In re Nevaeh T.

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In re Nevaeh T.

IN RE NEVAEH T.*
(AC 49495)
Elgo, Clark and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed from the trial court’s judgment terminat-
ing his parental rights with respect to his minor child, N, and denying his
motion for posttermination visitation or contact. The father claimed that
the court improperly denied his motion for posttermination visitation or
contact because the court did not properly weigh the informed preference of
N to have continued contact with him through letters or phone calls. Held:

The respondent father’s claim that the trial court improperly denied his
motion for posttermination contact between him and N was unavailing,
as this court could not conclude that the trial court erred in finding that a
posttermination contact order was not necessary or appropriate to secure
N’s welfare, protection, proper care and suitable support.

Argued May 28—officially released June 17, 2026**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Haven, Juvenile
Matters, where the case was tried to the court, Conway,
J.; judgment terminating the respondents’ parental
rights and denying the respondent father’s motion for
posttermination visitation or contact, from which the
respondent father appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(respondent father).
Alma Rose Nunley, assistant solicitor general, with
whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general,
*
In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-
142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in
this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall
be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein
and upon order of the court.
**
June 17, 2026, the date that this decision was released as a slip opin-
ion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
In re Nevaeh T.

and Heather J. Wilson, assistant attorney general, for
the appellee (petitioner).

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The respondent father, Dennis M.,1
appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminat-
ing his parental rights with respect to, and denying his
motion for posttermination visitation or contact with,
his minor daughter, Nevaeh T. (Nevaeh).2 On appeal, the
respondent challenges only the court’s decision denying
his motion for posttermination visitation or contact with
Nevaeh. Specifically, he claims that the court, in deny-
ing his motion, did not properly weigh the “informed
preference” of Nevaeh to have continued contact with
the respondent through letters or phone calls. We affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the court by clear
and convincing evidence, and procedural history are
relevant to our resolution of this appeal. In early March
2023, Nevaeh, along with her mother, Felicia T., and
two brothers, Xavier T. (Xavier) and Robert T. (Rob-
ert), “were living with Dawne M. and Daniel C., unre-
lated acquaintances of [Felicia T.].3 Nevaeh referred to
Dawne M. as ‘aunt’ and Daniel C. as ‘uncle.’ ” (Footnote
added.) “On or about March 2, 2023, Nevaeh’s school
staff reported concerns regarding Nevaeh’s presenta-
tion; she was sad and withdrawn with ongoing hygiene
issues. Additionally, Nevaeh had sent an email from her
school Chromebook alleging [that] she was being abused
by Dawne M. . . . [An employee of the Department of
Children and Families (department)] met with Nevaeh
at the school, and, in addition to what the school had
1
The court also terminated the parental rights of the respondent
mother, Felicia T. Because Felicia T. is not involved in this appeal, our
references in this opinion to the respondent are to the respondent father.
2
The attorney for the minor child filed a statement adopting the brief
of the petitioner in this appeal, the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies, pursuant to Practice Book §§ 67-13 and 79a-6 (c).
3
At that time, Nevaeh was ten years old, Xavier was thirteen years
old, and Robert was four years old.
In re Nevaeh T.

observed, the worker noted various bruises on Nevaeh’s
body. . . . Subsequently, upon visiting the family home,
the department found the home to be in deplorable condi-
tion, filthy, with animal feces spread over floors, mari-
juana paraphernalia accessible to the children, trash on
the floor and the presence of significant clutter. Like
Nevaeh, the boys presented disheveled and unkempt.
The children were sent to stay with a family friend to
afford [Felicia T.] an opportunity to clean up the home.
The children returned home a few days later. . . .
“On March 9 [2023], Nevaeh, again using her school
Chromebook, emailed a friend and disclosed [that] she
was being touched in her vagina by Dawne M. Nevaeh
had sent a similar email on March 7 [2023] but [Felicia
T.] deleted the email. [Felicia T.] initially denied delet-
ing the email but eventually admitted [that] she [had]
deleted the email to prevent the children from being
removed from her care and because she . . . did not believe
Nevaeh’s disclosure that Dawne M. had inappropriately
touched her.”4 (Footnote omitted.)
On March 9, 2023, the department “invoked a ninety-
six hour hold and assumed temporary custody of the three
children. On or about March 13, 2023, the [petitioner,
the Commissioner of Children and Families] sought and
obtained an order of temporary custody . . . of the three
children, and, on or about June 15, 2023, the children
were adjudicated neglected and committed to the . . .
custody [of the petitioner]. The children have remained
in the department’s care continuously since March 9,
2023.” Initially, the three children were placed together
in a foster home of a relative, but Nevaeh struggled with
that placement. In May 2023, she transitioned to her
third and current foster home, which is a nonrelative,
therapeutic foster home.
After Nevaeh was removed from Felicia T.’s care, she
“disclosed [that] she [slept] in the same bed with Dawne
M. and Daniel C. Nevaeh eventually disclosed that both
4
Nevaeh was sexually assaulted by a neighbor when Nevaeh was eight
years old and living elsewhere with her mother.
In re Nevaeh T.

Dawne M. and Daniel C. physically assaulted her as a form
[of] discipline and [that] they attempted to get Xavier to
hit Nevaeh. [Felicia T.] often left the children in the care
of Dawne M., even after Nevaeh had disclosed abuse.5”
(Footnote in original; footnote omitted.)
The respondent had ceased all contact with Nevaeh
when she was approximately five years old. He did so
because he and Felicia T. “did not get along and disagreed
on child-rearing practices.” The respondent currently is
incarcerated in connection with a 2021 conviction “of
sexually assaulting and having sexual contact with a
minor in 2017.6 His 2017 victim was his live-in (now) [for-
mer girlfriend’s] minor daughter. On or about February
1, 2023, he was sentenced to the custody of the Commis-
sioner of Correction . . . for eighteen years, execution . . .
suspended after he serves . . . eight years and five months
. . . followed by ten years of probation. Additionally, he
is listed on the state’s sex offender registry for ten years.
. . . [His] maximum prison release date is March 2029,
but he reports [that] he expects to have a parole hearing
in late 2025 or shortly thereafter.7” (Footnote added;
footnote in original; footnote omitted.)
“Once the [petitioner] assumed custody of the children,
[the respondent] contacted the department seeking to
reconnect with Nevaeh.” Nevaeh, however, was unaware
that her father was alive. Therefore, “the department
sought guidance and direction from Nevaeh’s therapist
as to when and how to inform Nevaeh [that] her father
5
“One or more of the children underwent a forensic evaluation regard-
ing the abuse and neglect allegations. The authorities sought and
obtained arrest warrants for Dawne M. and Daniel C. At the time of
trial . . . the status of [their] criminal cases [was unclear].”
6
The respondent “was first incarcerated on the 2017 sexual assault
charges in November 2020, and he has remained continuously incar-
cerated to date.”
7
“[Pursuant to] exhibit F . . . [the respondent] is eligible for a parole
hearing in December 2024. Whether a parole hearing was held in 2024
and parole was denied, or [whether] December 2024 is a typographical
error and a parole hearing is to take place in December 2025 is unclear.
Even if a parole hearing is held in late 2025 or in 2026, there is no [way]
to discern the likelihood of [the respondent’s] release prior to 2029.”
In re Nevaeh T.

was alive and wanted contact with her. It took time for
Nevaeh to process said information but, in approxi-
mately December 2023, in person monthly supervised
father-child prison visits commenced.” “Thirteen year
old Nevaeh and [the respondent] enjoy their monthly
prison visits, although initially Nevaeh expressed a level
of discomfort with being inside a prison. And, on at least
one occasion, Nevaeh declined phone calls or FaceTime
contact with [the respondent] because she did not like
his negative comments about [Felicia T.].”8
On September 11, 2024, the petitioner filed a petition
for the termination of the parental rights of the respon-
dent and Felicia T. with respect to Nevaeh.9 A trial on
the termination petition took place over the course of
three days: July 17 and 22 and August 27, 2025. Just
prior to the commencement of trial, on July 11, 2025, the
respondent filed a motion for a posttermination visitation
or contact order,10 and Felicia T. filed a similar motion
seeking posttermination visitation with Nevaeh on July
15, 2025. The parties agreed to have their motions seek-
ing posttermination visitation consolidated with the trial
8
On two other occasions in 2025, “Nevaeh did not make herself avail-
able for transport to a scheduled prison visit. In July 2025, when the
department social worker went to pick up Nevaeh and take her to the
prison visit, Nevaeh was not home. Nevaeh had walked from the foster
home to summer camp, and she later admitted [that] she wanted to go
to camp and not to the prison. In August 2025, Nevaeh opted to go to
a church social event rather than to the prison visit.”
9
The petitioner also had filed petitions for the termination of Felicia
T.’s parental rights with respect to Xavier and Robert, neither of whom
is a child of the respondent. Those petitions were tried together with
the termination petition regarding Nevaeh.
10
In his motion, the respondent alleged that, pursuant to In re Ava
W., 336 Conn. 545, 248 A.3d 675 (2020), “this court has the author-
ity to enter an appropriate order concerning parent-child visitation,
even after the granting of a [termination of parental rights] petition”;
that he “is appropriate and nurturing in visits and interaction with
[Nevaeh]”; that “[a] clear bond has been established and exists between
[the respondent] and [Nevaeh]”; and that Nevaeh’s “[c]ontinuing visita-
tion and contact with [the respondent] would be necessary or appropriate
to secure the welfare, protection, proper care and suitable support of
[Nevaeh]. Further, visitation and contact would be appropriate and in
the best interests of [Nevaeh].”
In re Nevaeh T.

on the termination petition. “Neither parent testified
or presented witnesses or evidence in support of their
motions, other than through cross-examination of the
petitioner’s witnesses and exhibits in the termination
case.11 Additionally, neither [parent] proffered specif-
ics as to the frequency, duration, location, or mode of
posttermination visitation/contact being requested.”
(Footnote added.)
On October 31, 2025, following the trial, the court
issued a memorandum of decision in which it termi-
nated the respondent’s parental rights12 with respect
to Nevaeh,13 which the respondent does not challenge
on appeal, and denied the respondent’s motion for post-
termination visitation or contact with Nevaeh. The fol-
lowing additional findings by the court are relevant
to its decision denying the respondent’s motion. “In
2024, Nevaeh [had] informed [the respondent] that she
wanted to be adopted by her foster mother. [The respon-
dent] reacted appropriately to Nevaeh’s announcement
and assured Nevaeh [that] he supported her decision.
[The respondent] recognizes [that] he is not a placement
11
At the termination trial, the petitioner presented testimony from
Jessica Biren-Caverly, a licensed psychologist who had performed a
psychological evaluation of Felicia T. and the three children in March
2025, and various social workers with the department, namely, Elizabeth
Herrera, Cheri Walker, Bianca Kennedy, and Lianna Carrero. The court
also admitted into evidence Biren-Caverly’s psychological evaluation;
the specific steps ordered for, and the certified criminal histories of,
the respondent and Felicia T.; and various social studies, permanency
plan studies and status reports of the department.
12
See footnote 1 of this opinion.
13
Specifically, in the adjudicatory phase, the court found, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the department had made reasonable
efforts in light of the limits imposed by the respondent’s incarceration
to reunify the respondent with Nevaeh and that, although the respon-
dent is willing, he is unable to benefit from reunification efforts. Next,
the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent
had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation as
would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable period of time, he
could assume a responsible position in Nevaeh’s life. Thereafter, in the
dispositional phase, the court considered the seven statutory factors in
General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) and determined that it was in Nevaeh’s
best interest to terminate the respondent’s parental rights.
In re Nevaeh T.

resource for Nevaeh but seeks ongoing contact with
Nevaeh if his parental rights were to be terminated.”
“Nevaeh’s nonrelative, therapeutic foster family is
made up of Nevaeh and [her] foster mother. Nevaeh has
lived with her foster mother for almost two and [one-half]
years. Nevaeh desires to be adopted by her foster mother. . . .
[T]hirteen year old Nevaeh desires to have in person
contact with [Felicia T.] posttermination. Nevaeh is only
open to limited contact with [the respondent] through
letters and phone calls.14 Nevaeh’s foster mother ada-
mantly objects to any form of posttermination visitation
[or] contact . . . involving either [the] respondent [or
Felicia T.]. She reports to the department that a court
imposed posttermination visitation/contact order may
cause her to reconsider adoption. Nevaeh is cognizant
[that her] foster mother is not keen on her having post-
termination in person contact with [the respondent] . . .
but Nevaeh is unaware [that] her foster mother may back
out of adopting her if a court-ordered visitation/contact
order were to [be] issue[d].
“In [the respondent’s] monthly prison visits with
Nevaeh and in his primarily one-sided correspondence
with Nevaeh, he encourages Nevaeh to do her best in
school and to behave appropriately. As discussed . . . [the
respondent] elected to sever contact with Nevaeh when
she was approximately five years old. He did not reappear
in her life until 2023, when she was approximately eleven
years old and he was serving a lengthy prison sentence
for sexually assaulting his girlfriend’s minor daughter
in 2017. The degree of his abandonment of Nevaeh was
such that Nevaeh was unaware [that] he was alive. She
only learned of his continued existence when, in con-
cert with Nevaeh’s clinician, the department informed
14
Lianna Carrero, a department social worker, testified about her
conversations with Nevaeh concerning posttermination contact with the
respondent, stating that, at the end of July 2025, Nevaeh had reported
to her that “she does not want in person contact with [the respondent]
postadoption, but she is open to letters and phone calls.”
In re Nevaeh T.

Nevaeh [that] her father was not only alive but wanted
her to visit him in prison.
“At best, Nevaeh and [the respondent] share a conge-
nial, monthly, supervised visitation session. . . . [F]or the
July and August 2025 scheduled prison visits, [however]
Nevaeh opted out of going to the visits. And she is clear
that, posttermination, she does not want in person con-
tact with [the respondent] and, at most, is open to letters
and calls from him.
“Nevaeh only regained [the respondent’s] attention
after he had spent a couple of years in prison (with sev-
eral more years still to serve) for sexually assaulting a
minor female. The foster mother shared with [a court
psychologist that] she is nervous about what will happen
after Nevaeh’s father is released from incarceration if
he knows her address. . . . Regardless of the merit of the
foster mother’s concerns regarding [the respondent], she
is steadfast in her desire for a closed adoption.
“The inherent baseness of [the respondent’s] child
sexual assault behavior (that ultimately resulted in a
protracted prison sentence followed by a decade long
period of probation and placement on the state’s sexual
offender registry), particularly given Nevaeh’s past
sexual and physical assault victimization, demand that
posttermination visitation/contact be scrupulously con-
sidered. [The respondent] has failed to provide this court
with any testimony or evidence that assuages the court’s
security concerns. The potential benefit, if any, that
Nevaeh may derive from a posttermination visitation
contact order as to [the respondent] [does not outweigh]
the potential harm such an order could potentially inflict
on Nevaeh’s emotional and physical well-being, or on her
relationship with [her] foster mother, or on her future
adoption possibilities. Having considered the . . . factors
[set forth in In re Ava W., 336 Conn. 545, 248 A.3d 675
(2020)], this court concludes [that] a posttermination
contact order is not necessary or appropriate to secure
Nevaeh’s welfare, protection, proper care and suitable
support. Accordingly, [the respondent’s] motion for
In re Nevaeh T.

posttermination visitation/contact is denied.” (Cita-
tions omitted; footnote added; footnotes omitted.) This
appeal followed.
On appeal, the respondent claims that denying his
motion for posttermination visitation or contact with
Nevaeh was not in Nevaeh’s “best interests15 and that
continued, though limited, contact with the [respon-
dent] is necessary and appropriate to secure [Nevaeh’s]
welfare, protection, proper care, and suitable support.”16
(Footnote added.) In particular, the respondent contends:
“Because [Nevaeh] is of an age where she can articulate
an informed position, and because the clinical evidence
supports [her] position, the trial court erred in denying
posttermination contact. Further, because the param-
eters of . . . posttermination visitation orders have not
been fully mapped by our reviewing courts, even to the
extent of whether such visitation should continue after
adoption, the weight to be given [a] minor child’s prefer-
ence as to posttermination visitation has not been fully
15
To the extent that the respondent claims that the best interest of the
child standard applies to the court’s decision concerning his motion for
posttermination visitation or contact, the claim fails. See In re Annessa
J., 343 Conn. 642, 670, 284 A.3d 562 (2022) (“trial courts must adhere
to the ‘necessary or appropriate’ standard set forth in [General Statutes]
§ 46b-121 (b) (1), not the ‘best interest of the child’ standard, when
ruling on motions for posttermination visitation”).
16
In his principal appellate brief, the respondent asserts that he “does
not seek in person visitation in opposition to [Nevaeh’s] wishes but,
instead, seeks to be able to continue to contact her through letters and,
possibly, phone calls.” The petitioner argues that the respondent did
not preserve this claim and, thus, that we should decline to review it
because the respondent is claiming, for the first time on appeal, that he
is not seeking in person visitation with Nevaeh. We disagree with the
petitioner. In his motion for posttermination visitation, the respondent
requested the court to “enter an order for appropriate and supervised
visitation and/or contact with [Nevaeh].” The respondent, therefore,
sought, at a minimum, an order allowing him to have contact with
Nevaeh, which does not necessarily mean in person visitation, and the
court’s decision refers to “posttermination visitation/contact . . . .”
Moreover, that fact that, on appeal, the respondent challenges only
the court’s failure to enter an order for posttermination contact with
Nevaeh, rather than its failure to allow for posttermination, in person
visitation with Nevaeh, does not render his claim unpreserved.
In re Nevaeh T.

explored. The [respondent] argues that where, as here,
[Nevaeh] is capable of stating an informed preference—
and that position is not overborn by clinical evidence that
continued contact would be harmful—[Nevaeh’s] wishes
should be afforded substantial weight.”
In support of this contention, the respondent points
to his continued expressions of interest in Nevaeh’s
well-being, the court’s description of his relationship
with Nevaeh as “ ‘congenial,’ ” testimony from Lianna
Carrero, a department social worker, that Nevaeh is
“open to letters and phone calls” from the respondent,
and testimony from Jessica Biren-Caverly, a licensed psy-
chologist who had performed a psychological evaluation
of Nevaeh, that it would be appropriate for the court to
fashion an order allowing for continuing contact between
Nevaeh and the respondent. According to the respondent,
Nevaeh’s “wishes should be given greater weight” in
this case because she “is of an age where she is able to
understand the ramifications of posttermination visita-
tion, especially where the weight of the clinical evidence
supports a continuation of contact between [Nevaeh]
and the respondent,” and “both [Nevaeh] and the court-
ordered psychologist recognize the benefit of continued
contact between the [respondent] and [Nevaeh].” Thus,
the respondent asserts that, because “the trial court
did not give due weight to the informed preference of
[Nevaeh],” its decision denying his motion for postter-
mination visitation should be reversed. We do not agree.
We first set forth our standard of review and relevant
legal principles. “In In re Ava W., [our Supreme Court]
held, for the first time, that a trial court has the authority
to consider a motion for posttermination visitation when
the court considers termination of parental rights pur-
suant to [General Statutes] § 17a-112 (j). In re Ava W.,
[supra, 336 Conn. 548–49]. This authority . . . originates
from the trial court’s broad authority in juvenile matters,
codified at [General Statutes] § 46b-121 (b) (1), ‘to make
and enforce such orders . . . necessary or appropriate to
secure the welfare, protection, proper care and suitable
In re Nevaeh T.

support of a child,’ including orders impacting parental
rights, such as termination and visitation. See In re Ava
W., supra, 572–76.” (Footnote omitted.) In re Annessa
J., 343 Conn. 642, 667–68, 284 A.3d 562 (2022).
As our Supreme Court stated in In re Ava W., supra,
336 Conn. 545, “the mo[st] prudent approach when eval-
uating whether posttermination visitation should be
ordered is to adhere to the standard that the legislature
expressly adopted [in § 46b-121 (b) (1)]—‘necessary or
appropriate to secure the welfare, protection, proper care
and suitable support of [the] child . . . .’ General Statutes
§ 46b-121 (b) (1) . . . .” Id., 589. In In re Annessa J., the
court further explained: “The term ‘necessary,’ when
used in this context, has one fixed meaning: ‘Impossible
to be otherwise . . . indispensable; requisite; [or] essen-
tial.’ Webster’s New International Dictionary (1931) p.
1443. Although the definition of ‘appropriate’ is elastic
insofar as it is susceptible to a number of meanings; see,
e.g., id., p. 111 (defining ‘appropriate’ as ‘[b]elonging
peculiarly,’ ‘suitable,’ ‘fit,’ or ‘proper’); given the fact
that the preceding word in the standard is ‘necessary,’
we choose to adopt a definition of ‘appropriate’ that
aligns with the more exacting term, ‘necessary.’ In the
context of posttermination visitation, we read the word
‘appropriate’ to mean ‘proper.’ . . . ‘[T]here should be few
cases in which court-ordered posttermination visitation
could be deemed “necessary or appropriate to secure the
[child’s] welfare,” ’ particularly in light of the grounds
on which a trial court can terminate parental rights. See
General Statutes § 17a-112 (j). A more exacting standard
is required in this context, particularly in light of the
rare circumstance in which a trial court could simul-
taneously terminate parental rights and, in the same
proceeding, order posttermination visitation. Mindful
of these considerations, we conclude that the ‘necessary
or appropriate’ standard is purposefully more stringent
than the ‘best interest of the child’ standard, as the trial
court must find that posttermination visitation is neces-
sary or appropriate—meaning ‘proper’—to secure the
In re Nevaeh T.

child’s welfare.” (Citation omitted.) In re Annessa J.,
supra, 343 Conn. 673–74.
“It is well settled that we review a trial court’s exer-
cise of authority under § 46b-121 (b) (1) for an abuse
of discretion. In re K. M., 217 Conn. App. 687, 702,
289 A.3d 1240 (2023). ‘Whether . . . posttermination
visitation [is necessary or appropriate] is, of course, a
question of fact for the trial court, which has the parties
before it and is in the best position to analyze all of the
factors [necessary for a determination regarding post-
termination visitation] . . . . Our dedicated trial court
judges, who adjudicate juvenile matters on a daily basis
and must make decisions that concern children’s wel-
fare, protection, care and support, are best equipped to
determine the factors worthy of consideration in making
this finding. As examples—which are neither exclusive
nor all-inclusive—a trial court may want to consider
the child’s wishes, the birth parent’s expressed inter-
est, the frequency and quality of visitation between the
child and birth parent prior to the termination of the
parent’s parental rights, the strength of the emotional
bond between the child and the birth parent, any inter-
ference with present custodial arrangements, and any
impact on the adoption prospects for the child.’ . . . In
re Ava W., [supra, 336 Conn. 589–90].
“It is axiomatic that we review a trial court’s factual
determinations for clear error. ‘A finding is clearly erro-
neous when either there is no evidence in the record to
support it, or the reviewing court is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. . . .
On appeal, our function is to determine whether the trial
court’s conclusion was factually supported and legally
correct. . . . In doing so, however, [g]reat weight is given
to the judgment of the trial court because of [the court’s]
opportunity to observe the parties and the evidence. . . .
We do not examine the record to determine whether the
trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than
the one reached. . . . [Rather] every reasonable presump-
tion is made in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’ . . . In
In re Nevaeh T.

re Anthony S., 218 Conn. App. 127, 153, 290 A.3d 901
(2023). On review for clear error, ‘the mere existence in
the record of evidence that would support a different
conclusion, without more, is not sufficient to undermine
the finding of the trial court.’ . . . In re Anaishaly C.,
190 Conn. App. 667, 682, 213 A.3d 12, cert. denied, 345
Conn. 914, 283 A.3d 505 (2019).” In re L. T., 220 Conn.
App. 680, 702–703, 299 A.3d 1229 (2023).
In the present case, in finding that a posttermination
contact order was neither necessary nor appropriate to
secure Nevaeh’s welfare, protection, proper care and
suitable support, the court took into consideration a
number of the factors set forth by our Supreme Court
in In re Ava W., supra, 336 Conn. 589–90. Specifically,
the court considered Nevaeh’s wishes, not only that
she was “open to” limited contact with the respondent
through letters and phone calls, but also that she desired
to be adopted by her foster mother; the respondent’s
expressed interest in having continued contact with
Nevaeh following the termination of his parental rights
and Nevaeh’s adoption by her foster mother, which he
supported; the fact that the respondent had abandoned
Nevaeh when she was five years old and only reentered
her life in 2023, at which time he was a virtual stranger
to Nevaeh; and their monthly prison visits, which the
court characterized as congenial, noting a few times
when Nevaeh had opted out of attending the visits and
her stated desire that she does not want posttermina-
tion, in person contact with the respondent. A few other
factors, however, weighed heavily in the court’s deci-
sion, namely, the respondent’s status as a convicted
child sex offender, Nevaeh’s past history of physical
and sexual abuse and emotional well-being, and how a
posttermination contact order would affect Nevaeh’s
adoption prospects. For example, the court explained
that the fact that the respondent is a convicted child sex
offender, as well as “Nevaeh’s past sexual and physical
assault victimization, demand[ed] that posttermination
In re Nevaeh T.

visitation/contact be scrupulously considered.”17 Of
particular concern to the court was the potential harm
that a posttermination visitation or contact order could
have on “Nevaeh’s emotional and physical well-being,
or on her relationship with [her] foster mother, or on
her future adoption possibilities,” especially given that
the foster mother was “steadfast” in her desire for a
closed adoption, “adamantly object[ed] to any form of
posttermination visitation/contact . . . involving [the]
respondent,” and might reconsider adoption if any such
order were imposed. Given the foster mother’s opposition
to any posttermination contact between Nevaeh and the
respondent, the court properly considered the potential
negative impact that a posttermination contact order
might have on Nevaeh’s adoption prospects.
We find no merit to the respondent’s contention that
the court should have afforded “greater weight” to
Nevaeh’s wishes and the clinical evidence supporting
continued contact between Nevaeh and the respondent.
There is nothing in the decisions of our Supreme Court
in In re Ava W., supra, 336 Conn. 545, or In re Annessa
J., supra, 343 Conn. 642, suggesting that trial courts
should elevate a minor child’s wishes over any of the
other factors considered by the court. The respondent
acknowledges that there is no authority governing the
degree of weight a court must afford to the particular
factors it considers in deciding a motion for posttermina-
tion visitation, and we decline the respondent’s request
to impose any such requirement. Indeed, in In re Ava
W., our Supreme Court, in setting forth a nonexclusive
list of factors that “a trial court may want to consider,”
expressly stated that trial court judges “are best equipped
17
As the court noted in the portion of its decision addressing the
termination petition: “Prior to the end of 2023, [the respondent] was
a virtual stranger to Nevaeh. [The respondent] is a convicted child
sex offender. What contact [the respondent] should have with Nevaeh
needs to be clinically evaluated and the level of risk he poses when
released back into the community needs to be determined, and needed
safeguards, if any, put in place. . . . Given Nevaeh’s tragic and repeated
sexual victimization, it is critical that she be protected from further
victimization of any kind.” (Footnote omitted.)
In re Nevaeh T.

to determine the factors worthy of consideration in mak-
ing [the necessary or appropriate] finding.” (Emphasis
added.) In re Ava W., supra, 589–90. It is not for this
court to usurp the discretion afforded to a trial court in
this context. The child’s wishes are but one factor that
a trial court may, but is not required to, consider. See
In re L. T., supra, 220 Conn. App. 704 (“Although the
respondent loves the minor children and may have had
frequent and positive interactions with them, that is
just one factor that the court may consider in evaluat-
ing whether posttermination visitation is necessary or
appropriate. It is not required to do so. Moreover, even
if the court did consider the nature of the respondent’s
previous visitation with the minor children, and agreed
with her that it was frequent and positive in nature, that
determination, in itself, would not have been disposi-
tive of the required inquiry of whether posttermination
visitation was necessary or appropriate.” (Emphasis in
original.)).
“Insofar as the [respondent] invites us to reconsider
the evidence that was before the court, [w]e note that it
is not the function of this court to review the evidence to
determine whether a conclusion different from the one
reached could have been reached. . . . Thus, [a] mere dif-
ference of opinion or judgment cannot justify our inter-
vention. . . . Likewise, it is not the province of this court
to reweigh the evidence before the court or to substitute
our judgment in this matter. F. S. v. J. S., 223 Conn.
App. 763, 794, 310 A.3d 961, cert. denied, 350 Conn.
903, 323 A.3d 344 (2024); see also In re Blake P., 222
Conn. App. 693, 707, 306 A.3d 1130 (2023) ([a]lthough
there may be evidence in the record that would support
the [plaintiff’s] position, it is not the role of [an appel-
late] court to examine that evidence and substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court).” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Cardona v. Padilla, 230 Conn. App.
534, 548, 330 A.3d 912 (2025).
Moreover, the respondent, in asserting his claim that
greater weight should have been afforded to Nevaeh’s
In re Nevaeh T.

wishes—that she was “open to” limited contact with the
respondent posttermination—ignores Nevaeh’s other
stated wishes and desire to be adopted by her foster
mother, which adoption might be jeopardized if the
court were to order posttermination visitation or contact
between Nevaeh and the respondent. As the court noted
in its decision: “Nevaeh’s history of abuse, neglect and
trauma is staggering and interventions to stabilize the
situation are ongoing. The court notes that, if Nevaeh is
not adopted by [her] foster mother, given Nevaeh’s age,
her ongoing need for a therapeutic level home environ-
ment, and her significant life struggles, the chances of
her achieving adoption elsewhere are greatly diminished.
The court reiterates that her current foster home is her
third foster home and she has resided with her foster
mother since May 2023.”18
In short, the record does not support the respondent’s
claim that posttermination contact between the respon-
dent and Nevaeh was necessary or appropriate to secure
Nevaeh’s welfare. See In re Annessa J., supra, 343 Conn.
674. Although the respondent contends that the record
contains evidence favoring his posttermination contact
with Nevaeh, “without more, [that] is not sufficient
to undermine the finding of the trial court.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re L. T., supra, 220 Conn.
App. 703. Accordingly, given that the necessary or appro-
priate standard is a stringent one; see In re Annessa J.,
supra, 674 (“[a] more exacting standard is required in this
context, particularly in light of the rare circumstance
in which a trial court could simultaneously terminate
parental rights and, in the same proceeding, order post-
termination visitation” (emphasis added)); and that a
court’s determination as to whether posttermination
visitation is necessary or appropriate is a factual one,
in which we afford every reasonable presumption in
favor of its correctness; see In re L. T., supra, 703; we
cannot conclude that the court erred in finding that a
18
We note that, although the court made this statement in the por-
tion of its decision addressing Felicia T.’s motion for posttermination
visitation, it applies equally with respect to the respondent’s motion.
In re Nevaeh T.

posttermination contact order is not necessary or appro-
priate to secure Nevaeh’s welfare, protection, proper
care and suitable support. See In re Ava M., 223 Conn.
App. 590, 609, 309 A.3d 383, cert. denied, 348 Conn.
962, 312 A.3d 38 (2024); In re L. T., supra, 704–705.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

************************************************
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************************************************
In re Nevaeh T.

IN RE NEVAEH T.*
(AC 49495)
Elgo, Clark and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed from the trial court’s judgment terminat-
ing his parental rights with respect to his minor child, N, and denying his
motion for posttermination visitation or contact. The father claimed that
the court improperly denied his motion for posttermination visitation or
contact because the court did not properly weigh the informed preference of
N to have continued contact with him through letters or phone calls. Held:

The respondent father’s claim that the trial court improperly denied his
motion for posttermination contact between him and N was unavailing,
as this court could not conclude that the trial court erred in finding that a
posttermination contact order was not necessary or appropriate to secure
N’s welfare, protection, proper care and suitable support.

Argued May 28—officially released June 17, 2026**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Haven, Juvenile
Matters, where the case was tried to the court, Conway,
J.; judgment terminating the respondents’ parental
rights and denying the respondent father’s motion for
posttermination visitation or contact, from which the
respondent father appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(respondent father).
Alma Rose Nunley, assistant solicitor general, with
whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general,
*
In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-
142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in
this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall
be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein
and upon order of the court.
**
June 17, 2026, the date that this decision was released as a slip opin-
ion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
In re Nevaeh T.

and Heather J. Wilson, assistant attorney general, for
the appellee (petitioner).

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The respondent father, Dennis M.,1
appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminat-
ing his parental rights with respect to, and denying his
motion for posttermination visitation or contact with,
his minor daughter, Nevaeh T. (Nevaeh).2 On appeal, the
respondent challenges only the court’s decision denying
his motion for posttermination visitation or contact with
Nevaeh. Specifically, he claims that the court, in deny-
ing his motion, did not properly weigh the “informed
preference” of Nevaeh to have continued contact with
the respondent through letters or phone calls. We affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the court by clear
and convincing evidence, and procedural history are
relevant to our resolution of this appeal. In early March
2023, Nevaeh, along with her mother, Felicia T., and
two brothers, Xavier T. (Xavier) and Robert T. (Rob-
ert), “were living with Dawne M. and Daniel C., unre-
lated acquaintances of [Felicia T.].3 Nevaeh referred to
Dawne M. as ‘aunt’ and Daniel C. as ‘uncle.’ ” (Footnote
added.) “On or about March 2, 2023, Nevaeh’s school
staff reported concerns regarding Nevaeh’s presenta-
tion; she was sad and withdrawn with ongoing hygiene
issues. Additionally, Nevaeh had sent an email from her
school Chromebook alleging [that] she was being abused
by Dawne M. . . . [An employee of the Department of
Children and Families (department)] met with Nevaeh
at the school, and, in addition to what the school had
1
The court also terminated the parental rights of the respondent
mother, Felicia T. Because Felicia T. is not involved in this appeal, our
references in this opinion to the respondent are to the respondent father.
2
The attorney for the minor child filed a statement adopting the brief
of the petitioner in this appeal, the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies, pursuant to Practice Book §§ 67-13 and 79a-6 (c).
3
At that time, Nevaeh was ten years old, Xavier was thirteen years
old, and Robert was four years old.
In re Nevaeh T.

observed, the worker noted various bruises on Nevaeh’s
body. . . . Subsequently, upon visiting the family home,
the department found the home to be in deplorable condi-
tion, filthy, with animal feces spread over floors, mari-
juana paraphernalia accessible to the children, trash on
the floor and the presence of significant clutter. Like
Nevaeh, the boys presented disheveled and unkempt.
The children were sent to stay with a family friend to
afford [Felicia T.] an opportunity to clean up the home.
The children returned home a few days later. . . .
“On March 9 [2023], Nevaeh, again using her school
Chromebook, emailed a friend and disclosed [that] she
was being touched in her vagina by Dawne M. Nevaeh
had sent a similar email on March 7 [2023] but [Felicia
T.] deleted the email. [Felicia T.] initially denied delet-
ing the email but eventually admitted [that] she [had]
deleted the email to prevent the children from being
removed from her care and because she . . . did not believe
Nevaeh’s disclosure that Dawne M. had inappropriately
touched her.”4 (Footnote omitted.)
On March 9, 2023, the department “invoked a ninety-
six hour hold and assumed temporary custody of the three
children. On or about March 13, 2023, the [petitioner,
the Commissioner of Children and Families] sought and
obtained an order of temporary custody . . . of the three
children, and, on or about June 15, 2023, the children
were adjudicated neglected and committed to the . . .
custody [of the petitioner]. The children have remained
in the department’s care continuously since March 9,
2023.” Initially, the three children were placed together
in a foster home of a relative, but Nevaeh struggled with
that placement. In May 2023, she transitioned to her
third and current foster home, which is a nonrelative,
therapeutic foster home.
After Nevaeh was removed from Felicia T.’s care, she
“disclosed [that] she [slept] in the same bed with Dawne
M. and Daniel C. Nevaeh eventually disclosed that both
4
Nevaeh was sexually assaulted by a neighbor when Nevaeh was eight
years old and living elsewhere with her mother.
In re Nevaeh T.

Dawne M. and Daniel C. physically assaulted her as a form
[of] discipline and [that] they attempted to get Xavier to
hit Nevaeh. [Felicia T.] often left the children in the care
of Dawne M., even after Nevaeh had disclosed abuse.5”
(Footnote in original; footnote omitted.)
The respondent had ceased all contact with Nevaeh
when she was approximately five years old. He did so
because he and Felicia T. “did not get along and disagreed
on child-rearing practices.” The respondent currently is
incarcerated in connection with a 2021 conviction “of
sexually assaulting and having sexual contact with a
minor in 2017.6 His 2017 victim was his live-in (now) [for-
mer girlfriend’s] minor daughter. On or about February
1, 2023, he was sentenced to the custody of the Commis-
sioner of Correction . . . for eighteen years, execution . . .
suspended after he serves . . . eight years and five months
. . . followed by ten years of probation. Additionally, he
is listed on the state’s sex offender registry for ten years.
. . . [His] maximum prison release date is March 2029,
but he reports [that] he expects to have a parole hearing
in late 2025 or shortly thereafter.7” (Footnote added;
footnote in original; footnote omitted.)
“Once the [petitioner] assumed custody of the children,
[the respondent] contacted the department seeking to
reconnect with Nevaeh.” Nevaeh, however, was unaware
that her father was alive. Therefore, “the department
sought guidance and direction from Nevaeh’s therapist
as to when and how to inform Nevaeh [that] her father
5
“One or more of the children underwent a forensic evaluation regard-
ing the abuse and neglect allegations. The authorities sought and
obtained arrest warrants for Dawne M. and Daniel C. At the time of
trial . . . the status of [their] criminal cases [was unclear].”
6
The respondent “was first incarcerated on the 2017 sexual assault
charges in November 2020, and he has remained continuously incar-
cerated to date.”
7
“[Pursuant to] exhibit F . . . [the respondent] is eligible for a parole
hearing in December 2024. Whether a parole hearing was held in 2024
and parole was denied, or [whether] December 2024 is a typographical
error and a parole hearing is to take place in December 2025 is unclear.
Even if a parole hearing is held in late 2025 or in 2026, there is no [way]
to discern the likelihood of [the respondent’s] release prior to 2029.”
In re Nevaeh T.

was alive and wanted contact with her. It took time for
Nevaeh to process said information but, in approxi-
mately December 2023, in person monthly supervised
father-child prison visits commenced.” “Thirteen year
old Nevaeh and [the respondent] enjoy their monthly
prison visits, although initially Nevaeh expressed a level
of discomfort with being inside a prison. And, on at least
one occasion, Nevaeh declined phone calls or FaceTime
contact with [the respondent] because she did not like
his negative comments about [Felicia T.].”8
On September 11, 2024, the petitioner filed a petition
for the termination of the parental rights of the respon-
dent and Felicia T. with respect to Nevaeh.9 A trial on
the termination petition took place over the course of
three days: July 17 and 22 and August 27, 2025. Just
prior to the commencement of trial, on July 11, 2025, the
respondent filed a motion for a posttermination visitation
or contact order,10 and Felicia T. filed a similar motion
seeking posttermination visitation with Nevaeh on July
15, 2025. The parties agreed to have their motions seek-
ing posttermination visitation consolidated with the trial
8
On two other occasions in 2025, “Nevaeh did not make herself avail-
able for transport to a scheduled prison visit. In July 2025, when the
department social worker went to pick up Nevaeh and take her to the
prison visit, Nevaeh was not home. Nevaeh had walked from the foster
home to summer camp, and she later admitted [that] she wanted to go
to camp and not to the prison. In August 2025, Nevaeh opted to go to
a church social event rather than to the prison visit.”
9
The petitioner also had filed petitions for the termination of Felicia
T.’s parental rights with respect to Xavier and Robert, neither of whom
is a child of the respondent. Those petitions were tried together with
the termination petition regarding Nevaeh.
10
In his motion, the respondent alleged that, pursuant to In re Ava
W., 336 Conn. 545, 248 A.3d 675 (2020), “this court has the author-
ity to enter an appropriate order concerning parent-child visitation,
even after the granting of a [termination of parental rights] petition”;
that he “is appropriate and nurturing in visits and interaction with
[Nevaeh]”; that “[a] clear bond has been established and exists between
[the respondent] and [Nevaeh]”; and that Nevaeh’s “[c]ontinuing visita-
tion and contact with [the respondent] would be necessary or appropriate
to secure the welfare, protection, proper care and suitable support of
[Nevaeh]. Further, visitation and contact would be appropriate and in
the best interests of [Nevaeh].”
In re Nevaeh T.

on the termination petition. “Neither parent testified
or presented witnesses or evidence in support of their
motions, other than through cross-examination of the
petitioner’s witnesses and exhibits in the termination
case.11 Additionally, neither [parent] proffered specif-
ics as to the frequency, duration, location, or mode of
posttermination visitation/contact being requested.”
(Footnote added.)
On October 31, 2025, following the trial, the court
issued a memorandum of decision in which it termi-
nated the respondent’s parental rights12 with respect
to Nevaeh,13 which the respondent does not challenge
on appeal, and denied the respondent’s motion for post-
termination visitation or contact with Nevaeh. The fol-
lowing additional findings by the court are relevant
to its decision denying the respondent’s motion. “In
2024, Nevaeh [had] informed [the respondent] that she
wanted to be adopted by her foster mother. [The respon-
dent] reacted appropriately to Nevaeh’s announcement
and assured Nevaeh [that] he supported her decision.
[The respondent] recognizes [that] he is not a placement
11
At the termination trial, the petitioner presented testimony from
Jessica Biren-Caverly, a licensed psychologist who had performed a
psychological evaluation of Felicia T. and the three children in March
2025, and various social workers with the department, namely, Elizabeth
Herrera, Cheri Walker, Bianca Kennedy, and Lianna Carrero. The court
also admitted into evidence Biren-Caverly’s psychological evaluation;
the specific steps ordered for, and the certified criminal histories of,
the respondent and Felicia T.; and various social studies, permanency
plan studies and status reports of the department.
12
See footnote 1 of this opinion.
13
Specifically, in the adjudicatory phase, the court found, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the department had made reasonable
efforts in light of the limits imposed by the respondent’s incarceration
to reunify the respondent with Nevaeh and that, although the respon-
dent is willing, he is unable to benefit from reunification efforts. Next,
the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent
had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation as
would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable period of time, he
could assume a responsible position in Nevaeh’s life. Thereafter, in the
dispositional phase, the court considered the seven statutory factors in
General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) and determined that it was in Nevaeh’s
best interest to terminate the respondent’s parental rights.
In re Nevaeh T.

resource for Nevaeh but seeks ongoing contact with
Nevaeh if his parental rights were to be terminated.”
“Nevaeh’s nonrelative, therapeutic foster family is
made up of Nevaeh and [her] foster mother. Nevaeh has
lived with her foster mother for almost two and [one-half]
years. Nevaeh desires to be adopted by her foster mother. . . .
[T]hirteen year old Nevaeh desires to have in person
contact with [Felicia T.] posttermination. Nevaeh is only
open to limited contact with [the respondent] through
letters and phone calls.14 Nevaeh’s foster mother ada-
mantly objects to any form of posttermination visitation
[or] contact . . . involving either [the] respondent [or
Felicia T.]. She reports to the department that a court
imposed posttermination visitation/contact order may
cause her to reconsider adoption. Nevaeh is cognizant
[that her] foster mother is not keen on her having post-
termination in person contact with [the respondent] . . .
but Nevaeh is unaware [that] her foster mother may back
out of adopting her if a court-ordered visitation/contact
order were to [be] issue[d].
“In [the respondent’s] monthly prison visits with
Nevaeh and in his primarily one-sided correspondence
with Nevaeh, he encourages Nevaeh to do her best in
school and to behave appropriately. As discussed . . . [the
respondent] elected to sever contact with Nevaeh when
she was approximately five years old. He did not reappear
in her life until 2023, when she was approximately eleven
years old and he was serving a lengthy prison sentence
for sexually assaulting his girlfriend’s minor daughter
in 2017. The degree of his abandonment of Nevaeh was
such that Nevaeh was unaware [that] he was alive. She
only learned of his continued existence when, in con-
cert with Nevaeh’s clinician, the department informed
14
Lianna Carrero, a department social worker, testified about her
conversations with Nevaeh concerning posttermination contact with the
respondent, stating that, at the end of July 2025, Nevaeh had reported
to her that “she does not want in person contact with [the respondent]
postadoption, but she is open to letters and phone calls.”
In re Nevaeh T.

Nevaeh [that] her father was not only alive but wanted
her to visit him in prison.
“At best, Nevaeh and [the respondent] share a conge-
nial, monthly, supervised visitation session. . . . [F]or the
July and August 2025 scheduled prison visits, [however]
Nevaeh opted out of going to the visits. And she is clear
that, posttermination, she does not want in person con-
tact with [the respondent] and, at most, is open to letters
and calls from him.
“Nevaeh only regained [the respondent’s] attention
after he had spent a couple of years in prison (with sev-
eral more years still to serve) for sexually assaulting a
minor female. The foster mother shared with [a court
psychologist that] she is nervous about what will happen
after Nevaeh’s father is released from incarceration if
he knows her address. . . . Regardless of the merit of the
foster mother’s concerns regarding [the respondent], she
is steadfast in her desire for a closed adoption.
“The inherent baseness of [the respondent’s] child
sexual assault behavior (that ultimately resulted in a
protracted prison sentence followed by a decade long
period of probation and placement on the state’s sexual
offender registry), particularly given Nevaeh’s past
sexual and physical assault victimization, demand that
posttermination visitation/contact be scrupulously con-
sidered. [The respondent] has failed to provide this court
with any testimony or evidence that assuages the court’s
security concerns. The potential benefit, if any, that
Nevaeh may derive from a posttermination visitation
contact order as to [the respondent does not outweigh]
the potential harm such an order could potentially inflict
on Nevaeh’s emotional and physical well-being, or on her
relationship with [her] foster mother, or on her future
adoption possibilities. Having considered the . . . factors
[set forth in In re Ava W., 336 Conn. 545, 248 A.3d 675
(2020)], this court concludes [that] a posttermination
contact order is not necessary or appropriate to secure
Nevaeh’s welfare, protection, proper care and suitable
support. Accordingly, [the respondent’s] motion for
In re Nevaeh T.

posttermination visitation/contact is denied.” (Cita-
tions omitted; footnote added; footnotes omitted.) This
appeal followed.
On appeal, the respondent claims that denying his
motion for posttermination visitation or contact with
Nevaeh was not in Nevaeh’s “best interests15 and that
continued, though limited, contact with the [respon-
dent] is necessary and appropriate to secure [Nevaeh’s]
welfare, protection, proper care, and suitable support.”16
(Footnote added.) In particular, the respondent contends:
“Because [Nevaeh] is of an age where she can articulate
an informed position, and because the clinical evidence
supports [her] position, the trial court erred in denying
posttermination contact. Further, because the param-
eters of . . . posttermination visitation orders have not
been fully mapped by our reviewing courts, even to the
extent of whether such visitation should continue after
adoption, the weight to be given [a] minor child’s prefer-
ence as to posttermination visitation has not been fully
15
To the extent that the respondent claims that the best interest of the
child standard applies to the court’s decision concerning his motion for
posttermination visitation or contact, the claim fails. See In re Annessa
J., 343 Conn. 642, 670, 284 A.3d 562 (2022) (“trial courts must adhere
to the ‘necessary or appropriate’ standard set forth in [General Statutes]
§ 46b-121 (b) (1), not the ‘best interest of the child’ standard, when
ruling on motions for posttermination visitation”).
16
In his principal appellate brief, the respondent asserts that he “does
not seek in person visitation in opposition to [Nevaeh’s] wishes but,
instead, seeks to be able to continue to contact her through letters and,
possibly, phone calls.” The petitioner argues that the respondent did
not preserve this claim and, thus, that we should decline to review it
because the respondent is claiming, for the first time on appeal, that he
is not seeking in person visitation with Nevaeh. We disagree with the
petitioner. In his motion for posttermination visitation, the respondent
requested the court to “enter an order for appropriate and supervised
visitation and/or contact with [Nevaeh].” The respondent, therefore,
sought, at a minimum, an order allowing him to have contact with
Nevaeh, which does not necessarily mean in person visitation, and the
court’s decision refers to “posttermination visitation/contact . . . .”
Moreover, that fact that, on appeal, the respondent challenges only
the court’s failure to enter an order for posttermination contact with
Nevaeh, rather than its failure to allow for posttermination, in person
visitation with Nevaeh, does not render his claim unpreserved.
In re Nevaeh T.

explored. The [respondent] argues that where, as here,
[Nevaeh] is capable of stating an informed preference—
and that position is not overborn by clinical evidence that
continued contact would be harmful—[Nevaeh’s] wishes
should be afforded substantial weight.”
In support of this contention, the respondent points
to his continued expressions of interest in Nevaeh’s
well-being, the court’s description of his relationship
with Nevaeh as “ ‘congenial,’ ” testimony from Lianna
Carrero, a department social worker, that Nevaeh is
“open to letters and phone calls” from the respondent,
and testimony from Jessica Biren-Caverly, a licensed psy-
chologist who had performed a psychological evaluation
of Nevaeh, that it would be appropriate for the court to
fashion an order allowing for continuing contact between
Nevaeh and the respondent. According to the respondent,
Nevaeh’s “wishes should be given greater weight” in
this case because she “is of an age where she is able to
understand the ramifications of posttermination visita-
tion, especially where the weight of the clinical evidence
supports a continuation of contact between [Nevaeh]
and the respondent,” and “both [Nevaeh] and the court-
ordered psychologist recognize the benefit of continued
contact between the [respondent] and [Nevaeh].” Thus,
the respondent asserts that, because “the trial court
did not give due weight to the informed preference of
[Nevaeh],” its decision denying his motion for postter-
mination visitation should be reversed. We do not agree.
We first set forth our standard of review and relevant
legal principles. “In In re Ava W., [our Supreme Court]
held, for the first time, that a trial court has the authority
to consider a motion for posttermination visitation when
the court considers termination of parental rights pur-
suant to [General Statutes] § 17a-112 (j). In re Ava W.,
[supra, 336 Conn. 548–49]. This authority . . . originates
from the trial court’s broad authority in juvenile matters,
codified at [General Statutes] § 46b-121 (b) (1), ‘to make
and enforce such orders . . . necessary or appropriate to
secure the welfare, protection, proper care and suitable
In re Nevaeh T.

support of a child,’ including orders impacting parental
rights, such as termination and visitation. See In re Ava
W., supra, 572–76.” (Footnote omitted.) In re Annessa
J., 343 Conn. 642, 667–68, 284 A.3d 562 (2022).
As our Supreme Court stated in In re Ava W., supra,
336 Conn. 545, “the mo[st] prudent approach when eval-
uating whether posttermination visitation should be
ordered is to adhere to the standard that the legislature
expressly adopted [in § 46b-121 (b) (1)]—‘necessary or
appropriate to secure the welfare, protection, proper care
and suitable support of [the] child . . . .’ General Statutes
§ 46b-121 (b) (1) . . . .” Id., 589. In In re Annessa J., the
court further explained: “The term ‘necessary,’ when
used in this context, has one fixed meaning: ‘Impossible
to be otherwise . . . indispensable; requisite; [or] essen-
tial.’ Webster’s New International Dictionary (1931) p.
1443. Although the definition of ‘appropriate’ is elastic
insofar as it is susceptible to a number of meanings; see,
e.g., id., p. 111 (defining ‘appropriate’ as ‘[b]elonging
peculiarly,’ ‘suitable,’ ‘fit,’ or ‘proper’); given the fact
that the preceding word in the standard is ‘necessary,’
we choose to adopt a definition of ‘appropriate’ that
aligns with the more exacting term, ‘necessary.’ In the
context of posttermination visitation, we read the word
‘appropriate’ to mean ‘proper.’ . . . ‘[T]here should be few
cases in which court-ordered posttermination visitation
could be deemed “necessary or appropriate to secure the
[child’s] welfare,” ’ particularly in light of the grounds
on which a trial court can terminate parental rights. See
General Statutes § 17a-112 (j). A more exacting standard
is required in this context, particularly in light of the
rare circumstance in which a trial court could simul-
taneously terminate parental rights and, in the same
proceeding, order posttermination visitation. Mindful
of these considerations, we conclude that the ‘necessary
or appropriate’ standard is purposefully more stringent
than the ‘best interest of the child’ standard, as the trial
court must find that posttermination visitation is neces-
sary or appropriate—meaning ‘proper’—to secure the
In re Nevaeh T.

child’s welfare.” (Citation omitted.) In re Annessa J.,
supra, 343 Conn. 673–74.
“It is well settled that we review a trial court’s exer-
cise of authority under § 46b-121 (b) (1) for an abuse
of discretion. In re K. M., 217 Conn. App. 687, 702,
289 A.3d 1240 (2023). ‘Whether . . . posttermination
visitation [is necessary or appropriate] is, of course, a
question of fact for the trial court, which has the parties
before it and is in the best position to analyze all of the
factors [necessary for a determination regarding post-
termination visitation] . . . . Our dedicated trial court
judges, who adjudicate juvenile matters on a daily basis
and must make decisions that concern children’s wel-
fare, protection, care and support, are best equipped to
determine the factors worthy of consideration in making
this finding. As examples—which are neither exclusive
nor all-inclusive—a trial court may want to consider
the child’s wishes, the birth parent’s expressed inter-
est, the frequency and quality of visitation between the
child and birth parent prior to the termination of the
parent’s parental rights, the strength of the emotional
bond between the child and the birth parent, any inter-
ference with present custodial arrangements, and any
impact on the adoption prospects for the child.’ . . . In
re Ava W., [supra, 336 Conn. 589–90].
“It is axiomatic that we review a trial court’s factual
determinations for clear error. ‘A finding is clearly erro-
neous when either there is no evidence in the record to
support it, or the reviewing court is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. . . .
On appeal, our function is to determine whether the trial
court’s conclusion was factually supported and legally
correct. . . . In doing so, however, [g]reat weight is given
to the judgment of the trial court because of [the court’s]
opportunity to observe the parties and the evidence. . . .
We do not examine the record to determine whether the
trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than
the one reached. . . . [Rather] every reasonable presump-
tion is made in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’ . . . In
In re Nevaeh T.

re Anthony S., 218 Conn. App. 127, 153, 290 A.3d 901
(2023). On review for clear error, ‘the mere existence in
the record of evidence that would support a different
conclusion, without more, is not sufficient to undermine
the finding of the trial court.’ . . . In re Anaishaly C.,
190 Conn. App. 667, 682, 213 A.3d 12, cert. denied, 345
Conn. 914, 283 A.3d 505 (2019).” In re L. T., 220 Conn.
App. 680, 702–703, 299 A.3d 1229 (2023).
In the present case, in finding that a posttermination
contact order was neither necessary nor appropriate to
secure Nevaeh’s welfare, protection, proper care and
suitable support, the court took into consideration a
number of the factors set forth by our Supreme Court
in In re Ava W., supra, 336 Conn. 589–90. Specifically,
the court considered Nevaeh’s wishes, not only that
she was “open to” limited contact with the respondent
through letters and phone calls, but also that she desired
to be adopted by her foster mother; the respondent’s
expressed interest in having continued contact with
Nevaeh following the termination of his parental rights
and Nevaeh’s adoption by her foster mother, which he
supported; the fact that the respondent had abandoned
Nevaeh when she was five years old and only reentered
her life in 2023, at which time he was a virtual stranger
to Nevaeh; and their monthly prison visits, which the
court characterized as congenial, noting a few times
when Nevaeh had opted out of attending the visits and
her stated desire that she does not want posttermina-
tion, in person contact with the respondent. A few other
factors, however, weighed heavily in the court’s deci-
sion, namely, the respondent’s status as a convicted
child sex offender, Nevaeh’s past history of physical
and sexual abuse and emotional well-being, and how a
posttermination contact order would affect Nevaeh’s
adoption prospects. For example, the court explained
that the fact that the respondent is a convicted child sex
offender, as well as “Nevaeh’s past sexual and physical
assault victimization, demand[ed] that posttermination
In re Nevaeh T.

visitation/contact be scrupulously considered.”17 Of
particular concern to the court was the potential harm
that a posttermination visitation or contact order could
have on “Nevaeh’s emotional and physical well-being,
or on her relationship with [her] foster mother, or on
her future adoption possibilities,” especially given that
the foster mother was “steadfast” in her desire for a
closed adoption, “adamantly object[ed] to any form of
posttermination visitation/contact . . . involving [the]
respondent,” and might reconsider adoption if any such
order were imposed. Given the foster mother’s opposition
to any posttermination contact between Nevaeh and the
respondent, the court properly considered the potential
negative impact that a posttermination contact order
might have on Nevaeh’s adoption prospects.
We find no merit to the respondent’s contention that
the court should have afforded “greater weight” to
Nevaeh’s wishes and the clinical evidence supporting
continued contact between Nevaeh and the respondent.
There is nothing in the decisions of our Supreme Court
in In re Ava W., supra, 336 Conn. 545, or In re Annessa
J., supra, 343 Conn. 642, suggesting that trial courts
should elevate a minor child’s wishes over any of the
other factors considered by the court. The respondent
acknowledges that there is no authority governing the
degree of weight a court must afford to the particular
factors it considers in deciding a motion for posttermina-
tion visitation, and we decline the respondent’s request
to impose any such requirement. Indeed, in In re Ava
W., our Supreme Court, in setting forth a nonexclusive
list of factors that “a trial court may want to consider,”
expressly stated that trial court judges “are best equipped
17
As the court noted in the portion of its decision addressing the
termination petition: “Prior to the end of 2023, [the respondent] was
a virtual stranger to Nevaeh. [The respondent] is a convicted child
sex offender. What contact [the respondent] should have with Nevaeh
needs to be clinically evaluated and the level of risk he poses when
released back into the community needs to be determined, and needed
safeguards, if any, put in place. . . . Given Nevaeh’s tragic and repeated
sexual victimization, it is critical that she be protected from further
victimization of any kind.” (Footnote omitted.)
In re Nevaeh T.

to determine the factors worthy of consideration in mak-
ing [the necessary or appropriate] finding.” (Emphasis
added.) In re Ava W., supra, 589–90. It is not for this
court to usurp the discretion afforded to a trial court in
this context. The child’s wishes are but one factor that
a trial court may, but is not required to, consider. See
In re L. T., supra, 220 Conn. App. 704 (“Although the
respondent loves the minor children and may have had
frequent and positive interactions with them, that is
just one factor that the court may consider in evaluat-
ing whether posttermination visitation is necessary or
appropriate. It is not required to do so. Moreover, even
if the court did consider the nature of the respondent’s
previous visitation with the minor children, and agreed
with her that it was frequent and positive in nature, that
determination, in itself, would not have been disposi-
tive of the required inquiry of whether posttermination
visitation was necessary or appropriate.” (Emphasis in
original.)).
“Insofar as the [respondent] invites us to reconsider
the evidence that was before the court, [w]e note that it
is not the function of this court to review the evidence to
determine whether a conclusion different from the one
reached could have been reached. . . . Thus, [a] mere dif-
ference of opinion or judgment cannot justify our inter-
vention. . . . Likewise, it is not the province of this court
to reweigh the evidence before the court or to substitute
our judgment in this matter. F. S. v. J. S., 223 Conn.
App. 763, 794, 310 A.3d 961, cert. denied, 350 Conn.
903, 323 A.3d 344 (2024); see also In re Blake P., 222
Conn. App. 693, 707, 306 A.3d 1130 (2023) ([a]lthough
there may be evidence in the record that would support
the [plaintiff’s] position, it is not the role of [an appel-
late] court to examine that evidence and substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court).” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Cardona v. Padilla, 230 Conn. App.
534, 548, 330 A.3d 912 (2025).
Moreover, the respondent, in asserting his claim that
greater weight should have been afforded to Nevaeh’s
In re Nevaeh T.

wishes—that she was “open to” limited contact with the
respondent posttermination—ignores Nevaeh’s other
stated wishes and desire to be adopted by her foster
mother, which adoption might be jeopardized if the
court were to order posttermination visitation or contact
between Nevaeh and the respondent. As the court noted
in its decision: “Nevaeh’s history of abuse, neglect and
trauma is staggering and interventions to stabilize the
situation are ongoing. The court notes that, if Nevaeh is
not adopted by [her] foster mother, given Nevaeh’s age,
her ongoing need for a therapeutic level home environ-
ment, and her significant life struggles, the chances of
her achieving adoption elsewhere are greatly diminished.
The court reiterates that her current foster home is her
third foster home and she has resided with her foster
mother since May 2023.”18
In short, the record does not support the respondent’s
claim that posttermination contact between the respon-
dent and Nevaeh was necessary or appropriate to secure
Nevaeh’s welfare. See In re Annessa J., supra, 343 Conn.
674. Although the respondent contends that the record
contains evidence favoring his posttermination contact
with Nevaeh, “without more, [that] is not sufficient
to undermine the finding of the trial court.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re L. T., supra, 220 Conn.
App. 703. Accordingly, given that the necessary or appro-
priate standard is a stringent one; see In re Annessa J.,
supra, 674 (“[a] more exacting standard is required in this
context, particularly in light of the rare circumstance
in which a trial court could simultaneously terminate
parental rights and, in the same proceeding, order post-
termination visitation” (emphasis added)); and that a
court’s determination as to whether posttermination
visitation is necessary or appropriate is a factual one,
in which we afford every reasonable presumption in
favor of its correctness; see In re L. T., supra, 703; we
cannot conclude that the court erred in finding that a
18
We note that, although the court made this statement in the por-
tion of its decision addressing Felicia T.’s motion for posttermination
visitation, it applies equally with respect to the respondent’s motion.
In re Nevaeh T.

posttermination contact order is not necessary or appro-
priate to secure Nevaeh’s welfare, protection, proper
care and suitable support. See In re Ava M., 223 Conn.
App. 590, 609, 309 A.3d 383, cert. denied, 348 Conn.
962, 312 A.3d 38 (2024); In re L. T., supra, 704–705.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.