Sharp v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

NOAH SHARP, §
§
Defendant Below § No. 64, 2023
Appellant, §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ Cr. ID No. 2010002207 (N)
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Appellee. §

Submitted: April 10, 2024
Decided: July 1, 2024

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and
GRIFFITHS, Justices constituting the Court en banc.

ORDER

This 1st day of July, 2024, it appears to the Court that:

(1) In October 2022, Noah Sharp stood trial in the Superior Court and was

found guilty of murder in the first degree, possession of a deadly weapon during the

commission of a felony, and conspiracy in the first degree. After the court sentenced

Sharp to life plus 28 years in prison, he appealed to this Court.

(2) Sharp raises a single issue. He claims that he was not afforded a trial

by an impartial jury because the trial court refused to strike a juror who, after hearing

counsel’s opening statements, came forward and admitted to some passing

familiarity with the murder.
(3) The murder, which received a considerable amount of publicity in New

Castle County, occurred two years before Sharp’s trial. The victim—Madison

Sparrow—was an eleventh grader at Newark Charter High School, from which

Sharp had graduated in June 2020. Sparrow and Sharp had dated when Sparrow was

in the ninth grade, but Sparrow eventually broke off the relationship.

(4) Sparrow had been friends with Sharp’s codefendant and coconspirator,

Annika Stalczynski, who also attended Newark Charter. After Sparrow broke up

with Sharp, Sharp began to spend time with Stalczynski. Sharp, who was troubled

by the breakup, convinced Stalczynski that Sparrow had been speaking poorly of her

and even wanted to fight her. Although these reports did not cause Stalczynski to

“hate” Sparrow, she admitted that she “didn’t like” her.1

(5) Sharp and Stalczynski’s shared disdain for Sparrow somehow devolved

into a conspiracy to kill her. On October 2, 2020, under the guise of walking with

Sparrow to get some ice cream, Stalczynski led Sparrow down a trail in a wooded

area behind an elementary school in Newark. Sharp was lying in wait there with a

baseball bat. According to Stalczynski’s testimony at Sharp’s trial, when Sparrow

saw Sharp, she was “shocked.”2 Stalczynski added that “[Sharp] came out and just

1
App. to Opening Br. at A613.
2
Id. at A622.
2
started swinging the bat . . . connecting with her body . . . . [Sharp] started hitting

on [Sparrow’s] side over and over again. And she fell.”3

(6) After Sparrow fell, Sharp continued to bludgeon her with the bat, now

“[i]n her head.”4 Sparrow died from her wounds, and Sharp and Stalczynski buried

her body in a shallow grave under an Interstate 95 overpass in Newark.

(7) Before the jury was selected for Sharp’s trial, the trial court conducted

its examination of the array of prospective jurors. Among other things, the court

gave a brief description of the charges and asked the prospective jurors two

important questions:

We’re about to select the jury in the case of State of Delaware vs. Noah
Sharp. This is a criminal case and the charges against the defendant are
murder first degree, possession of a deadly weapon during the
commission of a felony, and conspiracy first degree.
It is alleged that the offenses occurred in Newark, Delaware, on or
about October 2, 2020. . . .

Do you know anything about this case through personal knowledge,
discussion with anyone, the news media, including social media, or any
other sources? Do you know the defendant, Noah Sharp, Annika
Stalczynski, Madison Sparrow, or any of their friends or relatives?5

(8) This description of the charges and the identification of Sharp,

Stalczynski, and Sparrow as the central characters in the case did not prompt the

prospective juror, eventually seated as Juror No. 8, to come forth and make any

3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. at A21.
3
disclosures to the court. But that changed after counsel’s opening statements and

the first prosecution witness—Sparrow’s mother—began to testify.

(9) During a recess, the trial judge reported to counsel that Juror No. 8

informed a bailiff that “he has heard some discussions . . . about the case.”6 The trial

judge reported further that “[a]pparently [the prosecutor’s] opening statement rang

a few bells. Otherwise, he had no clue about it.”7 This prompted the trial judge to

question Juror No. 8 at sidebar with counsel present.

(10) During the court’s questioning, Juror No. 8 disclosed that:

a. he did not recognize any of the names mentioned by the court

during voir dire;8

b. he resided “in the heart of Newark”9 and knew families with

children who attended Newark Charter;

c. he did not realize that he was familiar with some of the facts

surrounding the case until he heard counsel’s opening statements;

d. his wife, who followed the relevant events on social media, had

told him “all about what was going on[]”10 two years earlier;

6
Id. at A292.
7
Id.
8
In addition to naming Sparrow, Sharp, and Stalczynski and identifying counsel by name, the
court named more than fifty potential witnesses.
9
Id. at A293.
10
Id. at A294.
4
e. he recalled hearing, two years earlier, “pieces of what he heard

this morning[], that[] this girl was killed in the woods . . . [and] there

was . . . a couple people involved. . . .”11

f. he “would like to think [he could] be impartial.”12

(11) The court questioned Juror No. 8 further about how his limited pretrial

exposure to information relating to Sharp’s case might affect his impartiality:

THE COURT: So based on what you heard back then, do you
recall forming an opinion about the defendants and whether they
were guilty or not guilty?

JUROR 8: I would say that you get feelings, not necessarily an
opinion. But you see a very one-sided series of posts and stories
and know people that are posting things kind of on, you know,
team Madison, right. So like the candlelight vigils and things
like that. But you don’t know - -

THE COURT: Did you participate in any of that or - -

JUROR 8: No I did not. Nobody in my family did.

THE COURT: So you have some impressions I guess it’s fair to
say or - -

JUROR 8: Right . . . . I mean it’s that whole unconscious bias,
right. Like I’m coming into it having heard some things a couple
of years ago.
...

THE COURT: So, . . . the question is not whether you really
heard about the case. The question is whether you formed
opinions or not and whether you can - - if you have formed an

11
Id.
12
Id.
5
opinion, set aside that opinion and base your verdict on what you
hear in the courtroom because everybody is entitled to a fair trial,
both the defense and the State . . . .

So what are your thoughts about your ability to do that, if you
have any?

JUROR 8: I mean, I think I’m okay. So . . . a lot of what I do
for work is very analytical, right. I’m an engineer. I trouble
shoot equipment and stuff like that. So it’s really
compartmentalizing information. So, you know, I’m very aware
of kind of taking what’s present now and using that only and not
trying to build from the past.13

(12) Based upon this exchange, Sharp’s counsel moved to strike Juror No.

8. The court denied the motion, noting that the juror’s exposure to the information

occurred two years earlier. The court also “was impressed with his candor and . . .

way of explaining things,”14 including his awareness of the possibility of

unconscious bias. One last exchange is worth quoting here:

THE COURT: . . . He’s an engineer, as he said, and gives him
the mindset of being able to sort of put things in a particular
cubbyhole or pigeonhole them and sort of not allow other things
to enter into the consideration. And he said he can do it and I
have no reason to doubt that.

The test is, as I said, not whether somebody knows about
something or heard about something, but whether you have an
opinion they can’t set aside and he doesn’t have an opinion, so
I’m going to allow him to remain.

Okay. [Juror No. 8], you don’t have to sit down. You can go
back to the jury room and continue on with the trial.

13
Id. at A295–97.
14
Id. at A302.
6
JUROR 8: Awesome. Thank you all very much.15

(13) Sharp now accuses Juror No. 8 of improperly withholding material

information during jury selection. He argues further that the court committed

reversible error by allowing Juror No. 8 to remain on the jury.

(14) We afford deference to a trial judge’s decision not to remove a juror for

cause.16 As this Court observed in Schwan v. State, “[t]he deference given to such

determinations on appeal is based upon the judge’s ability to assess the veracity and

credibility of the potential juror.”17 A trial judge’s finding, after due inquiry, that a

juror can evaluate the evidence impartially will not be set aside by a reviewing court,

absent manifest error.18 Under that standard, this is not a close call.

(15) We find no justification for Sharp’s accusation that Juror No. 8’s failure

to come forward during the court’s voir dire examination of the array was a product

of dishonesty or lack of candor. It is evident from the record that Juror No. 8’s

recollection of his tangential contact with the facts of the case was not jogged until

he heard the prosecution’s opening statements. During the luncheon recess, which

was the first recess after opening statements, Juror No. 8 informed a bailiff of his

15
Id. at A302–03. Sharp deems this response—Juror No. 8’s use of the overused and arguably
misused “awesome”—to be indicative of the juror’s bad faith. Delaware Supreme Court, Oral
Argument Video: Sharp v. State, at 8:50–9:01 (Apr. 10, 2024) (https://vimeo.com/932917683).
As we understand the record, this interpretation lacks any persuasive force.
16
Schwan v. State, 65 A.3d 582, 590 (Del. 2013).
17
Id. at 589.
18
Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878)).
7
realization that he, in fact, did possess some, albeit very limited, knowledge about

the case based on conversations with this wife two years earlier. The bailiff promptly

reported this to the trial judge, who in turn notified counsel and engaged in the

colloquy with the juror as recounted above. Juror No. 8 did the right thing, and it is

unfortunate in our view that he now stands accused of malfeasance.

(16) Nor has Sharp identified any manifest error in the trial court’s denial of

his motion to remove Juror No. 8 from the jury. The trial judge appropriately

inquired into the basis and depth of the juror’s prior knowledge of the case and his

ability to evaluate the evidence impartially. Given that the trial judge was in a

position to assess Juror No. 8’s veracity and credibility and we are not, we defer to

his determination.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court be AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gary F. Traynor
Justice

8