Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

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Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

OFFICE OF CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
v. NICKOLA J. CUNHA
(AC 48276)
Cradle, C. J., and Alvord and Moll, Js.

Syllabus

The petitioner appealed from the trial court’s judgment concluding that the
respondent attorney violated various Rules of Professional Conduct in con-
nection with three grievances that had been filed against her. It claimed that
the court erred in holding that the litigation privilege applied to statements
that the respondent made during grievance proceedings so as to preclude
further disciplinary action based on those statements. The respondent filed
a cross appeal, claiming that the court’s findings of misconduct were not
factually or legally supported. Held:

The trial court improperly determined that the respondent was immune from
further disciplinary proceedings for her alleged misconduct at a grievance
hearing, as, although the litigation privilege applies to statements made dur-
ing grievance proceedings, the immunity afforded by the litigation privilege
extends only to certain retaliatory lawsuits and does not shield an attorney
who is alleged to have engaged in professional misconduct during grievance
proceedings from further discipline stemming from that misconduct.

The respondent’s claim that the trial court’s findings of misconduct were
not factually and legally supported was unavailing, as the court’s findings
were supported by the evidence in the record.

Argued December 10, 2025—officially released June 16, 2026

Procedural History

Presentment by the petitioner for the alleged profes-
sional misconduct of the respondent, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven and
tried to the court, Abrams, J.; judgment suspending the
respondent from the practice of law for two and one-half
years, from which the petitioner appealed to this court
and the respondent cross appealed. Reversed in part;
further proceedings.
Leanne M. Larson, first assistant chief disciplinary
counsel, for the appellant-cross appellee (petitioner).
Nickola J. Cunha, self-represented, the appellee-cross
appellant (respondent).
CRADLE, C. J. In this presentment action stemming
from three separate grievances, the petitioner, the Office
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, appeals and the respon-
dent, Nickola J. Cunha, cross appeals from the judg-
ment of the trial court concluding that the respondent
violated several Rules of Professional Conduct but that
she was entitled to the absolute immunity afforded by
the litigation privilege as to certain of the allegations of
misconduct filed against her. On appeal, the petitioner
claims that the court erred in holding that the litigation
privilege applies to statements made during grievance
proceedings so as to preclude further disciplinary action
based on those statements.1 On cross appeal, the respon-
dent claims that the court’s findings that she violated
certain rules of professional conduct were not factually
and legally supported. Because we agree with the peti-
tioner that, although the litigation privilege applies to
statements made during grievance proceedings, it does
not shield attorneys from disciplinary action for miscon-
duct during those proceedings, we reverse the judgment
of the court as to its determination that certain allega-
tions of the first count of the presentment are entitled
to absolute immunity under the litigation privilege. We
affirm the judgment in all other respects.
The following facts, which the reviewing commit-
tee of the Statewide Grievance Committee (reviewing
committee) found by clear and convincing evidence,
and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of
the claims on appeal and cross appeal. The first griev-
ance underlying this presentment action was filed on
October 11, 2019, by Attorney Susan Cousineau, who
was the guardian ad litem in a family case in which the
respondent represented the plaintiff mother.2 On June
1
The petitioner also claims that the court violated its right to due
process when it sua sponte held that certain of the allegations of mis-
conduct were barred by the litigation privilege without affording the
petitioner an opportunity to be heard on that issue. Because we agree
with the petitioner that the court erred in holding that the litiga-
tion privilege precluded it from pursuing disciplinary action based on
misconduct during a grievance proceeding, we need not address the
petitioner’s due process claim.
2
In October 2019, the respondent alleged during a courtroom pro-
ceeding that, as the guardian ad litem, Cousineau was a mandated
reporter, and Cousineau’s failure to refer the case to the Department of
Children and Families constituted a criminal act. This allegation by the
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

30, 2021, the respondent sent an email to the caseflow
coordinator in response to the caseflow coordinator’s
attempt to schedule a status conference that had been
requested by Cousineau and opposing counsel in the
matter. In that email, the respondent stated, inter alia:
“[Cousineau’s] and [opposing counsel’s] use of the court
as a means of causing my client unnecessary stress and
financial hardship is unacceptable and now against the
law.” The petitioner filed additional allegations of mis-
conduct based on that accusation.
At the hearing before the reviewing committee (griev-
ance hearing), when asked to explain the basis of her
allegation in the email that Cousineau was engaged in
conduct that was “against the law,” the respondent
replied, inter alia, that Cousineau conspired with oppos-
ing counsel to request a status conference so that she
could increase her fees, in violation of the “RICO Act.”3
The reviewing committee found that the foregoing
accusations by the respondent constituted violations of
the following Rules of Professional Conduct: rule 4.4
(a), in that the accusations had no substantial purpose
other than to embarrass, delay, or burden Cousineau;
rule 3.4 (7), in that the accusations of criminal charges
were made solely with the goal of obtaining an advan-
tage in the ongoing litigation; and rule 8.4 (4), in that
the respondent’s accusations were prejudicial to the
administration of justice.4
respondent was the basis for the initial filing of the grievance, and the
reviewing committee found that the respondent’s accusation constituted
misconduct in that she, inter alia, knowingly made a statement for no
substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden Cousineau in
violation of rules 3.3 (a) (1), 3.4 (5) and (7), 4.4 (a), and 8.4 (1), (3) and
(4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and directed that these findings
of misconduct be included in the presentment. The trial court disagreed
with the reviewing committee’s foregoing findings of misconduct and
found in favor of the respondent as to those findings. The petitioner has
not challenged the court’s judgment as to those findings.
3
The court noted that “[o]ne is left to assume that the respondent was
referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., the Racketeer Influenced [and]
Corrupt Organizations Act.”
4
The reviewing committee further found that the respondent engaged
in misconduct when, on December 3, 2021, the respondent filed a motion
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

During the grievance hearing, the respondent
also “made several statements in which she accused
[Cousineau] of the crime of conspiracy. She maintained
that [Cousineau] conspired with [the other attorneys in
the matter] to keep information from [the court] and
that this conduct also constituted a RICO violation. The
respondent also maintained that [Cousineau] conspired
with Dr. [Linda] Smith and other professionals to steer
business to a particular psychologist. The respondent
failed to provide any factual or legal basis to support
these accusations.”
The reviewing committee further found that the
respondent’s testimony at the grievance hearing regard-
ing the foregoing allegations of conspiracy constituted
violations of the following Rules of Professional Conduct:
rule 3.1, in that her statements were frivolous and with-
out merit; rule 8.4 (3), in that her actions constituted
misrepresentation to the reviewing committee; rule 4.4
(a), in that her actions had no substantial purpose other
than to embarrass, delay, or burden Cousineau; rule 3.4
(7), in that her actions involved a threat to present crimi-
nal charges solely to gain an advantage in the ongoing
litigation; and rule 8.4 (4), in that her statements were
prejudicial to the administration of justice.
On May 4, 2022, the petitioner, at the direction of the
reviewing committee, filed a presentment against the
respondent based on the foregoing findings of misconduct
arising from the grievance filed by Cousineau.
The second grievance underlying this presentment
action was filed by Jennifer Jessica Recalde in May 2021.
to continue her grievance hearing, which was scheduled for December
8, 2021, citing a conflict with a hearing scheduled in Superior Court.
At the time she filed the continuance request for the grievance hearing,
the court hearing already had been continued. The reviewing committee
found that the respondent’s failure to inform it that her scheduling
conflict had been resolved constituted violations of rules 3.3 (a) (1) and
8.4 (3) and (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and it directed that
these violations be included in the presentment. The court later found
in favor of the respondent as to these findings of misconduct and the
petitioner has not challenged that holding on appeal.
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

“[Recalde] retained the respondent on September 18,
2020, to represent her in a postjudgment custody matter.
[Recalde] and the respondent signed a fee agreement on
that date and [Recalde] provided the respondent with a
$5000 retainer at that time. Over the next three months,
[Recalde] sent frequent text messages to the respondent
seeking legal advice and asking that action be taken
in the court matter. The respondent failed to reply to
many contact attempts by [Recalde] and failed to provide
definitive legal advice. While the respondent replied
on occasion to [Recalde’s] texts, suggesting potential
courses of action and promising to file various motions,
the respondent never provided any definitive guidance
as to what actions should be taken. The respondent never
filed any motions with the court [on behalf of Recalde].
“In January of 2021, [Recalde] retained successor
counsel in the matter. Successor counsel quickly filed
an emergency ex parte motion for custody, which was
granted by the court on February 3, 2021. Both [Recalde]
in a text [message], and successor counsel in an email,
requested an accounting of the respondent’s fee, but no
accounting was ever received from the respondent.
“The respondent did not file an answer to the griev-
ance complaint.
“By letter dated December 28, 2021, disciplinary coun-
sel requested that the respondent provide her with a copy
of [Recalde’s] file and an itemization of her time. The
respondent did not comply with the request. . . .
“In an email from the respondent to the disciplinary
counsel dated April 29, 2022, responding to disciplinary
counsel’s inquiry to the respondent regarding proposed
exhibits for the hearing in this matter, the respondent
wrote, inter alia, that she would no longer ‘sit back and
continue to allow you and your cohorts to harass me,
intimidate me and shed me in [a] poor light to the pub-
lic, you are sadly mistaken. You see for many years I’ve
been collecting evidence against each of you and I’ve had
enough . . . . God willing your end, along with the rest of
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

the professionals that violate everyone’s rights on a daily
basis, is creeping up on you. I hope you have adequately
informed [Recalde] that this is a public matter and I will
be allowed to use information gathered from her file.
Not that I believe you care, but there are children in this
matter and [maybe] [Recalde] cares.’ ”
On the basis of the foregoing, the reviewing commit-
tee found that the respondent violated the following
Rules of Professional Conduct: rules 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4
(a) (2), (3) and (4), in that the respondent displayed a
lack of competence and diligence, the respondent failed
to consult with Recalde, failed to keep her reasonably
informed, and failed to promptly comply with reason-
able requests for information; rule 1.5 (a), in that her
fee was unreasonable given the lack of results; and rule
1.15 (e), in that she failed to provide an accounting of
her fees. The reviewing committee further found that
the respondent’s actions in failing to respond to this
grievance complaint violated rule 8.1 (2) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct and Practice Book § 2-32.
At the direction of the reviewing committee, the peti-
tioner thereafter amended the presentment to include
the foregoing findings of misconduct.
The third grievance underlying this presentment action
was filed by Attorney Edward Nusbaum on November
20, 2020. “[Nusbaum] originally served as counsel for
the defendant [mother] in a divorce and custody action
[(divorce action)] filed in . . . Bridgeport . . . . On August
27, 2020, the respondent filed an appearance in lieu
of [Nusbaum] to represent the defendant. . . . In the
[divorce] action, two orders had been entered regard-
ing custody and visitation, dated June 10 . . . [and] 24,
2020 . . . . On December 1, 2020, the respondent’s cli-
ent filed an application for relief from abuse in the New
Haven Superior Court . . . . Although the application
for relief [from abuse] referenced the docket number
of the [divorce] action, the application did not disclose
the existing custody orders from the [divorce] action.
Furthermore, the affidavit of the respondent’s client
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

which had been attached to the application for relief
[from abuse] stated that the respondent’s client had not
been involved as a party in a Connecticut case concerning
the custody or visitation and did not know of other civil
cases in Connecticut that could affect the [application
for relief from abuse]. The respondent took her client’s
acknowledgement on the affidavit and participated in
the preparation and filing of the application. The New
Haven Superior Court granted an ex parte restraining
order on December 1, 2020. That same day, December 1,
2020, the [plaintiff father] filed an emergency motion to
vacate the restraining order. On December 2, 2020, the
court . . . held a hearing on the matter and vacated the
restraining order. In its order, the court noted that, if
it had been aware of the orders in the [divorce] action, it
would not have granted the restraining order.
“The respondent did not file a written response to the
grievance complaint.”
On the basis of the foregoing, the reviewing commit-
tee found that the respondent violated the following
Rules of Professional Conduct: rule 3.3 (a) (1), in that
the respondent made a knowingly false statement to a
tribunal; rule 3.3 (a) (2), in that the respondent failed
to inform the tribunal of legal authority known to her
to be directly adverse to the position of her client; rule
3.3 (a) (3), in that the respondent offered evidence that
she knew to be false; rule 3.3 (b), in that the respondent
knew that her client was engaging in fraudulent conduct
by failing to disclose the orders that had been entered in
the divorce action but failed to take reasonable remedial
measures; rule 3.3 (d), in that the respondent failed
to inform the court in an ex parte proceeding of all of
the material facts known to her to make an informed
decision; rule 3.4 (2), in that the respondent engaged
in the falsification of evidence or counselling or assist-
ing her client to testify falsely; rule 8.4 (3), in that the
respondent engaged in conduct constituting dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; and rule 8.4 (4), in
that the respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

the administration of justice. The reviewing committee
further found that the respondent violated rule 8.1 (2)
of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice Book
§ 2-32 by failing to respond to this grievance complaint
and failing to establish good cause for failing to respond.
At the direction of the reviewing committee, the peti-
tioner thereafter amended the presentment to include
the foregoing findings of misconduct.5
The court, Abrams, J., held a hearing on the present-
ment, at which Cousineau, Recalde, Nusbaum, and the
respondent testified, and both the petitioner and the
respondent introduced into evidence several exhibits for
the court’s consideration. Following the filing of posttrial
briefs by the petitioner and the respondent, the court
filed a memorandum of decision on October 10, 2024,
wherein it found in favor of the respondent as to certain
of the reviewing committee’s findings of misconduct
but affirmed the remaining findings of misconduct. The
court addressed separately each of the three grievances
as follows.
The court first addressed the grievance filed by
Cousineau. As to the respondent’s assertions, set forth
in an email to the caseflow coordinator, that Cousineau
was engaging in conduct that was “against the law,” the
court explained: “Even if there were a shred of eviden-
tiary basis for [the respondent’s] claim [that Cousineau
engaged in a conspiracy that constituted a RICO viola-
tion by conspiring with another attorney to request a
status conference with the court in order to increase
their legal bills], which there is not, even a first year
law student would recognize that under no conceivable
circumstances would RICO apply to a request of a status
conference in a state court family case. The respondent’s
5
Nusbaum also alleged that the respondent violated the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct during a dispute relating to the proceeds from the
sale of the marital home in the divorce action. The reviewing committee
agreed, but the court disagreed and found in favor of the respondent on
those allegations of misconduct. The court’s judgment in this regard
has not been challenged by the petitioner on appeal.
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

leveling of such an accusation was reckless at best and
the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
the respondent recognized that the allegation was false,
both that Cousineau requested the status conference to
make more money and the fact that it constituted a RICO
violation, at the time she made it. As a result, the court
enters judgment against the respondent on the allega-
tions [that she violated rules 4.4 (a), 3.4 (7) and 8.4 (4)
of the Rules of Professional Conduct].”
The court held, however, that the respondent’s testi-
mony at the grievance hearing was entitled to the abso-
lute immunity afforded by the litigation privilege for
her testimony at the grievance proceeding. The court
reasoned, inter alia, that, “[i]f attorneys testifying in
grievance hearings do so with the fear that their testi-
mony will subject them to additional grievance claims,
they may be inhibited from speaking freely.” The court
therefore found in favor of the respondent as to the
statements that she made during her testimony at the
grievance hearing.
In sum, as to the grievance filed by Cousineau, the
court found by clear and convincing evidence that the
respondent violated rules 4.4 (a), 3.4 (7) and 8.4 (4) of
the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The court next addressed the grievance filed by Recalde.
The court explained: “All of the claims in this present-
ment involve the respondent refusing to communicate
and/or cooperate with someone, be it [Recalde], her sub-
sequent attorney, or the grievance authorities. To the
extremely limited extent the respondent was willing to
recognize these failures during her testimony before this
court, she attributed them to . . . the pressures of work.
Experience tells us that the pressures of life challenge
many people, lawyers included, and can often interfere
with one’s ability to meet professional responsibilities.
It is at that precise point where lawyers are under an
obligation to communicate candidly with those affected
by their inability to meet their obligations. However,
the record reveals that the respondent did the exact
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

opposite; when she became overwhelmed, she refused to
communicate, ignoring the needs of others. In addition,
the statements made by the respondent in her email to
the disciplinary counsel clearly constitute an attempt
by the respondent to intimidate both the disciplinary
counsel and [Recalde] to abandon the matter.
“As relates to the respondent’s failure to provide an
accounting of [Recalde’s] retainer, the commentary to
rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides
that ‘[a] lawyer should hold property of others with the
care required of a professional fiduciary. . . .’ Subsec-
tion (b) of rule 1.15 requires a lawyer to keep ‘[c]omplete
records of such account funds. . . .’ The respondent failed
to do so in regard to the retainer provided to her by
[Recalde].
“As relates to this grievance [filed by Recalde] and
based on the foregoing, the court finds against the
respondent on each and every element of this present-
ment by clear and convincing evidence and finds that the
respondent violated the following Rules of Professional
Conduct: 1.1, 1.3, 1.4 (a) (2), 1.4 (a) (3), 1.1 (a) (4), 1.5
(a), 1.15 (a), 8.1 (2), and 8.4 (4). The court also finds that
the respondent violated [Practice Book] § 2-32 (a) (1) . . .
and that, while the respondent did perform some work
on [Recalde’s] behalf, she did not earn the entire $5000
and is ordered to return $3500 to [Recalde].”
The court finally addressed the grievance filed by Nus-
baum. As to the claim related to the filing of a false affi-
davit, the court explained: “There is really no defense to
the respondent’s preparation and filing of the application
for relief from abuse and the accompanying affidavit
that falsely claimed that there were no pending actions
or current orders in effect. She claims that the pending
action was listed in the application but does not really
have any answer to the question of why the affidavit does
not list the action or orders in effect for the benefit of
the judge, as it is clearly designed to do. As a result, the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

that relate to the false affidavit, with the exception of
rule 3.3 (a) (2), which the court reads as applying to the
failure of an attorney to bring relevant legal authority
to the court’s attention. In this case, the respondent’s
actions relate to a failure to bring facts to the court’s
attention rather than legal authority.”
As to the claims relating to the respondent’s failure
to respond to the grievance, the court found that “[t]he
record clearly demonstrates that the respondent failed to
respond to this grievance and, as a result, is in violation
of rule 8.1 (2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and
[Practice Book] § 2-32 . . . .
“Based on the foregoing, as relates to this grievance
[filed by Nusbaum], the court finds by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the respondent violated the following
Rules of Professional Conduct: 3.3 (a) (1), 3.3 (a) (3),
3.3 (b), 3.3 (d), 3.4 (2), 8.1 (2), and 8.4 (3). The court
also finds that the respondent violated [Practice Book]
§ 2-32 (a) (1) . . . .”
The court then considered the proper remedy for the
foregoing violations6 and imposed, inter alia, a total of
two and one-half years of suspension from the practice of
law for the three grievances “to commence immediately
upon the conclusion of the respondent’s disbarment
period.”7
The petitioner thereafter filed a motion to reargue
or for reconsideration of the court’s application of the
litigation privilege to the statements made by the respon-
dent during the proceedings on the grievance filed by
6
The respondent had been disbarred by the Superior Court on Janu-
ary 25, 2022.
7
The court reasoned: “[T]he court is left to conclude that the respondent
violated a myriad of duties, that a great deal of her behavior does not
evidence a healthy mental state, and, at least in the case of [Recalde], that
there was the potential for serious injury. As relates to the aggravating
factors, almost all of them exist in this case, with the possible exception
that most of the issues do not appear to be based on a dishonest or selfish
motive on the part of the respondent. In the court’s opinion, the most
prominent aggravating factor is the respondent’s disciplinary history,
particularly her current disbarment. As relates to mitigating factors,
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

Cousineau. The petitioner argued that, although the liti-
gation privilege affords immunity for statements made
during grievance proceedings, that immunity applies
only to retaliatory lawsuits, not disciplinary proceed-
ings stemming from misconduct that takes place during
those proceedings.8
On November 22, 2024, the court filed a memorandum
of decision wherein it denied the petitioner’s motion,
reasoning that there is no precedent that would sup-
port the petitioner’s alleged limitation of the immunity
afforded by the litigation privilege to the filing of a griev-
ance for misconduct during a grievance proceeding. The
court explained: “The fact that statements made by an
attorney in a grievance hearing are absolutely privileged
in every forum except a subsequent grievance hearing
strikes the court as antithetical to the principles of due
process, potentially trapping attorneys in an endless
vortex of disciplinary action.” This appeal and cross
appeal followed.
I
We first address the petitioner’s claim on appeal that
the court erred in concluding that the litigation privilege
precluded the filing of a grievance on the basis of the
respondent’s testimony during a grievance hearing. The
petitioner argues that, although the litigation privilege
applies to misconduct allegedly committed during griev-
ance proceedings, it does not afford immunity from
further disciplinary proceedings stemming from that
misconduct. We agree.
The question of “[w]hether absolute immunity applies
to the cause of action at issue is a question of law subject
the court is willing to concede that the respondent has not demonstrated
a pattern of dishonesty, at least as it regards money.
“On the whole, the court considers it a serious question whether the
respondent should ever be allowed to practice law again, but that issue
is not before the court. Rather, it will be an issue for the reinstatement
panel should the respondent apply for reinstatement at the conclusion
of her suspension period.” (Footnote omitted.)
8
The respondent did not file an objection to the petitioner’s motion
to reargue.
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

to de novo review.” Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1, 9, 266
A.3d 127 (2021). “[U]nder the litigation privilege, [a]n
attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defam-
atory matter concerning another in communications
preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the
institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judi-
cial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it
has some relation to the proceeding.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id. “The purpose of affording absolute
immunity to those who provide information in connec-
tion with judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings is that
in certain situations the public interest in having people
speak freely outweighs the risk that individuals will occa-
sionally abuse the privilege by making false and malicious
statements.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 10.
Our Supreme Court has explained, however, “that there
are limits to the application of the litigation privilege to
attorney conduct and communications. . . . Specifically,
attorneys are not protected by absolute immunity against
claims for abuse of process, vexatious litigation, or mali-
cious prosecution. . . . This is because whether and what
form of immunity applies in any given case is a matter of
policy that requires a balancing of interests . . . .” (Cita-
tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
This court has held that the litigation privilege extends
absolute immunity to statements made to the attorney
disciplinary authority by an attorney who is the subject
of a grievance complaint. Cohen v. King, 189 Conn. App.
85, 90–91, 206 A.3d 188 (2019), cert. denied, 336 Conn.
925, 246 A.3d 986 (2021).
“[T]he privilege protects access to the courts inasmuch
as retaliatory lawsuits [that might] cause the removal
of [an] adversary’s counsel would compromise the judi-
cial process, and there exist other remedies, such as the
court’s contempt powers and other disciplinary proceed-
ings, to deter attorney misconduct.” (Emphasis added;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Scholz v. Epstein,
supra, 341 Conn. 10. In discussing those other rem-
edies that are available when an attorney is alleged to
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

have engaged in misconduct in the context of a judicial
or quasi-judicial proceeding, our Supreme Court has
explained: “[S]afeguards other than civil liability exist
to deter or preclude attorney misconduct or to provide
relief from that misconduct. A dissatisfied litigant may
file a motion to open the judgment . . . or may seek relief
by filing a grievance against the offending attorney under
the Rules of Professional Conduct, which may result in
sanctions such as disbarment. . . . Additionally, [j]udges
of the Superior Court possess the inherent authority to
regulate attorney conduct and to discipline members
of the bar. . . . In exercising their inherent supervisory
authority, the judges have authorized grievance panels
and reviewing committees to investigate allegations of
attorney misconduct and to make determinations of prob-
able cause. . . . Further, the judges have empowered the
statewide grievance committee to file presentments in
Superior Court seeking judicial sanctions against those
claimed to be guilty of misconduct. . . . In carrying out
these responsibilities, these bodies act as an arm of the
court. . . . The range of sanctions available to the court
include those set forth in Practice Book §§ 2-37 and 2-44,
and General Statutes § 51-84, including fines, suspen-
sion and disbarment. Courts also may dismiss a case or
impose lesser sanctions for perjury or contempt. . . .
Accordingly, a formidable array of penalties, including
referrals to the [S]tatewide [G]rievance [C]ommittee for
investigation into alleged misconduct, is available to
courts and dissatisfied litigants who seek redress in con-
nection with an attorney’s fraudulent conduct. Indeed,
we not only encourage trial courts to use these tools to
protect the integrity of the judicial system but expect
them to do so in appropriate circumstances.” (Citations
omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 552–54,
69 A.3d 880 (2013).
On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear that, although
the litigation privilege applies to statements made dur-
ing grievance proceedings, the immunity afforded by the
litigation privilege extends only to certain retaliatory
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

lawsuits, and it does not shield an attorney who is alleged
to have engaged in professional misconduct from further
discipline. This conclusion is supported by the principle
that “[a]n attorney as an officer of the court in the admin-
istration of justice, is continually accountable to it for
the manner in which he exercises the privilege which has
been accorded him. His admission is upon the implied
condition that his continued enjoyment of the right
conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe
person to exercise it, so that when he, by misconduct in
any capacity, discloses that he has become or is an unfit
or unsafe person to be entrusted with the responsibili-
ties and obligations of an attorney, his right to continue
in the enjoyment of his professional privilege may and
ought to be declared forfeited.” (Emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Office of Chief Dis-
ciplinary Counsel v. Vena, 236 Conn. App. 39, 50, 347
A.3d 945 (2025).
Accordingly, the respondent’s testimony at the griev-
ance hearing wherein she accused Cousineau of, inter
alia, conspiring with others to withhold information
from the court was protected by the litigation privilege
in that she was immune from any retaliatory lawsuit by
Cousineau on the basis of that accusation, but the litiga-
tion privilege did not shield her from further disciplinary
proceedings based on those allegedly baseless accusations.
The respondent has not provided any authority, nor are
we aware of any, that supports a contrary conclusion.
We therefore agree with the petitioner that the court
improperly determined that the respondent was immune
from disciplinary proceedings for her alleged misconduct
at the grievance hearing.
II
We next address the respondent’s claim on cross appeal
that the court’s findings of misconduct, stemming from
the factual findings of the reviewing committee, were not
factually and legally supported. “Factual findings of the
reviewing committee are reviewed under the clearly erro-
neous standard. Although the [S]tatewide [G]rievance
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

[C]ommittee is not an administrative agency . . . the
court’s review of its conclusions is similar to the review
afforded to an administrative agency decision. . . . The
burden is on the [S]tatewide [G]rievance [C]ommittee to
establish the occurrence of an ethics violation by clear
and convincing proof. . . . Upon appeal, the court shall
not substitute its judgment for that of the Statewide
Grievance Committee or reviewing committee as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court
shall affirm the decision of the committee unless the court
finds that substantial rights of the respondent have been
prejudiced because the committee’s findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions are . . . (5) clearly erroneous in
view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record . . . . [W]hen we are required to inter-
pret the Rules of Professional Conduct, our review is
plenary, and the rules of statutory interpretation apply.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Cohen v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 339 Conn.
503, 520–21, 261 A.3d 722 (2021).
“The trial court’s findings are binding upon this court
unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence
and the pleadings in the record as a whole. . . . We cannot
retry the facts or pass on the credibility of the witnesses.
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no
evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Disciplinary Counsel v. Parnoff,
158 Conn. App. 454, 474, 119 A.3d 621 (2015), aff’d, 324
Conn. 505, 152 A.3d 1222 (2016). With these principles
in mind, we review each of the respondent’s challenges
to the trial court’s findings of misconduct in turn.
A
As to the grievance filed by Cousineau, the respondent
first claims that the court’s findings that she violated
rules 4.4 (a) and 3.4 (7) of the Rules of Professional
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

Conduct are not legally supported based on the clear
and unambiguous language of those rules.9 We disagree.
The respondent first challenges the finding that she
violated rule 4.4 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
which provides in relevant part: “In representing a client,
a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial
purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
person . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The respondent argues
that her testimony at the grievance hearing could not
constitute a violation of rule 4.4 (a) because she was not,
at that time, representing a client.10 In so arguing, the
respondent ignores the alleged conduct that gave rise to
Cousineau’s grievance, namely, the accusation contained
in the email to the caseflow coordinator that Cousineau
was engaging in conduct that was “against the law.” It
cannot be disputed that that accusation was asserted
while the respondent was representing a client. Although
the reviewing committee and the court recounted the
respondent’s explanation of that accusation, which she
provided during the grievance hearing, that does not
alter the fact that the grievance, and thus the finding
of misconduct, stemmed from the accusation contained
in the email to the caseflow coordinator asserted by the
respondent while she was representing a client.
The respondent also challenges the court’s determina-
tion that she violated rule 3.4 (7) of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not
9
Although the respondent also challenges on that same basis the court’s
finding that she violated rule 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct, the respondent has failed to brief this claim. We therefore deem
it abandoned. See Hudson City Savings Bank v. Hellman, 234 Conn.
App. 45, 72 n.16, 343 A.3d 781 (“Analysis, rather than mere abstract
assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure
to brief the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the state-
ment of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief
without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed
to be abandoned.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied,
353 Conn. 920, 345 A.3d 809 (2025).
10
We note that this is the sole basis of the respondent’s challenge to
the finding that she violated rule 4.4 (a) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

. . . [p]resent, participate in presenting, or threaten to
present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage
in a civil matter.” (Emphasis added.) The respondent
argues that her allegation that Cousineau had engaged
in conduct in violation of the RICO Act was asserted
in her testimony at the grievance committee, which is
not a “civil matter” and, therefore, rule 3.4 (7) does not
apply. Again, the respondent’s argument is misplaced in
that her testimony at the grievance hearing was simply
an explanation of the basis for the accusation contained
in the email that she sent to the caseflow coordinator in
the underlying family case, which is a civil matter. The
respondent’s argument therefore is unavailing.
B
The respondent next challenges the court’s findings
of misconduct stemming from the grievance filed by
Recalde. The respondent claims that the court’s findings
that she violated rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4 (a) (2), (3) and (4),
and 1.5 (a)11 of the Rules of Professional Conduct were
not factually or legally supported. We are not persuaded.
As to the court’s findings that the respondent violated
rules 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4 (a) (2), (3) and (4) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, which, generally, require that a
lawyer provide a client with competent representation,
act with reasonable diligence and promptness, and effec-
tively communicate with his or her clients, the respondent
essentially asks this court to retry the evidence and find
facts favorable to her. It is axiomatic that “[a]ppellate
courts do not examine the record to determine whether
the trier of fact could have reached a different conclu-
sion. Instead, we examine the trial court’s conclusion
in order to determine whether it was legally correct and
11
Although the respondent also lists the court’s finding of the vio-
lation of 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct as error, she
does not provide any argument or analysis pertaining to this rule. We
therefore deem this claim abandoned. See Hudson City Savings Bank v.
Hellman, 234 Conn. App. 45, 72 n.16, 343 A.3d 781, cert. denied, 353
Conn. 920, 345 A.3d 809 (2025). The respondent does not challenge the
finding that she violated Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (1) by not responding
to the grievance.
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

factually supported. . . . This distinction accords with
our duty as an appellate tribunal to review, and not to
retry, the proceedings of the trial court.” (Citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) First National
Bank of Litchfield v. Miller, 285 Conn. 294, 302–303,
939 A.2d 572 (2008). We have reviewed the record and
the arguments of the parties and conclude that the find-
ings that the respondent violated rules 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4
(a) (2), (3) and (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct
are supported by the evidence in this case.
The respondent also challenges the finding that she
violated rule 1.5 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
which provides in relevant part: “A lawyer shall not make
an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable
fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. . . .” Rule
1.5 (a) also enumerates eight factors to be considered
in determining the reasonableness of a fee.12 “The com-
mentary to rule 1.5 provides [however] that the factors
specified in the rule . . . are not exclusive, and not all may
be relevant given a particular instance. . . . [As] [w]e have
explained [previously] courts . . . may rely on their gen-
eral knowledge of what has occurred at the proceedings
before them to supply evidence in support of an award of
attorney’s fees.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Francini v. Riggione, 193 Conn. App.
321, 330–31, 219 A.3d 452 (2019).
The respondent argues that, in ordering her to return
$3500 of the $5000 retainer that Recalde paid to her, the
court “essentially entered a conclusion that [her] fees
12
Rule 1.5 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant
part: “The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness
of a fee include the following:
“(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;
“(2) The likelihood, if made known to the client, that the acceptance of
the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
“(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services;
“(4) The amount involved and the results obtained;
“(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

were unreasonable” but that “[t]here was no evidence
offered to allow the court to consider [the enumerated
factors] set forth in [rule] 1.5 (a)” of the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct. She asserts that “[t]he only factor
the court could have partially considered based on the
evidence was factor (4) based on the $5000 retainer paid,
the fee agreement setting the hourly rate at $375 an
hour, and the results obtained . . . .”13 She contends
that “[t]here was no evidence offered concerning the
reasonable value of the services provided to support the
court’s finding that the undersigned was only entitled
to $1500.” We disagree.
It is clear from the court’s decision that the respon-
dent’s efforts in representing Recalde were minimal in
that she never filed any motions on Recalde’s behalf,
despite numerous requests that she do so, and was rarely
responsive to Recalde’s communications to her. The court
nevertheless awarded the respondent $1500 for her mini-
mal efforts. Although the court did not expressly refer
to the factors enumerated in rule 1.5 (a) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, it was not required to consider
every factor because, as noted previously, not every fac-
tor is relevant in every case. The court properly relied on
its general knowledge of what occurred throughout the
respondent’s representation of Recalde and determined
that the respondent was entitled to be compensated for
four hours of labor at the hourly rate of $375. On the
basis of the record before us, we conclude that the court
did not abuse its discretion in ordering the respondent to
return the unearned portion of the retainer to Recalde.
“(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client;
“(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
“(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.”
13
The respondent argues that the results obtained “included assis-
tance with mediation, protection from a subpoena, the moving party
withdrawal of a motion for contempt, assistance with the Department
of Children and Families, assistance with educational issues, and pre-
paring an application for emergency ex parte custody.”
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

C
Finally, the respondent claims that the court erred
in finding that she violated the Rules of Professional
Conduct in her representation of Nusbaum. We disagree.
First, the respondent challenges the findings that
she violated rules 3.3 (a) (1) and (3), (b) and (d) and 3.4
(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct when she did
not disclose, on the affidavit concerning children that
accompanied the application for relief from abuse, that
there was a pending divorce action or that orders affect-
ing the children had been entered in that action. The
respondent argues that “the statement of facts contained
in the application for relief from abuse provided detailed
information about the parties’ pending divorce action to
ensure [that] the court had all the necessary information
before it when considering whether to grant or deny the
ex parte relief requested.” The respondent asserts: “The
[application for relief from abuse] contained all [of] the
accurate information from the divorce, including the title
of the case, the jurisdiction where the case was pending,
the docket number for the divorce and the accurate infor-
mation concerning where and with who[m] the children
[resided]. The affidavit was filed with the application for
relief from abuse, and the third page of the application
under the section for the ‘statement of conditions for
which you seek relief’ specifically identified within the
first two lines that [the parties were] going through a
divorce that involved the custody and parenting access
of the minor children, provided the judicial district and
the docket number. The statement also provided infor-
mation as to the current status of the proceedings and
provided the date for the next hearing.”
Although the record supports the respondent’s reci-
tation of the contents of the application for relief from
abuse, her argument falls short in that she failed to dis-
close in any of her filings that there were orders issued
in the divorce proceedings related to the custody of the
children. Two orders had been issued in the divorce
action relating to the custody of the children in that
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

the father was awarded sole legal and physical custody
of the children and the mother’s access had been “limited
to therapeutic and/or supervised access” to the children.
Neither the existence nor the substance of those orders
is referenced in the application for relief from abuse or
the accompanying affidavit concerning the children.
We therefore agree with the reviewing committee that
the respondent’s conduct “constituted a lack of candor
toward the tribunal by failing to disclose information
about the custody and visitation orders in a pending
Bridgeport action” in violation of rules 3.3 (a) (1) and
(3), (b) and (d), 3.4 (2) and 8.4 (3) of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.14
The respondent also argues that the court’s findings
that she violated rule 8.1 (2) of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct and Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (1) by failing
to respond to the grievance filed against her “violates
the governor’s emergency executive COVID-19 orders
suspending time frame limitations.” The respondent
admits that she did not respond to Nusbaum’s griev-
ance against her, but that she did not do so because she
believed that the time limitations for responding to the
filing of a grievance were suspended by the governor’s
“emergency COVID-19 executive orders.” Specifically,
the respondent argues: “The evidence offered to the
trial court cannot establish that the [respondent] ‘know-
ingly’ failed to respond to the grievance complaint when
the evidence before the court was that the [respondent]
didn’t respond based on the belief that the then exist-
ing emergency COVID-19 executive orders suspended
the attorney disciplinary proceedings and time frame
requirements.” As the petitioner aptly notes, there was
no such evidence presented to the trial court. Indeed, the
respondent conceded during her testimony at the present-
ment hearing that she “absolutely did receive” a letter
from the Statewide Grievance Committee indicating
that she was required to respond to the grievance within
14
The respondent has not challenged the finding that she violated
rule 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct in that she engaged in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunha

thirty days and she and her staff attempted to contact
the committee to request additional time to respond. She
testified that she called the committee and left a message,
in which she “would have said something like, I know
my time frame is coming up on the original letter. I’m
backed up in my office. I’m having some health issues.
I—I think I would have said I want to discuss, you know,
whether or not I need to seek additional time.” Also at
the presentment hearing, in response to the petitioner’s
question of whether the respondent filed an answer to the
grievance, the respondent answered: “No, this grievance
complaint came in when I was home sick with COVID . . . .”
On the basis of the respondent’s testimony at the pre-
sentment hearing, she seems to have abandoned her con-
tention that the emergency executive orders suspended
disciplinary hearings. Even if she has not, we need not
address the substance of the emergency executive orders
because, even if the time to respond to a grievance com-
plaint had been suspended, any such suspension was
not indefinite. The record reflects that the grievance
hearing in this matter was held on March 1, 2023, more
than two years after the grievance was filed, at which
time the respondent still had not filed a response to the
grievance. We therefore conclude that the court did not
err in finding that the respondent violated rule 8.1 (2)
of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice Book
§ 2-32 (a) (1) by failing to respond to the grievance filed
against her.
The judgment is reversed only as to the determina-
tion that certain allegations of the first count of the
presentment are entitled to absolute immunity under
the litigation privilege and the case is remanded for
consideration of those allegations on the merits; the
judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.