Stevens v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

KEVIN STEVENS, §
§ No. 298, 2024
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ Cr. ID No: 2212008180 (N)
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Appellee. §
§

Submitted: May 14, 2025
Decided: August 11, 2025

Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. AFFIRMED.

Robert M. Goff, Esquire, Elliot M. Margules, Esquire (argued), OFFICE OF THE
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant Kevin Stevens.

Carolyn S. Hake, Esquire (argued), DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee State of Delaware.
TRAYNOR, Justice:

The defendant was tried and convicted in the Superior Court for driving a

motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating drugs and driving with a

suspended license. In this appeal, he argues—as he did in the Superior Court—that

the court erroneously admitted the State’s toxicology evidence, which was derived

from two blood tests showing the presence of intoxicating drugs in the defendant’s

blood when he was arrested. More specifically, the defendant contends that the State

did not lay a sufficient foundation for the challenged evidence because it did not first

introduce documents showing that the machines from which the blood-test results

were derived were calibrated and in good working order. By allowing the results

into evidence, the trial court, so the defendant argues, abused its discretion. He asks

us to reverse his conviction.

In this opinion, we decline the defendant’s invitation to adopt a bright-line

rule requiring the introduction of calibration records before blood-intoxication

evidence is offered by expert witnesses familiar with the working order of the

machines they have used to test a defendant’s blood. And for all the reasons given

below, we conclude that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when it

overruled the defendant’s objections to the challenged evidence. Thus, we affirm

the defendant’s convictions.

2
I

A

On the evening of December 18, 2022, Alexander Batt was sitting in his car

in the parking lot at Branmar Plaza in Wilmington when he witnessed a white pickup

truck driving erratically. Batt noticed the truck after it “almost hit”1 his car and then

ran into another parked car with enough force to cause the car to move and damage

its bumper.2

Batt followed the truck. He observed the truck stop at a green light at an

intersection, and in the truck’s side mirrors, he saw the driver, later identified as

Kevin Stevens, hunched over the wheel. When the light turned red, the truck

proceeded through the intersection, narrowly avoiding another car. Batt continued

to follow Stevens’s truck, which then turned into the Graylyn Shopping Center on

Marsh Road. Stevens parked the truck across two open parking spots near the Rite

Aid pharmacy in the shopping center and remained slumped over for 20-30 seconds

before he exited the truck and stumbled into the Rite Aid. Batt followed Stevens

into the Rite Aid, where he observed him slumped over and asking where he could

find the dog food. Stevens then fell over, and Batt asked the store manager to call

the police.

1
App. to Opening Br. at A33.
2
A visual inspection of the truck later conducted by police, however, revealed no obvious signs
of damage.
3
Trooper Sean Setting of the Delaware State Police responded to the call from

the Rite Aid. Batt directed Setting to Stevens and told Setting what he had seen

before arriving at the Rite Aid. Setting asked Stevens if he had consumed any

alcohol or drugs, and Stevens said that he had not. Setting conducted horizontal

gaze nystagmus and vertical gaze nystagmus tests,3 but observed none of the signs

indicating intoxication in either test, leading him to conclude that Stevens’s

condition was “not alcohol related.”4 Setting attempted to administer other field

sobriety tests, but was unable to do. According to Setting, Stevens “seem[ed] like

he fell asleep a few times[,]” was “slouched over[,]” and was “almost not

coherent[.]”5 Setting arrested Stevens for suspicion of driving under the influence

of drugs.

After taking Stevens to the police station, Setting obtained a warrant to collect

a sample of Stevens’s blood. The blood sample was turned over to the Delaware

Division of Forensic Services, and chemical testing of Stevens’s blood revealed the

presence of flubromazepam, which is a benzodiazepine derivative,6 and fentanyl.7

Stevens was charged with driving a vehicle under the influence of drugs under 21

3
Nystagmus tests are standardized field sobriety tests conducted by asking the subject to focus on
an object such as a pen or a light, then moving the object while looking for signs of involuntary
eyeball movement—nystagmus—indicative of intoxication. See generally State v. Ruthardt, 680
A.2d 349, 352–53 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (describing the horizontal gaze nystagmus test).
4
App. to Opening Br. at A87.
5
Id. at A88.
6
See id. at A181–82, A291.
7
Id. at A291.
4
Del. C. § 4177 as well as driving with a suspended license under 21 Del. C. §

2756(a). A jury trial was held in March 2024.

B

Stevens’s trial strategy was twofold. As one part of his defense, he took the

stand to present his own account of the night of December 18, 2022. He testified

that he was in “a bad state of mind”8 that evening because he had recently separated

from his girlfriend and “just went out to get the dog some treats.”9 Stevens testified

further that he had left the Acme because the prices were too high and denied hitting

anything in the parking lot with his truck. He claimed that he parked his truck

sideways at the Rite Aid because he was in a hurry and denied that he had fallen

over inside the store. Stevens told the jury that he thought Setting was repeatedly

asking him to do field sobriety tests because “he was trying [to] get me to mess up.”10

He added that he would have been unable to complete the tests because he was

wearing steel-toed boots and had recently broken his kneecap. Stevens characterized

his demeanor in the Rite Aid as “just hanging my head down like shaking it”11 in

response to Setting’s repeated requests that he take field sobriety tests.

8
Id. at A217–18.
9
Id. at A218.
10
Id. at A223.
11
Id. at A225.
5
Of greater moment in this appeal, Stevens’s defense also took aim at the

admissibility of the State’s toxicology evidence. Stevens’s blood had been first

tested using an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (“ELISA”), a preliminary test,

the results of which are subject to confirmation. The ELISA results indicated the

presence of a benzodiazepine and fentanyl in Stevens’s blood sample. The ELISA

results were confirmed using a liquid chromatograph tandem mass spectrometer

(“LC-MS/MS”). The State called numerous witnesses from the Division of Forensic

Services to establish the chain-of-custody of Stevens’s blood sample and to provide

foundation testimony to introduce the preliminary ELISA results and the LC-

MS/MS results confirming the presence of a benzodiazepine, in this case

flubromazepam, and fentanyl in Stevens’s blood sample.

Grant Fehnel, an analytical chemist at the Division of Forensic services,

testified that he had performed the preliminary ELISA test on Stevens’s blood

sample. He explained that although the machine used for ELISA testing does not

undergo tests to ensure that it is calibrated before every sample is run, there are

“quality control samples” run during the testing of live samples to ensure accuracy.12

He further explained that the machine produces raw data during testing that may be

used to verify the accuracy of the test results. During Fehnel’s testimony, Stevens

objected to the introduction of the State’s toxicology evidence. He argued that the

12
Id. at A142–43.
6
State had failed to provide sufficient foundation that the equipment used by the

Division of Forensic Services had been properly calibrated and was in working order

before and after it was used to analyze Stevens’s blood sample.13 The trial judge

overruled Stevens’s objection because he had not made a specific discovery request

for the bench notes showing that the machines were properly calibrated and had

failed to “raise[] the specter that this was anything other than ordinary, regular

tests . . . .”14

Three of the State’s witnesses testified about the LC-MS/MS results. One

witness, Matthew Fox, an analytical chemist who conducted a test on Stevens’s

blood using an LC-MS/MS, testified that the machine has a “daily calibration

requirement.”15 He added that the machine was calibrated the day that he conducted

the test of Stevens’s blood but that he did not have the documentation produced by

any calibration tests with him in the courtroom. He testified that the test he had

conducted confirmed the presence of fentanyl in the sample. Another analytical

chemist, Shronda Ellis, who had been tasked with conducting an LC-MS/MS test to

confirm the presence of benzodiazepine in the sample, testified that although the

lab’s LC-MS/MS machines are not necessarily calibrated every day, they are cleaned

and a “neat” sample is run to ensure that the chemist can see all of the peaks that he

13
Id. at A151–53 (objecting to testimony concerning ELISA results).
14
Id. at A154.
15
Id. at A173–74.
7
or she is supposed to see in the machine’s output before an actual sample is run.16

Although Ellis had documentation showing the results of the “neat” sample with her

in the courtroom on the day of trial, it was not introduced into evidence. The LC-

MS/MS results confirmed that a benzodiazepine—specifically flubromazepam—

was present in Stevens’s blood sample. Lastly, Jessica Smith, Delaware’s Chief

Forensic Toxicologist, whose job includes certification of final toxicology reports,

confirmed that LC-MS/MS machines undergo daily maintenance. This includes

“running calibrators.”17 She added that the lab’s acceptance criteria had been

followed in this case and that she had the raw data showing that this was the case in

the courtroom with her. This documentation, too, was not introduced into evidence.

Stevens raised the same objection—that the experts’ reliability opinions were

inadequate and thus the toxicology evidence was inadmissible for lack of

foundation—during the testimony of each of the three witnesses that testified about

the reliability of the LC-MS/MS results, and the trial judge overruled each objection

for the same reasons.18

16
Id. at A184.
17
Id. at A201.
18
Id. at A167, A180, A194.
8
C

Stevens was convicted of both driving under the influence of drugs and

driving with a suspended license. Stevens moved for a new trial, augmenting the

argument that he had made at trial and arguing that the State’s foundation for the

admission of the blood intoxication results was insufficient under this Court’s

decision in McConnell v. State, an opinion that addressed the admissibility of

intoxilyzer evidence in driving-under-the-influence-of-alcohol cases.19 McConnell

requires that the State lay foundation showing that the machine that generated the

result in question was “operating accurately before and after testing the breath of the

defendant on trial.”20 This requirement, according to defense counsel, applies with

equal force to the LC-MS/MS results introduced in this case.

The Superior Court denied Stevens’s motion. The court noted again that it

was unclear whether defense counsel had requested the bench notes showing that

the machines were calibrated and in working order in discovery under Superior

Court Criminal Rule 16, but if he had and the bench notes had not been provided,

presumably any discovery dispute could have been resolved before trial.21 The court

also noted that numerous witnesses from the Division of Forensic Services had

testified that the machines were in working order and frequently calibrated, and

19
639 A.2d 74, 1994 WL 43751 (Del. Feb. 3, 1994) (TABLE).
20
Id. at *1.
21
Opening Br. Ex. B at 2.
9
when one witness offered to provide defense counsel with bench notes with this

information at trial, defense counsel demurred. Lastly, the court wrote that

McConnell was of no help to Stevens’s argument because, while that case requires

that the State show that an intoxilyzer machine was operating accurately before and

after it was used to test the defendant’s breath, it also states that “[i]n the absence of

evidence to the contrary, there is a presumption that the State Chemist acted carefully

and in a prudent manner.”22

Because this was his fourth DUI offense, Stevens was sentenced to two years

of incarceration, suspended after six months for probation. On appeal, Stevens

argues that the trial judge erred by permitting the State to introduce the results of the

confirmatory LC-MS/MS tests without proper foundation.23

II

Stevens properly preserved his objection to the introduction of the State’s

toxicology evidence at trial. We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse

of discretion.24 “An abuse of discretion occurs when a court has exceeded the

22
Id. at 3 (quoting McConnell, 1994 WL 43751, at *1).
23
Stevens’s trial counsel objected to testimony concerning both the ELISA and LC-MS/MS
results. Because Stevens’s appeal addresses only the LC-MS/MS results, we focus our analysis
accordingly. See Supr. Ct. R. 14(b)(vi)(A)(3).
24
McGuinness v. State, 312 A.3d 1156, 1190 (Del. 2024).
10
bounds of reason in light of the circumstances, or so ignored recognized rules of law

or practice [] as to produce injustice.”25

III

The gist of Stevens’s argument on appeal mirrors the argument in his new-

trial motion. He contends that this Court’s decision in McConnell creates a “bright-

line rule”26 that, before toxicology results may be introduced at trial, the State must

“present the certifications of the State Chemist that the intoxilyzer machine was

operating accurately before and after testing the breath of the defendant on trial.”27

This rule, according to Stevens, applies equally in the context of LC-MS/MS blood

tests.

A

We have held that, “[w]hen . . . evidence is obtained from the use of a

scientific instrument, expert testimony is necessary to establish the reliability and

accuracy of the instrument.”28 Here, the State called three expert witnesses,

analytical chemists Matthew Fox and Shronda Ellis, and Chief Forensic

Toxicologist Jessica Smith, to testify about the reliability of the LC-MS/MS

machines used to test Stevens’s blood. Stevens does not contend that the State’s

25
Id. (quoting Chaverri v. Dole Food Co., 245 A.3d 927, 935 (Del. 2021)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
26
Opening Br. at 11–12.
27
Id. at 11 (quoting McConnell, 1994 WL 43751, at *1).
28
Tolson v. State, 900 A.2d 639, 645 (Del. 2006).
11
witnesses lacked the qualifications to testify about the reliability of the LC-MS/MS

machines. He instead contends that the content of these witnesses’ testimony was

itself legally insufficient. The State should have, according to Stevens, introduced

certifications of the State Chemist or other calibration data showing that the

machines were operating accurately instead of presenting “inadequate and

unnecessary”29 testimony concerning the machines’ calibration. We disagree with

Stevens’s assertion that the State’s foundation testimony was insufficient.

Central to Stevens’s argument is his contention that McConnell v. State

provides a bright-line rule that calibration data must be produced before LC-MS/MS

test results are admissible. But McConnell is readily distinguishable. In that case,

as we have mentioned, the defendant challenged the introduction of intoxilyzer test

results. McConnell’s argument was that, although the State presented the required

certification from the State Chemist that the machine was operating accurately

before and after it was used to take a sample of McConnell’s breath, the State was

also required to show that the “standard solutions” used to calibrate the intoxilyzer

machine by the State Chemist had been checked to determine their validity.30 We

held that, absent a showing from McConnell that the calibration checks were

improper, there was a “presumption that the State Chemist acted carefully and in a

29
Opening Br. at 14.
30
McConnell, 1994 WL 43751, at *1.
12
prudent manner.”31 In light of this presumption, we held that the trial court in that

case did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the results of McConnell’s

intoxilyzer test into evidence.

Intoxilyzer breath tests are administered in the field or at police stations by

police officers. To ensure that each intoxilyzer in use in Delaware is operating

accurately, each machine is calibrated periodically. The Superior Court helpfully

explained this process in Cedeno v. State:

Those with some familiarity with the law of DUI in
Delaware . . . know that in order to satisfy the foundational
requirements of scientific validity of the BAC results as recorded by
the Intoxilyzer, Delaware case law requires that the State produce a
“Certification Sheet” prepared by the State Chemist, certifying that on
dates prior to and after the subject test, the machine was operating
properly.

The Certification Sheet for each Intoxilyzer in service in
Delaware is checked for calibration by the State Chemist periodically.
The State Chemist runs known samples of .05 and .10 through the
machine and records how close the machine reading is to the known
sample. These readings, along with the date and time they are taken,
are recorded on the Certification Sheet. In addition, the Chemist
breath[es] into the machine and records the Chemist’s own result
(hopefully zero).32

That our law requires the production of a certification sheet from the State

Chemist before intoxilyzer breath test results may be admitted is intuitive. These

machines are tools operated by police officers, not by the trained scientists who

31
Id.
32
Cedeno v. State, 2023 WL 6323598, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Sep. 27, 2023).
13
perform the calibration and certification of each machine. And at trial, testimony

supporting intoxilyzer results often comes from the police officer that administered

the test. It goes without saying that such police witnesses are not experts, as defined

by D.R.E. 702, who may testify as to the reliability of the device they were using to

conduct a breath test. Requiring a certification sheet from the State Chemist, the

contents of which are generally admissible without the need of live testimony from

the State Chemist through the business-records hearsay exception,33 provides a

check to ensure that the results generated from the machine used to analyze a

defendant’s breath sample are reliable.

LC-MS/MS blood intoxicant test results are different. These tests are

conducted in State laboratories by forensic chemists. These individuals are trained

experts who, unlike police officers using intoxilyzers, have knowledge of and

perform the calibration and maintenance of LC-MS/MS machines. Stevens’s

argument that, in addition to testimony from analytical chemists at the Division of

Forensic Services and the Chief Forensic Toxicologist that the LC-MS/MS machines

used were properly calibrated, the State must also provide the analog of certification

sheets from the State Chemist for these machines—such as the witnesses’ bench

notes—fails to recognize this distinction. It seems unnecessary, where there is a

qualified expert witness on the stand who can opine on the subject of the reliability

33
See, e.g., Best v. State, 328 A.2d 141 (Del. 1974).
14
of their laboratory equipment, that an additional hearsay document on which the

expert testimony is based be a foundational requirement. And as we mentioned

earlier, Stevens makes no argument that the State’s expert witnesses lacked the

knowledge and qualifications necessary to opine on the reliability of the toxicology

results.

In his reply brief, Stevens contends that the distinction between lay-witness

police-officer testimony and expert-analytical-chemist testimony is

“anachronistic”34 because police officers are now routinely offered as expert

witnesses. But Stevens provides no authority showing that police officers may be

offered as expert witnesses to testify about the calibration of intoxilyzer machines

in the same way that an analytical chemist might testify about the calibration of

laboratory machines.

Both cases cited by Stevens are unpersuasive. In Mooney v. Shahan,35 the

Superior Court noted that a police officer may be qualified as an expert with

specialized knowledge and training in administering nystagmus tests.36 Although

the court, reviewing a decision of the Court of Common Pleas, did also permit police

officer testimony that “a permanently implanted false tooth would not skew

34
Reply Br. at 9.
35
2001 WL 1079040 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2021).
36
Id. at *3.
15
intoxilyzer results[,]”37 it clarified that this testimony arose in the context of an

administrative hearing at the Division of Motor Vehicles. The Superior Court did

not analyze the police officer’s testimony under the rules of evidence because

“[a]dministrative hearings are not constrained by the rigid evidentiary rules which

govern jury trials.”38 Even so, the court held explicitly that the police officer in that

case “was not testifying as an expert.”39 And in State v. Bell,40 the State offered a

police officer as an expert witness on the administration of intoxilyzer tests. The

Court of Common Pleas excluded the breath test evidence in that case for the State’s

failure to show that the police officer in question was qualified to administer

intoxilyzer tests.41 The calibration evidence in Bell, on the other hand, was provided

by the State Chemist.42

The extent of foundation testimony necessary to admit the results of

laboratory tests such as LC-MS/MS into evidence was not at issue in McConnell.

To the extent McConnell is applicable, it stands for the proposition, as the Superior

Court noted, that when there is evidence from an expert witness such as the State

Chemist, an analytical chemist, or the Chief Forensic Toxicologist showing that a

machine used for scientific testing was calibrated, absent a showing to the contrary

37
Id. at *4.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
2015 WL 1880591 (Del. Com. Pl. Apr. 23, 2015).
41
Id. at *2.
42
Id. at *2, *3 n.9.
16
by the defendant, we presume that such calibration was done “carefully and in a

prudent manner.”43

B

To be sure, under Rule 702, “the trial judge must make a preliminary

determination that the expert witness is able, as a factual matter, to provide the

proposed opinion.”44 This means that the trial judge, as Stevens correctly contends,

must be satisfied that expert testimony is “based on sufficient facts or data.”45 But

those facts and data need not be admissible.

An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the
expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the
particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in
forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the
opinion to be admitted.46

Although the calibration data at issue here might in fact be admissible, the fact that

D.R.E. 703 permits an expert to testify based on that data without its admission is

fatal to Stevens’s argument that the introduction of the calibration data itself is a

foundational requirement for the introduction of LC-MS/MS results. The trial judge

heard testimony from three witnesses concerning the calibration of the LC-MS/MS

43
McConnell, 1994 WL 43751, at *1.
44
Perry v. Berkley, 996 A.2d 1262, 1270 (Del. 2010).
45
D.R.E. 702. Though Stevens does not cite Rule 702 in his opening brief, his argument appears
to take aim at the admissibility of the experts’ calibration testimony for failure to satisfy the second
of Rule 702’s requirements—that an expert’s testimony be based on sufficient facts or data. Reply
Br. at 5.
46
D.R.E. 703.
17
machines. All three, basing their opinions on observations of either calibration data

or the results returned by “neat” samples as permitted by the rules of evidence,

testified that the machines were operating properly.

Stevens had numerous tools at his disposal to attack the State’s toxicology

evidence if, in fact, the calibration of the LC-MS/MS machines was faulty. Under

Superior Court Criminal Rule 16(b)(1)(F), the State is required to permit a defendant

to inspect “any results or reports of . . . scientific tests or experiments . . . that are

material to the preparation of the defense.” This rule plainly encompasses

calibration data for the LC-MS/MS machines, but the record does not show that

Stevens ever took advantage of this discovery tool.47 In fact, two witnesses stated

that they had physical copies of documents containing LC-MS/MS calibration data

or similar test results with them in the courtroom, but Stevens did not request it.48

D.R.E. 705(b) also permits a defendant to object to testimony by an expert witness

on the grounds that the expert lacks a sufficient basis for expressing an opinion and

47
The record does show that the State provided to Stevens the toxicology results, CVs of each
expert witness, and chain of custody documentation for Stevens’s blood sample. Letter from
James Betts, Esq. to Defense Counsel, State v. Stevens, No. 2212008180 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 23,
2023) (Dkt. 4). During the sidebar conference to discuss Stevens’s initial objection to the
toxicology evidence, Stevens claimed to have made a broad discovery request under Superior
Court Criminal Rule 16. The trial judge noted, however, that there was no specific request for
bench notes or calibration data. App. to Opening Br. at A153–54. Nor does the record show that
there was any discovery dispute before trial. The trial judge also gave Stevens the opportunity to
raise the issue again post-trial if Stevens believed that there had been a “miscarriage of justice.”
Id. at A154. Stevens did not do so.
48
App. to Opening Br. at A185, A202.
18
“conduct a voir dire examination directed to the underlying facts or data on which

the opinion is based.” Complementing D.R.E. 705(b), Superior Court Criminal Rule

16(b)(1)(G) requires the State to disclose, upon request from the defendant, “any

evidence which the State may present at trial under [D.R.E.] 702, 703, or 705.”

Stevens did not take advantage of these tools either.

In his reply brief, Stevens raises for the first time the argument that this court

should follow United States v. Sheppard,49 an unreported case from a federal district

court in Kentucky. This argument is waived.50 In any case, Sheppard is

distinguishable. In Sheppard, the trial judge excluded toxicology evidence where

the defendant had requested, but the government was unable to provide, calibration

data showing that the machines used to conduct a blood test of samples from victims

harmed by drugs allegedly supplied by the defendant were operating accurately. The

Sheppard court excluded the toxicology evidence because the calibration data was

unavailable altogether, so the testimony through which the government sought to

show that the testing was reliable consisted only of descriptions of the lab’s standard

practices.51 Here, by contrast, the State’s witnesses testified in reliance on actual

49
2021 WL 1700356 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 29, 2021).
50
See Supr. Ct. R. 14(b)(vi)(A)(3).
51
Sheppard, 2021 WL 1700356, at *5 (“Simply, [the expert’s] reliance on [the lab’s] standard
procedures is not enough to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the . . . testing was
done properly.”).
19
calibration data concerning the machines and tests at issue—data that was available

and could have been obtained by the defense.

To sum up, McConnell provides no bright-line rule that a certification sheet

from the State Chemist or other calibration data must be produced before blood-

intoxicant test results from LC-MS/MS machines may be admitted into evidence.

Nor do our established rules of evidence.52 In light of the fact that the court heard

extensive testimony from expert witnesses based on their observations of the

calibration data indicating that the machines were properly calibrated, and that

Stevens presented no evidence showing that this testimony was not based on

sufficient facts and data, we conclude that the Superior Court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting that testimony and the LC-MS/MS results contained within

it.

52
Even if our rules of evidence suggested otherwise, the General Assembly has supplemented
these rules in DUI cases. The toxicology evidence may well have been introduced under 21 Del.
C. § 4177(h)(1), which provides that

[f]or the purpose of introducing evidence of a person’s alcohol concentration or the
presence or concentration of any drug pursuant to this section, a report signed by
the Forensic Toxicologist, Forensic Chemist or State Police Forensic Analytical
Chemist who performed the test or tests as to its nature is prima facie evidence,
without the necessity of the [expert witness] personally appearing in court.

So long as the report meets certain criteria as defined in the statute, the toxicology results contained
within are prima facie evidence of intoxication—subject to challenge by the defendant. Because
we determine that the State’s toxicology evidence was admissible under the traditional rules of
evidence, we do not address its introduction under this alternative route.
20
IV

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Stevens’s convictions.

21