CourtListener 10875022

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Kirpas v. Griffin Hospital

REBECCA KIRPAS v. THE GRIFFIN
HOSPITAL ET AL.
(AC 47842)
Clark, Wilson and Palmer, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the defendant
hospital in this medical malpractice action, in which she alleged that the
defendant physicians, S and F, as agents of the hospital, were negligent in
failing to properly diagnose her and the hospital was vicariously liable for
their negligence. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the trial court, con-
cluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the existence
of an agency relationship between the hospital and S and F, improperly
granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment on her vicarious
liability claim. Held:

This court determined that the plaintiff’s appeal was moot, as the plaintiff
released S and F from any liability for the conduct that formed the basis of
her negligence claim against them after the filing of this appeal, and those
releases operated as a matter of law to release the hospital from any claim of
vicarious liability for that same conduct, and, thus, there was no practical
relief that could be afforded to the plaintiff; accordingly, the appeal was
dismissed.

Argued February 3—officially released June 9, 2026

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, medical
malpractice, and for other relief, brought to the Supe-
rior Court in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford
at Milford, where the court, J. Welch, J., granted the
named defendant’s motion for summary judgment and
rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff
appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.
Kenneth A. Votre, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Michael G. Rigg, with whom, on the brief, was Adam
Maiocco, for the appellee (named defendant).

Opinion

CLARK, J. In this medical malpractice action, the
plaintiff, Rebecca Kirpas, appeals from the summary
judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the named
Kirpas v. Griffin Hospital

defendant, The Griffin Hospital (Griffin Hospital),1 with
respect to her direct negligence and vicarious liability
claims. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged two counts
against the defendant: (1) the defendant was vicariously
liable for the alleged negligence of two physicians, Joseph
Felice and Krithika Srinivasan (physicians or Felice and
Srinivasan); and (2) the defendant was directly negligent
in its supervision and training of Felice and Srinivasan.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in
rendering summary judgment for the defendant on her
vicarious liability claim by (1) concluding that there
was no genuine issue of material fact as to the existence
of an agency relationship between the defendant and
Felice and Srinivasan under the doctrine of apparent
agency, (2) disregarding our Supreme Court’s holding
in Cefaratti v. Aranow, 321 Conn. 593, 141 A.3d 752
(2016), which sets forth the standard for establishing
apparent agency in tort actions, and (3) concluding that
the plaintiff’s expert testimony was not sufficient to
establish a genuine issue of material fact as to causation
and damages.2 The plaintiff, however, did not include
in her brief a challenge to the court’s decision render-
ing summary judgment in favor of the defendant on
her direct negligence claim and, during oral argument
before this court, confirmed that she was not pursuing
any such challenge in her appeal. Because we conclude
that the plaintiff’s appeal is moot by virtue of her release
of Felice and Srinivasan from liability for the allegedly
negligent conduct that formed the basis of her vicarious
liability claim against the defendant, we do not reach the
1
The plaintiff originally brought this action against Krithika Srini-
vasan, Joseph Felice, Griffin Hospital, and Connecticut Emergency
Medicine Specialists, LLC. Srinivasan, Felice, and Connecticut Emer-
gency Medicine Specialists, LLC, are not parties to this appeal and,
therefore, all references to the defendant herein are to Griffin Hospital.
2
In relation to the plaintiff’s claims of error relating to agency, the
trial court expressly declined to address whether the physicians were
actual or apparent agents of the defendant. Instead, it rendered sum-
mary judgment on the vicarious liability claim on the ground that the
plaintiff had failed to disclose an expert witness to testify to causation
and damages.
Kirpas v. Griffin Hospital

merits of the plaintiff’s claims of error and dismiss the
appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The following facts as alleged in the plaintiff’s com-
plaint and procedural history are relevant to our reso-
lution of this appeal. On August 24, 2019, the plaintiff
sought treatment at and was admitted to the emergency
department at Griffin Hospital for pain and discomfort in
her abdomen, nausea, loss of appetite, bloating, headache
and an extended stomach. The plaintiff was examined
by Srinivasan, a third year medical resident, and other
emergency department staff. Srinivasan performed a
physical exam and ordered certain laboratory tests and
a computerized tomography (CT) scan of the plaintiff’s
abdomen and pelvis. Srinivasan’s notes in the plaintiff’s
chart indicated that the CT scan and laboratory evalua-
tion were largely negative but that the appendix could
not be visualized in the scan. The plaintiff was subse-
quently discharged the same day with instructions to
follow up with her primary care doctor, her obstetrician/
gynecologist, and to return to the emergency depart-
ment if she developed chest pain, shortness of breath,
or other concerning symptoms. Felice was the attending
physician supervising Srinivasan during the plaintiff’s
emergency department visit. Felice never saw or spoke to
the plaintiff and did not discuss the plaintiff’s case with
Srinivasan prior to the plaintiff’s discharge. On August
25, 2019, the day after the plaintiff was discharged,
Felice checked a box in the plaintiff’s chart, attesting
that he had reviewed the emergency room record and
agreed with Srinivasan’s documentation. Approximately
two weeks later, on September 8, 2019, the plaintiff
went to Yale-New Haven Hospital due to worsening
abdominal pain and was diagnosed with a perforated
appendix requiring emergency surgery, which resulted
in a prolonged hospital stay and scarring.
In August 2021, the plaintiff commenced the present
medical malpractice action arising out of the treatment
the plaintiff received from the emergency department at
the defendant. On December 2, 2022, the plaintiff filed
a five count amended complaint against the defendant,
Kirpas v. Griffin Hospital

Felice, Srinivasan, and Connecticut Emergency Medicine
Specialists, LLC (Emergency Medicine), alleging that
(1) Felice failed to adequately supervise Srinivasan or
examine the plaintiff himself (count one), (2) Srinivasan
failed to adequately examine the plaintiff (count two),
(3) the defendant was vicariously liable for the alleged
negligence of Felice and Srinivasan because it held the
physicians out as its agents or employees (count three),
(4) the defendant was negligent in its selection, utiliza-
tion, supervision, and training of Felice and Srinivasan
(count four), and (5) Emergency Medicine3 was negligent
in its selection, utilization, supervision and training of
Felice and Srinivasan (count five).
On November 30, 2023, the defendant filed a motion
for summary judgment accompanied by a memorandum
of law and supporting documentation as to counts three
and four of the plaintiff’s amended complaint. The defen-
dant claimed that it was entitled to summary judgment
on the vicarious liability claim because (1) the plaintiff
had not disclosed an expert witness to testify to a causal
connection between the alleged breaches of the standard
of care by Felice and Srinivasan and the plaintiff’s inju-
ries and (2) there is no genuine issue of material fact that
Felice and Srinivasan were not agents or employees of
the hospital. The defendant further claimed that it was
entitled to summary judgment on the direct negligence
claim because (1) there was no genuine issue of material
fact that the physicians did not have a propensity to pro-
vide negligent care or supervision and, as a result, the
alleged negligent conduct at issue was not foreseeable
to the defendant and (2) the plaintiff had not disclosed
an expert witness to testify to the defendant’s alleged
departure from the applicable standard of care4 or to a
causal connection between the alleged breaches of the
3
The complaint alleges that Emergency Medicine is a Connecticut lim-
ited liability company “engaged in the providing of emergency medical
care in hospital emergency rooms” in Connecticut and that Emergency
Medicine and the defendant “managed, operated . . . controlled [and
provided] emergency medical care to patients at [the defendant].”
Emergency Medicine is a nonappearing party in this action.
4
The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s expert only opined on the
alleged breaches of the standard of care by Felice and Srinivasan.
Kirpas v. Griffin Hospital

standard of care by the defendant and the plaintiff’s inju-
ries. The defendant attached to its memorandum of law
the following: an affidavit; excerpts from the transcripts
of the depositions of (1) Jeffrey Coppola, the plaintiff’s
husband, (2) the plaintiff, and (3) Heikki E. Nikkanen, an
emergency medicine physician and the plaintiff’s expert
witness; and other documentary evidence.
On March 26, 2024, the plaintiff filed an objection to
the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, contend-
ing, in her memorandum of law in opposition, that the
defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on
either of the counts because (1) Nikkanen was prepared
to offer an opinion on both causation and damages and
(2) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
Felice and Srinivasan were agents of the defendant. The
plaintiff filed affidavits in support of her objection to the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
The court, J. Welch, J., heard arguments on the
motion on April 1, 2024.5 On July 9, 2024, the court
issued a memorandum of decision in which it granted
the defendant’s motion as to both counts.6 Specifi-
cally, with respect to the vicarious liability claim, the
court granted the motion for summary judgment on
the ground that “the plaintiff has failed to disclose an
expert witness who will testify as to a causal connection
between the physicians’ alleged departures from the
5
Also on April 1, 2024, the defendant filed a posthearing brief for the
limited purpose of providing additional case law on the issue of causa-
tion. On April 29, 2024, the plaintiff filed a reply asserting that there
remained a genuine issue of material fact as to causation and damages.
6
The court initially issued a combined memorandum of decision on June
24, 2024, rendering judgment on the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment and on a separate motion for summary judgment filed by the
physicians as to counts one and two. The June 24, 2024 decision granted
summary judgment in favor of both the defendant and the physicians on
counts one through four. The court subsequently vacated the June 24,
2024 decision by order dated July 3, 2024, and ordered that judgment
shall enter in accordance with the memorandum of decision dated July
9, 2024. The July 9, 2024 memorandum of decision addresses only the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment. On November 6, 2024, the
plaintiff withdrew her claims against the physicians.
Kirpas v. Griffin Hospital

standard of care to the plaintiff’s alleged injuries and
damages. [The defendant] cannot be found liable where
its alleged agents cannot be found liable.” With respect
to the direct negligence claim, the court granted sum-
mary judgment on two grounds: (1) “that the plaintiff
has failed to disclose an expert witness who will testify
that [the defendant] departed from the standard of care
or a causal connection between such alleged departures
to the plaintiff’s alleged damages,” and (2) “there is no
evidence demonstrating [the defendant’s] knowledge
of [Felice’s] or [Srinivasan’s] propensity for tortious
conduct” to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
any “allegedly negligent supervision, training, hiring,
and/or retention.” This appeal followed.
In her principal appellate brief to this court, the plain-
tiff argued that the trial court erred in rendering sum-
mary judgment as to count three because genuine issues
of material fact exist with respect to whether (1) the
physicians were agents of the defendant and (2) Nik-
kanen’s testimony was sufficient to establish causation
and damages. The defendant argued in its brief that (1)
the plaintiff abandoned her direct negligence claim on
appeal by not challenging the court’s decision granting
summary judgment in the defendant’s favor on count
four, and (2) the trial court properly rendered summary
judgment on the vicarious liability claim because the
plaintiff failed to disclose an expert witness to testify
as to causation and, therefore, there is no genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the alleged negligence of
Felice and Srinivasan caused the plaintiff’s injuries.
The defendant also claimed that the plaintiff’s appeal
with respect to the vicarious liability claim was moot
because the plaintiff appeared to have settled her claims
against Felice and Srinivasan. Specifically, the defendant
noted that, although the trial court had initially issued a
memorandum of decision rendering summary judgment
in favor of Felice and Srinivasan, the court subsequently
vacated that decision, after which the plaintiff withdrew
her claims against the physicians. See footnote 6 of this
opinion. The defendant argued that, on the basis of the
Kirpas v. Griffin Hospital

withdrawal of those claims, “the plaintiff appears to have
settled her lawsuit against . . . Felice and Srinivasan,”
and that, “[i]f the plaintiff released [the physicians] from
liability pursuant to a settlement agreement, a successful
appeal will not provide the plaintiff with any practical
relief because the settlement will also have extinguished
[the defendant’s] liability.” The defendant therefore
requested that this court “require the plaintiff to state
whether she has ‘released’ . . . Felice and Srinivasan . .
. .” The plaintiff filed a reply brief that did not address
the mootness argument raised by the defendant.
Oral arguments before this court occurred on February
3, 2026. During argument, the plaintiff’s counsel clari-
fied that the plaintiff was not raising any claim of error
relating to the plaintiff’s direct negligence claim and
that, as a result, the only claims at issue on appeal per-
tained to the plaintiff’s vicarious liability claim against
the defendant. Upon questioning from this court, the
plaintiff’s counsel also conceded that there had been
a release of liability as to the physicians in the action,
Felice and Srinivasan, but argued that the release was not
a part of the record and, thus, not before this court for
consideration.7 In response, the defendant argued that
the court could rely on concessions made by the plaintiff’s
counsel during argument to dismiss the case as moot.
Following argument, on February 25, 2026, to aid
in our determination of jurisdiction over the remain-
ing issues in this appeal relating to the vicarious liabil-
ity of the defendant, this court, sua sponte, ordered
the plaintiff to augment the record to include true
and attested copies of any documents reflecting the
“release of any individual or entity who was at any
time a party to the civil action underlying the pres-
ent appeal, including but not limited to, [Felice] and
[Srinivasan], from any claim or form of liability.”8
7
In response to questioning from the court, the plaintiff’s counsel rep-
resented that he could not recall if it was a general release and that, “to
the best of [his] knowledge,” the release was somewhat limited in nature.
8
Following oral argument, on February 5, 2025, the defendant filed a
motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal based on the representations of
Kirpas v. Griffin Hospital

See Practice Book § 60-2.9 On March 6, 2026, the plaintiff
filed with this court true and attested copies of the exe-
cuted release and settlement agreements, which settled
the plaintiff’s claims against Felice and Srinivasan and
released both physicians from liability for any and all
claims relating to the civil action underlying the pres-
ent appeal.
We begin our analysis with a brief discussion of the
mootness doctrine. “Mootness implicates the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter
for us to resolve. . . . The issue of mootness often arises
in the latter stages of the appeal process, when actions of
the parties have resolved the underlying dispute between
them. . . . It is a well-settled general rule that the exis-
tence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite
to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appel-
late courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from
the granting of actual relief or from the determination
of which no practical relief can follow. . . . An actual
controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal is
taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal. .
. . When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have
occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting
any practical relief through its disposition of the mer-
its, a case has become moot. . . . The determination of
whether a claim has become moot is fact sensitive, and
may include the representations made by the parties at
oral argument.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Ayala v. Smith, 236 Conn. 89, 93, 671
A.2d 345 (1996).
We first address the plaintiff’s argument, made before
we ordered her to augment the record with copies of the
releases, that the record is not adequate for us to review
the plaintiff’s counsel at oral argument that the plaintiff had released
from liability the two physicians whose alleged negligent conduct
formed the basis for the vicarious liability against the defendant. The
plaintiff never responded to that motion. Because the defendant fully
briefed the issue of mootness in its brief, we address the mootness issue
in this decision.
9
Practice Book § 60-2 provides in relevant part: “The supervision and
control of the proceedings shall be in the court having appellate jurisdic-
tion from the time the appellate matter is filed . . . .”
Kirpas v. Griffin Hospital

the defendant’s mootness claim because the releases were
not part of the trial court record. “The rules of prac-
tice vest broad authority in the Appellate Court for the
management of its docket.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Georges v. OB-GYN Services, P.C., 335 Conn.
669, 686, 240 A.3d 249 (2020); see also Practice Book
§ 60-2 (“[t]he supervision and control of the proceedings
shall be in the court having appellate jurisdiction from
the time the appellate matter is filed”). Furthermore,
it is well established that this court has the power to
resolve issues of mootness based on events that trans-
pired while an appeal was pending, particularly where
the facts are undisputed, without remand to the trial
court. See Darien v. Estate of D’Addario, 258 Conn. 663,
677 n.15, 784 A.2d 337 (2001) (concluding remand was
not necessary to resolve issue of mootness “because this
court certainly is capable of determining, particularly
when the facts are undisputed, whether the case is now
moot as a result of the events that transpired while the
appeal was pending”); Ayala v. Smith, supra, 236 Conn.
93 (relying on concession of plaintiff’s counsel at oral
argument to dismiss appeal as moot); Pollio v. Conser-
vation Commission, 32 Conn. App. 109, 114, 628 A.2d
20 (1993) (“[w]hile our rules do not ordinarily permit
us to consider information that is not contained in the
trial record, we may do so when a question of mootness
is raised”).10
In the present case, the plaintiff’s counsel conceded
during oral argument that the plaintiff had executed
releases in favor of Felice and Srinivasan. Pursuant to
our supervisory authority under Practice Book § 60-2,
we ordered the plaintiff to augment the record with
true and attested copies of any releases of liability of
any individual or entity who was at any time a party to
10
Cf. State v. Ryder, 111 Conn. App. 271, 277, 958 A.2d 797 (2008)
(concluding that record was insufficient to determine whether appeal
was moot and remanding to trial court, pursuant to Practice Book
§ 60-2, for evidentiary hearing but retaining jurisdiction over case for
“the purpose of deciding the appeal following the trial court’s factual
determinations”); Karp v. New Britain, 57 Conn. App. 312, 316, 748
A.2d 372 (2000) (remanding matter to trial court for resolution of factual
issues relating to issue of mootness pursuant to Practice Book § 60-2).
Kirpas v. Griffin Hospital

the action underlying this appeal. The true and attested
copies of the releases provided to this court by the plain-
tiff are dated June 2, 2024, and, on their face, clearly
and unambiguously release Felice and Srinivasan from
any liability for the allegedly negligent conduct that
formed the basis of the claims in the action underlying
this appeal. The releases as to both physicians state that
it is “the intention of the parties that this settlement
forever extinguishes and discharges any claims, actions,
and/or causes of actions, which were brought or could
have been brought against the [r]eleasee in this [a]ction
or which, in any way, relate to this [a]ction,” and that the
plaintiff would withdraw her action against the physi-
cians with prejudice. We therefore reject the plaintiff’s
claim that the record is inadequate for us to consider
whether this appeal has become moot.
With respect to the merits of the defendant’s moot-
ness claim, which the plaintiff has chosen not to address
despite opportunities to do so in her reply brief, at oral
argument, and in response to the defendant’s postargu-
ment motion to dismiss; see footnote 8 of this opinion; the
law in Connecticut is clear that, “where the liability of a
principal for a tort committed by his agent is predicated
solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, a valid
release of either operates to release the other.” Alvarez
v. New Haven Register, Inc., 249 Conn. 709, 715–16,
735 A.2d 306 (1999); see also Cunha v. Colon, 260 Conn.
15, 19, 792 A.2d 832 (2002) (explaining that, in Alvarez,
our Supreme Court concluded that “a release executed
in favor of an employee operates as a matter of law to
release the employer whose sole liability is premised on
the doctrine of respondeat superior” because “a principal
whose liability rests solely upon the doctrine of respon-
deat superior and not upon any independent act of the
principal is not a joint tortfeasor with the agent from
whose conduct the principal’s liability is derived” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); Alvarez v. New Haven
Register, Inc., supra, 710–11 (concluding that release
executed in favor of employee, releasing employee of all
claims relating to her involvement in car accident that
Kirpas v. Griffin Hospital

occurred while she was acting in scope of her employ-
ment, also released employer, as matter of law, from
claims premised on doctrine of respondeat superior).
Consequently, this court has held that, when an agent
is not liable, any claim of vicarious liability against a
principal is rendered moot because no practical relief
can be afforded to the plaintiff. See Tiplady v. Maryles,
158 Conn. App. 680, 700–701, 120 A.3d 528 (conclud-
ing that jury verdict finding defendant physician not
liable to plaintiff rendered issue of whether physician
was apparent agent of hospital moot and barred vicari-
ous liability claim against hospital), cert. denied, 319
Conn. 946, 125 A.3d 527 (2015); Mazzacane v. Elliott,
73 Conn. App. 696, 701, 812 A.2d 37 (2002) (concluding
that, “[u]nder the theory of vicarious liability advanced
by the plaintiffs, [the employer] could be liable only if
[the employee] were found liable” and, “[b]ecause the jury
found that [the employee] was not liable for the accident,
the plaintiffs would not be able to recover damages from
[the employer],” rendering claim of error relating to
vicarious liability of employer moot).
In the present case, the trial court rendered summary
judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff’s
direct negligence claim, and the plaintiff has not chal-
lenged that aspect of the court’s decision. Thus, the only
claims remaining in this appeal pertain to the plaintiff’s
vicarious liability claim. The plaintiff released Felice
and Srinivasan from any liability for the conduct that
forms the basis of her negligence claim against them and
those releases operated as a matter of law to release the
defendant from any claim of vicarious liability for that
same conduct. Consequently, a decision on the merits of
this appeal could not result in any practical relief to the
plaintiff. Where no practical relief can be afforded to the
plaintiff, we must dismiss the appeal as moot.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

REBECCA KIRPAS v. THE GRIFFIN
HOSPITAL ET AL.
(AC 47842)
Clark, Wilson and Palmer Js.