Coleman v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DEVIN COLEMAN, §
§
Defendant Below, § No. 196, 2025
Appellant, §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 2010012644A/B (K)
§
Appellee. §
§

Submitted: April 24, 2026
Decided: June 17, 2026

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR and LEGROW, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears

to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Devin Coleman, has appealed a Superior Court order

adopting a Superior Court Commissioner’s report and denying Coleman’s motion

for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. For the reasons

discussed below, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.

(2) The Court previously described the events leading to Coleman’s

convictions as follows:

In June 2020, Devin Coleman, a convicted felon prohibited from
possessing a firearm, was released on probation after completing an 8-
year prison sentence. Soon after his release, the police began
monitoring Coleman’s calls through court-approved telephone
wiretaps, as part of a joint contraband investigation by the City of Dover
Police and the Delaware State Police. At the time, Coleman, a Level III
probationer, lived in Room 117 of the Capitol Inn in Dover.

On July 21 and 22, the police listened to Coleman over the wiretap as
he discussed guns and drugs. During the calls on July 21, Coleman
expressed a desire to purchase firearms, and, the following day,
Coleman was recorded telling associate Antwan Campbell, “I spent
$1,700 on guns yesterday.”

After Coleman made these incriminating statements, he was observed,
on the morning of July 22, 2020, carrying a blue backpack into his
motel room at the Capitol Inn. A few minutes later, Coleman went
outside to take a call from his friend Kendra Lewis. Lewis, who then
arrived by car, was greeted by Coleman and the two walked back into
the motel room together. Shortly after that, probation officer Ricky
Porter and two other officers knocked on the door with the intention of
conducting an administrative search. Hearing the knock, Coleman
looked out the window, and Porter asked him to open the door. Lewis,
James Ayers, and Shaketah Giles were also in the room. Coleman did
not open the door immediately. Instead, he turned to Ayers, who was
moving things around, and asked him, “Yo, you good?” and Coleman
then opened the door.

Once inside, Porter and the officers found drugs containing Fentanyl.
Porter also located the blue backpack that Coleman was seen carrying
into the room within the preceding hour. Inside the blue backpack,
Porter found (i) one Ruger handgun with a loaded 9mm magazine
inserted, (ii) one Smith & Wesson with an unloaded .40 caliber
magazine inserted, and (iii) one spare .40 caliber magazine that was
unloaded and loose in the backpack. Porter photographed the items
“before handling the weapons.”

During the evidence collection process, Porter removed the magazines
from the Ruger and the Smith & Wesson and confirmed that neither
weapon's chamber contained a round. Only the 9mm magazine found
in the Ruger contained any ammunition. When he seized the .40 caliber
magazines, both of which were unloaded and appeared to be

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“identical,” Porter did not designate which magazine was found in the
Smith & Wesson.

Porter delivered the evidence to the Dover Police Department. The
items were then tagged and separately photographed. Later, Detective
Nolan Matthews, a Dover Police Department crime-scene investigator,
lifted three fingerprints from one of the .40 caliber magazines, an
examination of which showed that the prints belonged to Coleman,
Mack, and Ayers. These were the only fingerprints found that had any
identification value. Because no effort had been made when seizing the
evidence to differentiate between the two .40 caliber magazines, there
was no way to tell which of the .40 caliber magazines the fingerprints
were lifted from—the magazine found inside the Smith & Wesson or
the one that was loose in the backpack.

Based on the wiretap investigation, a Kent County grand jury indicted
29 defendants, including Coleman, on racketeering, drug, and weapons
offenses. Separately, Coleman faced additional charges stemming from
the search of his motel room, including two charges of possession of a
firearm by a person prohibited and one charge of possession of
ammunition by a person prohibited. To avoid the prejudice that might
attend the jury’s learning of Coleman's prior felony conviction and his
status as a “person prohibited,” the court severed the “person
prohibited” charges and held two trials. The same jury heard both cases
and much of the separately presented evidence overlapped. To
streamline the trial, the first trial was limited to one drug dealing
(fentanyl) charge; the State entered nolle prosequis as to eight other
charges pending against Coleman. The second trial was limited to two
charges of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited and one count
of possession of ammunition by a person prohibited….

[T]he jury found Coleman guilty of the lesser-included offense of
misdemeanor possession of fentanyl. Then, in the second trial, after the
prosecution rested, the court denied Coleman’s application for a
missing evidence instruction finding no breach of the State’s duty to
collect or preserve evidence.

Coleman then testified in his own defense that he was lying when he
told Campbell that he had spent “$1,700 on guns.” According to
Coleman, when he entered the Capitol Inn on the morning of July 22,

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the blue backpack contained a pair of sneakers. Coleman opined that
Ayers had deposited the guns and spare magazine into the blue
backpack while Coleman was outside talking on the phone with Lewis
in the minutes before the probation officer arrived to conduct the
search. He also claimed that he only briefly touched the spare .40
caliber magazine on the morning of July 22 when he slid the “clip”
across the sink to Ayers and told him to “pick this stuff up.”

At the end of the second trial, the jury found Coleman guilty of only
one count of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited. Because
neither of the counts charging Coleman with possession of a firearm by
a person prohibited describes the firearm—that is, neither count
identifies the type of firearm Coleman was alleged to have possessed—
we do not know whether Coleman was convicted of possessing the
Ruger or the Smith & Wesson firearm.1

(3) After granting the State’s habitual offender petition, the Superior Court

sentenced Coleman to 29 years of unsuspended Level V time for possession of a

firearm by a person prohibited (“PFBPP”) and a fine for drug possession. On appeal,

this Court affirmed Coleman’s conviction, holding that the Superior Court did not

err in denying his request for a “missing evidence” instruction. 2

(4) On May 1, 2023, Coleman filed a timely motion for postconviction

relief and a motion for appointment of counsel. The Superior Court granted the

motion for appointment of counsel and referred the matter to a Superior Court

Commissioner. Coleman’s postconviction counsel filed an amended motion for

postconviction relief. The motion alleged that Coleman’s trial counsel was

1
Coleman v. State, 289 A.3d 619-623 (Del. 2023) (citations omitted).
2
Id. at 629.

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ineffective for failing to object to (i) the inclusion of the accomplice-liability

instruction from the jury instructions for the first trial in the jury instructions for the

second trial, and (ii) the trial court’s reliance on impermissible factors at sentencing.

Following trial counsel’s submission of an affidavit responding to the allegations,

the State’s response to the postconviction motion, and Coleman’s reply, the

Commissioner issued a report finding that Coleman failed to prove his trial counsel

was ineffective and recommending denial of the postconviction motions. The

Superior Court accepted the Commissioner’s recommendation and denied the

postconviction motions. This appeal followed.

(5) We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for postconviction

relief for abuse of discretion.3 We review constitutional claims, including claims of

ineffective assistance, de novo. 4 The Court considers the procedural requirements of

Rule 61 before addressing any substantive issues, 5 but most claims of ineffective

assistance raised in a timely postconviction motion are not procedurally barred. 6 On

appeal, Coleman argues that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in their

handling of the accomplice-liability instruction and that his trial counsel was

3
Baynum v. State, 211 A.3d 1075, 1082 (Del. 2019).
4
Id.
5
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
6
Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 175 (Del. 2020).

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ineffective for failing to object to the Superior Court’s reliance on impermissible

factors at sentencing.

(6) To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant

must demonstrate that: (i) his counsel’s representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness, and (ii) but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is

a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been

different.7 There is “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the

wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 8 “A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 9

(7) In his amended postconviction motion, Coleman argued that his trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the incorporation of the accomplice-

liability instruction from the first trial in the jury instructions for the second trial.

Coleman’s trial counsel challenged this argument in his affidavit, contending that he

did object to the inclusion of this instruction. In his postconviction reply, Coleman

contended that his trial counsel had waived the objection, but if the Superior Court

found otherwise then his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the

issue on direct appeal. Coleman has failed to show that either his trial counsel or

7
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
8
Id. at 689.
9
Id. at 694.

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appellate counsel were ineffective with respect to the accomplice liability

instruction.

(8) The jury instructions for the first trial on the drug charges included an

instruction on accomplice liability. This instruction provided, among other things,

that:

So in order to find the defendant guilty of an offense committed by
another person, you must find that all three of the following elements
have been proven to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt: One,
another person committed the offenses charged, namely drug dealing,
possession with intent to deliver Fentanyl as I’ve explained that offense
to you.

The defendant—2, the defendant intended to promote or facilitate the
commission of the offense. In other words, it was his conscious object
or purpose to further or assist the commission of the offense.

And 3, the defendant aided, counseled, or agreed, or attempted to aid
the other person in planning or committing the offense. 10

During closing arguments in the first trial, the prosecutor argued that the jury could

find Coleman guilty of the drug charges as an accomplice.

(9) When the parties discussed the jury instructions for the second trial on

the weapon charges, Coleman’s trial counsel questioned whether accomplice

liability applied to the weapon offenses. The Superior Court and prosecutor agreed

that accomplice liability only applied to the drug offenses. Coleman’s trial counsel

then asked the Superior Court to instruct the jury that, although most of the jury

10
App. to Answering Br. at B113.

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instructions from the first trial carried over to the second trial, the accomplice-

liability instruction did not. The Superior Court found that such a carve-out was

unnecessary because the accomplice-liability instruction was expressly limited to

the drug charges. Coleman’s trial counsel ultimately agreed, stating:

You know what, you’re right, Your Honor. I didn’t see it. It does say,
page 9, paragraph 1, another person committed the offense as charged,
namely, drug dealing, possession with intent to deliver fentanyl. It
doesn’t say anything about the gun, so I can refer to that in the jury
instructions and it’s completely consistent. All right, Your Honor. 11

(10) After the parties rested in the second trial, the Superior Court advised

the jury that they should consider the supplemental jury instructions along with the

jury instructions from the first trial. During closing arguments, the prosecutor did

not argue that the jury could find Coleman guilty as an accomplice. Instead, based

on the wiretap evidence, the presence of the firearms in Coleman’s backpack, and

Coleman’s fingerprint on one of the magazines, the prosecutor asserted that Coleman

purchased and possessed the firearms.

(11) Coleman’s trial counsel emphasized to the jury that Coleman could not

be found guilty as an accomplice, stating:

Another point that I wanted to touch upon was there is an instruction
that was applicable to the first case that is not applicable to this case,
and that is the instruction regarding accomplice liability. And if you go
back and look at that instruction, it specifically states in it the theory of
accomplice liability was being utilized to attempt to establish liability
11
Id. at B128.

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for the offense of drug dealing, possession with intent to deliver the
drug fentanyl. It did not extend to possession of a firearm, possession
of firearm ammunition. It only related to the possession of fentanyl with
the intent to deliver the drug dealing charge.

So that theory about accomplices and about aiding somebody or helping
somebody, and if there was that type of connection that was made,
that’s enough for a person who is not owning something on a person or
physically possessing something could be guilty of it, does not apply
here.12

Before their deliberations, the jurors were provided with a copy of the original

instructions and the supplemental instructions. The jury found Coleman guilty of

one count of PFBPP.

(12) As the Superior Court concluded, Coleman’s trial counsel’s handling

of the accomplice liability-instruction did not fall below an objective standard of

reasonableness. The accomplice-liability instruction in the first trial expressly

referred to the drug charges, not the weapon charges. Unlike in the first trial, the

prosecutor did not argue in the second trial that the jury could find Coleman guilty

of the weapon as an accomplice. Coleman’s trial counsel stressed to the jury that

the accomplice-liability instruction applied only to the drug charges, not the weapon

charges. Nothing in the record suggests that the jury was confused by the

accomplice-liability instruction and found Coleman guilty of PFBPP as an

accomplice instead of as a principal. “[B]y all appearances, the jury concluded that

12
Id. at B170.

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Coleman possessed at least one of the two handguns found in his blue backpack—

most probably, the .40 caliber Smith & Wesson, given his possession of the unloaded

.40 caliber magazine. 13 Coleman has not shown that either his trial counsel or

appellate counsel were ineffective with respect to the accomplice-liability

instruction.

(13) Nor has Coleman demonstrated that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to object to the Superior Court’s alleged use of impermissible sentencing

factors. At sentencing, the Superior Court found that there were seven aggravating

factors—prior violent criminal conduct, repetitive criminal conduct, undue

depreciation of the offense, custody status at the time of the offense, lack of remorse,

lack of amenability to lesser sanctions, and habitual-offender status. The court found

that there were no mitigating factors. In discussing the aggravating factors, the court:

Assign[ed] considerable weight to two. They are your lack of remorse
and that you reoffended barely 40 days after your release from an eight-
year prison sentence after just being released into the community on
probation and conditional release.

As to your lack of remorse and lack of acceptance of responsibility—
and that is so important in the Court’s eyes because it tends to
demonstrate whether you’re committed to change; and thus, will be
less likely to reoffend in the future—the Court observed the A Case in
this matter, the drug dealing case, in which you did not testify.

That was your right and there was absolutely nothing inappropriate
about that. What is so striking, however, is that after the jury acquitted

13
Coleman, 289 A.3d at 629 (citation omitted).

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you of drug dealing in that case; that is, of possessing those drugs in the
motel room that you had rented, you then took the stand in the B Case
and essentially admitted you were a drug dealer. There was no remorse
or acceptance of responsibility in your demeanor when you testified or
at any other point in this process.

Also then, as a defense in the B Case that involved firearm possession,
you admitted that you were trying to obtain two semiautomatic firearms
to protect yourself because you were a drug dealer and you had heard
someone was going to try and kill you.

But to avoid responsibility, you again claimed without remorse or
acceptance of responsibility that the firearms you were trying to buy
were not the same that were found in the motel room you had rented.
Your testimony in this regard showed a callous lack of remorse given
that you were just released from an eight-year prison sentence for also
possessing a firearm while you were a person prohibited.14

(14) Coleman argues that his trial counsel should have objected to the

Superior Court impermissibly finding that Coleman demonstrated a lack of remorse

by testifying that he was a drug dealer during the second trial after he was acquitted

of drug dealing in the first trial. The Superior Court found that Coleman’s trial

counsel was not ineffective because the court did not consider impermissible factors

in sentencing Coleman.

(15) As the Commissioner recognized, the sentencing judge’s finding of a

lack of remorse was not based solely on Coleman’s admission to drug dealing in the

second trial. The court found that Coleman also demonstrated a lack of remorse by

14
App. at B173-74.

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testifying that he was trying to purchase guns shortly after his release from prison

for PFBPP. In addition, the court found other aggravating factors including repetitive

criminal conduct, custody status at the time of the offense, lack of remorse, lack of

amenability to lesser sanctions, and habitual offender status. The court was

particularly troubled by Coleman’s purchase of firearms just weeks into his

probation and conditional release for his previous PFBPP conviction. Coleman does

not challenge any of the other aggravating factors identified by the sentencing judge

when he sentenced Coleman, as a habitual offender, to 29 years of unsuspended

Level V time. Even assuming that there was a basis to object to the Superior Court’s

finding that Coleman’s testimony about his drug dealing demonstrated a lack of

remorse, he cannot show a reasonable probability of a different outcome. For all the

foregoing reasons, the Superior Court did not err in denying Coleman’s motion for

postconviction relief.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court be AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:
/s/ Gary F. Traynor
Justice

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