In re Bianca K.

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IN RE BIANCA K.*
(AC 41819)
Lavine, Prescott and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed to this court from the judgment of the
trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor
child. Held:
1. The respondent mother’s claim that the trial court erred in concluding
that she failed to achieve the requisite degree of personal rehabilitation
required by statute (§ 17a-112 [j] [3] [B] [i]) was unavailing; although
the mother asserted, and the court acknowledged, that she had made
substantial progress toward the completion of certain specific steps
ordered by the court, the court reasonably found that the mother had
failed to understand the impact of domestic violence on her and the
minor child given the evidence concerning the mother’s relationship
with J, which was marked by a history of domestic violence and sub-
stance abuse, that she had continued to have a relationship with J
notwithstanding his violent behavior, and that she failed to recognize
the dangers that his violent history posed to her and her child, and
although there was no specific step that precluded the mother from
having contact with J, the court was not strictly bound by the enumerated
specific steps when determining whether the mother had failed to reha-
bilitate, and the cumulative effect of the evidence presented was suffi-
cient to justify the court’s determination that the mother had failed to
achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation as required by § 17a-112 (j)
(3) (B) (i).
2. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that the trial court
improperly determined that the termination of her parental rights was
in the best interest of the minor child; that court made specific findings
with respect to each of the seven factors delineated by statute (§ 17a-
112 [k]), including finding that the termination of the mother’s parental
rights would provide the minor child with a consistent, stable, safe, and
secure environment, and although the court found that the mother and
the minor child shared a close bond, it was not clearly erroneous for
the court to conclude that it was in the best interest of the minor child
to terminate the mother’s parental rights.
Argued January 3–officially released February 26, 2019**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, Child Protec-
tion Session at Middletown, and tried to the court, Hon.
Barbara M. Quinn, judge trial referee; judgment termi-
nating the respondents’ parental rights, from which the
respondent mother appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Ani A. Desilets, with whom was Lisa M. Vincent, for
the appellant (respondent mother).
Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, former attor-
ney general, and Rachel Catanese, legal intern, for the
appellee (petitioner).
Ellin M. Grenger, with whom, on the brief, was Rose-
mary J. Dempsey, for the minor child.
Opinion

BISHOP, J. The respondent mother appeals from the
judgment of the trial court terminating her parental
rights with respect to her minor child, Bianca K.1 On
appeal the respondent claims that the court improperly
concluded that (1) by the clear and convincing evidence
adduced at the termination hearing, she had failed to
achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation within the
meaning of General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i),
and (2) that the termination of her parental rights was
in the best interest of the child. We affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
The court found the following pertinent facts:2 ‘‘On
August 27, 2017, the [Commissioner] of Children and
Families [commissioner] . . . filed a petition for the
termination of the parental rights of [the respondent]
. . . to [her] daughter, Bianca. The child was first
removed from her parents on an order of temporary
custody on July 1, 2014, when she was not yet three
years old. She was returned to her mother about a year
later under an order of protective supervision on July
30, 2015. She was removed for the second time on March
7, 2016, when testing revealed that her mother was still
abusing illegal drugs and was generally noncompliant
with the other conditions of protective supervision.
Bianca has been in nonrelative foster care since that
time. . . .
‘‘[The respondent] is now twenty-eight years old and
Bianca is her only child. She also experienced a dysfunc-
tional family growing up, with [Department of Children
and Families (department)] involvement and time spent
in relative care during her childhood and teenage years.
[The respondent’s] mother has struggled with mental
health and substance abuse issues. [The respondent’s]
two adult relationships with intimate partners have
involved domestic violence and substance abuse, as
well as mental health difficulties for herself and her
partners. [The department] and the police have been
involved with her at various times since [2014]. During
much of this time, she has not been cooperative with
[the department], conduct she shares with many chil-
dren who have rejected [the department] due to the
agency’s involvement in their earlier lives. [The respon-
dent] has not only been resistant to services, but secre-
tive and quite misleading as to the details of her life.
‘‘[The respondent] began using alcohol, marijuana
and cocaine as a teenager in high school. She failed
to graduate, although she believes she did quite well.
However, she has not to this date earned her equiva-
lency diploma. After she stopped going to school, she
continued her cocaine use. She was arrested, convicted
and incarcerated at age nineteen. After her child was
born, she did not change her drug-abusing behavior.
She broke up with the father of her child soon after
Bianca’s birth and began a relationship with James P.,
someone she had known since high school. Bianca sees
James as her father. James, like Bianca’s biological
father, has engaged in domestic violence toward Bianca
and her mother and continues to be very heavily
involved in drug abuse. He is a convicted felon and has
been incarcerated a number of times. . . .
‘‘[The respondent] and her child came to the attention
of [the department] early in Bianca’s life. Consistent
with the policy of trying to keep families together,
Bianca was not immediately removed from [the respon-
dent’s] care, yet the neglectful and potentially life
threatening incidents did not end. The first event
occurred in 2013 when Bianca was eighteen months
old. She ingested Klonopin, which she apparently found
loose in the back of her mother’s car. [The respondent],
when questioned, first denied it was her medication but
later admitted that it was. Next, there was a police visit
to the home where Bianca’s grandmother reported that
she had a fight with James P. and she was thrown to
the ground, while James and [the respondent] held her
there. They were all living in her house at that time.
All three adults were reported to be intoxicated at that
time, while Bianca was in the house. Next, in July of that
year, when Bianca was not yet two, her grandmother
apparently saw James P. strike Bianca. He was arrested
for his conduct.3 In March, 2014, when Bianca was two
and [one-half years old], James was arrested for selling
heroin from his car, while Bianca and her mother were
in the car with him. [The respondent] admitted at that
time to opiate abuse. In June of 2014, James broke into
the house and attempted to strangle [the respondent].
. . . [I]n July, 2014, Bianca was treated for an overdose
of Suboxone, her mother’s pills, which she had found
and ingested. She was very lethargic and was hospital-
ized. It was this last of these many neglectful events
which brought about the first order of temporary cus-
tody and Bianca’s removal from her mother’s home and
chaotic drug-impacted lifestyle.
‘‘During the next year, [the respondent] attended pro-
grams to which she was referred for treatment of drug
addiction, counseling, and domestic violence. She
received parenting education and had regular visitation.
As she testified [at] trial, [the respondent] did the things
she was supposed to do, and said what she had to say
in order to have Bianca returned to her care. She now
admits she did not really change her behavior or inter-
nalize any of the behavioral changes needed.
‘‘Bianca was returned home to [the respondent] in
June, 2015, when she was not yet four years old.
[Department] services continued for a period of time,
but [the respondent’s] participation was inconsistent.
She participated in a child and family reunification ther-
apeutic family time program, but was discharged when
she attended less than half of the sessions. She also
did not consistently engage in therapy during this time.
She did not routinely attend random urine drug screen-
ings [and the department] was very concerned about
her continued contact with James P., despite his known
drug use and his documented abuse of Bianca. Fears
about [the respondent’s] own drug use and the lack of
urine screenings made [the department] insist upon a
hair test. When the test was completed in February,
2016, the test showed continued illegal opiate use,
which [the respondent] denied. As was typical, she later
admitted to such use. Bianca was again removed from
her mother’s care under an order of temporary custody,
given her mother’s behavior, continued drug use and
lack of compliance with her specific steps. At the time
of the removal in March, 2016, Bianca was four and
one-half years old. . . .
‘‘Bianca was placed in a [nonrelative] foster care
home where she has remained since her removal from
her mother’s care in 2016. She has done well there, but
as her foster mother testified, from time to time, she
will become sad and want to go home to her mother.
. . . It is apparent that Bianca remains closely attached
to her mother with whom she enjoys a comfortable
visiting relationship. It is a connection that she and [the
respondent] both enjoy.
‘‘As has been the case before, specific steps were
issued for [the respondent] for services and programs
in which to participate before she could be reunited
with Bianca. These services include counseling, drug
treatment and a component for her to understand the
impact of domestic violence on her as well as its seri-
ousness for her daughter and the potential for additional
abuse in the future. As was the case in the past, [the
respondent] attended fitfully with starts and stops. She
successfully completed the drug treatment component
of her specific steps and the various programs for such
treatment. She has participated in parenting education
and has done well.’’ (Footnote added.)
The court addressed the respondent’s continued rela-
tionship with James and her attempts to conceal the
relationship from the department despite James’ past
violent conduct toward her and Bianca. It stated: ‘‘The
court received a DVD into evidence, which shows [the
respondent] and James at a Henny Penny and shopping
at a market. It is very apparent that they are closely
connected, as evidenced by their body language and
the frequency with which the social worker randomly
encountered them together in the community. The
social worker’s information makes [the respondent’s]
testimony about these events less than credible. One
event took place when James’ car broke down on an off-
ramp. [The respondent] was seen by the social worker
helping him and then they went to the Henny Penny for
gas. Next, she saw them at a market shopping together.
While they [entered] the store at separate times, while
shopping, the video shows them interacting and
together. Neither of these events was disclosed by [the
respondent] to [the department] until she was con-
fronted. The court concludes that the two of them con-
tinue to be involved with each other in some fashion,
and therein lies the problem.
‘‘[The department] also received information from
[the respondent’s] neighbor in December, 2017, con-
cerning James’ presence in the home, which [the
respondent] denies to this day. Specifically, the neigh-
bor said that James was there regularly.4 Certainly, the
evidence is that a truck, which [the respondent] viewed
as belonging to James, was registered and insured in
her own name. The truck was parked next to the neigh-
bor’s part of the duplex in which [the respondent]
resides. In addition, James is known to drink a certain
alcoholic drink and an empty can of it was found outside
[the respondent’s] home in early 2018. While none of
this information directly proves that James was present
in the home, it strains the court’s credulity, when com-
bined with all the other evidence, to imagine that the
two of them have not had regular contact. [The respon-
dent] does admit that, from time to time, she and James
share a meal and she continues to see nothing wrong
with that contact. While [the respondent] certainly is
entitled to have such friends as she finds appropriate,
when her desire for maintaining an old and harmful
friendship is in direct conflict with her desire to have
Bianca returned to her care, concerns for Bianca’s
safety must remain paramount. It is clear from the evi-
dence that Bianca cannot safely be returned home.’’
(Footnotes added and omitted.) This appeal followed.
I
The respondent first claims that the trial court
improperly concluded by clear and convincing evidence
that she had failed to achieve sufficient personal reha-
bilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i).
Specifically, the respondent argues that the court, in
concluding that she failed to rehabilitate, ‘‘undervalued’’
the substantial progress she made toward the comple-
tion of specific steps ordered by the court. Citing to
her sobriety, her procurement of stable housing and an
income, the completion of parenting classes, and the
progress she has made in therapy, the respondent
claims that she has in fact rehabilitated. We are not per-
suaded.
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard
of review and relevant legal principles that guide our
analysis. ‘‘Proceedings to terminate parental rights are
governed by § 17a-112. . . . Under [that provision], a
hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights con-
sists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and disposi-
tional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial
court must determine whether one or more . . .
grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in
§ 17a-112 [(j) (3)] exists by clear and convincing evi-
dence. The commissioner . . . in petitioning to termi-
nate those rights, must allege and prove one or more
of the statutory grounds. . . . Clear and convincing
proof is a demanding standard denot[ing] a degree of
belief that lies between the belief that is required to
find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an
ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to
find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden]
is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier
a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly
probably true, that the probability that they are true or
exist is substantially greater than the probability that
they are false or do not exist. . . . If the trial court
determines that the petitioner has failed to meet this
high burden, it must deny the petition.’’ (Citations omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Mariana
A., 181 Conn. App. 415, 427–28, 186 A.3d 83 (2018).
‘‘Personal rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a–112 (j) (3)
(B) (i)] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or
her former constructive and useful role as a parent.
. . . The statute does not require [a parent] to prove
precisely when [she] will be able to assume a responsi-
ble position in [her] child’s life. Nor does it require
[her] to prove that [she] will be able to assume full
responsibility for [her] child, unaided by available sup-
port systems. . . . Rather, [§ 17a-112] requires the trial
court to analyze the [parent’s] rehabilitative status as
it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further,
that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a
reasonable time. . . . [The statute] requires the court
to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level
of rehabilitation [the parent] has achieved, if any, falls
short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief
that at some future date [he or she] can assume a
responsible position in [his or her] child’s life. . . . [I]n
assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether
the parent has improved [his or her] ability to manage
[his or her] own life, but rather whether [he or she] has
gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the
child at issue.’’ In re Lilyana P., 169 Conn. App. 708,
717–18, 152 A.3d 99 (2016), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 916,
153 A.3d 1290 (2017).
‘‘Our Supreme Court has clarified that [a] conclusion
of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from both the trial
court’s factual findings and from its weighing of the
facts in assessing whether those findings satisfy the
failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in § 17a-112 (j)
(3) (B). Accordingly . . . the appropriate standard of
review is one of evidentiary sufficiency, that is, whether
the trial court could have reasonably concluded, upon
the facts established and the reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evi-
dence was sufficient to justify its [ultimate conclusion].
. . . When applying this standard, we construe the evi-
dence in a manner most favorable to sustaining the
judgment of the trial court. . . . We will not disturb
the court’s subordinate factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Damian G., 178 Conn. App. 220, 237, 174 A.3d
232 (2017), cert. denied, 328 Conn. 902, 177 A.3d 563
(2018). ‘‘A factual finding is clearly erroneous when it
is not supported by any evidence in the record or when
there is evidence to support it, but the reviewing court
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mis-
take has been made.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Bauer v. Bauer, 173 Conn. App. 595, 601, 164 A.3d
796 (2017).
We turn now to the application of this statutory and
decisional law to the matter at hand. Although the court
acknowledged in its findings that the respondent had
made substantial progress with respect to the specific
steps she relies on in her claim, the court concluded,
as noted in its thorough and well reasoned memoran-
dum of decision, that the respondent has failed to
‘‘understand the impact of domestic violence on her as
well as its seriousness for her daughter and the potential
for additional abuse in the future,’’ as required by one
of the specific steps provided to her after Bianca had
been taken into the commissioner’s temporary cus-
tody.5 To support its determination, the court explained
that the respondent has completely failed to understand
that maintaining a relationship with James, platonic or
otherwise, raises concern for Bianca’s safety and is
detrimental to the respondent’s unification efforts.
Indeed, the respondent, through counsel, conceded in
her principal appellate brief that ‘‘the risk of Bianca
being exposed to domestic violence is far greater with
James in the picture, and this is precisely the reason
why [the respondent] has not brought James around
Bianca.’’ Further, despite the respondent’s insistence
that she has had minimal contact with James, the court
found the respondent’s testimony to be entirely incredi-
ble and demonstrated that she was unable to under-
stand why she could not have contact with James, that
she has yet to acknowledge the harm James caused to
her and Bianca, and that she even seemed to excuse
James’ violent behavior toward Bianca. On review, we
are mindful of the principle that ‘‘[i]t is the exclusive
province of the trier of fact to weigh conflicting testi-
mony and make determinations of credibility, crediting
some, all or none of any given witness’ testimony. . . .
Questions of whether to believe or to disbelieve a com-
petent witness are beyond our review.’’ State v.
DeMarco, 311 Conn. 510, 519–20, 88 A.3d 491 (2014).
When construing the evidence available to us in a
manner most favorable to sustaining the judgment of
the trial court, it is apparent that the court’s subordinate
findings were not clearly erroneous and that the evi-
dence was sufficient to support the court’s conclusion
that the respondent has failed to rehabilitate. The
respondent does not dispute that she still maintains
a relationship with James and that she has not been
forthcoming with the department about her repeated
contact with him. To further support its conclusion, the
court refers in its memorandum of decision to, inter
alia, the respondent’s deceitful conduct and failure to
disclose that she was having contact with James, video
evidence of the respondent and James shopping
together, photographs of James’ truck parked near the
respondent’s residence, an empty can of James’ alco-
holic beverage of choice outside of her home, and testi-
mony from a neighbor that James frequently visits the
respondent’s home. Moreover, the court found credible
a social study of the respondent performed by Kelly
F. Rogers, a court-appointed psychologist. Specifically,
the court found persuasive Rogers’ assessment that the
respondent was likely to take advantage of the goodwill
of others and tended to blame others and her perceived
unfair treatment to justify her actions.
Her contact with James notwithstanding, the respon-
dent argues that her specific steps for reunification did
not stipulate that she was to have no contact with James
and that she is free to associate with whomever she
wishes. Although there was no specific step that pre-
cluded contact with James, our Supreme Court has
made clear that a court is not strictly bound by the
enumerated specific steps when determining whether
a parent has failed to rehabilitate. ‘‘Although . . . spe-
cific steps provide a benchmark by which the court
measures whether either reunification or termination
of parental rights is appropriate, the court necessarily
will consider the underlying adjudication and the atten-
dant findings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In
re Natalie S., 325 Conn. 833, 844, 160 A.3d 1056 (2017).
‘‘Specific steps provide notice and guidance to a parent
as to what should be done to facilitate reunification
and prevent termination of rights. Their completion or
noncompletion, however, does not guarantee any out-
come. A parent may complete all of the specific steps
and still be found to have failed to rehabilitate. . . .
Conversely, a parent could fall somewhat short in com-
pleting the ordered steps, but still be found to have
achieved sufficient progress so as to preclude a termina-
tion of his or her rights based on a failure to rehabili-
tate.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485, 507–508, 78
A.3d 797 (2013). ‘‘Our Supreme Court has stated that [i]n
determining whether a parent has achieved sufficient
personal rehabilitation, a court may consider whether
the parent has corrected factors that led to the initial
commitment, regardless of whether those factors were
included in specific expectations ordered by the court
or imposed by the department. . . . Accordingly, suc-
cessful completion of expressly articulated expecta-
tions is not sufficient to defeat a department claim that
the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jazmine B.,
121 Conn. App. 376, 390–91, 996 A.2d 286, cert. denied,
297 Conn. 924, 998 A.2d 168 (2010).
On the basis of the record and mindful of controlling
law, we conclude that it was proper for the court, in
deciding that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate,
to consider the respondent’s continued contact with
James and her reluctance to accept that, given James’
history of violence toward her and Bianca, his presence
in the respondent’s life posed a credible threat to Bian-
ca’s safety and demonstrated a lack of understanding
of the impact of domestic violence on her and Bianca.
Thus, on the basis of the cumulative effect of the evi-
dence presented, there was sufficient evidence to estab-
lish the court’s ultimate conclusion that the respondent
failed to rehabilitate within the meaning of § 17a-112
(j) (3) (B) (i).6
II
The respondent next claims that the trial court
improperly concluded that the termination of her paren-
tal rights was in the best interest of the child. Specifi-
cally, the respondent argues that because of the close
bond shared between her and Bianca, termination of
her parental rights is not in the best interest of the
child. We disagree.
We begin our analysis by setting forth the relevant
legal principles and standard of review. ‘‘In the disposi-
tional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing,
the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of
the parent to the best interest of the child. . . . It is
well settled that we will overturn the trial court’s deci-
sion that the termination of parental rights is in the
best interest of the [child] only if the court’s findings
are clearly erroneous. . . . The best interests of the
child include the child’s interests in sustained growth,
development, well-being, and continuity and stability
of [his or her] environment. . . . In the dispositional
phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the
trial court must determine whether it is established by
clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of
the respondent’s parental rights is not in the best inter-
est of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court
is mandated to consider and make written findings
regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a-112 (k)].
. . . The seven factors serve simply as guidelines for
the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need
to be proven before termination can be ordered. . . .
There is no requirement that each factor be proven
by clear and convincing evidence.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Athena C., 181 Conn. App. 803,
811, 186 A.3d 1198, cert. denied, 329 Conn. 911, 186
A.3d 14 (2018).
The court, in its memorandum of decision, made writ-
ten findings regarding the seven factors. In its findings,
the court acknowledged and considered the bond
between the respondent and Bianca in making its deter-
mination to terminate the respondent’s parental rights.
Nonetheless, ‘‘[o]ur courts consistently have held that
even when there is a finding of a bond between parent
and a child, it still may be in the child’s best interest
to terminate parental rights.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Daniel A., 150 Conn. App. 78, 104, 89
A.3d 1040, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 911, 93 A.3d 593
(2014). Such was the finding in the present case. Specifi-
cally, the court noted that termination of the respon-
dent’s parental rights would enable Bianca to grow up
in a consistent, stable, safe, and secure environment
where she would be able to overcome issues associated
with her upbringing thus far. As a result, it was not
clearly erroneous for the court to conclude that it was
in the best interest of the child to terminate the respon-
dent’s parental rights even while recognizing the contin-
uing bond between the respondent and Bianca.7
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the Appellate Court.
** February 26, 2019, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
1
The parental rights of Bianca’s biological father were terminated in the
same proceeding after he was defaulted for his failure to appear. He did
not participate in this appeal.
2
Pursuant to Practice Book § 63-4 (a) (2), the respondent certified that
no transcripts were necessary for the resolution of this appeal. See also
Practice Book § 63-8. As a result, our review of the record is confined to
the trial court file, exhibits marked at trial, and the respective appendices
submitted by the parties.
3
James admitted to slapping Bianca in the face and was charged with
risk of injury to a child.
4
The court recognized that there were credibility issues concerning the
neighbor’s testimony, particularly because she withdrew some statements
she made during her deposition. The court, however, determined that the
‘‘cumulative weight of all the tangential evidence and [the respondent’s]
general secretive and manipulative behavior and testimony . . . persuades
the court that James P. is regularly present in her life.’’
5
The record reflects that after the court had issued its second order of
temporary custody of Bianca on March 7, 2016, the court issued several
specific steps to the respondent to facilitate Bianca’s return to her. Although
none of these steps made explicit reference to James, one step required the
respondent to make progress toward addressing the impact of domestic
violence as part of her required counseling. It is clear from the record that
the trial court found that the respondent’s continuing relationship with
James was strong evidence of the respondent’s failure to adhere to this step.
6
In its memorandum of decision, the court stated its belief that the respon-
dent had been impregnated by James after being evaluated by the court-
appointed psychologist. The respondent asserts that this was an erroneous
finding by the court and that the record reflects only that she was impreg-
nated and had her pregnancy terminated prior to her evaluation with Rogers.
Even if this factual finding was made in error, this discrepancy alone does
not demonstrate that the court’s finding that the respondent had failed to
rehabilitate was clearly erroneous. As previously set forth, the court relied
on a plethora of other factual findings to determine that the respondent
had failed to rehabilitate. Thus, we conclude that this finding, even if errone-
ous, does not erode our conclusion with respect to the court’s factual
findings regarding the respondent’s failure to rehabilitate.
7
The respondent also argues, without citing to any authority, that the
trial court committed ‘‘clear error’’ in considering the testimony of Bianca’s
foster mother, who stated that she would be willing to permit the respondent
to continue to have contact with Bianca even after the termination of the
respondent’s parental rights. Specifically, the court stated: ‘‘In this case, the
foster mother testified to her awareness of the child’s connection to her
mother and indicated her willingness to permit contact, even after termina-
tion, if that is the outcome.’’ The respondent cannot demonstrate that this
statement was integral to the court’s analysis and ultimate conclusion that
termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in the best interest of
the child. Rather, this statement appears to be an acknowledgement of the
continuing bond between the respondent and Bianca. As previously noted,
the strong bond between parent and child is not dispositive as to whether
it is in the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights. Further,
the trial court’s memorandum of decision is replete with facts supporting
the conclusion that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in
the best interest of the child.