for’ world—i.e., the hypothetical world that would exist if the

[a]greement had been fully performed.”41 The court evaluates proximate causation by

considering “how close the relationship is between the causal factor and the resulting

damages. If the causal factor is too attenuated, then a court can decline to award

damages because of a lack of proximate cause.”42

Where parties have agreed on a particular remedy, Delaware law prioritizes

their agreement. The parties’ agreement on a remedy is sufficient, standing alone, to

38 Genencor Int’l, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 766 A.2d 8, 11 (Del. 2000).

39 Cobalt, 2007 WL 2142926, at *29.

40 Base Optics Inc. v. Liu, 2015 WL 3491495, at *16 (Del. Ch. May 29, 2015)

(internal quotation mark omitted).

41 eCommerce Indus., Inc. v. MWA Intel., Inc., 2013 WL 5621678, at *43 (Del.

Ch. Sept. 30, 2013).

42 Smash Franchise P’rs, LLC v. Kanda Hldgs., Inc., 2023 WL 4560984, at *22

(Del. Ch. July 14, 2023), aff’d sub nom. McLaren v. Smash Franchise P’rs, LLC, 319
A.3d 909 (Del. 2024).

41
award it.43 Requiring parties to live with “the language of the contracts they negotiate

holds even greater force when, as here, the parties are sophisticated entities that

bargained at arm’s length.”44

That said, a contractual remedy does not bind the court, and the court has

discretion to award a different remedy. “[E]ven if a contract specifies a remedy for

breach of that contract, ‘a contractual remedy cannot be read as exclusive of all other

remedies [if] it lacks the requisite expression of exclusivity.’”45

1. The Contractual Indemnification Regime

The Merger Agreement provides for indemnification as a remedy for breaches

of representations. The Merger Agreement states:

Subject to the limitations in Section 9.4, each Seller, severally and not
jointly (except with respect to any claims which may be set off against
the Seller Note), based on its respective Pro Rata Share, agrees to
indemnify and hold harmless [Holdings], the [Company], and their
respective Subsidiaries directors, officers, employees, equity owners,
members, managers, successors, assigns, controlling Persons, Affiliates
representatives and agents (collectively, the “Purchaser Indemnitees”),
from, against and in respect of all Losses incurred or required to be paid
by any of them by reason of: (i) any misrepresentation, breach or

43 See Gildor v. Optical Sols., Inc., 2006 WL 4782348, at *11 (Del. Ch. June 5,

2006) (specific performance); Kan. City S. v. Grupo TMM, S.A., 2003 WL 22659332,
at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 4, 2003) (injunctive relief); Dover Assocs. Joint Venture v. Ingram,
768 A.2d 971, 974 (Del. Ch. 2000) (receiver).

44 Progressive Int’l Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 2002 WL 1558382,

at *7 (Del. Ch. July 9, 2002).

45 Gotham P’rs, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty P’rs, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 176 (Del. 2002)

(second alteration in original) (quoting Oliver B. Cannon & Son, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver,
Inc., 336 A.2d 211, 214 (Del. 1975)).

42
inaccuracy of any representation or warranty made by the Company in
Article IV of this Agreement or in any Transaction Document[.]

JX 312 § 9.1(a)(1). The Merger Agreement defines “Losses” as “any and all

damages . . . including any amounts paid in settlement in accordance with this

Article IX or any damages based on a multiple of earnings, revenue or other metric.”

Id. § 9.1(c). If the Buyers seek Losses based on a multiple of earnings, revenue, or

other metric, then “no amount shall be payable by the Sellers until the aggregate

amount of such Losses exceeds $1,500,000 (taking into account the multiple of

earnings, revenue or other metric), after which point the Sellers shall be liable for all

Losses from dollar one related to such damages based on a multiple of earnings,

revenue or other metric.” Id.

The Merger Agreement also establishes a true deductible of $300,000. The

relevant provision states:

No amount shall be payable by Purchaser or the Sellers, as applicable,
as indemnification pursuant to this Article IX, except to the extent that
the aggregate amount of Purchaser’s or Sellers’ Losses, as applicable,
exceeds $300,000 (the “Deductible”), after which point Purchaser or the
Sellers, as applicable, shall only be liable for all Losses of the
Indemnified Party in excess of the Deductible. The limitations set forth
in this Section 9.4(c) shall not apply to any liabilities and obligations
that arose from (i) any breaches of the Company Fundamental
Representations or the Seller Fundamental Representations, (ii) any
breaches of any of the covenants, agreements, and obligations under this
Agreement or any Transaction Document by the Company or the Sellers,
(iii) fraud or willful misconduct of or by the Company or the Sellers, (iv)
knowing or intentional misrepresentations or omissions of or by the
Company or the Sellers, (v) indemnification obligations pursuant to the
Specific Indemnities, or (vi) Losses related to defending any claims of
appraisal rights made by any Seller, or enforcing or defending any
similar rights or remedies related thereto (items (i) through (vi) of this
Section 9.4(c) shall be referred to as the “Limitation Carve-Outs”);
provided, that any indemnification claims related to any of the
43
Limitation Carve-Outs shall not be used in connection with the
determination of the Deductible.

Id. § 9.4(c). One of the Limitation Carve-Outs addresses “any breaches of the

Company Fundamental Representations,” defined to include the Law Compliance

Representation addressing healthcare law compliance. Id. §§ 9.4(b), 4.8. The

Deductible also does not apply to losses calculated using a multiple of earnings,

revenue, or other metric, because the language addressing that form of damages calls

for a tipping basket of $1,500,000. The latter more specific provision controls over the

more general Deductible.46

2. Damages For Breach Of The Counterparty Representation

The Buyers seek $3,155,546 in damages for breach of the Counterparty

Representation.47 To reach that figure, the Buyers’ expert Scott Bouchner calculated

the lost earnings from those two customers for LTM April 2018, including offsets for

costs and expenses the Company would not have incurred. The lost earnings totaled

$478,701.48 The Buyers’ expert then multiplied that figure by 6.7797, the multiplier

46 DCV Hldgs., Inc. v. ConAgra, Inc., 889 A.2d 954, 961 (Del. 2005) (“Specific

language in a contract controls over general language, and where specific and general
provisions conflict, the specific provision ordinarily qualifies the meaning of the
general one.”).

47 The Buyers’ expert originally calculated these losses to be $3,322,427. JX

1155 at 8. In his reply report, the expert corrected a calculation error, which the
Sellers’ expert had pointed out. Dkt. 368 at 77; JX 1160 at 19; JX 1161 Schedule 4.

48 The Buyers’ expert first determined the annual lost revenue for both
customers. To do that, he multiplied their total gross revenue in LTM April 2018 by
their customer-specific GNR ratio. JX 1155 at 14; Bouchner Tr. 1263–66. For that
period, the Stanford account had gross revenue of $2,346,280 and a GNR of 29.23%
44
that the Buyers applied to the LTM April 2018 EBITDA to arrive at the Merger price.

Last, the Buyers’ expert deducted actual post-closing collections from both customers

through July 2018—$89,903—for net damages of $3,155,546. JX 1155 at 15; Dkt. 368

at 77.

The Sellers argue that the Buyers cannot recover more than $433,322. They

say the Buyers underestimated the operating expenses and costs that the Company

saved from losing the two customers. They also argue that the Company was not

permanently impaired by the loss of the two customers and therefore the court should

not apply a multiplier.

The difference between the Buyers’ pre-multiplier figure of $478,701 and the

Sellers’ figure of $433,322 turns on what “unincurred operating expense percentage”

applies to the lost net revenue totals to capture expenses saved. The Buyers deducted

for net revenue of $685,712. JX 1155 at 15. For that period, the account for the Baptist
Health System hospital that terminated its agreement had gross revenue of $502,819
and a GNR of 15.23% for net revenue of $76,751. Id. The total lost net revenue for
both customers was $762,283.

The Buyers’ expert next multiplied those lost earnings by the customer-specific
gross margins. Stanford’s gross margin was 79.62%, which applied to earnings of
$685,712 results in lost gross profits of $545,956. Id. The Baptist Health System
hospital had a gross margin of 49.52%, which applied to earnings of $76,751 results
in lost gross profits of $37,917. Id. The total lost gross profits for both customers was
$583,873.

The Buyers’ expert then deducted operating expenses that the Company would
no longer expend on these two customers. He calculated those expenses as 13.8% of
total lost net revenue. Id. Applying that percentage to total lost revenue of $762,283
results in $105,172 in unincurred operating expenses. Bouchner Tr. 1265–66; JX
1161 Schedule 4. Deducting $105,172 from total lost gross profits of $583,873 results
in projected lost income or EBITDA of $478,701.
45
13.8% from the lost net revenue figure; the Sellers argue for 19.75%, asserting that

the Buyers failed to account for “professional fees relate[d] to a collection agency,

software, legal and various consulting fees” and collection expenses “incurred for

postage and delivery, electronic remittances for payments, printing claims and other

one-off expenses.” JX 1160 at 19–20. The parties agree that the professional fees as a

percentage of total revenue equaled 2.62% and the collection expenses as a percentage

of total revenue equaled 3.34%. JX 1155 Exhibit 6; JX 1160 at 19–20.

The Buyers argue against including a reduction for professional fees because

no Company employees were fired as a result of the lost customers. Bouchner Tr.

1329–32; Dkt. 388 (Comvest Parties’ Post-Trial Reply Brief) at 34. But the Company

could have saved on professional fees and collection expenses without firing people.

The Buyers also argue that Stanford had a high Gross-to-Net Ratio and therefore its

loss would not result in saved collection costs or professional fees. Bouchner Tr. 1329–

32; Dkt. 388 at 34. Not so. Stanford’s company-specific Gross-to-Net Ratio was

29.23%, roughly the Company’s historical average.49 The Sellers therefore are correct

that the two components should be added, resulting in lost earnings from the two

customers of $433,322.

49 JX 1155 at 15; JX 48 at 8 (November 2017 Comvest due diligence memo

showing Gross-to-Net Ratio of 32.8% for 2014, 31.9% for 2015, 27.6% for 2016, and
21.1% for 2017); JX 17 at 25 (FTI report showing Gross-to-Net Ratio “per P&L” of
31.9% for 2015, 28.4% for 2016, and 30.8% through June 2017).

46
The Buyers next argue that the lost earnings should be multiplied by 6.7797,

the multiple the Buyers applied to LTM April 2018 EBITDA in the Merger Agreement

to calculate the Merger price. The Merger Agreement expressly contemplates a claim

for damages “based on a multiple of earnings, revenue or other metric.” JX 312 §

9.1(c). The Merger Agreement does not, however, require a multiple-based

calculation, nor does it specify under what circumstances a multiple should be used.

Because the agreement is silent, the court must look to the common law.50

Under the common law, a party can recover reasonable expectation damages based

on a multiple where the price was “established with a market approach using a

multiple.”51 That reasoning applies here.

50 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 204 (Am. L. Inst. 1981) (“When the

parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect
to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term
which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court.”); Concord Real
Estate CDO 2006-1, Ltd. v. Bank of Am. N.A., 996 A.2d 324, 332 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“I
look to the common law because this body of jurisprudence provides a backdrop of
standard default rules that supplement negotiated agreements and fill gaps when a
contract is incomplete, whether by inadvertence or design.”), aff’d, 15 A.3d 216 (Del.
2011) (TABLE).

51 NetApp, Inc. v. Cinelli, 2023 WL 4925910, at *18 (Del. Ch. Aug. 2, 2023). See

WaveDivision Hldgs., LLC v. Millenium Digit. Media Sys., LLC, 2010 WL 3706624,
at *23 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2020) (“For present purposes, I find it appropriate to use a
multiple of EBITDA analysis to calculate the value of Systems to Wave. That is the
technique upon which Wave based its expectations . . . .”); Cobalt, 2007 WL 2142926,
at *29 (awarding damages based on a cash flow multiple where “Jim Hilliard knew
Cobalt was relying on a cash flow multiple in reaching the price it was willing to pay
for WRMF”); Swipe Acq. Corp. v. Krauss, 2020 WL 5015863, at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25,
2020) (“[I]t is reasonably conceivable that an EBITDA multiple could support a
damages calculation. Plaintiff alleges that the parties discussed using an EBITDA
multiple to calculate the purchase price and that the Buyers, in fact, did so.”); Taylor
Precision Prods., Inc. v. Larimer Gp., Inc., 2023 WL 6785802, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13,
47
The Buyers proved that they derived the Merger price by applying a multiple

of 6.7797 to the Company’s EBITDA.52 The court will calculate damages using the

same multiple.

The Sellers respond that applying a multiple only makes sense where the

losses permanently affected the business, citing Zayo Group, LLC v. Latisys Holdings,

LLC.53 That decision declined to apply an EBITDA multiple where there was “no

evidence that [the buyer] actually based its purchase price on a multiple of

EBITDA.”54 The court also declined to apply a multiple because “all of the Material

2023) (“Plaintiff has isolated the effects of the breach by calculating the TTM adjusted
EBITDA ($593,670.00) of the lost SKUs and subtracting that from the TTM EBITDA
and applying the purchase price multiple of 7.55x, which itself is derived from the
original purchase price of $69.5 million.”); see also Tam v. Spitzer, 1995 WL 510043,
at *12 (Del. Ch. Aug. 17, 1995) (“The only credible valuation of Data Works without
[the client] is that of [plaintiff’s expert], who employed the same discounted cash flow
methodology and valuation data he had previously used to arrive at the 1991
purchase price, but then deducted the revenue and expenses attributable to [the lost
client].”).

52 See JX 273 at 2 (May 7, 2018 Comvest investment committee update valuing

the Company as a multiple of EBITDA); Marrero Tr. 758–62; 851–52. The Sellers’
expert conceded that the Buyers based the Merger purchase price on a multiple of
EBITDA. Steffens Tr. 1206; see also JX 231 (Ferreira admitting to Einwechter in an
April 1, 2018 email that Comvest was justified in revising the EBITDA downward
and that “[m]ultiples on sub-$5M EBITDA businesses are lower—definitely not 8
times”). The Sellers point out that Marrero testified that, as a general matter,
Comvest uses other metrics to value transactions. Dkt. 385 at 64 (citing Marrero Tr.
821–22). But Marrero never testified that Comvest calculated the Merger price using
any other metric than a multiple of EBITDA.

53 2018 WL 6177174 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 2018).

54 Id. at *17.

48
Contracts at issue in this case expired in less than one year” and therefore the related

misrepresentation did not “cause[] a permanent diminution in the value of the

business (as a result of lost revenues into perpetuity).”55

The reference to a “permanent diminution . . . into perpetuity” was

descriptively accurate on the facts of that case, but it does not translate into a test for

future cases. Nothing lasts forever. Whether a misrepresentation diminishes the

value of the business sufficiently to warrant applying a multiple turns on the extent

to which the misrepresentation affects future earning periods.56

Here, the customer losses resulted in recurring declines in revenue. Once

Stanford left and Baptist Health System reduced its commitment, the Company

would never earn revenue from their contracts. True, as the Sellers argue, the

Company might find other customers, but revenue from the new customers would be

55 Id. at *16. The court cited no legal authority for the “permanent diminution”

proposition.

56 See, e.g., NetApp, 2023 WL 4925910, at *20 (“This did not amount to a one-

time loss for NetApp, but would continue to affect future cash flows. In these
circumstances, dollar-for-dollar damages would not make NetApp whole.”); see also
Association of International Certified Professional Accountants, Forensic &
Valuation Services Practice Aid: Mergers & Acquisitions Disputes 58 (2020) (updated
Jan. 1, 2020) (“Claims that result in dollar-for-dollar damages are typically those that
have a one-time effect on the target and that do not impact the target financial
condition in future periods (in other words, will not affect future cash flows).”), cited
in NetApp, 2023 WL 4925910, at *20 n.256. Although the Buyers’ expert properly
applied a multiple to lost earnings, he was confused as to whether his calculation was
based on the future effects the loss of the customers would have on the Company. See
Bouchner Tr. 1324–28.

49
additive if the Company could have retained Stanford and the fifth Baptist Health

System hospital.

For the same reason, the Sellers’ argument that the Buyers failed to mitigate

damages fails. The Sellers could not “mitigate” the damages from the lost customers

by obtaining new customers. The Buyers could only mitigate their losses from the two

customers by cutting expenses or somehow convincing the customers to come back.

The Sellers bore the burden of proving that the Buyers failed to mitigate damages by

not using reasonable efforts to reacquire them.57 The Sellers failed to meet their

burden.58

The Sellers also suggest that a court must find fraud to apply a multiple to

calculate damages. A court can apply a multiple to address fraud, but fraud is not

required to apply a multiple. That is particularly so here where the Merger

Agreement contemplates multiple-based damages.

Finally, the Sellers argue that the Buyers used the wrong multiple. The Sellers

say the multiple of 6.7797 should be 4.9168 because the Buyers’ expert calculated

57 BTG Int’l, Inc. v. Wellstat Therapeutics Corp., 2017 WL 4151172, at *20 (Del.

Ch. Sept. 19, 2017), aff’d, 188 A.3d 824 (Del. 2018) (“Failure to mitigate damages is
an affirmative defense, and the burden of proving the failure falls upon the
defendant.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

58 W. Willow-Bay Ct., LLC v. Robino-Bay Ct. Plaza, LLC, 2009 WL 458779, at

*8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2009) (“A non-breaching party need not hazard undue risk,
burden, or humiliation in mitigating costs and damages. Mitigation is subject to a
rule of reasonableness, and whether a loss is mitigable turns on the circumstances.”
(footnote omitted)).

50
EBITDA over a period greater than one year. But that argument misunderstands

what the Buyers’ expert did. The Buyers’ expert correctly used the period from

January 2015 through April 2018 to derive an average percentage for unincurred

operating expense. The Buyers’ expert used LTM April 2018 EBITDA to derive the

multiple and correctly reached a multiple of 6.7797.

At trial, the Buyers proved that the Sellers’ misrepresentation resulted in

$433,322 in lost earnings. Multiplying the lost earnings by 6.7797 results in an

overpayment of $2,937,793. Deducting post-closing collections for both customers

through July 2018—$89,903—equals $2,847,890 in damages.

3. Damages For Breach Of The Law Compliance Representation

For the Sellers’ breach of the Law Compliance Representation, the Buyers seek

to recover the expenses they incurred dealing with the undisclosed TPE audit, the

First Zone 4 ZPIC Audit, and 2017 RAC Audit. That is a proper measure of damages.

The Buyers seek to recover:

• $90,550 paid to Grant Thornton and $124,384 paid to McDermott Will &
Emery for an acquisition that the Buyers say the Company aborted because of
a cash-flow shortage caused by the undisclosed audits;

• $91,952 paid to “Lender Counsel” and $80,057 paid to McDermott Will &
Emery to secure a loan that the Buyers say the Company secured to address
the cash-flow shortage caused by the need to address the undisclosed audits;
and

• $159,291 paid to van Halem to advise on the undisclosed audits.

In total, the Buyers seek indemnification for $546,235 in fees.

The losses attributable to “unexpected cash flow problems” are too attenuated

to recover. They reflect consequential damages, defined as damages that “do not flow

51
directly and immediately” from the breach.59 A plaintiff only can recover

consequential damages if they were foreseeable at the time of contracting.60 At trial,

the Buyers did not prove that the Sellers foresaw at the time of contracting that their

failure to disclose the audits would result in the Company being unable to finance an

acquisition or being forced to obtain a loan. “The law does not . . . promote speculative

damages at the [defendant’s] expense.”61

The Buyers also failed to prove that the undisclosed audits were the but-for

cause of the Company’s decision to abandon the acquisition. The record indicates that

the Company made its decision based on other factors. See JX 457 at 22. The Buyers

similarly failed to prove the reasonableness of the amount they sought in connection

with the loan, because the invoices on which they relied were excessively redacted.

See, e.g., JX 472; see also JX 287 at 2 (listing $91,952 in unspecified loan transaction

fees and expenses).

59 Pharm. Prod. Dev., Inc. v. TVM Life Sci. Ventures VI, L.P., 2011 WL 549163,

at *6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 16, 2011) (internal quotation mark omitted); 24 Williston on
Contracts § 64:12 (4th ed. 2024 Update).

60 Pharm. Prod., 2011 WL 549163, at *6; see Restatement (Second) of Contracts

§ 351(1) (“Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have
reason to foresee . . . .”).

61 Ryan v. Tad’s Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 682, 689 (Del. Ch. 1996) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

52
That leaves $159,291 in fees to van Halem. The trial record supports the

Buyers’ argument that the van Halem Group helped the Company address the

undisclosed audits:

• In a June 21, 2018 email to Eckberg, Black states the Company had discovered
the TPE audit and was “quickly bringing in professional and legal experts in
the area . . . to address the situation.” He then states, “[W]e will be working
closely with Van Halem, Brown & Fortunado and McDermott Will & Emery to
ensure we are a compliant company.” JX 381.

• An August 1, 2018 Company quarterly business review states, “Utilizing vHG
Clinical Staff to review TPE-focused claims prior to submission.” JX 435 at 6.

• An August 13, 2018 Company memo states, under the heading “Round 3 TPE
began 8/3/18,” “Van Halem Group (vHG) has also been assisting with pre-
screen reviews in readiness for the next round.” JX 442 at 5.

• In a September 28, 2018 monthly business report, the Company states that it
“continue[s] to work closely with van Halem Group” while discussing the TPE
audit and “one additional ZPIC audit since August QBR (2017 audit with 69%
error rate[,] not disclosed by seller).” JX 457 at 7. That is the First Zone 4 ZPIC
Audit. See JX 98 at 1.

• A July 22, 2019 investment committee memo states that the TPE Reviewer
“reached out to van Halem Group . . . to let them know that the auditors will
be meeting to discuss next steps given limited billings.” JX 608 at 2.

The trial record showed that the van Halem Group also was helping the

Company overhaul its billing system and ensure compliance, not simply addressing

the undisclosed audits.62

62 See, e.g., JX 434 at 6 (an August 1, 2018 Company quarterly business review

stating, under “Current Plan for Release of Claims,” “vHG to audit first 10 claims
that have passed the QC Checks”); JX 381 (“[W]e will be working closely with Van
Halem . . . to ensure we are a compliant company . . . .”).

53
The Buyers’ expert totaled the van Halem Group fees from invoices that the

Buyers provided him.63 The invoices included billed items that related to the

undisclosed audits.64 The invoices also included other billed items that appear to be

unrelated to the undisclosed audits.65 Other items could go either way.66 The Buyers’

expert did not attempt to separate the work that van Halem performed to address

the undisclosed audits from the work it performed to address CMS compliance in

general or other tasks that van Halem billed.

“The law does not require certainty in the award of damages where a wrong

has been proven and injury established. Responsible estimates that lack

m[a]thematical certainty are permissible so long as the court has a basis to make a

responsible estimate of damages.”67 “[O]nce a breach of duty is established,

uncertainties in awarding damages are generally resolved against the wrongdoer.” 68

The Buyers’ invoices did not provide the court “mathematical certainty” for

63 JX 1155 at 18 n.41; JX 370; JX 426; JX 437; JX 448; JX 458; JX 463.

64 See, e.g., JX 426 at 2–3 (“Call with Kim and Tim to talk about TPE audits”);

JX 458 at 1 (“[R]eviewed additional L4361 claims denied and approved during phase
2 TPE to compare on what TPE auditor is looking for”).

65 See, e.g., JX 370 at 1 (“Research and questions answered from Tosha”); JX

426 at 1 (“Review of LMN template with feedback to Kim via email”).

66 See, e.g., JX 370 at 1 (“[P]roviding audit report details to Rick for Jonathan”);

JX 426 at 4 (“4 ADR reviews completed (crutches, wrist brace)”).

67 Red Sail Easter Ltd. P’rs, L.P. v. Radio City Music Hall Prods., Inc., 1992

WL 251380, at *7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 1992) (Allen, C.).

68 Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 1993 WL 443406, at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 1993).

54
determining damages, but they do provide the court a “basis to make a responsible

estimate of damages.”

Without pretense of precision, the court awards the Buyers $100,000,

approximately two-thirds of the van Halem fees. The Company paid van Halem fees

to address the undisclosed audits, to overhaul the billing system, and to comply with

CMS requirements in general. The Buyers are entitled to recover the entirety of the

first bucket. But the undisclosed audits also contributed to the Company’s need to

overhaul the billing system and focus on meeting CMS requirements. The Buyers

therefore are entitled to half of the other two buckets.

Because these fees were incurred in connection with a breach of Section 4.8,

which is a Company Fundamental Representation, the $300,000 deductible in Section

9.4(c) does not apply. The Buyers are entitled to $100,000 in damages as a result of

the Sellers’ breach of the Law Compliance Representation.

F. The Seller Representative’s Claims For Breach Of Contract

The Seller Representative has asserted claims against the Buyers for breach

of contract. First, the Seller Representative asserts that the Buyers breached the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Merger Agreement and the

Seller Note by withholding Medicare claims. Second, the Seller Representative

asserts that Comvest, Black, and Marrero tortiously interfered with the Merger

Agreement and Seller Note by causing Holdings and Dura Medic to breach the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

55
1. Breach Of The Implied Covenant

The Seller Representative asserts that the Buyers breached the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Merger Agreement and Seller Note by

withholding Medicare claims over a period of eight months. The Seller Representative

contends that the Buyers willingly depressed the Company’s short-term revenue

because the Buyers could recover more money than they lost by (i) pursuing an

indemnification claim and (ii) avoiding paying the Seller Note. Dkt. 358 (Sellers’

Opening Post-Trial Brief) at 45–46, 50–52; Dkt. 385 at 9–14.

“The implied covenant is inherent in all contracts and is used to infer contract

terms to handle developments or contractual gaps that the asserting party pleads

neither party anticipated.”69 When determining whether to invoke the implied

covenant, a court “first must engage in the process of contract construction to

determine whether there is a gap that needs to be filled.”70 “Through this process, a

court determines whether the language of the contract expressly covers a particular

issue, in which case the implied covenant will not apply, or whether the contract is

silent on the subject, revealing a gap that the implied covenant might fill.”71 The court

69 Dieckman v. Regency GP LP, 155 A.3d 358, 367 (Del. 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

70 Allen v. El Paso Pipeline GP Co., L.L.C., 113 A.3d 167, 183 (Del. Ch.
2014), aff’d, 2015 WL 803053 (Del. Feb. 26, 2015) (ORDER).

71 NAMA Hldgs., LLC v. Related WMC LLC, 2014 WL 6436647, at *16 (Del.

Ch. Nov. 17, 2014).

56
must determine whether a gap exists because “[t]he implied covenant will not infer

language that contradicts a clear exercise of an express contractual right.”72

“[B]ecause the implied covenant is, by definition, implied, and because it protects the

spirit of the agreement rather than the form, it cannot be invoked where the contract

itself expressly covers the subject at issue.”73

“If a contractual gap exists, then the court must determine whether the implied

covenant should be used to supply a term to fill the gap. Not all gaps should be

filled.”74 One reason a gap might exist is if the parties negotiated over a term and

rejected it. Under that scenario, the implied covenant should not be used to fill the

gap left by a rejected term because doing so would grant a contractual right or

protection that the party “failed to secure . . . at the bargaining table.”75

But contractual gaps may exist for other reasons. “No contract, regardless of

how tightly or precisely drafted it may be, can wholly account for every possible

contingency.”76 “In only a moderately complex or extend[ed] contractual relationship,

72 Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Del. 2010).

73 Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, 2008 WL 1961156, at *10 (Del. Ch. May 7,

2008), aff’d, 984 A.2d 124 (Del. 2009) (ORDER).

74 Allen, 113 A.3d at 183.

75 Aspen Advisors LLC v. United Artists Theatre Co., 843 A.2d 697, 707 (Del.

Ch. 2004), aff’d, 861 A.2d 1251 (Del. 2004).

76 Amirsaleh v. Bd. of Trade of City of N.Y., Inc., 2008 WL 4182998, at *1 (Del.

Ch. Sept. 11, 2008).

57
the cost of attempting to catalog and negotiate with respect to all possible future

states of the world would be prohibitive, if it were cognitively possible.”77

Equally important, “parties occasionally have understandings or expectations

that were so fundamental that they did not need to negotiate about those

expectations.”78 “The implied covenant is well-suited to imply contractual terms that

are so obvious . . . that the drafter would not have needed to include the conditions as

express terms in the agreement.”79

Applying these principles, the Delaware Supreme Court has made clear that

the implied covenant restrains a party’s exercise of discretion under an agreement.

As a general rule, a party cannot engage in arbitrary or unreasonable conduct that

prevents the counterparty from receiving the fruits of its bargain. That rule operates

with special force “when a contract confers discretion on a party.”80 At a minimum,

the implied covenant requires that the party empowered with the discretion to make

a determination “use good faith in making that determination.”81

77 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 1991 WL

277613, at *23 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (Allen, C.).

78 Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986) (Allen, C.)
(quoting Corbin on Contracts § 570 (Kaufman Supp. 1984)).

79 Dieckman, 155 A.3d at 361.

80 Glaxo Grp. Ltd. v. DRIT LP, 248 A.3d 911, 920 (Del. 2021).

81 Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1984), aff’d, 575 A.2d

1131 (Del. 1990).

58
But what does it mean to exercise discretion “in good faith” and not arbitrarily

or unreasonably for purposes of the implied covenant? A reviewing court does not

simply introduce its own notions of what is “fair or reasonable under the

circumstances.”82 The implied covenant “emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed

common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party.”83

When used with the implied covenant, the term “good faith” contemplates

“faithfulness to the scope, purpose, and terms of the parties’ contract.”84 The concept

of “fair dealing” similarly refers to “a commitment to deal ‘fairly’ in the sense of

consistently with the terms of the parties’ agreement and its purpose.” 85 The

application of these concepts turns “on the contract itself and what the parties would

have agreed upon had the issue arisen when they were bargaining originally.”86 When

applied to an exercise of discretion, this means that the exercise of discretionary

authority must fall within the range of what the parties would have agreed upon

during their original negotiations, if they had thought to address the issue.

82 Allen, 113 A.3d at 184.

83 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a.

84 Gerber v. Enter. Prods. Hldgs., LLC, 67 A.3d 400, 419 (Del. 2013) (cleaned

up), overruled on other grounds by Winshall v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 76 A.3d 808 (Del.
2013).

85 Id. (cleaned up).

86 Id. (cleaned up).

59
The Seller Representative argues that the Merger Agreement and Seller Note

have two gaps that the implied covenant should fill:

• Section 2.3(a) of Merger Agreement requires the Buyers to provide the Sellers
with post-closing calculations of the “Final Working Capital,” which “shall
include all accounts receivable amounts in respect of devices provided or
services performed on or prior to the Closing Date.” JX 312 § 2.3(a).

• Article IX of the Merger Agreement authorizes the Buyers to seek
indemnification for breaches of the Company’s representations and
warranties, and the Seller Note authorizes the Buyers to offset any amounts
due on the Seller Note with the amount of any indemnification claim. Id.
Article IX; JX 414 at 9–13.

The Seller Representative asserts that these provisions confer discretion on the

Buyers but do not establish a standard for exercising that discretion. The Seller

Representative argues that the Buyers reached the implied covenant by failing to

exercise their discretion reasonably.

Under Section 2.3(a) of the Merger Agreement, the Buyers have discretion over

how to address the Company’s pre-closing accounts receivable as part of the post-

closing purchase price adjustment. The Seller Representative argues that the implied

covenant requires “that the Company would continue to operate the business in the

ordinary course and try to collect its pre-Merger receivables.” Dkt. 358 at 51. In other

words, the Buyers had to treat the pre-closing accounts receivable the same way the

Company treated them pre-closing.87

87 Dkt. 358 at 51 (seeking to include “an implied term that the Company would

continue to operate the business in the ordinary course and try to collect its pre-
Merger receivables”) (emphasis added); Dkt. 385 at 10 (“Leard’s testimony supports
what the Sellers did pre-closing: billing claims that have the necessary information
60
At trial, the Seller Representative failed to prove that, at the time of

contracting, the Buyers would have agreed to treat the pre-closing accounts

receivable the same way the Company treated them pre-closing.88 No hypothetical

counterfactual is necessary because the Buyers expressly stated that they intended

to withhold all Medicare claims and overhaul the billing process. On May 30, 2018, a

week before the Merger closed, Tidd reported to Black, Callahan, and Carroll that

“[u]pon close, I have informed Kim [Sauber] to stop all Medicare claims from billing

until we have a QC process in place that ensures that the only claims that go out are

clean.” JX 335 at 1. Black agreed. Black Tr. 242, 247. Whether Sauber communicated

this information to the other Sellers does not matter. Tidd’s report to Black and

Callahan shows that the Buyers would not have agreed to continue the pre-closing

practices. They intended to overhaul the Company’s billing procedures.

The Seller Representative also failed to identify “express terms” of the Merger

Agreement that “naturally imply” a continuation of the Company’s pre-closing billing

and working to track down missing information for those that do not. That is what a
good-faith actor would have done.” (footnote omitted)).

88 Baldwin v. New Wood Res., LLC, 283 A.3d 1099, 1118 (Del. 2022) (“When

determining the parties’ reasonable expectations, the court analyzes ‘whether the
parties would have bargained for a contractual term proscribing the conduct that
allegedly violated the implied covenant had they foreseen the circumstances under
which the conduct arose.’”).

61
practices.89 Section 2.3(a) of the Merger Agreement, on which the Seller

Representative relies, states that the Buyers’ calculation of “Final Working Capital”

shall include all accounts receivable amounts in respect of devices
provided or services performed on or prior to the Closing Date (and
remaining uncollected as of the Closing Date), to the extent such
accounts receivable were collected (i.e., converted to cash) within 730
days following the Closing . . . .

JX 312 § 2.3(a) (emphasis added). The Seller Representative complains that the

Buyers withheld all Medicare claims for eight months, i.e., around 240 days. But

under Section 2.3(a), the Final Working Capital calculation encompasses 730 days,

triple the time the Buyers withheld Medicare claims. That time frame was

sufficiently lengthy to allow for delays in processing claims attributable to a

revamped billing system. It does not support the Seller Representative’s argument.

Section 4.5(d) also does not help the Seller Representative. It states that all

“accounts receivable set forth on the Recent Balance Sheet and . . . accruing through

the Closing Date . . . are valid and enforceable claims.” JX 312 § 4.5(d). That language

does not imply that the Buyers had an obligation to pursue every claim. It enabled

the Buyers to seek indemnification for amounts that were not valid or enforceable

claims.

Finally, the Seller Representative points to the indemnification set-off rights

in Article IX of the Merger Agreement and Section 16 of the Seller Note. The Seller

Representative argues that the existence of set off rights means the parties would not

89 See id. at 1117.

62
have permitted a pause on Medicare claims; rather, those provisions assumed

attempts at collection.90 That does not follow. The inclusion of set-off rights does not

suggest an agreement on billing policy.

The Buyers believed that they had to overhaul the billing system to achieve J-

curve growth. That was not an arbitrary or irrational exercise of discretion. It was a

reasonable decision consistent with the Buyers’ pre-closing plans for the Company.

The Seller Representative cannot invoke the implied covenant to impose an obligation

that they “failed to secure . . . at the bargaining table.”91

G. Tortious Interference With Contract

The Seller Representative also contends that Black, Marrero, and Comvest

tortiously interfered with the Merger Agreement and the Seller Note. This claim fails

because the Seller Representative failed to prove an underlying breach of contract.

The elements of a claim for tortious interference with contract are “(1) a

contract, (2) about which defendant knew, and (3) an intentional act that is a

significant factor in causing the breach of such contract, (4) without justification, (5)

which causes injury.”92 The only breach of contract the Seller Representative sought

90See Dkt. 358 at 51 (“Attempted collection was assumed by the
indemnification set-off rights in the Merger Agreement and the Seller Note, as
otherwise the Seller Note would be rendered worthless by Comvest’s ability
opportunistically to depress earnings and seek indemnity.”).

91 See Aspen Advisors, 843 A.2d at 707.

92Bhole, Inc. v. Shore Invs., Inc., 67 A.3d 444, 453 (Del. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

63
to prove involved the implied covenant. A proven claim for breach of the implied

covenant can support a claim for tortious interference.93 Here, the Seller

Representative failed to prove that claim. Lacking an underlying breach of contract,

the tortious interference claim fails.

III. CONCLUSION

At trial, the Buyers proved that the Sellers breached representations and

warranties in Article IV of the Merger Agreement. For the breach of Section 4.23 of

the Merger Agreement, the Buyers proved damages of $2,847,890, plus pre-judgment

interest that accrues from June 6, 2018, and post-judgment interest that accrues until

payment. For the breach of Section 4.8(a) of the Merger Agreement, the Buyers

proved damages of $100,000, plus pre-judgment interest that accrues from December

31, 2018, and post-judgment interest that accrues until payment. Interest will accrue

at the legal rate, compounded quarterly, with the interest rate changing in

conjunction with changes in the reference rate.

The Buyers failed to prove their other claim. The Seller Representative failed

to prove its claims for breach of the implied covenant and for tortious interference.

The parties will submit a form of order implementing the rulings in this

decision and Dura Medic I. If there are issues that still need to be resolved at the trial

court level, the parties will submit a joint letter identifying them and proposing a

process for bringing the case to a conclusion.

93 See NAMA Hldgs, 2014 WL 6436647, at *25–27.

64